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ABSTRACT 
This doctoral thesis aims to explore the underlying rationale of the (by modern 
standards) wide use of character evidence in the courts of classical Athens. 
Linking divergent areas of social sciences such as law, history, psychology and 
social anthropology, this interdisciplinary quest examines under a socio-political 
prism the question of legal relevance in Athenian forensic rhetoric. Specifically, I 
am concerned with an in-depth analysis of the surviving court speeches placed 
in their context in order to reveal the function of the Athenian courts and the 
fundamental nature of Athenian law. 
  
I explore the utmost aims of the first democratic system of justice and give a 
verdict as to its orientation towards the attainment of key notions such as the 
rule of law, equity and fairness, or social stability through utilitarian dispute 
resolution. My claim is that, although ancient and modern definitions of such 
ideals are in essence incomparable, the Athenians achieved the rule of law in 
their own terms through the strict application of legal justice in their courts. In 
such a legal system, no ‘aberrations’ or irrelevant ‘extra-legal’ arguments may 
carry significant weight. 
 
Central for my argument is the homogeneous approach to (legal and quasi-
legal) argumentation from Homer to the orators, in a period covering more than 
four centuries. Close analysis of the dispute-resolution passages in ancient 
Greek literature exposes the striking similarities with the rhetoric of litigants in 
the Athenian courts. Therefore, instead of isolating (in time and space) the 
sphere of the Athenian courts of the mid-5th to the late-4th centuries, my holistic 
approach discloses the need for an all-embracing interpretation of the wide use 
of character evidence in every aspect of argumentation. I argue that the 
explanation for this practice is to be found (on a subjective level) in the Greek 
ideas of ‘character’ and ‘personality’, the inductive method of reasoning, and (on 
an objective level) in the social, political and institutional structures of the 
ancient Greek polis. Thus, a new exegesis to the question of legal relevance for 
the Greeks emerges. 
 
τὸ γὰρ μετὰ πολλῶν παραδειγμάτων διδάσκειν ῥᾳδίαν ὑμῖν τὴν κρίσιν καθίστησι 
(Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 124) 
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FOREWORD 
 
A PhD is a demanding and challenging undertaking. It is a multidimensional 
educating process that tests personality, skills, determination; it also assesses 
human relationships. It demands composure, adaptability, clear and productive 
thinking focused on straightforward objectives, and definitely a bunch of people 
for support and encouragement; togetherness. The current project begun in the 
midst (and partly because) of a severe multilevel crisis; this calamity is equally 
educative. Though principally economic, it has also proved its capacity to test all 
the aforementioned. The agent’s personal stance is uniform regardless of the 
context, and is revealed in respect to the PhD as well as in respect to the 
everyday challenges and vice versa. I guess this is why this stance is called 
‘personal’; not a particularly impressive inference, but it is drawn from 
comparison and experience.  
 
The extreme focus required for a PhD assists in the comprehension of the value 
of general perspective and open-mindedness in the real world. The primary 
lesson I learned in the process (both as a PhD student and as a Greek in times 
of crisis) is that nothing is so bad that it can’t get worse. Hence, it still has some 
good in it which must be discovered and appreciated; it ‘must’ because this is 
certainly much better than not discovering and not appreciating it. Also, keeping 
this stance of realistic optimism is useful. It helps to believe that no dead ends 
exist; at least until the opposite is proved. It also helps because it instils distrust 
when something is presented as a dead end that allows for ‘one and only’ 
solution. After all, it is stimulating to pave a new way and any assistance in that 
direction is valued. Nonetheless, I discovered that many people are prone to get 
trapped in dead ends in politics or personal life. Actually, maybe there are some 
that copiously work for it:  
 
Faust: The mob streams up to Satan's throne; I'd learn things there I've never known... 
Mephistopheles: The whole mob streams and strives uphill: One thinks one's pushing and one's 
pushed against one's will.  
 
[7] 
 
Having advanced these preliminary considerations, I chose to endorse them 
and integrate them to my personality. For argument’s sake, deliberately and 
without much effort I applied them to this work. Escaping from my typical doubt 
(considering it inappropriate on this occasion) about ‘one and only’ solutions, I 
treated other scholars’ opinions with the greatest respect and, I hope, justice. I 
retained and implemented the idea that when confronted with choosing one way 
or another, a third is possible. Yet I deliberately relied on the findings of many 
great works available in international bibliography; I refer to them as long as 
they advance or corroborate my study. High tone polemics are avoided since 
again, such an approach is better than her opposite. I still believe, as I will prove 
the Greeks did, in the unity of character and its imprint on a person’s acts in 
diverse fields. I also believe in its changeable nature; hopefully the twofold 
challenge of my life improved my skills as an academic and made me a better 
man. Both need to be proved. 
 
I may now proceed to the hardest but most pleasant task: to communicate to 
the people that supported me the magnitude of appreciation they deserve. This 
thesis has been originated, developed and written at the University of Exeter. 
During these years, I had the luck to witness its wide-scale development and 
improvement. Keeping in line with my characteristic method of reasoning, I 
could not avoid mentioning these structural positive influences and their 
similarities to my position; like my university, I also aimed at progress and I had 
a thesis to ‘construct’. Still, ἄνδρες γὰρ πόλις so many thanks are owed to the 
University staff. Special appreciations go to the Departments of Law and 
Classics, and to the great people that constitute them.  I would like to thank, in 
particular, my two supervisors Anthony Musson and Richard Seaford. Anthony 
offered me tireless help and support from the very first to the very last stages of 
my dissertation. Being a great scholar, agreeable and calm in testing moments, 
he provided the necessary balance to reach the destination. Richard has been 
my mentor in all respects. Always responsive to my ideas, he wholeheartedly 
helped me in shaping both my academic and my private mentality. Purposely or 
not, he is a μυσταγωγός. 
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I would also like to thank the many notable scholars who unreservedly provided 
their assistance in different ways and at different times. Lynette Mitchell stood 
by me from the very beginning as a tutor and a friend. Jenny McEwan granted 
intellectual support and guidance in hard technical issues of my thesis. 
Christopher Gill, apart from providing the spark through his work, had the 
courtesy to read, comment and deliberate on parts of my thesis. Edward Harris 
partly inspired and influenced the subject of this work through our 
correspondence in the early days. I had also profited from the comments of 
Michael Gagarin who read and commented on this thesis, as well as from the 
stimulating discussion I had with William Fortenbaugh. Special thanks to 
Christopher Carey who, as the external examiner, suggested remarkably useful 
and apposite amendments. To all of them I direct my genuine esteem as 
scholars and my deep gratitude. 
  
Finally, I would like to record some more personal debts, though without 
becoming too personal. I would like to thank my Exeter friends and colleagues 
whose presence, encouragement, and liveliness made these years there 
enjoyable and productive. As another friend of mine in another setting, quoting 
a line from a movie, once said to me: “I will miss our conversations”. Equal 
thankfulness goes to those people in Greece who saw me off and welcomed me 
back as a φίλος. They certainly understood and excused the weakness of my 
situation: nothing is worth as much as a discussion while wandering the alleys 
of Thiseion and Plaka under the shadow of the Acropolis. Enormous 
indebtedness goes to the man who taught me to appreciate the splendour of 
Hellas, my δάσκαλος Alexandros Tsoumbas: Χαῖρε. My final acknowledgment 
goes to my family in Nikaia with the hope that they will not get offended for 
leaving them last. I am sure that my brother, Nikolaos, will not bear any grudges 
(as he has proved so many times in the past) and he will assist me in giving an 
acceptable justification to our parents, Efstathios and Despoina. After all, apart 
from keeping for them this honouring position, this work is dedicated to them 
with much love. Without their affection and support nothing could happen. 
  
Ευχαριστώ. 
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NOTES ON CONVENTIONS 
1. Ancient authors 
In the footnotes I abbreviate names and works of ancient authors as in Liddell 
H.G. & Scott R. (eds.), Greek-English Lexicon (1st ed. 1843), Oxford: Clarendon 
Press (1996), and in Glare P.G.W. (ed.), Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1982). 
 
I have used Greek texts from the Perseus Digital Library, accessible online via 
the http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/. I have italicised the Greek text and 
the translation in words or phrases that I consider of special importance. At 
times, in quoting Greek or Latin texts, I choose to omit certain sentences or 
parenthetical expressions: this will be indicated with the sign ‘[…]’.  
 
I have used published translations of Greek texts, usually modified by me, for 
the following works: 
 
HOMER: 
Murray A.T. (ed.) (1924), The Iliad Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 
- (1919), The Odyssey, Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann, Ltd. 
HOMERIC HYMNS: 
Evelyn-White H.G. (ed.) (1914), The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, 
Cambridge, MA.; Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann 
Ltd. 
 
ARISTOTLE: 
Rackham H. (ed.) (1934), ‘The Nicomachean Ethics’, in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, 
Vol. 19, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William 
Heinemann Ltd. 
- (1944), ‘The Politics’, in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
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- (1952), ‘The Athenian Constitution’, in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 20, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
Freese J.H. (ed.) (1926), ‘The Rhetoric’, in Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 22, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
 
PLATO: 
Shorey P. (1969), ‘The Republic’, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
Lee D. (2003), The Republic (first edition 1955), Penguin Books Ltd. 
Lamb W.R.M (1955), ‘Alcibiades 1, Alcibiades 2, Hipparchus, Lovers, Theages, 
Charmides, Laches, Lysis’, in Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 8 Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
- (1967), ‘Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno’, in Plato in Twelve 
Volumes, Vol. 3, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, 
William Heinemann Ltd. 
Fowler H.N. (1955), ‘Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo’, in Plato in Twelve 
Volumes, Vol. 1, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, 
William Heinemann Ltd. 
- (1925), ‘Parmenides, Philebus, Symposium, Phaedrus’, in Plato in Twelve 
Volumes, Vol. 9 Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William 
Heinemann Ltd. 
ATTIC ORATORS: 
Maidment K.J. (1968), Minor Attic Orators in two volumes 1, Antiphon 
Andocides, M.A. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, 
William Heinemann Ltd. 1968. 
Gagarin M. and MacDowell D.M. (1998), Antiphon and Andocides, University of 
Texas Press. 
Carey C. (2000), Aeschines, University of Texas Press.  
Adams C.D. (1919), Aeschines, Cambridge, Harvard University Press; London, 
William Heinemann Ltd. 
Lamb W.R.M (1930), Lysias, M.A. Cambridge, Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann Ltd. 
Todd S.C. (2000), Lysias, University of Texas Press. 
[11] 
 
Vince C.A., Vince H.A. (1926), Demosthenes, M.A. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1926. 
Murray A.T. (1939), Demosthenes, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1939. 
DeWitt N.J (1949), Demosthenes, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; 
London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1939. 
Yunis H. (2005), Demosthenes, Speeches 18 and 19, University of Texas 
Press. 
Harris E.M. (2008), Demosthenes, Speeches 20-22, University of Texas Press. 
MacDowell D.M. (2004), Demosthenes, Speeches 27-38, University of Texas 
Press. 
Scafuro A.C. (2011), Demosthenes, Speeches 39-49, University of Texas 
Press. 
Bers V. (2003), Demosthenes, Speeches 50-59, University of Texas Press. 
Edwards M. (2007), Isaeus, University of Texas Press. 
Worthington I., Cooper C., Harris E.M. (2001), Dinarchus, Hyperides, and 
Lycurgus, University of Texas Press. 
Norlin G. (1980), Isocrates, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, 
William Heinemann Ltd. 
 
2. Modern works 
The following modern works are abbreviated: 
LSJ Liddell H.G., Scott R. & Jones H.S. (eds.), Greek-English Lexicon 
(1st ed. 1843), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
OED Simpson J.A. & Weiner E.S.C. (eds.), The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1st ed. 1933), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. 
DK Diels H. & Kranz W. (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 
griechische und deutsche (12th ed.), 1966. 
 
3. Legal cases and materials 
The citation of legal cases and materials follows the Oxford University Standard 
for Citation of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA). 
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ἴτω δίκα φανερός, ἴτω ξιφηφόρος 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The character of man is his fate (ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων) according to 
Heraclitus1. The word ἦθος derives from ἔθος (habit), highlighting the typical 
Greek inductive method of reasoning through which a multitude of past acts 
serves to extract a human’s true character. In apparent contradistinction, the 
word δαίμων indicates a god, a deity or divine power2. Its root meaning denotes 
“one who distributes or assigns a portion”3. Destiny and fate are perfectly 
suitable words to transmit the symbolic meaning of the word in its current use. 
Character, as designated by a person’s past acts, is responsible for his fate. 
Man himself, not any deity, controls his destiny. If this inherent interplay of the 
divergent meanings of the word δαίμων is pushed to the extreme, man through 
his character and actions creates or controls his personal δαίμων. So strong is 
the sense of individual responsibility; so decisive is human control over life. 
  
The Heraclitean δαίμων is neither the anthropomorphic deity of the poets4 nor 
the subject of the conventional religious beliefs observed as fictitious by 
Democritus, Prodicus or the theatrical Sisyphus5. It is an expression of the 
divine element that can take many forms6 and on an allegoric level symbolises 
the reconciliation of nature (natural philosophy) with the divine (religion). The 
supernatural (in the form of fate) is influenced by humans to the extent that man 
(through his character) directs his own future. Thus character is attributed 
probative value for deeds of the past and predictive value for the future. By the 
same token, character evidence breaks into the courtrooms to promote the 
implementation of justice by assisting the quest for the discovery of truth.  
 
                                            
1
 Heraclitus, fr. 114. Tr. by Kahn (2004). 
2
 LSJ s.v. ἦθος, δαίμων. 
3
 Kahn (2004), p. 261. 
4
 See Heraclitus fr. B.32. 
5
The Sisyphus fragment (DK 88B.25) was traditionally attributed to Critias, though later research 
has shown that its authorship probably belongs to Euripides. Cf. Kahn (1997). 
6
 Heraclitus fr. B.67. 
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1. The Main Question 
Character evidence was widely used in the courts of classical Athens and this 
raises significant issues as to the foundations of this practice. The central 
question that triggered this research concerns the causes and the aims of this 
wide use of character evidence in the Athenian courts. In the ancient forensic 
speeches litigants proceed to argumentation which would sometimes fail the 
test of relevance in a modern court; this has to be explained. Notwithstanding 
the fact that ancient sources mention a (legal or quasi-legal) rule of relevance7, 
namely the requirement that litigants ought to speak to the point, both parties 
proceeded to an apparently liberal use of extra-legal argumentation and (to 
modern eyes) irrelevant material8. But did the Athenians actually assess this 
material as irrelevant?  
 
Modern scholars offer differing interpretations of the apparent readiness to 
accept 'irrelevant' material in the Athenian courtrooms and have reached 
divergent conclusions as to the overall aims of the Athenian system of justice. 
These interpretations are influenced by the significance that each researcher is 
willing to afford to this extra-legal material. One stream of scholarship attributes 
great weight to it and, as a result, finds the Athenians unwilling to strictly 
enforce the law in their courts. Since the Athenians permitted quasi-legal 
evidence to influence their verdicts (as proved by the continuous presence of 
such evidence in the speeches) then the implementation of justice based on the 
strict enforcement of the letter of the law is undermined. Hence, each 
commentator questions the true role of the court and substitutes the 
enforcement of law with alternative propositions.  
 
Interpretations and proposals of this stream range from decision-making based 
on equity and fairness to achieve ad hoc and personal justice to the attainment 
of social order by channelling class feuding and socio-political contest for 
honour to an objective and acceptable non-violent arena. For instance, Cohen 
                                            
7
 Arist. Rhetoric 1354a22-3; Ath. Pol. 67.1. 
8
 By the term ‘extra-legal’ I refer to the kind of argumentation that is not directly based on or 
referring to positive law. By this token, character evidence is considered as a form of extra-legal 
argumentation, though it clearly has a legal bearing in the sense of supporting the court (and 
the litigants) as regards the probability of essential facts in order for the legal case to be 
established. 
[15] 
 
argues that the wide use of extra-legal argumentation (that would be considered 
as irrelevant in modern courts) and the invocation of notions such as patriotism 
and status or appeals to pity by litigants, support the view that the courts were 
formulated in such a way as to serve social and political ends9. Todd goes so 
far as to claim that in Athens, law and politics were ultimately 
indistinguishable10. Lanni, slightly deviating from this approach, argues that 
such a wide use of extra-legal argumentation brought about inconsistent 
verdicts by the Athenian courts, with the result that cases were knowingly 
judged in an ad hoc basis, the major aim being the attainment of equity11. 
Osborne mixes up the inherent democratic nature that the Athenians reserved 
for their system with the purpose that it served and argues that the institutional 
framework and the courts in particular aimed at the embodiment of the rule of 
the majority12. 
 
Although this stream is correct to afford noteworthy role to the wide use of 
extra-legal argumentation, they tend to underrate the commitment of the 
Athenians to the ideal of the rule of law. By this approach, rules and procedures 
that promoted the strict enforcement of the law and proved the commitment of 
the Athenians to this ideal are systematically downplayed. However, careful 
analysis of the court speeches reveals that notions such as the Heliastic oath 
weighed far more than these researchers are willing to acknowledge. 
Relevance was also respected by the requirement to speak to the point, with 
the written plaint specifying the particular charges (‘the point’) that formed the 
accusation13. Tactics such as insistence on writing and penalisation of any 
reference by litigants to non-existent or unwritten laws, have to be taken into 
account. Such rules were not accidental and they prove that far more evidence 
than subjective discovery of irrelevant argumentation is needed in order to 
question the Athenian dicasteries’ upholding of the rule of law. 
 
                                            
9
 Cohen (1995), Osborne (1985), Lanni (2006). 
10
 Todd (1993), p. 29. 
11
 See Lanni (2005), (2006); Cf. Christ (1998a), esp. pp. 41-2 and 195-6; Scafuro (1997), pp. 
50-66. 
12
 See for e.g. Osborne (1985). 
13
 Gagarin (2012). 
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The other stream of scholarship, sometimes downplaying the significance of the 
wide use of extra-legal argumentation and character evidence in particular, 
insists on the attainment of the rule of law. Researchers like Ostwald and 
Sealey, building on the institutional and procedural framework of the Athenian 
legal system, argue that the Athenians had achieved the strict application of 
law14. Another trend of the same stream approaches this question by the close 
analysis of the surviving forensic speeches. So, for instance Harris, Meyer – 
Laurin, and Meinecke argue for the prominence of the rule of law, embodied in 
a strictly legal resolution of disputes15. Harris in particular, offering a highly 
idealised picture of Athenian adjudication, led his critics to observe that he 
refers to the extra-legal argumentation as “stray comments reflecting only the 
amateurism and informality of the system”16. Nevertheless, the continuous and 
wide presence of character evidence in the delivered speeches makes it too 
obvious and noteworthy to be considered as simple aberrations to the norm of 
relevant legal argumentation. 
  
This stream is correct to maintain that the Athenians were indeed committed to 
the rule of law. Nevertheless, the presence of extra-legal argumentation needs 
somehow to be explained acknowledging its admittedly significant role in the 
speeches. Underrating what is obvious is equivalent to leaving their thesis 
vulnerable. Yes, the institutional framework, the procedures and the laws 
unequivocally aim at the attainment of the rule of law. However, this is not 
proved simply because these factors are compared against the wide presence 
of character evidence and found to prevail. The thesis is not entirely convincing 
if the factors promoting the rule of law are put into a quantitative and qualitative 
comparison against those that may inhibit it. Another explanation is needed; a 
new thesis that reconciles these ostensibly antithetical features and finds an 
underlying homogeneous approach behind the Athenian attitudes to the rule of 
law and the relaxed rules of relevance.  
 
                                            
14
 Ostwald (1986), pp. 497-525; Sealey (1987), pp. 146-8. 
15
 Meyer – Laurin (1965), Meinecke (1971), Harris (2000). 
16
 Lanni (2005), p. 113. 
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This thesis bridges the gap and proposes a solution to the dilemma between the 
above two streams of scholarship. It takes an approach that reveals the 
rationale behind the wide use of character evidence in a way that conforms with 
the deeply rooted in the Athenian conscience ideal of the rule of law. Therefore, 
this thesis belongs to the research trend which maintains that the Athenian 
courts sought to implement the idea of the rule of law as the Athenians 
perceived it, yet it offers an original approach as to the method of proving this 
point. My view stands in general agreement with Herman who points out that 
“Athenian litigants were not, as has traditionally been held, deliberately 
departing from the issue at hand...but conscientiously observing standards of 
relevance altogether different from ours”17. This thesis aims to demonstrate, by 
focusing primarily (though not exclusively) on character evidence, the relevance 
of such argumentation to the issue at hand, namely what evidence the 
Athenians perceived as relevant to a legal case, how they argued such 
evidence and, ultimately, why they perceived such argumentation as relevant. 
The innovative deployment of the Greek ideas of character and personality, as 
well as the Greek method of reasoning, and their application to the legal setting 
allow the deduction that extensive reference to character evidence was 
received by the court as relevant to the legal case and served its quest for truth 
in uncovering the exact facts.Thus, in their view, the wide invocation of 
character evidence promoted the application of the written law without inhibiting 
the consistency and predictability of the court verdicts. In order to verify this 
hypothesis a series of secondary (though equally decisive) questions need to 
be asked and assumptions to be tested and verified.  
 
2. Current Scholarship and Research Hypotheses  
This thesis aims to discover the primary reasons behind the Athenian liberal (by 
modern standards) approach to forensic argumentation. One of the most 
striking features of the Athenian courtroom speeches is, according to modern 
scholars, the litigants’ readiness to resort to extra-legal argumentation, 
sometimes perceived as irrelevant to the legal charge. This has been 
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Herman (2006), p. 149. However, I do not agree with the view that this ‘observation of their 
standards of relevance’ was a conscious departure from the issue at hand. On the contrary, I 
aim to demonstrate throughout this thesis, by focusing primarily though not exclusively on 
character evidence, that it did refer to the issue at hand.   
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interpreted in various ways depending on the focus, the background, and the 
aims of each researcher. Nevertheless, their contrasting positions unite them on 
a higher level. What they all share is the failure to avoid interpretations based 
on modern presuppositions; this is a flaw that this thesis aspires to avoid. 
 
To offer but a few examples, Lanni discusses ‘relevance’ in the Athenian courts 
with the assumption that the notion of ‘relevance’ in modern western courts sets 
the standard against which the Athenian ‘liberal’ approach should be 
contrasted. The fact that the Athenians had such an approach (according to 
modern standards) is explained by the discovery of a covert role for the 
courts18. Harris stands at the opposite extreme and argues for an extreme 
legalism implemented by the participants of the legal system through the rigid 
application of the rule of law. Although he examines what the ‘rule of law’ 
signified for the ancient Greeks, he fails to liberate himself entirely from modern 
presuppositions as to the normative meaning of the ‘rule of law’, especially 
when this is applied to a pre-modern state19. Furthermore, sharing Lanni’s 
presuppositions about ‘relevance’ downplays extra-legal argumentation 
referring to it as ‘aberration from the norm’ being a ‘way of distracting the judges 
from the charges in the plaint’20. Rhodes has recently asserted that Athenian 
litigants actually spoke ‘to the point’; however, he interprets the court speeches 
based on a ‘modern’ approach (i.e. whatever is ‘logically relevant’ and does not 
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 Lanni (2006) sees the Athenian popular court as an institution indifferent as to the application 
of the ‘rule of law’, which aimed at giving contextualised ad-hoc decisions, thus settling disputes 
by taking into account wider notions of justice and equity rather that strictly applying objective 
rules in  consistent manner (thus disclosing her presuppositions as to what the ‘rule of law’ 
means); cf. Christ (1998a) esp. pp. 41-43 and 196; for a different exegesis based on the same 
assumptions stressing the political dimension of the courts, see Todd (1993); the same pattern 
(search for an exegesis based on modern presuppositions) is valid for social anthropological 
studies such as Cohen (1995) and Ober (1989). 
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 Harris, by concentrating on divergent aspects of the Athenian legal system which promoted a 
strict application of the law (such as the Heliastic oath, the written plaint, the prevalence of 
substance against procedure etc.), offers an account of the Athenian system based on modern 
–especially procedural- conditions for the attainment of the ‘rule of law’. I acknowledge that 
Harris has offered many accounts as to what the ‘rule of law’ meant for the ancient Greeks 
though without, in my opinion, liberating himself from the normative presence of the modern 
‘rule of law’. My perception of his work is that by following a comparative account of the two 
legal cultures he places emphasis on the similarities (sometimes downgrading the differences) 
in order to present the Greek legal system as scarcely alien (or even a precursor) to the 
(normative) modern one. Nevertheless, I am not sure whether this can be a valid undertaking, 
since I do not believe that the two legal systems may be compared. The difference of structures, 
psychology and sociology precludes such a comparative study and this is one of the points that 
my thesis aims to prove.  
20
 Harris (2013). 
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create ‘exceptional prejudice’), thus omitting a technical examination of the 
issue21. His conclusion may be criticised as subjective and arbitrary22.  
 
My general point is that divergent interpretations offered by modern scholars 
share a set of ‘normative’ (though not uncontroversial) presuppositions which, 
by influencing their methodology, restrict any room for a reading of the 
speeches that is as objective as possible23. This tendency recalls the effort of 
Athenian litigants who, although their way of reasoning and argumentation was 
restricted by the fact that they competed on a canvas painted by a common set 
of ethical norms, nonetheless focused on (or ignored) different pieces, offering a 
personal interpretation of the facts.  
 
The first research hypothesis of this thesis is that the wide use of character 
evidence is the result of the socio-political structures, the psychology and the 
way of reasoning of the Greeks. In particular, the Athenians believed that this 
approach to argumentation was illuminative for the legal case and would enable 
them to discover the truth. Since most disputes in their courts were factual, a 
wide approach to character evidence and the presentation of contextual and 
background information facilitated them, in accordance with their ideas and 
following an inductive method of reasoning, to uncover the true facts of the 
case. Afterwards they could proceed to the application of the written law to 
these facts and, thus, the attainment of legal justice. Therefore, psychological 
reasons largely caused the wide use of character evidence in their 
argumentation which, by being a method that assisted the discovery of the truth, 
facilitated the implementation of their ‘rule of law’. This hypothesis of 
interpreting the role of the courts (assisted by the speeches of the litigants and 
the wide invocation of character evidence) as ‘objective discoverers of truth’ 
runs (as we have seen above) contrary to the conclusions of current 
researchers24 who reserve for them alternative aims and results.  
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 Rhodes (2004); This is true for Griffith-Williams (2012), pp. 160-1.. 
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 For a criticism see Harris (2013). 
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 By ‘objective’ I mean a third-person reading, as far as possible closer to the ancient 
protagonists’ perceptions.  
24
 The scholars who in one way or another have expressed reservations or denied  the Athenian 
courts’ upholding of the law and the discovery of truth include Cohen (1995) who sees them as 
institutions for pursuing personal feuds, Lanni (2006) and Christ (1998a) who believe that the 
invocation of extra-legal material facilitated the rendering of ad hoc judgments and the jurors 
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The second research hypothesis is that this quest of the Athenian courts for the 
discovery of the truth and the subsequent application of the letter of the law was 
in truth facilitated and not obstructed by the wide use of extra-legal material. 
According to this assumption, the information that the courts received 
concerning the background and the wider context of a dispute was welcomed 
as directly relevant to the facts and, rather than widening the scope of the legal 
case in order to induce the jurors to vote in accordance with norms of equity 
and epieikeia25, it actually assisted them to focus more on the innocence or guilt 
in that particular case and thus to correctly apply the law26. By the same token, 
and always by reference to the Greek ideas of character and personality, 
litigants’ reference to the harsh impact of an adverse verdict, citation of a list of 
their liturgies and / or advertisement of their adherence to (at first glance 
irrelevant) ethical norms of the polis acquire probative value.  
 
The same conclusion applies to the third hypothesis of this thesis, which is an 
extension of the second so as to embrace emotional argumentation. For the 
Greeks, human emotions and desires are cognitive processes and informed by 
beliefs and reasoning. Pathos is taken to be ‘rational’ in the sense that it is 
based on a cognitive evaluation of a particular situation, and the person, 
drawing on preconceived ethical beliefs and stereotypical assumptions instilled 
in him by the environment, reacts with the proper response, i.e. feels the proper 
emotion. As a result, proper emotional responses (positive or negative) should 
be provoked in jurors by the argumentation of the litigants (with regard to the 
right persons, at the correct timing and context, for the right reason) and 
triggered the appropriate reaction in the form of sentencing or acquittal. 
Emotional argumentation was therefore based on the legal argumentation and 
was always coupled with the justice of one’s cause. However, how certain can 
                                                                                                                                
paid little attention to the letter of the law, Todd (1993) who overstates the political decision-
making of the courts to the expense of its legal role, and Ober (1989) who downplays the 
commitment of the courts to the attainment of truth and prefers to see them as institutions of 
social significance in facilitating the dialogue between the mass and the members of the elite. 
25
 On the role of epieikeia see Harris (2013), pp. 274ff. According to him, when a litigant used 
an argument based on epieikeia, he was not asking the court to reject the written law but was 
demonstrating that his case was an exception to the general rule contained in a statute and that 
in his specific case other legal considerations should take precedence. 
26
 Contra Lanni (2006), especially at pp. 46ff. 
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we are that the popular courts and their amateur audiences abode by these 
rules? 
 
The above issues therefore bring to the fore the question of the competence of 
Athenian jurors. The common opinion regarding the direction of the Athenian 
courts can be summarized as such: “the popular and unprofessional nature of 
the jury much relaxed the need for logical, relevant treatment of points of law 
and increased the opportunities for irrelevant, but brilliant digressions and 
emotional appeal”27. Others prefer a more balanced view, arguing that “their 
verdicts might be coloured by factors outside the issue; they might, for instance, 
decide to temper strict justice with mercy if a defendant’s past life warranted it; 
they might allow the prejudices of the moment on occasion to override reason, 
as of course modern juries sometimes do. But ultimately their courts were 
intended to arrive at just decisions; decisions based on the laws; decisions 
primarily on matters of fact; decisions on specific cases which came before 
them”28. The conclusion of decisions based on justice and equity, rather than 
strict law, was promoted by Lanni29 as well.  
 
On the other hand, researchers believing in an Athenian rule of law make a 
more convincing case. Harris for instance, refers to the whole range of 
procedures and factors that secured a high level of sophistication for the 
Athenian legal system, and surely cannot be blamed for stating that “modern 
scholars (except those who believe in necromancy) cannot raise Athenian 
judges from the dead and ask them why they voted the way they did in a 
particular case”30. After all, as Gagarin observes (referring to scholars who have 
uncritically accepted the picture of Philocleon as the stereotype of the Athenian 
juror) “the accuracy of the portrayal can surely be doubted. There probably were 
jurors like Philocleon voting on actual cases, but that these constituted the 
majority or even a large minority of jurors is doubtful. If they had, the Athenian 
legal system could hardly have survived long”31. The fourth hypothesis of this 
thesis is that Athenian jurors had a high degree of competence and experience. 
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 Kennedy (1963), p. 160.  
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 Carey (1994b). 
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 Lanni (2006). 
30
 Harris (2006a), p. 179. 
31
 Gagarin (1994), p. 47. 
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They judged (as proved by the litigants’ argumentation as interpreted by the 
model of this thesis) human action in perfectly rational and nearly objective 
terms and it may be safely concluded that they formed one of the most qualified 
popular audiences of recorded history32. 
 
This fact contributed towards the achievement of a relative amount of 
consistency and predictability of court verdicts rather than decision-making on 
an ad hoc basis33. This is yet another hypothesis supported by this thesis. Lanni 
focuses on the pragmatic difficulties of the period such as the sparse 
documentation for cases kept in the Metroon, and on legal issues such as the 
absence of a binding ratio decidendi and the limited discussion of precedents in 
the forensic speeches. However, notwithstanding the genuine difficulties in 
reaching a safe conclusion on the matter, there are some factors which are 
decisive on the balance of probabilities. These have been treated by Harris34 
and include i) the fact that in legal disputes before the Athenian courts, there is 
a targeted use of precedent (though most of the cases concern factual disputes 
rather than disputes about the meaning of the law), ii) the correct estimate of 
the written and oral resources that could be used for the transmission of the 
rationale behind verdicts (so as to create a homogeneous approach in the 
future), and iii) other factors that could assist in reaching consistency such as a) 
the coherence offered by the references to the intent of the lawgiver and b) the 
interpretation of laws by reference to other statutes. These served as 
homogenising factors and set the basic principles of the legal system, at the 
same time placing a framework and boundaries to the discretion of the judges.  
 
This thesis confirms and supplements the above conclusions. What is original is 
the methodology used in proving the degree of consistency and predictability of 
Athenian verdicts, which is based on a close analysis and theorisation of the 
litigants’ rhetoric in accordance with Greek psychology. In order for the court to 
be able to achieve consistency, a sub-hypothesis needs to be fulfilled, namely 
that rules of relevance had been developed. This again may be answered in the 
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 Lanni (2004). 
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 Harris (2007b). 
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affirmative. In answering how we know that the Athenian courts had already 
developed a more or less sophisticated approach to relevance, three factors 
may be cited: i) the requirement to ‘speak to the point’, ii) the absence of 
complaints from the litigants as to what is relevant and iii) the consistent 
patterns of argumentation throughout the approximately one century of our 
enquiry.  
 
In deciding what is relevant for Athenian courts we may use the following 
reasoning. The evident loyalty of litigants to certain patterns of argumentation 
signifies the relevance and success of these patterns as regards their reception 
by the court. This strategic and tactical consistency of argumentation shows a 
consistency of rhetorical approach to a legal case which in turn is accepted as 
valid and ‘to the point’ by jurors. This underlying homogeneity of rhetoric reveals 
an agreement of all parties to a judicial case as to what is relevant. To make it 
plain, all recurring arguments that emerge throughout the period of the Attic 
orators may be safely pronounced as relevant for the Athenians. Thus, we may 
infer from the speeches as a general rule that i) any argument that was directly 
relevant to the legal case, the written law or the ethical norm enforced by that 
law and / or ii) any argument that was relevant to the more general character 
trait that embraced this norm were received by the court as relevant.  
 
So, having extracted the examples of what kind of argumentation found in the 
speeches is relevant, can we theorise and (re) construct the Athenian rules of 
relevance? In other words can we answer the question why the ever-recurring 
patterns of argumentation (and especially extra-legal and character evidence 
that concern us here) were received as relevant? The Greek ideas of character 
and personality, as well as the Greek method of reasoning provide a way to 
understand why the patterns of extra-legal argumentation found in the orators 
were indeed relevant in their perception. This underlying rationale may assist in 
the comprehension of the rules of relevance in Athenian courts and explain the 
consistent approach to character evidence. 
 
 A litigant had to prove whether or not there was a breach of the law specified in 
the written plaint. The legal statute enjoyed unquestionable authority and it 
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embodied or was related to a communal ethical norm. The central issue to be 
proved by the invocation of character evidence was a litigant’s general 
adherence or not to that norm which would increase the probability of the 
parties’ allegations as to the particular charge. Following an inductive way of 
reasoning (and taking into account the, for the Greeks, relative unity of virtue or 
vice), adherence to this particular norm reveals the possession of a related, 
more general character trait. Hence, by reference to a multitude of remote or 
close examples of his past acts, a litigant aimed at proving the possession of 
this particular general trait. By deduction in turn, the possession of this trait 
would prove his adherence to the ethical norm thus making respect for the law 
which formalised it more likely. Extra-legal, irrelevant argumentation would be 
the most serious impediment to the achievement of consistency and could have 
led to ad hoc judgments based on the particularities of each case; but this did 
not happen (at least to a degree that would incur the questioning of the 
Athenians, since such argumentation is entirely absent from the speeches). 
Relevance was not a black hole. Athenian forensic rhetoric, in close proximity 
with their ideas of character, had developed its rules of relevance which were 
apparently accepted and substantiated by the courts.  
 
The above conclusion though, is subject to reservations: i) the uncertainty as to 
the existence of a written, formal rule of relevance that one ought to speak to 
the point; ii) the lack of trained personnel and formal processes to direct the 
jurors as to what is relevant and to enforce the rules of relevance, iii) the rough 
edges and subjectivity as to the boundaries of which norms are or are not 
included in a general character trait. Nonetheless, the relatively limited number 
of complaints (mainly of rhetorical value), as to the other party’s abuse of the 
rule of relevance, provide a significant argument in support of our hypothesis. 
Thus, the fact that the Athenian courts were staffed by an amateur personnel 
(albeit of high quality and experience), and the development of at least relatively 
concrete and clear rules of relevance contribute to the central hypothesis that 
the Athenian approach to character evidence did not obstruct consistency and 
predictability of verdicts.  
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Another assumption of this thesis is that Athenian laws had a substantive 
orientation. Siding with Harris35 in that respect, this thesis maintains that 
Athenian laws were very much concerned with directing human conduct and 
setting standards of behaviour. Nonetheless, although Athenian statutes were 
not overwhelmingly concerned with procedure36, the creation of a mechanism 
for the settlement of disputes was undoubtedly an equally significant aspect of 
the Athenian (and Greek) judicial process since the archaic period. Harris, in 
order to prove his suppositions, examines the wording of a number of Athenian 
laws that were primarily concerned with substantive matters. This thesis aims to 
add to his findings by examining the rhetoric of litigants and their insistence (in 
accordance with Greek ideas of personality) on presenting themselves as 
ethical adherents of the community. The fact that Athenian laws encompassed 
and enforced a wider ethical norm of the polis meant that when Athenian jurors 
decided a legal case, the letter of a specific law was applied but a wider ethical 
norm was reinforced. This was the essence of the legal enforcement of morals 
in classical Athens, namely the reinforcement of the wider ethical norm that 
triggered the enactment of a particular law. In this way the court, apart from its 
primary task of implementing the rule of law by applying specific laws to 
particular legal cases, acted also as the moral educator of the polis in the 
absence of an official public system of education, strengthening thus the 
substantive orientation of the laws. 
 
A further hypothesis of this thesis diverts from the aforementioned legal issues 
and focuses on the Greek ideas of character. Contrary to the conclusion of 
some researchers37 the Greeks did not hold a firm and universal belief in a 
stable and unchanging human character. Close examination of the Greek 
perceptions and ideas of ethos reveals a highly flexible approach to the issue 
and an uncertainty as to the stability of ethos. This has important implications 
for the method of argumentation in forensic fora as to the width and content of 
character evidence offered by litigants. The flexibility and uncertainty allowed 
them to offer lengthy accounts of previous acts of varied proximity to the legal 
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case (though in accordance with the rules of relevance described above and 
their ideas of character) in order to convince the jurors of the truth of their 
presented facts. Furthermore, such a lengthy account of their positive character 
traits (and the opponent’s negative) aimed at an increase of their credibility in a 
setting that relied heavily and almost exclusively to the litigants’ rhetoric. The 
enormous significance afforded to words in the Athenian legal setting led to the 
gradual evolution of scattered and loose approaches to argumentation into a 
finely formed art of rhetoric. 
 
This brings me to the last hypothesis of this thesis which does not take a static 
view of Athenian litigation, especially in relation to forensic rhetoric and 
argumentation. The first chapter serves to fulfill that aim by offering a historical 
overview of rhetorical argumentation from Homer onwards. It includes a search 
for the origins of argumentation in general and of character evidence in 
particular, combined with background information about the nature of litigation 
in the period before the Attic orators. Development of such rules of rhetoric led 
to their consolidation into an art to be applied in the courts of classical Athens. 
By this time, the art of rhetoric had reached its climax, the methods and tactics 
of argumentation had been clarified, and consistent patterns had emerged. 
 
3. Setting the Context 
3.1. Relevant characteristics of the ancient Greek World 
In order to discover the underlying reasons behind this Athenian (and Greek) 
approach to argumentation, it would be useful to address a series of questions 
relating to the unique features of this civilisation. What are the main features 
that might have influenced their attitude to argumentation in general and 
character evidence in the courts in particular? The socio-political structures of 
the newly formed polis, an originally weak state, formed the Greek ideas of 
‘character’ and ‘personality’38, placing the benefit of the community to the fore. 
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 I use the term ‘personality’ throughout this thesis for the sake of convenience as the most 
practical word to be used in order to give to the reader a familiar meaning she can grasp. The 
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‘personality’ as a modern audience understands it depends on the meaning we attach to this 
word. With the potential meanings ranging from psyche to ethos and character, I prefer to retain 
the English word throughout and attach to it the meanings of i) how a person perceives herself 
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The individual and the oikos, in an era of ground-breaking changes, gradually 
conceded their hereditary powers to the polis and increasingly depended on the 
public institutions. Realities such as the invention of writing, the novel hoplite 
warfare and the more objective and impersonal legal procedures, posed new 
challenges for the subjects. The ancient ‘person’ thinking of himself as a 
constituent of the community rather than a subject to be protected by the 
Leviathan-state, wholeheartedly adhered to the ethical norms of the polis.  
 
Philosophical enquiries also played significant role in the formation of these 
ideas and the resulting wide use of character evidence. The inductive and 
deductive method of reasoning provided for the extraction of grounded 
conclusions based on a multitude of examples. The fact that the Greeks did not 
acknowledge the person’s ethical autonomy of action in every single instance of 
his life meant that any act should be considered in connection and in 
conjunction with the rest, resulting in the extraction of a coherent set of 
character traits. The belief that the emotions are rational processes based on 
preconceived experiences and beliefs permitted a unified approach to 
character, a coherent interpretation of human behaviour and an attribution of 
blame or merit  liberated from asterisks and exclusions (such as ‘acting 
irrationally in the grip of emotion’).  
 
3.2. The Athenian Legal System 
Demonstration of the characteristics and peculiarities of the legal system that 
influenced the Athenian approach to character evidence is necessary in order to 
set the context of the current study. Although these will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, it is useful to sketch here the limits they set and their implications. 
The system of justice of the first direct (and radical) democracy had inherent 
features which promoted the constitutional structures of the Athenian polis, 
while concurrently facilitating the overall aim of the attainment of the rule of law 
in the way the Athenians understood it. Their commitment to political 
                                                                                                                                
in relation to the community, ii) how the individual interacts with herself during the decision-
making process and iii) how the community perceives the ‘person’, the ‘subject’, the ‘individual’ 
as a distinct entity. All these complex notions are primarily related to modern philosophical 
considerations about ‘individual personality’ for which it is not clear that the Greeks ever really 
had a word. 
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egalitarianism dictated the democratic nature of the system on all its stages. 
Staffing every office by sortition from the qualified male Athenian citizens, and 
providing for decision-making by popular vote in panels ranging from 201 voters 
up to six thousand were the two pillars of the system’s democratic nature. The 
pervasive ideology of amateurism (with more or less significant detours from 
this rule, such as the presence of logographers) though instigating a strong 
adversarial atmosphere, allowed for a less bureaucratic but more flexible and 
comprehensible approach to justice. 
  
These features have significant implications for forensic rhetoric. The lack of 
professionals signified the need for self-regulation with the possibility of minimal 
regulation being present. In such a context, due to the absence of strict 
enforcement mechanisms, rules of relevance may be relaxed and 
argumentation in the courts may be controlled only by the uproar of the jurors. 
The amateur litigants were careful not to expose the professional touches of the 
logographers and insisted on the human tendency to storytelling reminiscing 
everyday conversation. The fierce adversarial contests sometimes occasionally 
resulted in name-calling and similar methods of blackening the opponent’s 
person. The Athenian legal system’s structures, procedures and laws facilitated 
the wide use of character evidence. 
 
3.3. Comparators 
The above discussion highlights the differences between ancient and modern 
approaches to ‘character’ and ‘personality’ and the striking dissimilarities 
between the Athenian and modern legal systems. Although this is not a 
comparative work, comparators are sometimes needed in order to locate 
relevant terminology, emphasise key points and demonstrate the rationale 
behind the Athenian practices.  
 
The first comparison is between ancient and modern conceptions of 
‘personhood’. Opposing  ideas of these notions39 may produce alternative 
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approach to law in general and to character evidence in particular. Although defining these 
notions is far from indisputable, I take ‘character’ to mean the aggregate of behavioural traits as 
revealed by actions or habits and distinguish one person from another. In that sense ‘character’, 
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approaches to forensic argumentation (e.g. a more liberal or stricter approach to 
character evidence) and, in turn, diverse explanations and interpretations of this 
fact. Disregard of the dissimilar structures of these two eras (e.g. the modern 
industrial, impersonal state compared to the ancient polis) may lead to 
misunderstandings as to their influence on various fields of human life. Modern 
presuppositions about these concepts tend to take an unjustified normative 
force. By the same token, the Greeks’ different approach to extra-legal 
argumentation leads scholars to issue conclusions about the attainment or not 
of (even today) controversial and problematic concepts such as the ‘rule of law’ 
or ‘relevance’. These concepts, as we understand them today, were influenced 
by modern ideas such as the individualistic conception of ‘personhood’, the 
individual’s autonomy against a repressive sovereign or exclusively modern 
conditions such as the need for individual rights against impersonal 
bureaucratic states. Therefore, the rules of relevance or the rule of law in the 
Athenian context need to be conditioned by the above reservations and be 
treated in their own merits. 
  
A comparison that is occasionally used in this thesis is between the Athenian 
legal system and those of the Western capitalist democratic states, especially 
the Anglo-American ones. Comparison with these highlights the different lines 
that may be followed in order to reach similar goals, such as the rule of law and 
democracy. Nevertheless, the aims and procedures of these legal systems are 
not taken as normative examples. On the contrary, in the course of this study it 
is demonstrated that definitions and interpretations of key notions may differ 
and call for fresh examination. For instance yes, the Greeks had certainly 
developed a sophisticated notion of the ‘rule of law’ to which they strongly 
adhered. Nevertheless, their notion of the ‘rule of law’ was unique and in many 
ways distinct from its modern counterpart. Therefore any classification of the 
Athenian legal system as ‘rule of law based’ or ‘equity based’ is unjustified, 
unless these terms are clearly defined and given their contextual meaning. I 
believe that the legal system of classical Athenian democracy provides a 
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noteworthy, comprehensive example of a different (though equally valid) 
approach to justice.  
 
The aforementioned normative force that is sometimes attributed to modern 
legal systems in comparison with the Athenian obstructs the objective 
application and interpretation of the evidence. In that sense, such an approach, 
aggravated by a romantic and idealistic approach of some modern scholars as 
to the nature of modern systems, exaggerates the ‘otherness’ of Athenian law40. 
Nevertheless, a more realistic line followed by scholars and personnel that are 
actual practitioners or closer workers of the law41 illuminates the problems and 
inefficacies of modern systems and exposes the questions that still remain 
problematic; these are not too remote from the ones asked in the Athenian 
courts. The advantages and disadvantages of the adversarial mode of trial as 
opposed to a more inquisitorial approach, the democratic or elitist approach to 
law, and the competence of laymen to decide on questions of fact in a 
responsible manner, are recurrent themes that chronologically originate in 
classical Athens. Therefore the Athenian approach to character evidence can 
deepen our understanding of the key, knotty questions which have their roots in 
the emergence of a court system42.  
 
Changes in the adversarial character of the Commonwealth legal systems have 
been proposed and advocated throughout the previous century and still 
persist43. The ‘legal laissez-faire’44 heavily influenced the method of attaining 
the ‘truth’ in a court-room; the adversarial mode of trials (or ‘fight’ theory) found 
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many supporters in the assumption that the ‘fight’ theory and the ‘truth’ theory 
coincide45. However, is it really an objective of a common law hearing to 
discover the truth or merely to decide on the cases presented by the parties?46 
According to the distinguished legal historian Vinogradoff an ancient trial “was 
not much more than a formally regulated struggle between the parties in which 
the judges had to act more as umpires and wardens of order and fair play than 
as investigators of truth”47. In the course of this thesis it will be unequivocally 
demonstrated that this statement is far from accurate and that at least the 
Athenian courts were overwhelmingly interested in the attainment of truth; 
though the fact that lawyers regard modern adversarial systems in such terms 
illustrates the worthiness of the comparison. 
 
The exclusionary or inclusionary approach to the admissibility of character 
evidence in particular touches upon the democratic or elitist nature of the 
system. Firm disbelief in the laymen’s (fact-finders) capacity to contain 
themselves on deciding on the relevant issues of a case has brought about a 
restrictive approach to the admissibility of evidence. This exclusionary tactic’s 
reception is far from unanimous (since it arguably creates more problems than it 
solves48), thus generating voices for a more liberal and inclusionary attitude49. 
Distrust in the competence of jurors leads to the withholding of evidence, which 
in turn promotes an elitist approach to justice by creating a self-regulating and 
maybe unchecked legal bureaucracy. This encapsulates the real danger of 
broadening the gap and alienating the general public. With these in mind, 
comparison with its extreme Athenian opposite (namely that of a highly inclusive 
and democratic legal system) is incumbent. 
 
The above themes set the relevant axes within which the limited but targeted 
comparison will emerge throughout the thesis. Although at times such thematic 
comparison may be viewed as arbitrary and random, the complete picture will 
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 Frank (1949): “They think that the best way for a court to discover the facts in a suit is to have 
each side strive as hard as it can, in a keenly partisan spirit, to bring to the court’s attention the 
evidence favourable to that side”. 
46
 Jolowicz (1996). 
47
 Vinogradoff (1920), at p. 348, paved a way to be followed by many [e.g. Cohen (1995)] in the 
interpretation of ancient legal systems. 
48
 E.g. McEwan (2002), pp. 190-1. 
49
 See for example McEwan (2007), p. 188 n. 4. 
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slowly emerge. By avoiding anachronistic value-judgments and unnecessary 
modern presuppositions it will be made plain that the existence of a highly 
democratic and citizen-friendly legal system is achievable, provided that the 
laymen participants are properly educated through experience and that each 
person is assigned a clearly designated and proper role. Modern methods of 
fact-finding ease the burden and smoothen the inequalities between the parties, 
while the rationalisation and codification of the relevant rules of evidence assist 
in the objective and efficient conduct of the trial, avoiding agonistic or 
sportsmanship demonstrations. As a result, the unbiased use of relevant data 
will demonstrate that a legal system’s adversarial character and the quest for 
truth may not be mutually exclusive. 
 
3.4. Collection of Data 
The basic source of evidence is the canon of the ten Attic orators in the form of 
the approximately one hundred surviving forensic speeches50. The chronology 
of these refers to more than a century ranging from approximately 420  BC to 
the 320s BC51, albeit not uniformly distributed. Before proceeding to the main 
points of discussion, there are some important general considerations that have 
to be taken into account. These concern the uncertainties surrounding the 
material. Firstly there cannot be certainty about the number of surviving 
speeches that were actually delivered in court. Some of them were rhetorical 
exercises and, thankfully, can more or less be identified. 
  
However, even when there is certainty (to a degree) that a speech was written 
and delivered in court, ambiguity still remains as to the extent of revision 
between this time and its publication52. This process of alteration had three 
stages: the first being the actual delivery in the courtroom, the second being the 
revision by the orator and the third the exact publication and also the 
transmission (with mistakes) by copyists through the centuries. Written 
speeches were the models upon which a litigant was based; nonetheless, oral 
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 Ober (1989) conveniently offers a list of the speeches delivered before the Courts, the Boule, 
and the Assembly. 
51
 Hansen (1991), finds the earliest speech (Ant. 6) to be written in 419/18 BC and the latest 
(Dem. 56) in 322. 
52
 For the revision of speeches, see Dover (1968); Usher (1976); Johnstone (1999); Todd 
(1993), p. 37.. 
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delivery entails minor detours from the script. Apart from the linguistic detours, 
actual speeches also contained non-scripted, extemporaneous elements53 that 
do not appear in the texts but would be extremely useful in the picturing of 
characters. Other omissions include the failure, generally, to incorporate the 
actual texts of the laws and decrees, as well as the testimonies of witnesses. 
 
Regarding the second stage, namely the revision of the text before publication, 
this seems less puzzling. Firstly, such a revision, whatever its extent and if 
existed at all, gives us an account of the best and most refined argumentation 
that the speechwriter could offer, including evidence from character. This is a 
good indication of what argumentation concerning character ought to be used 
and would have appealed the most to an Athenian jury. Secondly,  although the 
revision need not be uniform, there is no  way to discover whether one 
speechwriter revised his speeches more than the other or that the speeches of 
a defendant or of a public suit where altered more than the corresponding ones 
of a prosecutor or of a private trial. Thus, there is no choice but to analyse what 
is present in the texts, not what it might have actually been said in court.  
Without overestimating the difficulties posed by the evidence, caution should 
still remain in its treatment. 
 
4. The Structure of the Thesis 
As mentioned above, this thesis explores the multidimensional influences, 
causes and aims whose resultant produces the wide use of character evidence 
in the Athenian court system. Chapter 1 finds the beginning of the thread whose 
end reaches the Athenian rhetoric of the fourth century. The identification of 
similarities between classical age’s forensic argumentation and archaic dispute 
resolution as presented in literature provides the first step towards the 
conclusion that the causes of the liberal approach to rules of relevance have to 
be sought in the distant past. Travelling through these four centuries and 
highlighting the ground-breaking developments assist in locating the use of 
character evidence in their temporal context. The progressive emergence of the 
polis-state and its legal system, though altered the orientation and aims of 
Athenian law (from equitable arbitration to the rule of law), left the broad 
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 Johnstone (1999), p. 12.  
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approach to argumentation from character almost intact. This fact is stimulating 
and calls for further explanation. 
  
Chapter 2 acknowledges the (by modern standards) excessive reliance of the 
Athenian legal system on personal worthiness and merit, a factor that created 
incentives to litigants and judges to place more weight on evidence from 
character. Its structures, institutions, laws and procedures provoked litigants to 
unfold even remotely relevant aspects of their personalities. The purposeful 
survival of this tendency from the archaic age, which provides yet another vote 
of confidence to this traditional practice, certified that for the classical 
Athenians, proper judicial process and the rule of law were best served by 
having the rules of relevance relaxed. The first two chapters therefore provide 
the series of choices that the Athenians made and the socio-political context 
within which argumentation from character operated. The consistent presence 
of this wide approach to character evidence in divergent arenas of 
argumentation, its persistence down to the classical age, and its eventual formal 
endorsement by the advanced official legal system, prove that the causes for 
this practice were deeply rooted in the collective psyche. 
  
Chapter 3 is the first step towards the explanation of this phenomenon. The 
causes need not be solely sought in external forces such as the structures and 
the institutions of the Greek polis. These decisively influenced psychology and 
philosophical ideas and vice versa. This chapter explores the Greek ideas of 
character and proves that their beliefs are directly connected with their 
rhetorical practices. Unequivocal trust to the probative and predictive force of 
human ethos instigated the important assistance of character evidence to 
arguments from probability. On the other hand, uncertainty as to the fixed and 
unchanging nature of character provoked the flexibility of argumentation evident 
in the speeches. The inductive method of reasoning fertilised the speeches with 
series of examples from a man’s past acts, a practice which was evidently 
expected by the audience. In other words, the Greek perceptions of human 
psychology decisively formed the content and the methods of character 
evidence. 
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Chapter 4 applies the conclusions of the previous chapter to the forensic 
speeches and explores the divergent methods and strategies that the 
rhetoricians used for the portrayal of character. Its aim is broader than mere 
application of the conclusions of Chapter 3. A step further is taken towards a 
comprehensive exploration of the tactics behind the argumentation from 
character in order to offer an accurate account of this part of Athenian rhetoric. 
At the same time, the rhetorical strategies and the content of the speeches 
concerning character evidence are contrasted to modern Anglo-American 
approaches. Besides, this comparison offers a clear insight of the socio-political 
background of the Athenian polis. 
  
Chapter 5 returns to the investigation of Greek psychology. This time, not 
‘character’ but ‘personality’ and ‘human action’ are analysed and contrasted 
with their modern counterparts. The need for a different approach is highlighted 
and the model of the ‘objective – participant’ person being applied as more 
suitable for the ancient context. This model provides that the human mind and 
human action can be understood and interpreted in objective terms, relenting 
from the modern highly subjective definitions. The ethically participant (rather 
than individualistic) ancient person accepts and wholeheartedly adheres to the 
conventional ethical norms of his society. These ideas serve as adequate 
causes for the wide use of character evidence in all types of argumentation. 
When the facts are unknown, past deeds may be inferred from a person’s 
typical method of reasoning and action as revealed by his characteristic deeds 
and motivation. Examples of past behaviour serve as proofs of this person’s 
general adherence or non-adherence to the norms (and consequently laws) of 
the polis. 
 
The final Chapter answers some of the standard questions surrounding 
Athenian law by reference to this new model of interpretation of the Athenian 
speeches. Acknowledging the paramount influence of the ideas explored in the 
previous chapters, this chapter analyses the imminent, utilitarian effects of 
character evidence in the courts. The wide use of extra-legal argumentation 
neither hindered legal justice nor inhibited jurors’ rational judgment. 
Examination of legalistic and rhetorical aims such as propensity, credibility and 
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good will, is necessary in order to prove the compatibility of this practice with 
the rule of law. Analysis of ancient beliefs about human emotions and their 
relation to rational decision-making is required to demonstrate that pathos 
argumentation is not irreconcilable with straight judgment based on law. One 
more time, modern presuppositions may be disorienting and what 
contemporaries consider as irrelevant argumentation may not be so after all. 
[37] 
 
1 CHAPTER ONE: THE ARCHAIC ORIGINS OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE: FROM HOMER TO 
CLASSICAL ATHENS 
 
The central idea of this chapter originates from the fact that all researchers (to 
my knowledge), isolate and examine the (admittedly better attested) more 
recent picture of Athenian courts of the late 5th and 4th century. This thesis 
follows a more holistic approach to the issue of extra-legal argumentation, thus 
reference to rhetorical approaches found in other literary sources and in other 
periods is unavoidable. The current chapter offers a historical background to the 
main theme of character evidence and illuminates the sequence of changes that 
took place in the field of rhetoric before the age of the Attic orators.  . The 
transformation of dispute-settlement, the development of instinctive 
argumentation to an art (rhetoric), and the codification of oral rules after the re-
invention of writing, all taking place in the archaic period, offer the key to 
understand later issues of Athenian law. My main aim is to examine the 
Athenian legal system and the presence of character evidence from a holistic 
point of view, not by examining it as a corpse, witnessing its very last moments 
and performing an autopsy using modern medical tools (in the form of 
presuppositions and definitions), but as a living organism which evolved for 
centuries. In such a way, by avoiding unnecessary anachronisms and by getting 
rid of modern stereotypes about (even today) controversial notions such as 
relevance, equity and the rule of law, a plausible explanation can be offered. 
 
This chapter proves that the wide (to modern perception) use of character 
evidence in Athenian courts is a tendency surviving from the (broadly defined) 
Greek  administration of justiceof the archaic period
1. This tendency is also to be found in Greek literature therefore an all-
embracing explanation for this phenomenon needs to be offered. Undoubtedly, 
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 This expression presupposes a (strict or loose) unity of Greek law (or at least a structural 
consistency of Greek legal behaviour) through time and space, which although has met the 
contention of scholars, it is now accepted, including by myself. Cf. Gagarin (2005), Foxhall and 
Lewis (1996), pp.1-2. 
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in a pre-judicial or proto-judicial form of adjudication, one cannot expect 
coherent rules providing for strict legal argumentation. After the dismissal of 
self-help as a justified method of performing justice (though its remnants 
survived down to the classical age2), the emergence of arbitration aiming at the 
reconciliation of disputants favoured the human beings’ natural tendency to 
storytelling3. By this token, positive portrayal of character supported parties in 
their effort to gain the good will of the arbitrator, enhanced their credibility and, 
thus, the plausibility of their story. Also, the public character of these early legal 
systems4, where disputes arose among members of a small-scale society and 
decided openly in the agora, may have supported the emergence of public 
opinion as an important factor to be taken into account. Litigants, apart from 
merely mentioning the facts of a (in legal terms) loosely defined dispute, were 
probably obliged to win the approval not only of the judge(s) but also of the 
audience. Lacking the assistance of modern science in the gathering of 
evidence, the believability of a story usually based on controversial facts was 
improved by the positive portrayal of the litigant’s ethos (character). The 
presence of spectators had important implications on the judges’ decisions and 
the way a dispute ended. 
  
Therefore, if this line of thought is correct, traces of this tendency to extra-legal 
argumentation are to be found in texts surviving from the archaic period. 
However, the claim that such wide use of character evidence was born in an 
environment of arbitration, favouring equity and reconciliation, does not mean 
that this was the case in 4th century Athens. On the contrary, the fact that 
argumentation retained its basic features despite the transformation of the legal 
system calls for a plausible explanation. Therefore, the fact that although the 
tactics of argumentation evolved but the framework of basic principles, 
strategies, and aims persisted through time, leads us to look for a steady, 
underlying cause which is to be found in the Greek ideas of character and 
personality. The separation of legal and quasi-legal spheres (each serving a 
different aim, enforcing written law in courts and equity in out of court 
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 Cf. Christ (1998b), p. 26; this issue will be discussed later in the chapter. 
3
 Cf. Gagarin (2003). 
4
 Cf. Gagarin (1986), pp. 46 and 133-4. 
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arbitration) and the more elaborate context (a belief in the rule of law and the 
legal norms’ gradual acquisition of substance) could have diminished the effects 
of extra-legal argumentation; nonetheless its persistence is stimulating and 
must be examined. 
 
In order to prove my point of the existence of this wide use of character 
evidence in archaic Greece and in divergent contexts I will examine the literary 
evidence of this period, concentrating on argumentation from character during 
the settlement of disputes. Nevertheless, since direct evidence is sometimes 
slim, I will examine the developments in argumentation and the role of character 
in general, since persuasive speech can take many forms, depending on its 
purpose. Moreover, indirect evidence will be provided by examining other 
remnants of rhetoric from the archaic period. Legal remnants of the archaic 
system of justice which survived to the classical one will be used as 
circumstantial evidence. Norms and rules found during that period in an 
embryonic state were later developed and codified. Furthermore, the process of 
transformation of oral (mainly procedural) rules into written (gradually 
substantive) laws5, may have produced an alternative approach to justice (from 
arbitration by potentially arbitrary magistrates to a court system based on the 
rule of law), with serious implications on the legal system as a whole. Within 
that context, I suggest that the Athenian courts’ rule of relevance that litigants 
ought to ‘speak to the point’ is also a remnant of the past, an oral requirement of 
the archaic age, which was later codified and substantiated. 
  
In this world of change, the amateurism and openness of the early legal system 
remained intact, being products of the polis as a political organisation and not 
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 This reform is regarded as typical within the process of evolution of a legal system from a 
primitive to more elaborate state. This is evident on the archaic law codes [e.g. inscriptions from 
Dreros, Chios and Eretria (all dating in 650-620 BC), the homicide Law of Draco, Gortyn’s law 
code etc.]; Gagarin (1986) observes that one of the most notable things about all Greek laws 
from the very beginning is the way in which they focus on procedure and do not concentrate 
either on defining criminal activity or on establishing fixed penalties for fixed crimes; Todd and 
Millett (1990) state that “In Athens, so far as we can tell, procedural law held both a 
chronological and a logical priority… Procedure came first and a substantive right could only 
exist where there was a procedure available to create that right”. However, the laws gradually 
took a substantive orientation, especially obvious in the Athenian setting during the age of the 
Attic orators [Harris (2009)]. 
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products of the later democracy (though they may be appreciated as its seeds). 
Although population increase, supported by the unusually large (for a polis) 
territory of Attica,  challenged the idea of ‘personal justice’ based on familiarity, 
of the previous face-to-face community nonetheless, the continued belief in this 
kind of justice (cf. Aristotle Politics 1326b) promoted the wide use of character 
evidence in Athenian courts. Persuasion of public opinion became more 
important than ever with the creation of mass jury courts. The need for an art of 
persuasion taught by professional experts became more evident, as well as the 
emergence of a body of professional speechwriters. However, the the 
framework and the aims of rhetoric remained intact. Persuasion through the 
invocation of one’s good character and meritorious personality became the rule 
in such an adversarial and agonistic environment. Denigration of opponents, 
maximisation of credibility, and every effort to gain the good will of mass juries 
constituted the components of the driving forces behind extra-legal 
argumentation in Athenian courts. The authority of written law, and the 
limitations to litigants and jurors alike, transformed the system and established 
the courts as guardians of the laws.. 
 
These new realities and the increasing rationalisation and codification of legal 
rules brought about a progressive attainment of a degree of consistency and 
predictability to the legal system. The gradual emergence of rhetoric as an art 
(assisted for example from the consolidation and organisation of rules in 
handbooks, such as the one mentioned under the names of Corax and Teisias 
in the early fifth century) and the patterns of ad hominem argumentation 
provided guidelines for the, at least, practical and utilitarian definition of 
‘relevance’, possibly developed through the archaic period and infused into the 
classical Athenian court-rooms. Abstaining from the unnecessary anachronisms 
and presuppositions of some modern scholars, this approach to relevance will 
be presented as a Greek (and Athenian) practice per se, evaluated in its own 
terms rather than judged against the attainments of modern legal systems. 
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1.1 The Origins of Character Evidence in Homer 
It is widely acknowledged that traces of the art of rhetoric6 can be found in 
Homer7. Odysseus had the ability ‘to speak lies like truth’ (Od. 19.203), 
exploiting a subsequently defined trick, specifically the accumulation of wealth 
of circumstantial detail, making the whole thing seem too complicated to have 
been invented8. A similar technique, either to conceal a lie or to enhance the 
verisimilitude of a story, was used in later years to make the weaker argument 
defeat the stronger or to support a case in Athenian courts9. A passage from 
Aeschines is enlightening:  
 
“When the other boasters tell lies, they try to make their speech vague and imprecise because 
they are afraid of being disproved, but whenever Demosthenes boasts, first he tells his lies 
under oath, conjuring destruction upon himself; second, he dares to tell what he knows will 
never happen and actually calculates the time when it will happen, and he tells the names of 
people whose bodies he has not seen, deceiving his audience and imitating those who tell the 
truth.” (3.99) 
 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus identified this device as one of the main virtues in 
persuasive speech, “a power of conveying the things about which one speaks to 
the senses of the audience” (Dion. Hal. Lys. 7), explaining that it is achieved by 
a grasp of circumstantial detail10. Similarly, when Lysias gives a detailed 
description of a trial under the Thirty (Lys. 12.37), he offers a vivid narrative of 
their character’s brutality following the path of his archaic predecessor. He 
describes their cruelty in detail, exemplified by their not refraining from taking 
“even the earrings of a woman [Polemarchus’ wife] who had been wearing them 
when she entered his house for the first time—that is, on the day of their 
wedding” (12.19). Apart from merely enhancing the verisimilitude of his 
                                            
6
 By ‘rhetoric’ I refer either to the subsequently developed art or to the natural instinct of 
argumentation and mode of speech inherent in any human being facing the challenge of 
persuading others. I hope that the difference in use will be obvious by the context. 
7
 Kennedy (1980) pp. 9–15 and (1963) pp. 35– 40, stresses a number of similarities between 
Homeric rhetoric and its classical form. Also see Edwards (1991) pp. 55–60; Karp (1977), Cole 
(1991) pp. 33–46. 
8
 Cole (1991), p. 39. 
9
 See Schmitz (2000), pp. 66-7. 
10
 Cf. Schmitz (2000), p. 64: “The strategy of mentioning specific dates and places and giving 
specific names is one of the most persistent ways of achieving verisimilitude, employed in 
countless fictional narratives from antiquity to the present day”. 
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arguments and reaching an emotional climax, Lysias also walks on the footpath 
that Homer firstly opened. 
  
Appeals to emotion are far from infrequent in Homer11. Securing the good will of 
one’s hearers is sought after, not only through words of praise but also by one’s 
friendly character. The effort for the appeasement of Achilles’ wrath in Book 9 of 
the Iliad is shouldered by Odysseus, Phoenix and Ajax, the ambassadors being 
chosen for their potential influence on the hearer. Indeed, Achilles 
acknowledges (Il. 9.198) that they are the men he loves most12. In sharp 
contrast, Achilles, disregarding Odysseus’ emotional appeals, rejects 
Agamemnon’s offers on the basis of the latter’s untrustworthiness, based on his 
previous acts that reveal his general disposition13(esp. 9.373-378). Phoenix 
takes over, reminding Achilles of his past acts and his affection since his early 
life, in an effort to re-establish their personal relationship. Such a technique of 
enumerating previous beneficial acts is also familiar in later orators. Phoenix’s 
use of Meleager’s story14, analogous with the use of later orator’s ‘examples’, 
acts as argumentation from precedent in order to convince Achilles of the 
soundness of his council. Finally, Ajax experiments with the technique of 
indirectly addressing one’s target by talking to another (here Odysseus) saying 
essentially ‘let’s go home – we are wasting our time’. Then, directly addressing 
Achilles he offers a protestation of love and honour from his friends. Although 
Achilles is not convinced to set his wrath aside, a little deviation from his original 
position is achieved15. 
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 For emotional appeals in Homer see Carey (1994a), p. 27; Kennedy (1980), p. 12. 
12
 Cf. Kennedy (1980), p. 11. 
13
 Cf. Kennedy (1980), p. 13, where Kennedy takes a less conservative approach by stating: 
“The character (ethos) of Agamemnon, which he regards as evil, is to him a more important 
factor than the emotional appeals which have been made.”. This reference to previous acts as 
revealing an individual’s character and general disposition is indeed one of the most important 
weapons of the Attic orators and of litigants diachronically. 
14
 On the use of historical example cf. Kennedy (1963), pp. 37-8. 
15
 Kennedy (1980), p. 14. Cf. Kennedy (1963), p. 36: “the speaker relies heavily on his personal 
authority and the impression he gives, as does Agamemnon in his debate with Achilles in book 
one. Thus also Athena increases the poise and dignity of Telemachus in Odyssey 2.12, to make 
up for his youthfulness. Later rhetoricians did not forget the importance of weight of character in 
effecting persuasion”. Kennedy concludes that “Much can be learned about classical rhetoric 
from the ninth book of the Iliad. Many devices of invention, arrangement and style were clearly 
in use long before they were conceptualised and named… The role of ethos, or character, is 
particularly strong…”. 
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Homer offers us direct examples of argumentation during settlement of 
disputes, though in a proto-legal, pre-court society. Notwithstanding these 
reservations, he offers us extremely valuable evidence about the existence and 
the use of rhetoric in archaic Greece, especially about types of argumentation 
during conflict crises before a mass audience. Therefore, although lacking a 
(not yet existent) strictly legal substance, the roots of later forensic persuasive 
speech can be traced. Consciously or not, and though Homeric poems lack 
arguments from probability, ad hominem argumentation forms the basis of 
persuasive speech in circumstances of adversarial nature, reserving for 
‘evidence’ from character a central role. It is in this light that I aim to examine 
the following literary evidence. 
 
The first scene I would like to examine is the conflict between Agamemnon and 
Achilles in Book 1 of the Iliad. This dispute constitutes the triggering event of the 
poem, being the cause of all the resulting pains. The facts are widely known. 
The Achaean army is devastated by a god-sent plague due to the abduction of 
the daughter of Apollo’s priest. Achilles calls an assembly (1.54, 1.57), which 
resembles legal proceedings16, in order for a solution to be found. Since the girl 
had been granted to Agamemnon, Calchas the prophet, after securing the 
protection of Achilles for his subsequent speech, predicts that, in order for the 
plague to end, Agamemnon has to give her back. Agamemnon, enraged, 
begins a quarrel with Calchas (1.104). He stresses the prophet’s evil 
disposition, particularly against himself: 
  
“Prophet of evil, never yet have you spoken to me a pleasant thing; ever is evil dear to your 
heart to prophesy, but a word of good you have never yet spoken, nor brought to pass” (1.105-
7).  
 
However, portraying himself as protector of the people, agrees to Calchas’ 
demand: “Yet even so will I give her back, if that is better; I would rather the 
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 Havelock (1978), pp. 129ff.; Bonner and Smith (1930-38 reprinted 1968), pp. 2-11.; White 
(1985), p. 33. 
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people be safe than perish” (1.115-6). This constitutes a first indication of how 
rhetoric could be used in a dispute before a mass audience.  
 
Nonetheless, the insistence of Agamemnon to replace the girl by taking 
another’s [and in that way he unilaterally declares the case closed (1.138-40)], 
provokes Achilles’ wrath and the dispute escalates. Speaking on behalf of all 
the army, in an effort to gain the concord and support of the people and isolate 
the king (1.122-25), he insults him17 by demonstrating his greed 
(φιλοκτεανώτατε πάντων - 1.122). Agamemnon, although acknowledging 
Achilles’ purpose to ‘induce’ to persuasion both the king and the audience, 
replies:  
 
“Do not thus, mighty though you are, godlike Achilles, seek to deceive me with your wit 
(κλέπτε νόῳ); for you will not get by me nor persuade me” (1.131-2) 
 
stating that he has a valid claim due to his status as a king, which he is going to 
enforce (1.137-9).  
 
The poet, sketching Achilles’ emotional state, portrays him as “glaring from 
beneath his brows” (1.148). His reply is again insulting (1.158:  dog-face) but 
more importantly reveals the king’s ingratitude and injustice (1.155-68). These 
arguments which made an impact on the army (cf. 2.239-40) provoke 
Agamemnon’s reaction who characterises Achilles as the most hateful to him 
due to his propensity for violence [“for always strife is dear to you, and wars and 
battles” (1.177)].  
  
Preventing further escalation (taking place through resort to violence as 
opposed to mere rhetoric), Athena intervenes and restrains Achilles. The latter, 
justifying his behaviour and putting the blame on the adversary, says that 
Agamemnon’s arrogance was the cause of this dispute (1.203, 1.205). 
However, the insulting words continue (1.225: drunkard), with Achilles focusing 
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 Harding (1994), pp. 197ff., following other scholars, traces the origins of the comic abuse or 
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on Agamemnon’s injustice, cowardice and non-adherence to widely acceptable 
values:  
 
“with the face of a dog but the heart of a deer, never have you had courage to arm for battle 
along with your people, or go forth to an ambush with the chiefs of the Achaeans. That seems to 
you even as death. Indeed it is far better throughout the wide camp of the Achaeans to deprive 
of his prize whoever speaks contrary to you. People-devouring king, since you rule over 
nobodies; else, son of Atreus, this would be your last piece of insolence” (1.225-232). 
  
The final piece is provided by Nestor’s intervention (the famous for his 
persuasive rhetoric aged king of Pylos), who tries to gain their good will18 and 
their respect19. However, the unbalanced triangle of Nestor as arbitrator, 
Agamemnon (superior king) and Achilles (half mortal king) as litigants, and 
silently acquiescing subordinate warriors as audience did not produce 
reconciliation or any inducement to resolution20. The conflict is suspended with 
a last adversarial exchange21. 
 
The preceding scene is not a mere quarrel or an exchange of insults. On the 
contrary, since the disputants are surrounded by an audience both parties try to 
prove the validity of their claim. Both sides base their argumentation on widely 
acceptable (though frequently conflicting or ambiguous) norms22 and the conflict 
escalates (facilitated by the denial of retreat or the existence of a clear hierarchy 
                                            
18
 Hom. Il. 1.258: “you two quarrelling, you who are chief among the Danaans in counsel and 
chief in war”. 
19
 Hom. Il. 1.258ff: “Listen to me, for you are both younger than I. In earlier times I moved 
among men more warlike than you, [260] and never did they despise me… [270] And I fought 
on my own; with those men could no one fight of the mortals now upon the earth. Yes, and they 
listened to my counsel, and obeyed my words. So also should you obey, since to obey is 
better”. 
20
 Lloyd – Jones (1971), p. 13: "Had Nestor and not one of the disputants been the king, they 
would have been obliged to follow his instructions. But the quarrel is one in which the king, 
whose duty it is to give justice to his subjects, is himself a party, so that the human machinery 
for securing justice cannot be set into motion.". 
21
 Hom. Il. 1.284ff: “In answer to him spoke lord Agamemnon: [285] “All these things, old man, 
to be sure, you have spoken as is right. But this man wishes to be above all others; over all he 
wishes to rule and over all to be king, and to all to give orders; in this, I think, there is someone 
who will not obey. If the gods who exist for ever made him a spearman, [290] do they therefore 
license him to keep uttering insults?”. “Brilliant Achilles broke in upon him and replied: “Surely I 
would be called cowardly and of no account, if I am to yield to you in every matter that you say. 
On others lay these commands, but do not give orders to me”. 
22
 Cf. Gagarin (1986), p. 105. 
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of these norms). Within a legal context, such a conflict of norms is rarer, since 
the law (unambiguous compared to unwritten norms) specifies how a case is to 
be decided. Prosecutors contain a series of adversarial incidents of a dispute in 
a single offence referred to in the written plaint, thus limiting the spectrum of 
irrelevant argumentation, as well as preventing any potential conflict of 
ambiguous norms. 
 
Nonetheless, tendency towards liberal, ad hominem argumentation remains, 
especially in contexts resembling Athenian courts, in a system promoting 
adversarial argumentation and favouring the atmosphere of a village moot 
before large juries. Undoubtedly, some similarities with the Attic speeches are 
unavoidable. Achilles, inferior in status, tries to support his arguments with the 
concord of the audience23. His main aim is to arouse hostility against the person 
of Agamemnon, since his cowardice and greed has led him to injustice and 
ingratitude against the whole army. On the other hand, Agamemnon, stresses 
his superior status and wants a quick end to the dispute, even by the threat of 
self-help. Both parties feel obliged to excuse themselves and put the blame on 
the other side, especially when addressing a respectable or superior third party. 
Gradually it becomes evident that rhetoric is the only weapon of participants to 
this dispute since violence (through the intervention of Athena) is declared 
unacceptable. Homer thus provides us with the first example of persuasive 
speech, in a context of conflict before a mass audience. 
 
The second scene comes from the Iliad’s Book 23, presenting two speeches of 
Antilochus, Nestor’s son, both delivered after a chariot-race held under the 
auspices of Achilles in honour of Patroclus. Diomedes won the race and 
Antilochus came second (exploiting his skills or even trickery), overtaking 
Menelaus who finished third. However, Achilles, pitying Eumelus who, though 
meritorious, finished last, proposed to give him the prize for the second place. 
This provoked Antilochus’ fury, who immediately protested. His purpose was to 
                                            
23
 Humphreys (1983), p. 230 observes that in acephalous or ‘stateless’ societies disputants try 
to mobilise public opinion in support of acts of self-help. The community cannot remain 
uninvolved in the dispute, though it may be reduced to silent acquiescence in a questionable 
victory of the stronger party. She sets this scene as example, together with Telemachus’ 
unsuccessful attempt to arouse public opinion against his mother’s suitors in the Ithacan 
assembly in Odyssey 2. 
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secure the prize, assisted solely by means of his rhetoric, and he proceeded in 
three steps. Firstly, he stressed the injustice of this proposal, by presenting 
himself as the owner of the prize from which Achilles wanted to strip him 
(23.544: μέλλεις γὰρ ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἄεθλον). If Achilles wanted to honour him, 
he should give Eumelus another prize, and not Antilochus’. Secondly, he puts 
the blame on Eumelus for finishing last, claiming that, although brave, in order 
to secure a good place he should have prayed to the Gods24. Antilochus 
finishes his speech with a threat of self-help25. 
 
Antilochus’ speech had attained its purpose, evidenced by Achilles’ smile; he 
kept the mare and other gifts were announced for Eumelus. Nevertheless, 
although this dispute ended at its very beginning, Menelaus stood forth and 
accused Antilochus of stripping him of the second place through trickery 
(23.570-85). Therefore, the prize belongs to him, unless Antilochus accepts an 
oath-challenge26, swearing that his deceit had not been done willingly. This is 
the moment of Antilochus’ second speech. His implicit treacherousness and the 
threat of having a dispute with Menelaus induce him to surrender the prize and 
make reconciliation the best available purpose for his speech. Thus, while his 
first speech had an adversarial tone, claiming that he had been treated unjustly, 
his second speech resembles the procedure of arbitration (Menelaus himself 
asks for the leaders of the Achaeans to act as judges to their case) and aims at 
reconciliation. Antilochus, acknowledging his guilt but placing the blame on his 
                                            
24
 Hom.Il. 23.546-7: ἀλλ᾽ ὤφελεν ἀθανάτοισιν εὔχεσθαι: τό κεν οὔ τι πανύστατος ἦλθε διώκων. 
This argument seems to be a distant ancestor of a similar one from the fifth century’s Antiphon’s 
Tetralogies. There (Ant. 3.3.8) the prosecutor of a young man who has accidentally killed a boy 
while practising javelin-throwing argues that the young man may have been guilty of impiety and 
so, being ‘stained’, was manoeuvred by the gods into a predicament which would result in his 
condemnation for accidental homicide. One could also add Andokides’ attempt to attack a 
similar accusation of ‘condemnation due to impiety’ by his opponents. He says:  “We are asked 
to believe that the only object of the gods in saving me from the dangers of the sea was, 
apparently, to let Cephisius put an end to me when I reached Athens. No, gentlemen. I for one 
cannot believe that if the gods considered me guilty of an offence against them, they would 
have been disposed to spare me when they had me in a situation of the utmost peril—for when 
is man in greater peril than on a winter sea-passage? Are we to suppose that the gods had my 
person at their mercy on just such a voyage, that they had my life and my goods in their power, 
and that in spite of it they kept me safe?” (Andok. 1.137). 
25
 Hom. Il. 23.553-4: τὴν δ᾽ ἐγὼ οὐ δώσω: περὶ δ᾽ αὐτῆς πειρηθήτω 
ἀνδρῶν ὅς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσιν ἐμοὶ χείρεσσι μάχεσθαι. 
26
 This is yet another remnant of the Homeric period which survived down to the classical 
Athenian legal system. 
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youth (a stereotype that continued down to the classical period), asks for 
Menelaus’ patience and good will while offering the mare (23.587-92). Faithful 
to the purpose of reconciliation and recognising Menelaus’ superior status 
(23.588), he even offers further goods from his possessions (23.593-4). Instead 
of a resort to insulting name-calling of previous instances, Antilochus mollifies 
Menelaus by calling him king (ἄναξ), a better and more powerful man 
(πρότερος καὶ ἀρείων), nourished by Zeus (διοτρεφὲς). Not only reconciliation is 
achieved, but Menelaus, soothed by Antilochus’ speech, allows him to keep the 
prize, an outcome which in fact makes us wonder whether this was Antilochus’ 
underlying purpose behind the apparent change of his rhetoric between his first 
and his second speech.  
 
Homer, by offering in a short space two antithetical speeches by the same 
person, both achieving the same result (albeit through different tactics), 
enlightens us as to multiple potential uses of rhetoric, and offers a paradigm for 
suitable speech in different circumstances. Antilochus’ dynamic and aggressive 
rhetoric of the first speech gave place to the mollifying and reconciliatory one 
when encountering Menelaus. This adjustment was successful and, by its 
accomplishment of Antilochus’ aim to keep the prize, we may also infer that it 
was purposeful. The persons, the audience, and the purpose, set the 
environment for rhetoric; it is true that in accordance with these same factors 
Aristotle in late 4th century classified the types of rhetoric27. 
 
The third piece of evidence comes from book 3 of the Iliad. The scene is set on 
the walls of Troy. There, the old Trojans observe the Achaean leaders and ask 
Helen for information. When king Priam asks about a man and Helen identifies 
him as Odysseus, Antenor intervenes and offers his memory of their previous 
meeting. Odysseus and Menelaus were sent as envoys to Troy and Antenor 
describes his account of their rhetorical skills (3.212-24). He praises Menelaus 
for his precision and fluency; to this positive image he contrasts Odysseus’ 
awkward original stance, followed by his eloquent speech: 
                                            
27
 For deliberative speeches in Homer see Toohey (1994) where he examines five deliberative 
speeches of Nestor; Kennedy (1980), p. 11, finds similarities of Homeric rhetoric with yet 
another genre, namely epideictic oratory. 
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“But when wily Odysseus leaped up, he stood there, his eyes fixed on the ground, and looked 
up from under his eyebrows. He did not move the sceptre back and forth, but held it immobile, 
like an ignorant man. You could say that he was surly and witless. But when his voice came, 
loud, from his chest, his words like snow, no other man could compete with Odysseus” (3.216-
24)28. 
 
Rhetoric had already established rules. Solemn performance and eloquent, 
pointed speech (a rule that acquired formality in Athenian courts) were the usual 
criteria for judging an orator’s quality. Nevertheless, the uncommon factor about 
Odysseus that surprised the audience was the interplay between personality (as 
wilfully presented by his original stance), performance, and speech. Public 
oratory required not only skill at verbal composition but also skill of another sort 
– a performative imagination through which character could be imagined and 
portrayed29. Odysseus, a pioneer indeed of argumentation from character, by 
this antithesis between character (by means of his awkward stance) and speech 
(having surprising gravity), enraptured his audience, in a memorable - as to 
rhetorical skills - performance. Such a skilful presentation of a case, though 
concentrating on sketching character through the speech’s composition and not 
presentation, is attributed centuries later to Lysias by Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus. In my opinion, as in Lysias’ case, the great impact of Odysseus’ 
rhetoric was due to 
  
“the impression that this arrangement has not been deliberately and artistically devised, but is 
somehow spontaneous and fortuitous. Yet it is more carefully composed than any work of art. 
For this artlessness is itself the product of art”
30. 
  
Homer was indeed a master of this art. 
 
                                            
28
 Cf. Bers (2009), p. 27: “Antenor commends Menelaus’ speech for excelling in what we might 
suppose were the usual criteria, clarity and persuasiveness … there was, then, a way one was 
expected to speak, or at least to wield the sceptre, the physical object that, as it were, gave one 
the floor. Odysseus succeeds in part by playing off against an established mode to trick his 
audience into taking him for a dolt, or at least an amateur in the grip of embarrassment and 
fear”. 
29
 Fredal (2001), p. 253. 
30
 Dion. Hal. (Lysias 8.25-34). 
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The final scene is Thersites’ ‘arhetorical’ performance in Book 2 of the Iliad. The 
Greeks tended to define things by their opposites, in forms of binaries (e.g. 
Greek / barbarian, man / woman, free / slave) and this is what I will try to do: 
uncover the ideas of skilful rhetoric by examining the model of its opposite. The 
poet, in order to allow the reader to judge the subsequent scene, offers a 
preliminary description of his person: 
 
“He was the ugliest man of all those that came before Troy - bandy-legged, lame of one foot, 
with his two shoulders rounded and hunched over his chest. His head ran up to a point, but 
there was little hair on the top of it” (2. 216-19). 
  
Thersites’ rhetoric lacked the qualities that were mentioned before: it was 
mistimed, imprecise, disorderly, and disrespectful while his only care was to “set 
the Achaeans in a laugh”31. His speaking voice is characterised as loud, 
presumably too loud, and shrill (2.223-224), two qualities skilled speakers of the 
classical period worked to avoid32. Although he does not possess Achilles’ 
status, he uses the same arguments (albeit distorted) against Agamemnon, 
even takes Achilles’ side regarding their previous dispute, without considering 
his inferiority. This stood in contrast to the Homeric model of aristocratic 
domination where commoners who spoke out of place were soundly thrashed or 
worse33. Unsurprisingly then, when Odysseus decides to put an end to this 
measureless speech, his act receives the unanimous approval of the army. 
  
This last scene sheds light on two more issues, the first relating to the reaction 
of the people, and the second to the method that Odysseus used to silence 
Thersites. Although Thersites breaks the ‘silent acquiescence’ of the army and 
raises his voice, his act is far from justified. Mobilisation of the public opinion 
failed and as a result his punishment was applauded by his comrades. 
                                            
31
 Hom. Il. 2.212-15: “The rest now took their seats and kept to their own several places, but 
Thersites still went on wagging his unbridled tongue - a man of many words, and those 
unseemly; a monger of sedition, a railer against all who were in authority [kosmos], who cared 
not what he said, so that he might set the Achaeans in a laugh.”. 
32
 Bers (2009), p. 27. 
33
 Fredal (2001) citing Martin (1989): In such a world “speaking length and audience tolerance 
were directly proportional to social rank: from Zeus to the lesser gods, from Achilles and 
Agamemnon to the lesser chieftains and soldiers. Aristocrats could by definition talk longest and 
best”. Cf. Dover (1974), p. 30. 
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Furthermore, his general disposition (apart from his failed rhetoric), was 
certainly important in receiving such contempt by the public. Homer describes 
one (soldier) saying to the other 
 
“Odysseus has done many a good thing ere now in fight and council, but he never did the 
Argives a better turn than when he stopped this man's mouth from prating further. He will give 
the kings no more of his insolence”
34. 
  
It is evident that apart from his speech, his character and status also 
condemned him. As far as the method used in performing this widely accepted 
act, Odysseus  
 
“beat him with his sceptre about the back and shoulders till he dropped and fell a-weeping. The 
golden sceptre raised a bloody weal on his back, so he sat down frightened and in pain, looking 
foolish as he wiped the tears from his eyes” (2.265-9). 
  
But what does this sceptre represent in this and other contexts from archaic 
Greece? Firstly, it is a symbol of public authority35. It arguably symbolises 
religious authority36, being a gift of Zeus, and possibly constitutes a “dimming 
memory” of divine kingship37.  What is of major importance is its potential 
symbolism of judicial authority, as presented in the trial scene of Achilles’ shield 
(Iliad 18.497-508)38. This symbol of rhetoric is used as the tool of punishment 
against Thersites, the unskilled speaker who dared to insult the kings without 
even carrying the sceptre (thus without having permission to speak39). And by 
whom is he checked? By Odysseus, the skilled speaker, the one who rightfully 
holds the sceptre in his hands. The symbolism of that scene is powerful. 
                                            
34
 Hom. Il. 2.272-7. 
35
 See Gagarin (1986), p. 27. 
36
 Gernet (1965), p. 240; Cf. Hom. Iliad 2.101-8; Gagarin plausibly states that such a religious 
symbolism of the sceptre is not present in Homer [Gagarin (1986) at p. 27, n. 28]. 
37
 Mondi (1980), p. 211; pace Calhoun (1962), p. 436. 
38
 “The town elders sat in a ring, on chairs of polished stone, the staves [skeptra ] of clarion 
criers in their hands, with which they sprang up, each to speak in turn”. Havelock (with 
reference to the dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles) states: "The performance of 
judgment is also a function of rhetoric: the one is achieved through the other, so that the sceptre 
is both a judge's symbol and a speaker's symbol". 
39
 The sceptre, apart from its symbolism, was also a practical way of achieving order in the 
course of crowded debates, since only the carrier had the right to speak. 
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Rhetoric in Homer had already rules of substance and procedure. Most of its 
basic features are present, only to be further developed in the following 
centuries. Procedural rules were set (albeit unwritten) as to who and when is 
allowed to speak. Substantive issues were developed as to how and what one 
ought to say in order to qualify as a skilled speaker. Finally the personality, 
disposition and character of a speaker were equally important in either 
adversarial speeches or deliberative ones. 
  
The Scene on the Shield of Achilles 
The most famous juridical scene of the archaic period comes from Homer’s 
description of a trial depicted on the shield of Achilles in book 18 (Il. 497-508) of 
the Iliad. The scene runs as follows: 
  
“In the assembly place were people gathered. There a dispute had arisen: two men were 
disputing about the recompense for a dead man. The one was claiming to have paid it in full, 
making his statement to the people, but the other was refusing to receive anything; both wished 
to obtain trial at the hands of a judge. The people were cheering them both on, supporting both 
sides; and heralds quieted the people. The elders sat on polished stones in a sacred circle, and 
held in their hands sceptres from the loud-voiced heralds; with these they were then hurrying 
forward and giving their judgments in turn. And in the middle lay two talents of gold, to give to 
the one who delivered judgment most rightly among them.”
40
 
  
Although the legal interpretation of the dispute, as well as the above translation, 
is not free from controversy41, what is of interest here is not to offer yet another 
explanation but to highlight and utilise the uncontroversial facts of the scene. 
Thus, the previous discussion of rhetorical remnants will be followed by one 
about legal remnants of the archaic age, which were largely retained, 
reintroduced or transformed in the classical period. The large amount of such 
remnants has to be examined under the light of the conservatism and 
traditionalism of the Greeks42. This ideological context will add one more brick 
                                            
40
 Translated by Macdowell (1978). 
41
 The translator (D.M. Macdowell) admits that lines 499-500 could be rendered: "the one was 
claiming to have paid it in full ..., but the other was denying that he had received anything”. 
42
 This traditionalism extends from “the inclination of composers of epitaphs to perpetuate 
traditional formulae and to use resounding Homeric epithets” [Dover (1974), p. 7], to the political 
nostalgy and search for the reestablishment of the patrios politeia, the ancestral constitution, 
which was “always a Good Thing: the term patrios politeia silenced the critics and they could 
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to the plausibility of this thesis’ suggestion that the liberal use of character 
evidence was characteristic of the early stages of Greek law and, although 
substantiated and transformed, was nevertheless retained by Athenian 
litigants43. 
  
The main issues arising from this scene (whether it is imagined or real, does not 
make any difference) must be examined,since they contribute to our 
understanding of the archaic judicial process and may offer some insight on 
their approach to argumentation.. One feature of the classical Athenian legal 
system that has drawn attention from the vast majority of scholars is the 
adversarial nature of its trials.  
  
 Adding to this the real difficulties of the era, such as examining factual issues in 
an environment where collection of evidence was based solely on testimonies, 
one can explain the ‘my word against your word’ approach as well as the 
dependence of the system on partisan witnesses44.  
 
This last observation brings me to the multidimensional role of people in archaic 
trials, as evidenced by the trial scene on the shield. Starting with the described 
partisanship, one may safely argue that litigants had to direct their 
argumentation both to judges and crowd. Scholars studying the settlement of 
disputes in early Greek literature, such as the famous scene depicted on the 
shield of Achilles, have often noted that a public forum like the agora or the 
assembly seems to have been an essential element in the early judicial 
                                                                                                                                
only retaliate by arguing that their ideal was the true ancestral constitution.” [Hansen (1991) p. 
297]. As Hansen (1991), p. 296 notes: “Like many Greeks, the Athenians had a soft spot for the 
‘golden age’, the belief that everything was better in olden times and that consequently the road 
to improvement lay backwards and not forwards”. 
43
 This tendency, evident in the archaic age and persistent until the classical one, had deep 
roots in the psychology and philosophy of the Greeks. An all-embracing solution will be offered 
in the course of the next chapters.  
44
 Arist Politics [1269a] refers to a “quite absurd” ancient law from Cumae of Magna Graecia: 
“for example, at Cumae, there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produces a 
certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty”. 
This certainly reflects a period during which social peace and stability mattered more than 
justice, but also reveals the difficulty of gathering evidence in order to solve a case. 
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process45. This was possibly yet another  incentive for a broader invocation of 
character evidence, in an effort to receive good will, persuade a mass audience 
and increase credibility. Secondly, under such conditions of a village moot, 
people tend to speak by heart; litigants follow their natural tendencies, with 
argumentation resembling everyday disputation. This environment of village 
moot or ‘personal justice’ achieved by familiarity was positively endorsed during 
the classical period.. Aristotle, in a time when the polis (and the Athenian 
democracy) was reaching its end, still believed that straight judgment can be 
achieved by judges personally knowing the character of litigants46. The courts of 
classical Athens, whether or not functioning within a ‘face-to face’ society47, in 
an effort to understand the context of a dispute and its background in an era 
when the gathering of hard evidence was impossible, allowed for a wide use of 
oral evidence directed at the portrayal of litigants’ personality and mode of life, 
in order to bridge the gap. 
  
Public opinion was important for verdicts as well. The crowd, putting heavy 
pressure on the parties to accept a fair deal offered by the judges’ best opinion 
                                            
45
 Lanni (1997), p. 188 recaps scholarly assumptions: “It is often assumed that the spectators at 
Homeric and Hesiodic dispute settlements were the precursors of the classical Athenian juries. 
MacDowell, for instance, writes that the 'speakers haranguing the crowd on the shield of 
Achilles [...] are forerunners of the orators who addressed the Athenian juries', and Humphreys 
examines Hesiod and Homer in an attempt to map 'the transformation of the crowd into a jury' in 
Attica”. 
46
 Arist. Politics [1326b 15-20]: “in order to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute 
the offices according to merit it is necessary for the citizens to know each other's personal 
characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of electing officials 
and trying law-suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in both matters, and this 
must obviously prevail in an excessively numerous community”. 
(πρὸς δὲ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν δικαίωνκαὶ πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς διανέμειν κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ἀναγκαῖον   
γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλους,ποῖοί τινές εἰσι, τοὺς πολίτας, ὡς ὅπου τοῦτο μὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι, φαύλω
ς ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς κρίσεις. περὶ ἀμφότερα γὰρ οὐ 
δίκαιον αὐτοσχεδιάζειν, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ πολυανθρωπίᾳ  τῇ λίαν ὑπάρχει φανερῶς.); 
cf. Wolff (1946), p. 38: “Jolowicz compared the Homeric ‘istor’ to the English jury in its most 
primitive form, when it was not yet a body of men who decided on the ground of the evidence 
laid before them, but a group of neighbours who gave their verdict on the ground of their own 
knowledge of the facts involved... Jolowicz's comparison certainly fits in with Iliad 23.486, where 
Agamemnon is called upon by Idomeneus and Ajax to act as an umpire familiar with the facts, 
as he is himself one of the spectators, in their controversy over the result of a chariot race. It is 
also in complete agreement with the etymological meaning of the term istor, and there can be 
little doubt that it applies as well to the istor who appears on the shield of Achilles.” 
47
 Face to face society is supported by: Finley [1973] 1985, p. 17 and (1983): pp. 28-9 and 82; 
Osborne (1985), pp. 64-5; Hunter (1994), pp. 96-119; Cohen D. (1991), pp. 155-6; Whitehead 
(1986), p. 69; For a contrary view see Cohen E. (2000), pp. 105ff. 
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acted as the legitimising force of a verdict. This can be interpreted as the root of 
‘decision-making by majority vote’ of later times. Spectators could hold judges 
to account (as they arguably did in classical Athens)48, limiting arbitrariness or 
inconsistency of decisions. Possibly, this was a subsidiary factor that induced 
archaic thesmothetae to write down their previous decisions for future 
reference49. 
  
Finally, the whole picture of archaic trials reveals the openness of the system. 
This aspect, favouring wide participation of amateurs, increased liberality in 
argumentation and, by the same token, resort to character evidence. Classical 
Athens insisted on an ideology of amateurism even after the full development of 
the court system. Despite their degree of experience,magistrates responsible 
for introducing cases to courts were plain citizens selected by lot, as were the 
jurors. Legal direction by any expert judge was absent, as was any formal 
deliberation before the verdict. Litigants, sometimes resorting to the aid of 
supporting speakers (and these, at least in principle, had a direct interest in the 
case), were expected to speak for themselves. Legal experts were approached 
with suspicion and overacting participants faced serious dangers50. In this legal 
environment, taking into account the traditionalism of ancient Greeks, it was 
safe to walk on the path of your predecessor, retaining the role originally 
ascribed to his office. Although the system evolved (from equity and 
reconciliation to law enforcement and ‘winner – loser’ system) and 
transformed51, significant trends remained.  
1.2 Rhetoric in the Poems of Hesiod  
Hesiod provides us with further evidence as to the evolution of the law in 
archaic Greece and the emergence of a legal system. What is particularly 
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 See Lanni (1997); on the incorruptibility of masses as opposed to less numerous panels of 
expert judges see Arist. Politics [1286b26-35], and Ath. Pol. 41.2; cf. Neel (1994) at p. 108; 
Mirhady (2006). 
49
 Arist. Ath. Pol. 3.4. 
50
 Cf. Lanni (1999), p. 29; Legal expertise as suspicious and as incentive for sycophancy is 
discussed by the majority of legal historians and classicists (an indicative list would include 
Lofberg (1976), Christ (1998a), Macdowell (1978) 62-66; Osborne (1993); Harvey (1993); Harris 
(1999). 
51
 For instance, Humphreys (1983) suggests that this partisan crowd was the precursor of the 
mass juries. 
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important to this study is the (explicit and implicit) evidence that both his major 
poems (Theogony, Works and Days) provide regarding argumentation during 
the settlement of disputes in the late 8th or early 7th century BCE52. The first 
passage that is of aid in tracing the remnants of archaic Greek law, with wide 
use of character evidence being one of them, comes from Hesiod’s Theogony 
(80-93). In that passage the poet refers to the benefits that the Muses confer on 
kings. If the Muses favour a king, Hesiod says: 
 
"soothing words flow from his mouth. And all the people look at him, deciding the proprieties 
with straight settlements. And he, speaking surely, quickly and intelligently puts an end to even 
a great dispute.” (84-90) Therefore there are intelligent kings, in order that in the agora [the 
public meeting or market place] they may easily restore matters for people who have suffered 
damages, persuading them with gentle words".
53
 
  
Evidence is therefore provided that the gift of persuasion and the value of 
rhetoric must have been already present in the archaic Greek system of justice. 
It may be assumed that when a notion (here rhetoric) is valued to such a degree 
that even the kings are considered blessed if the Muses confer on them this 
benefit, this notion is also looked for by common people, let alone by litigants. 
Moreover, such a system of – presumably - voluntary arbitration54 which favours 
equitable decisions with a view to reconciliation possibly provides a fertile 
ground for more natural and liberal argumentation. To follow Hesiod, rhetoric is 
valued for its soothing force in a village moot, capable of convincing both 
litigants and spectators for the ‘straightness’ of a judgment. Nevertheless, since 
public opinion played an important role in the proceedings, it need not be 
speculative if it is suggested that apart from the judge, litigants had to convince 
the audience as well. Conformity with public opinion by gaining its goodwill and 
concord would increase the chances of reaching a favourable conclusion55. 
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The second piece of literary evidence comes from Hesiod’s Works and Days 
(27-39). The central theme is the dispute56 between the poet and his brother 
Perses, after the division of their inheritance. Whatever the details of the case, 
Hesiod is unwilling to submit (or resubmit) the dispute to the ‘gift-devouring 
kings’ and calls his brother to settle the matter themselves. The voluntary nature 
of arbitration and Hesiod’s dislike of the judges (and / or their previous decision) 
have urged some scholars to propose that the recital of the Works and Days 
was an attempt to mobilise public opinion in order to achieve justice as he 
imagined it57. 
 
If this approach is correct (and in my opinion it largely is), then Hesiod’s Works 
and Days provides a testimony of a litigant’s plea in an effort to convince a 
mass audience. Liberal approach to argumentation could have reached the 
heights of poetry, and Hesiod’s verses provide us with a monument of positive 
character portrayal, namely a quiet, pious, caring individual valuing justice 
above anything else58. Following an ordinary for a litigant adversarial model of 
pleading, the main binary of this poem is between dike and hubris (or bie)59. His 
portrayal is continued in lines 189-94: 
  
                                                                                                                                
a judge must have had a more specific obligation to remember them accurately. Memory, then, 
was an essential faculty for an early Greek judge”. Such a verdict, being welcome by an already 
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“Settlements will be by force and one man will destroy the city of another. And there will be no 
appreciation of a man who keeps his oath nor of a just (dikaios) man nor of a good man, but 
they will instead honour the doer of evils and violence. Justice (dike) will be by force and there 
will be no respect, and the worse man will injure the better man by speaking with crooked 
words, and he will swear a false oath”. 
 
In his effort to win good will, Hesiod uses arguments that are in concord with the 
values of his audience60. Also, by presenting justice as a matter of importance 
to each individual, he heightens the level of attention61. In a subtle way, he 
attacks his brother’s character (214-6, 274-5) and transforms himself into a 
preacher of justice for the benefit of the polis (225-237). Positive portrayal of 
one’s character, innuendoes aiming at character assassination, and an effort to 
gain the goodwill of the audience by presenting oneself as a peaceful, just 
citizen, who by his behaviour promotes the public interest, are specific patterns 
of extra-legal argumentation in the Attic orators. Hesiod provides both direct and 
implicit evidence of a primal forensic rhetoric, traces of which have travelled 
through time and space to 4th century Athens. The innocent victim who acts in 
wholehearted adherence to the quiet communal norms required by the new 
institution of the polis (i.e. the image of a philopolis), whose personal dispute 
becomes a matter for the whole community and through the norms and ideas 
expressed achieves universality, touches the heart of Athenian forensic rhetoric.  
1.3 Probability and Character Evidence in the Homeric Hymn to 
Hermes 
The Homeric Hymn to Hermes is an invaluable piece of evidence about 
settlement of disputes in the late archaic period (presumably towards the end of 
the sixth century BCE)62. The dispute arises when the newly born Hermes 
steals Apollo’s cattle, hides them in a cave and slaughters two of them. Apollo, 
inquiring about his cattle accuses Hermes of the theft, while the latter in a 
masterpiece of character portrayal, denies that he even knows what cattle are, 
due to his infant ignorance. That moment is crucial to understand the use of 
character evidence in the archaic period. Hermes, in establishing character 
evidence as a method of pleading one’s case, sheds light on the inconsistency 
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of the deed with his personality, pointing to the unnaturalness of the deed for a 
person of his calibre and his age. Such an act neither conforms to his ‘role’ nor 
to the stereotypical behaviour to be expected by an infant. It is actually the very 
first evocation of an argument from probability. His disposition is to care about 
childish matters: 
  
“Am I like a cattle-lifter, a stalwart person? This is no task for me: rather I care for other things: I 
care for sleep, and milk of my mother's breast, and wrappings round my shoulders, and warm 
baths. Let no one hear the cause of this dispute; [270] for this would be a great marvel indeed 
among the deathless gods, that a child newly born should pass in through the forepart of the 
house with cattle of the field: herein you speak extravagantly. I was born yesterday, and my feet 
are soft and the ground beneath is rough; nevertheless, if you will have it so, I will swear a great 
oath by my father's head and vow that [275] neither am I guilty myself, neither have I seen any 
other who stole your cows —whatever cows may be; for I know them only by hearsay.” (265-
278) 
 
However, the conflict escalates. Apollo’s insulting words (280ff.) and threats of 
use of force, make Hermes suggest submission of their dispute to Zeus. An 
assembly of gods was called (326), with Zeus setting “the scales of judgment 
for them both” (324). The following scene reveals the adversarial nature of 
voluntary arbitration, where accusations and counteraccusations go hand in 
hand, in a manner reminding the method of argumentation in classical Athenian 
courts. Apollo, the ‘plaintiff’, concentrates on the central issue of the dispute 
accusing Hermes, the ‘defendant’, while the latter resorts to counteraccusations 
and a presentation of the wider context of the conflict, stating that Apollo burst 
into his house in an illegal search (368-86)63. Apollo, launching insults against 
the infant Hermes (336-40, 345) presents his case providing circumstantial 
evidence: Hermes was the thief. Any efforts from the infant to prove himself 
innocent, though ingenious, were unsuccessful. Apollo concludes that Hermes  
 
“lay down in his cradle in the gloom of a dim cave, as still as dark night, so that not even an 
eagle keenly gazing would have spied him. Much he rubbed his eyes with his hands as he 
prepared falsehood, and himself straightway said roundly: `I have not seen them: I have not 
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heard of them: no man has told me of them. I could not tell you of them, nor win the reward of 
telling.” (358-365). 
 
Hermes on the other hand begins with an attack against Apollo’s character 
pointing particularly on his violent behaviour and procedural norms: 
 
“He brought no witnesses with him nor any of the blessed gods who had seen the theft, but with 
great violence ordered me to confess, threatening much to throw me into wide Tartarus” (369-
374). 
 
Then, portraying himself as weak and above suspicion, in contrast with Apollo’s 
strength, offers a tricky, sophistic oath: 
 
“For he has the rich bloom of glorious youth, while I was born but yesterday —as he too knows 
—, nor am I like a cattle-lifter, a sturdy fellow. Believe my tale (for you claim to be my own 
father), that I did not drive his cows to my house —so may I prosper—nor crossed the threshold: 
this I say truly. I reverence Helios greatly and the other gods, and you I love and him I dread. 
You yourself know that I am not guilty: and I will swear a great oath upon it:—No! by these rich-
decked porticoes of the gods. And someday I will punish him, strong as he is, for this pitiless 
inquisition; but now do you help the younger.” (375-386) 
 
The poem, magnificently describing Hermes’ acting who, in his effort to gain the 
goodwill of the Gods and support his credibility, even kept his swaddling-clothes 
in order to prove that his character and age were inconsistent with such a deed: 
  
“So spake the Cyllenian, the Slayer of Argus, while he kept shooting sidelong glances and kept 
his swaddling-clothes upon his arm, and did not cast them away. But Zeus laughed out loud to 
see his evil-plotting child [390] well and cunningly denying guilt about the cattle.” (388-390). 
  
The dispute ends with Zeus convincing them to give up their anger, both taking 
positive steps to achieve reconciliation, which after all was the aim of voluntary 
arbitration of disputes64. Nonetheless, even under such secure conditions, the 
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poem offers an undoubted confirmation of the value of evidence from character 
in archaic Greece.  
1.4 The Transcendent Play: Aeschylus’ Eumenides 
The Eumenides (458 BCE) begins the action in a pre-judicial society, where the 
dispute arises not due to a breach of a (written) law but due to an act of 
intentional homicide65. This is unacceptable by the aggrieved parties and calls 
for retribution through self-help. The play is interpreted as the aetiological myth 
behind the establishment of the court of Areopagus and, by the same token, the 
court-system in general. Therefore, although referring to the distant past, 
Aeschylus mixes contemporary elements of judicial procedure and offers a 
transcendent picture of Athenian courts. Analysis of this play offers an insight to 
the underlying legal and rhetorical ideas of the day. Although sometimes 
deviating from the strict treatment of argumentation, the following discussion 
illuminates Athenian approaches to justice three decades before the period of 
the orators, sketches the canvas on which they have put their marks and 
reveals the structural and ideological tensions instigated by the reforms in the 
function of the Areopagus. 
  
The Furies, acting on behalf of Clytemnestra (the victim) chase Orestes (the 
perpetrator) to exact his punishment (135-140, 176, 185ff. 300). The Furies 
represent the Old Order, where acts of vengeance and retribution, justified by a 
primal sense of justice, lead to an interminable circle of violence between 
opponents. Orestes, desperate for protection, introduces the dispute in the 
public sphere, by asking the aid of Apollo. The purification offered by the latter 
(281-7, 445, 578), being a stage of the early process of overcoming the 
pollution inflicted on the perpetrator of homicide (which left its remnants to the 
classical age as well), is not sufficient. On the other hand, the Furies want the 
dispute to remain private. Only an intervention by a powerful, respected and 
widely accepted third party could end this circle of violence, by channelling the 
feud into an acceptable institution (here arbitration by Athena). Again, however, 
this is not perfectly legitimate, even though both parties agree to submit their 
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dispute to her. Athena, declares herself incompetent (470-2) and announces the 
foundation of a new institution, the court of the Areopagus. This new institution,  
which was foreseen by Apollo, provides alternative means of exacting justice, in 
the form of persuasive rhetoric rather than raw force (81-2). The fact that jurors 
are chosen among the finest citizens of Athens reserves consideration for public 
opinion, legitimising thus its operations. 
  
The facts of the case are not in dispute (463, 588, 611). Orestes has killed his 
mother, Clytemnestra, following the oracle of Apollo, in order to avenge the 
murder of his father. However, the parties disagree as to whether the murder 
was justified (lawful homicide 468, 472) or not, and both believe in the validity 
and justice of their claims (155, 210-220, 272, 312, 510). A mere conflict as to 
priority of values conceals a conflict between two worldviews. Gradually, the 
establishment of the court and the transformation of a never-ending dispute into 
a purely legal issue, transforms a pre-judicial society of disorder and self-help 
(personified by the Furies), into the new order of the Olympians, namely an 
ordered polis, founded on legality, justice and reconciliation66. 
 
The legal issues of the case are equally fascinating. The play transcends 
spacetime and shows a picture of three different systems of justice, one based 
on self – help and retribution, another on voluntary arbitration, and finally the 
formal adjudication within a court system. The first system represents a pre-
judicial era, where justice was equated with retribution and punishment. The 
second system represents a proto-judicial form of justice, which although 
retained down to the classical period, was based on equity67 rather than 
enforcement of law. Finally, the court of the Areopagus represents the rule of 
law; a legal order where disputes are transformed into legal cases, 
argumentation takes the form of forensic rhetoric, and an impartial jury gives its 
verdict in accordance with law (680, 710). This new institution, supported by the 
powerful members of society (here Athena), inspiring respect and fear – 
deterrence (690, 827), recognises as its primary aim the harmony of the polis. 
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Public interest and social order provide benefits for the parties themselves; 
apparently, when the Furies (the losing party of a tie vote) face the dilemma of 
dwelling honoured in a prospering Athens or leaving (851-870, 887), they 
decide for the former (900). 
  
Nevertheless, this picture of the court is not fully consistent with the Athenian 
system in practice. Arbitration can be a win-win system, but court decisions tend 
to create winners and losers68. Under the latter, reconciliation is not possible 
and losing parties may be aggrieved and subsequently hostile to the polis. On 
the other hand, lenient treatment or avoidance of harsh punishment to keep 
both parties satisfied may become disadvantageous. When the Furies describe 
how disorder and injustice will prevail if the unjust fears no more, they anticipate 
possible tensions and balance of interests that this court system has to 
encounter. 
  
Aeschylus proposes a mixture of the three systems of justice, retaining the 
positive features of each. Fear of punishment (in the form of violent retribution) 
of the first system, is transformed and legitimised under the shield of the polis, 
and the law, impartial and cold provides in advance the outcome of each case. 
Arbitration, especially in a voluntary manner aims at reconciliation. Aeschylus 
retains this utmost purpose as beneficial to the new order. Thus, for the new 
system to promote the harmony of the polis, it has to aim at the reconciliation of 
the parties, simultaneously promoting the good will of the losing party towards 
the city. Instead of simply using the strong arm of the law as punishment and 
deterrence, which could provoke humiliation and create incentives for revenge, 
one should aim at the transformation of the losing party into an educated good 
member of the polis. Finally, the arbitrariness of primitive systems is substituted 
by the rule of law as expressed by the verdicts of an impartial court. Legitimacy 
is guaranteed by the participation of citizens, the jurors’ submission to oaths 
and the public’s harmonious adherence to decisions. 
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Aeschylus’ vision, as interpreted here, notwithstanding the expressed 
reservations, is not entirely alien to Athenian courts. Although arbitration 
(promoting equitable solutions) and court system (reaching legal verdicts) 
coexisted in classical Athens in a parallel fashion, this process of evolutionary 
experimentation transformed the archaic ideas about justice and created new 
ideals. Athenian traditionalism is undisputed, but the extremely important 
innovations of written law-codes, mass jury courts (as opposed to potential 
arbitrary magistrates), and legal verdicts (verified by oaths), allowed for a 
different approach to justice. In this context of tension and order, 
experimentation and steadiness, reconciliation and punishment, a new legal 
system emerged; elaborate, pluralistic, and capable of achieving the rule of law. 
The new courts of law, final guardians of legality, retained tolerance to liberal 
argumentation, allowing for flexibility, albeit without inhibiting the emergence of 
the rule of law. 
 
In the Eumenides in particular, as far as rhetoric is concerned, many similarities 
can be observed with the Attic orators. A wide use of extra-legal argumentation 
is adduced, notwithstanding the fact that Athena reminds the jurors to respect 
their oath (490, 710). Certainly, this does not mean that, as Aeschylus favoured 
a semi-legal, semi-equitable approach to justice, the same is true for Athenian 
courts of the late 5th and early 4th century. Nevertheless, this liberal 
argumentation found in the Eumenides, adds one more argument that this 
approach was a remnant of the archaic age, neither inconsistent with legality 
and justice nor with the requirement of ‘speaking to the point’. Character 
evidence, though more relevant to the context of arbitration, was apparently 
(and purposefully) not restrained under the new system of courts. 
  
In the play, Orestes and Apollo use arguments about the ‘public interest’, try to 
gain the good will of the jurors and picture the impact of a positive verdict (289, 
670). In the Attic orators, it is usual for a litigant, apart from mentioning any 
harsh impact of a potential adverse verdict, to stress the justice of his case in 
connection with the positive public impact that a favourable to himself outcome 
[65] 
 
would produce69. On the other hand, the adversarial nature of Athenian trials 
forced opponents to refute such an argument in order to prevent a favourable to 
the adversary verdict70. Hence, such a ‘public impact’ consideration still retained 
its force. However, what is not explicitly evidenced in the Attic orators (and this 
is certainly explicable) is the kind of argumentation resembling that of the 
Furies. They, in their part, also argue about the impact that an adverse verdict 
would have, not on them (as in the Attic orators) but on the polis (502, 720). 
This impact was their direct threat of destruction and famine that would fall on 
the city. Nonetheless, in the context of Athenian trials, such arguments would 
be suicidal71. Aeschylus, through the final appeasement of the Furies, reveals 
the proper way of making this system work. One way or another, invocation of 
such argumentation based on public interest remained central and relevant to 
the legal case. 
  
Another similarity with the Attic orators, refers to the issue of ‘political 
correctness’ shown by hereditary loyalty to the court, the constitution, or the 
jurors (or the opposite, hereditary enmity)72. A similar argument is adduced 
(455-6) to reveal the friendly relations of Orestes’ father, Agamemnon (whose 
death he avenged), with Athena. This argument aimed at the establishment of 
contact with the jurors, directly or indirectly in order to gain their good will. A 
similar tactic is used by Apollo, when he argues that his oracle interpreted the 
will of Zeus (617-21). Athenian litigants frequently refer to their services to the 
polis and their friendly relations with highly respected members of society or 
their detestation and enmity to persons hated by the jurors as well73. This 
establishment of concord in order to produce a friendly disposition of the 
audience is also suggested by Aristotle (e.g. Rhetoric 1381a, Nic. Eth. 1167a-
b). 
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Athena, in a procedure resembling ‘anakrisis’74, had already asked for the 
background of the parties, as well as the background to the dispute. Apollo, a 
supporting speaker (579), argues for the justice of Orestes’ act (as well as his 
own support) by arguing that his oracle was Zeus’ command, which here 
represents the ultimate law (621). Apollo is the infallible interpreter of Zeus’ will, 
and since Orestes’ act conformed to his interpretation, it is unavoidable that the 
three of them are in concord. Again, this resembles paradigms from Athenian 
courts, in the sense that litigants offered themselves interpretations of relevant 
laws, and tried to prove that their acts were in concord with the interpretation of 
the stronger party, the majority vote of the jury. In the absence of ratio 
decidendi, winning litigants’ speeches, substituted the archaic judges’ opinions 
from which the ‘straightest judgment’ was chosen (as represented in the scene 
of Achilles’ shield), and contained the verdicts’ rationales75. The adversarial 
nature of argumentation is much more evident than in Attic orators but 
nevertheless retains similar characteristics. Refutations of the adversary’s 
arguments, a wider background of the dispute (625) in order to prove one’s 
right, an effort to gain the goodwill of the judge (666), arguments from precedent 
(not strictly legal but persuasive: 718) and reference to gratitude (725) are 
offered. 
 
A closer look of the above issues is revealing. Athena establishes the fairness 
of the procedure by asking both parties to submit their cases (428). The Furies, 
while interrogating the matricide Orestes, rejoice at their successful attempts in 
showing his guilt (589), simultaneously trying to influence the jurors. On the 
other hand, Orestes, willingly submits his fate to Athena. His former supplication 
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(474), although not taking place in the course of the trial, also reminds scenes 
from Athenian trials where defendants chose this ultimate method of asking for 
pity, coupled with their innocence76. Apollo, the supporting speaker, uses 
euphemistic words for the court directly addressing the jury (614) and for 
Athena (664), while degrading the Furies with insulting name-calling (644). 
Furthermore, the praise for the dead manly warrior Agamemnon (625, 637), 
especially in light of his sneaky murder by a woman (627) and wife, is used to 
arouse the emotions of the jurors (638), and closely  resembles the tactics of 
argumentation in Athenian homicide trials. Finally, Apollo’s personal occupation 
as being the infallible soothsayer of Zeus’ will (616) proves the justice of 
Orestes’ act, and again reminds the positive or (mainly) negative effect of 
referring to occupation or calling in the Attic orators in order to prove or disprove 
the credibility and disposition of a litigant. 
  
The use of precedent is equally interesting. Although modern scholars attribute 
different characteristics and aims to this form of argumentation in Athenian 
courts77, it is useful to remember that Aristotle in his Rhetoric (not a legal 
treatise but a manual for speakers), treated precedent as a form of example 
whose aim was not solely to prove the legality of a case but to persuade the 
audience about the truth or plausibility of an argument by reference to the past 
(e.g. Rhet. 1356b, 1357b, 1377a etc.). In the Eumenides, at first sight, a similar 
approach is taken, but a closer look will reveal that different forms of precedent 
(factual, legal, persuasive) had already been clarified. 
  
Starting with the simplest form of precedent that is used in the text, the factual, 
it does not require any legal insight but merely rational thought in recognising 
similarities and differences. Apollo in support of his argument that father is the 
real parent of a child, and therefore Orestes’ act of matricide is justified in 
avenging the death of his father, cites  the following as example, which although 
not repeatable has persuasive force: 
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“The mother of what is called her child is not the parent, but the nurse of the newly-sown 
embryo. The one who mounts is the parent, whereas she, as a stranger for a stranger, 
preserves the young plant, if the god does not harm it. And I will show you proof of what I say: a 
father might exist without a mother. A witness is here at hand, the child of Olympian Zeus, who 
was not nursed in the darkness of a womb, and she is such a child as no goddess could give 
birth to” (658-65). 
  
Notwithstanding the fact that such an argument is far from persuasive and 
highly sophistic, it nonetheless shows how an argument from precedent could 
be used in support of one’s case. The second example is deeper and more 
revealing. When Apollo argues that Zeus gives a greater honour to a father’s 
death, the Furies remind him that Zeus himself bound his aged father (640-3). 
Nevertheless, Apollo, in a logically and legally persuasive argument, 
distinguishes the two cases by arguing that 
  
“Zeus could undo fetters, there is a remedy for that, [645] and many means of release. But 
when the dust has drawn up the blood of a man, once he is dead, there is no return to life.” 
(644-7). 
  
An act of homicide needs to be distinguished from a rectifiable act of violence. 
Finally, I would argue that the third example of argumentation from precedent 
suffices to clinch the issue. Both litigants address the jurors while they vote, 
arguing for the justice of their case (711-714).  The Furies threaten them with 
their rage while Apollo directs them to respect his oracles, which come from 
Zeus. To this the Furies protest and refer to them as outside the scope of 
Apollo’s oracle since they are impure. Apollo’s reply is convincing: 
  
“Then was my father mistaken in any way in his purposes when Ixion, who first shed blood, was 
a suppliant?” (717-8). 
  
Apollo refers to a previous, unmistakable ‘verdict’ taken by Zeus. How similar 
were the two cases? The most complete account of Ixion's tale comes from 
Pindar in his Pythian Odes. Ixion is a fundamental character in Greek 
mythology, significant in many respects, but is chiefly known as the first human 
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to shed kindred blood. This occurred when Ixion invited his father-in-law, 
Deioneus, to come and collect the price that Ixion owed him for his bride. Upon 
his arrival, Deioneus fell into a pit filled with burning coals Ixion had 
camouflaged. Because this was a crime new to the human race, nobody could 
purify Ixion and he wandered in exile. Zeus took pity on him and decided not 
only to purify Ixion, but to invite him to Olympus as a guest. The similarity of the 
case Apollo chooses is striking. The first example of legal precedent is set, in 
Aeshylus’ aetiological myth behind the creation of the court. 
  
Concluding, it is evident that in these early, and maybe unsure, days of the new 
court system (following the reforms of Ephialtes), influences of the status quo 
are evident. The Eumenides provides an example of the method of 
argumentation during the settlement of disputes, establishing the claim that a 
wide use of character evidence was indeed present before the age of the Attic 
orators. By the same token, this way of argumentation, survived from previous 
years and probably, from previous systems of justice. 
1.5 Evidence from Comparison: The Story of Deiokes 
The Median Deiokes was a man of great ability and popularity as described by 
Herodotus in his Histories (1.96ff.). Although written in the second quarter of the 
5th century, and this alone explains many of this period’s biases, the story refers 
to the late 8th century BCE. Deiokes, a man of mark in his own village (since the 
Medes had established themselves in small settlements) was chosen to 
arbitrate his fellow villagers’ disputes. His reputation for integrity and fair 
judgment made him a preferable judge for all the Medes, until one day, realising 
his great power, he announced that he got tired from this process and wanted to 
retreat to privacy. The result was an increase of disorder and contempt for law; 
therefore the Medes called for a general meeting in order to deliberate on the 
issue. Their decision was to centralise the government by setting up a 
monarchy, with Deiokes being their chosen ruler. Deiokes’ first act was to 
command his subjects to build him a palace and to grant him the protection of a 
private guard. Nevertheless, this was not the only change. A certain ceremonial 
was established to prove his superiority and the procedure of justice was 
transformed.  
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“Once his sovereign power was firmly established, he continued his strict administration of 
justice. All suits were conveyed to him in the form of written documents, which he would send 
back after recording upon them his decisions”
 78. 
 
The above story provides valuable evidence, especially if examined through a 
Greek lens and evaluated in contrast to their practices. Although it does not 
explicitly provide evidence for the kind of argumentation used before a tribal 
judge, the passage is illuminating if contrasted to the Greek public and open 
approach to justice. It may therefore be used as circumstantial evidence (by 
comparison) in order to supplement our previous findings. Firstly, an inference 
may be drawn that Deioces, in his early steps, acquired his prominent status 
due to the support of public opinion as well as the voluntary acquiescence of 
litigants to his verdicts. This suggests that decisions were taken publicly, in a 
kind of a village moot, resembling the archaic Greek practice as described by 
Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric Hymn to Hermes79.  
This picture, which closely resembles the Greek experience of the archaic 
period, is contrasted with Deioces’ behaviour after his acquisition of power. 
Village moot is substituted by autocratic decision-making, arbitration and 
reconciliation by espionage and punishment, and presumably relaxed, oral, 
liberal argumentation by stricter, shorter, written pleas80. Herodotus, by 
providing this example from Persian experience, offers a sharp contrast with the 
traditional openness of the Greek legal system, which favoured amateurism and 
participation  rather than professionalism (which could prove dangerous) and 
exclusion, and promoted a democratic legitimisation of judiciary rather than 
Deiokes’ autocratic (and potentially arbitrary) methods. In Athens for instance, 
public opinion retained its traditional role as the legitimising force behind 
decisions81and litigants’ argumentation should take this into account. The 
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 Hdt. Hist. 1.100: In addition to this there were other practices he introduced: if he heard of any 
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presence of elite bystanders and numerous spectators in the corona may have 
affected the litigants' rhetoric in a number of quite different ways82. The 
connection between the classical Athenian approach to justice (and, by 
inference, to argumentation) and its archaic counterpart is obvious. The story of 
Deiokes proves that the Athenians were aware of alternative approaches to 
justice; nonetheless they deliberately and purposely chose to retain an open 
and public legal system. A significant component of this system was the 
liberality in argumentation enjoyed by litigants, in the belief that this served the 
courts’ purpose of attaining the truth.  
 
1.6 Archaic Legal Remnants in the Classical Legal System 
1.6.1 Homicide laws 
Apart from the archaic legal remnants drawn from the trial scene depicted on 
the shield, even more can be adduced. First of all, in order to avoid speculation, 
hard evidence should be adduced, like the inscriptions of Draco’s homicide laws 
of the seventh century. These laws reveal the traditionalism of Athenians, since 
they were attributed a divine origin83 and due to their ancestry, were valued 
above all other laws at least until the late fourth century84. They remained 
unspoilt during Solon’s important innovations of the early 6th century, survived 
Cleisthenes’ reforms of 508/7 BC, and were the first to be re-inscribed 
(unaltered) during the wide revision of laws in the last decade of the 5th 
century85. The great respect of the Athenians for their tradition salvaged Draco’s 
laws unchanged for more than three centuries. The extension of homicide laws 
(e.g. by introducing the procedure of apagoge, introduced in the second half of 
the fifth century86), simply corroborates the idea that ancestral legal norms, 
                                                                                                                                
Athenian democracy, the immunity of its mass juries from formal accountability”; cf. p. 188: “The 
corona may have served to rectify a perceived weakness in the Athenian democracy…the 
decisions of a jury could not be appealed and jurors were the only state officials not subject to 
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overwhelmingly procedural, gradually gained substance and developed 
simultaneously with the whole system. Their supplementation by the 
introduction of supportive written laws and their non-legalistic definition through 
oral norms did not strip them of their initial rationale87. Changes were made with 
a view to extend the scope of the original law, rather than alter or repeal it88. 
1.6.2 Archives 
Another traditional aspect that was supplemented and enhanced during the next 
centuries was the inscription of archives and records. The archaic period was 
an enormously significant era in every aspect of human life. In particular, wider 
utilisation of writing, gradually made law the property of all citizens 
indiscriminately (especially in the context of openness of a Greek polis). Even if 
the original purposes of written laws were the avoidance of arbitrariness (to be 
effected by the presence of checks from other members of the ruling elite) and 
the inscription of the more controversial rules89, nevertheless, with the aid of 
time, written rules acquired the status of the only legitimate law, seen as the 
ultimate democratic and just ruler90. Also, it was a major step towards a society 
ruled by law. Writing laws and recording previous decisions (as the 
thesmothetae did) triggered a habit of public lawmaking and enforcement, which 
in turn was undoubtedly proved a prolific seed of later democracy. Citizens were 
now able to see the actual law carved on wood or stone91, and at Athens in 
particular, they even developed a public archive, the Metroon92. By the 
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introduction of written laws (nomoi) for the substitution of thesmoi93, the early 
judges’ possible arbitrariness was curtailed. In classical Athens, officials were 
forbidden to use unwritten laws (Andoc. 1.85-7), litigants faced the threat of 
severe punishment for citing a non-existent law (Dem. 26.24) and, by the early 
fourth century, witnesses presented their testimonies in written form. Originating 
in the innovations of archaic Greece, a modern legal system had emerged.  
1.7 Conclusion 
One could find many examples of ancestral legal remnants in classical Athenian 
law, whether concentrating on procedure or in the powers of the officials94. 
Although Athens experienced important changes and innovations in the fields of 
law and politics, the fact that these were probably less violent than in other city-
states provided for a smoother evolution of its legal system. Oral rules and 
norms were codified in the form of written laws, disputable themistes of the past 
gave place to nomoi legitimised by the community, and self-help was 
substituted by an elaborate system, either of law-courts or public and private 
arbitration. 
  
The system developed through progressive consolidation of previous norms. 
These, after being recorded and publicised, were gradually substantiated, 
clarified, and supplemented in order to reach the picture sketched in the Attic 
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accepted rules of behaviour… by the fourth century nomos was the normal word for a statute, a 
law published in writing and validated by a political process” Macdowell (1978), p. 44; The usual 
Athenian word for law in the seventh or sixth century was thesmos, but nomos in the fifth and 
fourth. Ostwald (1969) suggests that the substitution of nomos for thesmos was a deliberate act 
of policy by Cleisthenes as part of the establishment of democracy in 507 BC. 
94
 For instance, Wolff (1946), pp. 82ff. says about the procedure of ‘anakrisis’: “in an epoch 
when a well-established judicial system, by requiring written plaints and peaceful summonses, 
had long succeeded in eliminating force as a means of seeking the realization of rights, the 
anakrisis none the less still reflected the function of the archaic official, who maintained the 
peace of the community by inhibiting arbitrary acts of self-help and arranging for a judicial 
control of its use.”; Cf. the procedure of ‘epidikasia’: “The right to employ self-help might be 
beyond doubt, and then it was the duty of the public authority to lend it its backing. This too is 
reflected in an institution of the classical legal system of Athens; and here the original function 
of the magistrate is even more clearly visible, since it resulted in a lawful use of self-help by 
virtue of a mere provisional permission of the archon. This was the επιδικασία, an act through 
which the archon, upon request, allowed heirs who were not descendents, and as such 
domestic successors, of the deceased to take possession of the latter's estate; an επιδικασία 
decree was also issued for him who claimed the hand of an heiress as her closest kinsman. The 
επιδικασία was an administrative act based on police power, not a judgment.”. 
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orators. Although primal oral rules were mainly procedural (and this is attested 
in the epigraphic evidence), in classical Athens substance was equally, if not 
more, important95. In the absence of hard evidence, any effort to reconstruct a 
precise history of character evidence in Athens may resort to speculation. 
However, my impression, based on the above discussion, is that the evident (to 
modern standards) wide use of such argumentation has firm roots in the past. 
Its persistence and its preservation have to warn us against any easy 
conclusions based merely on the evidence provided by the Attic orators. Deeper 
roots have to be traced and universal explanations of this phenomenon need to 
be sought. 
  
The existence of rhetoric, not as a scientifically formulated art but as a set of 
common sense rules formed by a natural inclination towards persuasive 
speech, is apparent from Homer onwards. Literary evidence supports such a 
view. Hesiod portrays persuasive speech as a gift of the Muses. Hermes offers 
the first attested argument from probability, in an example of adversarial 
argumentation closely resembling arguments from classical Athens. The 
presence of procedural norms in early Greek law and their codification, 
interpreted together with the methods of argumentation attested in the archaic 
literature, induces one to argue for the presence of a rule of relevance in 
archaic Greece, with the sole requirement to ‘speak to the point’, which was 
gradually substantiated and gained clarity and precision before the age of the 
orators. 
  
This argument becomes less speculative due to the fact that this rule is attested 
1) in relation to the court of Areopagus, and 2) in relation to private suits (dikai). 
The court of the Areopagus was respected as the most ancient and traditional 
court institution of Athens. Its origins cannot be traced with precision, with myth 
and history further clouding the picture. Aristotle informs us that litigants there 
were forbidden to speak outside the issue (Arist. Rhet. 1354a22-3). In 
conjunction with this, in dikai, the court procedure most resembling archaic trials 
(as depicted e.g. in the shield of Achilles), it was required that “opposing 
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litigants swear to direct their speeches to the actual issue” (Arist. Ath. Pol. 
67.1)96. 
  
In my opinion, it is not a mere coincidence that this rule of relevance is provided 
for these two institutions. It is reasonable that in archaic trials, litigants, far from 
exchanging insults, gossiping and deviating from the main points of the case - 
which would certainly disgruntle the audience (in the agora) and the judges 
(who had to judge other cases as well97) – they were encouraged to offer their 
viewpoint, not in a limitless manner but by speaking to the point. Though 
originally loosely formulated, the self-regulation of the parties informed by the 
component of the views of litigants, spectators, and judges as to what is 
relevant, presumably could define this rule98. Such an approach coincides with 
the more general picture of Greek law. The Greeks, believing in the capability of 
anyone to grasp the meaning of legal justice, interpreted their laws by common 
sense. By the same token, verdicts were validated by the assent of the majority, 
rather than by legal expertise. 
  
The result of this approach was their indifference as to codification of their 
findings in a scholarly manner, but the success in making law a common 
property99. After all, their laws were not strange to them; they were made by the 
community and for the community. Plain citizens were the first and the last to 
understand them and adjust their behaviour accordingly. They deserved the 
acknowledgement of their capability in defining them and the privilege of 
interpreting and enforcing them. Athens in particular offers  a good example, as 
common sense interpretation of laws was proved by the majority decision-
making of mass juries. Although it may be argued that such an approach may 
lead to inconsistency, the traditionalism of Athenian society, the limitations 
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posed by the presence of written laws, and the obligation of jurors to judge in 
accordance with their oath (thus according to the laws), enabled the Athenian 
courts to overcome this trap. Additionally, litigants were required to speak to the 
point, and probably (to the Athenians’ opinion) were largely successful100. It 
therefore needs to be asked why they were successful by their own standards 
instead of supplementing their own view with modern presuppositions. Modern 
scholars, especially when using a developmental or a structural methodology 
cannot really be objective about relevance in Athenian courts. Modern 
presuppositions need to be forgotten and a deep understanding of the Greek 
ideas and way of thinking needs to be promoted. After all, in such controversial 
issues such as the definitions of the rule of law or legal relevance, no easy 
solutions can be offered. What was considered relevant in 19th century Britain 
may be irrelevant today or what is relevant in contemporary United States may 
be irrelevant in Saudi Arabia. 
  
The consistent patterns that Athenian litigants followed for more than a century 
can be interpreted as the substantiation of a previously uncodified concept as to 
what is relevant. Presumably, these patterns reveal that after years of 
experimentation, argumentation found in the Attic orators was considered to be 
to the point as regards the illumination of factual and legal issues. 
Simultaneously, jurors probably expected their invocation, affording to such 
arguments a second dimension as efficient means of persuasion. The final 
point, namely that all participants in Athenian trials remained loyal to patterns, 
proves that Athenian courts (though maybe following a different path) were 
actually capable of achieving a relative, at least, degree of consistency, 
supported by their consistent approach to rhetoric and to what is relevant. 
Deciding strictly legal issues as well as highlighting the significance of social 
norms, extended the rules of relevance but conformed to judging cases in a 
manner far from ad hoc or inconsistent. The next chapters will further illuminate 
the issue.  
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2 CHAPTER TWO: INCENTIVES FOR WIDE USE OF 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN THE ATHENIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
2.1 Characteristics of the Athenian Legal System as Incentives for 
Wide Invocation of Character Evidence 
The purpose of this discussion of the Athenian legal system is not to give a 
detailed account of its institutions and procedures; this is an undertaking 
beyond the scope of the present study. On the contrary I will briefly concentrate 
on some key aspects and peculiarities that relate to the wide use of extra – 
legal argumentation in Athenian courts and provide some aid in understanding 
the extent and types of character evidence put forward by the litigants. 
2.1.1 : The Democratic Nature of the System 
The first aspect to be highlighted is the democratic nature of the system. As in 
all its institutions and constituents, the Athenian legal system was consistent in 
its pursuit of strict democracy. Equality in the opportunities for participation, by 
demolishing the barriers of birth and wealth, signified a right to participate in 
every public business. By the same token, all Athenian citizens could participate 
in the process of adjudication. Each year, any male citizen over the age of thirty 
could put himself forward and be selected by sortition as one of the 6,000 jurors 
that manned the Athenian courts. Private cases were decided by a democratic 
jury of at least 201 members, public ones by at least 501, a number that in most 
serious cases was multiplied and (though extremely rarely if ever) could extend 
to all 6,000 jurors. Verdicts were taken by majority vote, without the aid of any 
legal experts and judges, or the opportunity for formal deliberation among 
jurors. Aristotle says that the ballot of the courts was a major contributing factor 
to the creation of democracy, since when the demos took power over the 
courts, magistrates’ powers were delimited and common people increased their 
influence
1. As a result, participants in Athenian adjudication were obliged to convince 
[78] 
 
large panels acting as representatives of the body of the 30,000 or so Athenian 
citizens. Therefore any argument they used and, in particular, any evidence 
from character they invoked should conform to the mentality of the polis and its 
communal norms.   
2.1.2 : The Ideology of Amateurism 
Directly connected with the democratic nature of the Athenian legal system, is 
the pervasive ideology of amateurism, or the “complete absence of 
professionals or experts”2. In essence, the interconnection of these two 
characteristics lies on the Athenian belief that “professionalism and democracy 
were regarded as, at bottom, contradictory”3. The fact that wide participation of 
laymen was promoted through the introduction of measures such as state pay, 
annual rotation in most public offices, and sortition between nominees, added to 
the absence of competent state machinery, such as a Director of Public 
Prosecutions or police, cases were initiated and pursued until their end by 
private individuals. These features were so deeply entrenched in the democratic 
ideology of the polis, to the extent that legal professionals were seen with 
suspicion and hostility. 
  
The importance of this characteristic of the Athenian legal system when seen as 
an incentive for the wider use of character evidence can be traced by analogy, 
in particular with modern English criminal law. Drawing from research on the 
development of the English criminal process from the mid-eighteenth to the late 
twentieth century one can sketch “a broad movement from ideas of 
responsibility as founded in character to conceptions of responsibility as 
founded in capacity”4. During this process “as confidence in substantive 
evaluations of character diminished, yet as demands for legitimisation 
increased, the criminal process was in search of a conception of criminal 
responsibility which could be explicated in legal, technical terms, and hence 
legitimated as a form of specialist knowledge underpinning an impersonal mode 
of judgment. The full articulation of such a system depended, however, on a 
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number of other institutional features which developed only slowly from the late 
eighteenth century on: an adversarial trial dominated by lawyers; a 
sophisticated law of evidence; a further professionalization of legal practice.”5. 
By contrast, the Athenians never felt the pressing need for such an ‘impersonal’ 
mode of judgment or for the legitimisation of democratic court verdicts through 
formalisation and expertise. The character of the ‘polis – citizen’ relationship as 
opposed to the modern ‘state – individual’, the absence of urbanisation and 
industrialisation (that supports a more individualistic mode of living), and their 
distinctive ideas of ‘character’ and ‘personality’, allowed for a composite idea of 
responsibility based on ‘status’ (adherence to behavioural standards as a result 
of being a citizen) and ‘personality’ (a human being with distinct dispositions 
and traits). The total lack of professionalism is merely the – astonishing - sign of 
this approach.   
 
The results of this fact can be observed in divergent fields and stages of 
adjudication. Litigants, with (in principle) minimal help from legal experts or 
speechwriters, conducted research into the relevant laws and decrees, and they 
largely decided the strategy and presentation of their case. Therefore, the 
amateur  litigant faced a number of challenges; either to rely entirely on legal 
documents and technical issues (which could trigger the suspicion of the 
audience) or to concentrate on narrative and extra – legal argumentation. Either 
way one ought to keep a balance, since his adversary lurked to expose the 
opponents’ weaknesses. The amateurism of the system is also highlighted by 
the slim limitations on the presence of allegedly partisan witnesses and 
supporting speakers, whose aim was predominantly to promote  the parties’ 
interests6. Nonetheless, any generalisation could be misleading and caution is 
needed in the treatment of the role of witnesses in Athenian courts. Their 
function has been interpreted as highly biased, yet certain safeguards could be 
implemented in order to ensure their compliance with the requirement to attest 
to the truth of alleged facts. Disregard of this expectation or non-appearance at 
the trial could trigger a prosecution against them (dike pseudomarturion) or 
alternative safeguarding procedures such as exomosia, kleteusis and dike 
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lipomarturiou. In cases of false witnessing, their (written from 380 BC onwards) 
testimonies could be used as evidence in a subsequent trial against them. 
Although these mechanisms may have limited the presence of untruthful 
partisan witnesses (this may be partly proved by the fact that there are rare 
attacks against their characters to undermine their credibility and 
trustworthiness), the lack of coherent and formalised legal rules allowed for 
uncertainty in that field too7. 
  
The ideology of amateurism in the Athenian legal system  led the protagonists 
to neglect any systematic and professional treatment of legal rules. A lot of 
interpretations and explanations can be offered, but the essence remains that 
the Athenians regarded law as common sense and common property, departing 
from the idea of expertise. As a result, diachronically, rules of admissibility are 
interpreted at will. Certainly at least in homicide cases before the Areopagus 
litigants were obliged to speak only to the charge in question; this rule possibly 
had effect in the popular courts as well especially in private cases8. 
Nevertheless, such a compact rule could be  open to a series of interpretations. 
The accusatorial nature of Athenian courts and the amateurism of participants 
meant that litigants could exploit it to their advantage and make use of a more 
liberal interpretation of the ‘speak to the point’ clause. This in turn could 
facilitate an expansive use of character evidence relating either to the issue of 
guilt (in the form of propensity evidence) or to the trustworthiness and credibility 
of the speakers. In theory, therefore, the absence of any exclusionary rules 
means that the rule of relevance could have been transformed into a black hole, 
an all-inclusive clause, vulnerable to subjective interpretations as to its 
meaning9.  
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Furthermore, the lack of formalisation in almost every part of the system (no 
strict legal precedence, no official detailed record of past decisions, no ratio 
decidendi etc.) allowed for divergent interpretations of court verdicts. As a result 
of this relative uncertainty, defendants thought necessary, in addition to a 
precise reply to the legal charges, to offer a more general account of their life in 
an effort to increase their chances of success by provoking the audience’s good 
will and advertising their character’s credibility. The objectives of the system in 
accepting such arguments and the themes / patterns that speakers followed are 
the subjects of another chapter. What is important here is the attested belief 
that evocation of character evidence was necessary in order to offer a complete 
speech. As Todd, somewhat excessively, notes: “the way to success in an 
Athenian court is to use all your available artillery”10. 
   
How the  rule of relevance (i.e. that litigants should speak to the point) could be 
enforced is even more complicated. Again, the absence of a professional expert 
or judge responsible for the direction of the jury as to the admissibility of 
evidence, led this enforcement to be effected presumably by the disapproval of 
the audience11. The thorubos (tumult) could take place in dicastic and non-
dicastic settings and could be originated from the panel of jurors itself or from 
the spectators watching the legal case from the corona12. Bers, in the still most 
informing study on dicastic thorubos, concludes that “fairly early in the fifth 
century thorubos was common at large official meetings”13. In the dicastic 
context, there could be positive and negative reasons that incited uproar. A 
speaker could ask the jury to confirm or disprove a story or a fact14 or he could 
incite the jurors to interrupt, limit or control the speech of the opponent 
(presumably due to the latter’s irrelevant argumentation)15. In [Dem.] 45, 
Apollodorus asks the jurors: 
 
“Let him not, then, leave this and talk about matters regarding which I am not suing him; and do 
you, if he is so shameless, refuse to permit it” ([Dem.] 45.50).  
                                            
10
 Todd (1993), p. 138. 
11
 Bers (1985) 
12
 For reference to thorubos in symbouleutic contexts, see Dem. 19.23, 113; 18.143; 19.15, 45, 
122; Aeschin. 1.34, 80; 2.84, 153; 3.82, 224; Andoc. 2.15; Lys. 12.73. 
13
 Bers (1985), p. 3, Plut. Life of Aristides, 4.1. 
14
 See Is. 5.20; Dem. 18.10; 44.79; 47.44; 50.3; Din. 1.41-3. 
15
 See Hyp. 1.11; Dem. 19.75, 162; 18.2, 160; 21.28, 40; Is. 6.62. 
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In fact, Apollodorus himself had already been the victim of dicastic thorubos as 
he mentions earlier in his speech. He claims (no matter how much he 
overdramatises) that his opponent: 
 
“by reading these documents and making other false statements which he thought would favour 
his case, he made such an impression on the jury that they refused to hear a single word from 
me. I was fined one-sixth of the amount claimed," was denied the right of a hearing, and was 
treated with such contumely as I doubt if any other man ever was, and I went from the court, 
men of Athens, taking the matter bitterly and grievously to heart”. ([Dem.] 45.6) 
 
Thus, the panel’s (more or less fair) spontaneous negative reaction to a 
litigant’s argumentation could cause disturbances and pose a serious problem 
to the smooth delivery of his speech16. In anticipation to this, Hyperides tells the 
jurors: 
 
“Just as you have allowed my accusers to conduct the prosecution as they wanted, so allow me 
to deliver my defence, to the best of my ability, in the manner I choose. Don’t interrupt me, 
asking, ‘Why do you tell us this?’ Don’t add anything of your own to the prosecution’s arguments 
but rather listen carefully to my defence”.
17 (Hyp. 1, fr. 2) 
 
The dicastic thorubos was the most efficient method of keeping litigants’ rhetoric 
to the point. Nonetheless, this self-regulating mechanism of the court would 
probably carry with it the pros and cons of large bodies with their mass 
psychology. Despite the fact that Athenian juries were largely experienced in 
listening to lengthy and eloquent speeches, the oral delivery, the lack of 
exclusionary rules of evidence, and the absence of any kind of deliberation18 
before the vote could presumably make them disregard any inconsistencies in 
the litigants’ argumentation, allow room for extraneous issues and be swayed 
                                            
16
 E.g. Dem. 45.6; 57.63-65; cf. Hyp. 4.31. 
17
 Cooper, the translator and editor of this speech for the University of Texas Press Series of 
Attic Orators, comments on this passage (p.71, n. 5): “Speakers often ask their audience not to 
interrupt.It is hard to know whether in any given speech this is a real concern or a rhetorical 
play, but it is likely that such interruptions were not uncommon and the Athenian courtroom 
could at times be a noisy place, with jurors interjecting their own thoughts and comments”. 
18
 For the absence of jurors’ deliberation between themselves prior to the vote, see Arist. Pol. 
2.1268b7-11. For the significance of deliberation in modern courtrooms and the supposition that 
jurors may reach their decisions before deliberation, see McEwan (2003), p. 5 and n. 16 with 
relevant bibliography. 
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by irrelevant information. An anecdote from Plutarch (On Garrulity 504c), 
illuminates the matter:  
 
“Lysias had given to a certain accused criminal an oration of his own writing. He, having read it 
several times over, came to Lysias very much dejected, and told him that, upon his first perusal 
of it, it seemed to him to be a most admirable piece; but after he had read it three or four times 
over, he could see nothing in it but what was very dull and insipid. To whom Lysias, smiling: 
What, said he, is not once enough to speak it before the judges?”  
 
- Absence of Burden and Standard of Proof 
 
Closely connected to the dominant ideology of amateurism is the absence of a 
theorised formal concept of the burden of proof (onus probandi). The lack of 
professionalism left its mark in this field too; in the Athenian jurisprudence we 
find nothing similar to the Latin maxim: “semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei 
qui agit”19. Yet, in practice, Athenian litigants generally followed the rule that the 
introducer of an assertion or fact has the duty of proof. In principle, the burden 
felt on the claimant since the original initiation of the proceedings. In the 
anakrisis he had to follow the procedural rules in order to establish that his case 
was eisagogimos by providing all the evidence he planned to present at the 
trial, place it in the echinos, and prove that there was an alleged breach of a 
specific law20. The defendant had to follow a similar procedure in order to 
counter the prosecutor’s allegations and both of them were obliged to take an 
oath (antomosia).  
 
Until that point the burden remained on the side of the prosecutor, with the 
written plaint setting the legal burden that had to be proved. In support of this 
we may adduce the fact that the prosecutor spoke first in the court. However, if 
the defendant wanted to block the prosecutor’s case, he could make use of a 
special plea (in the form of paragraphe, diamarturia, or antigraphe). Then the 
burden was shifted and it was for the defendant to prove his alleged points as to 
                                            
19
 “At all times the compulsion of proving a case lies on the plaintiff”; [tr. in Sienkewicz and 
McDonough (1999)]. 
20
 See Harrison (1971), pp. 94 ff.; Thur (2007); Harris (2013a). 
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why the prosecutor’s case was inadmissible. The defendant thus spoke first in 
the hearing.  
 
The best example of this shift of the burden of proof can be found in paragraphe 
cases where a defendant objected to a dike emporike21. In order for the 
prosecutor to initiate his case, he should present a valid contract for shipment to 
or from Athens that was allegedly breached. Up to that point, the burden of 
providing this contract fell on the prosecutor. However, if the defendant denied 
the existence or the validity of such a contract, he could initiate a paragraphe; 
then, the burden shifted on his side in order to prove his allegations. Therefore, 
although the concept of the burden of proof was underdeveloped and 
uncodified, some procedural and practical rules substantiated it in loose terms. 
 
Nonetheless, any resemblance to an elaborate concept stops at this point. 
There was no division between a legal and an evidential burden of proof, in 
addition to the uncertainty as to the requirements for the establishment of a 
prima facie case22. Although the written plaint limited the scope for irrelevant 
evidence and set a common ground for argumentation (with the most cases 
concerning factual disputes, thus the facts requiring presentation of evidence 
were more or less specified), there was a call for both parties to make the best 
of their cases, using all the legitimate means at their disposal. One significant 
aspect was their resort to extra-legal argumentation thus, the absence of a 
concrete concept of the burden of proof could be regarded as an incentive. Both 
parties shared an equal evidential burden and had the obligation of a total 
attack against their opponent’s allegations by providing evidence to prove their 
alleged facts and disprove their opponent’s. Furthermore, the fact that it was a 
battle of words between the parties signified a need to increase their credibility 
and diminish their opponent’s. To recap then, it can be plausibly said that the 
Athenian concept of the burden of proof (if there could be extracted anything 
close to this) bears a closer resemblance with its modern counterpart in civil 
                                            
21
 Harrison (1971), p. 123.For the dike emporike see Lanni (2006), pp. 150ff. 
22
 By ‘legal burden of proof’ I mean “the burden of persuading the tribunal of fact of the truth or 
sufficient probability of every essential fact in issue” or, in other words, “to prove the elements of 
the case or defence to the appropriate standard”; by ‘evidential’ I mean the requirement “to 
adduce sufficient evidence to justify, though not require, a favourable decision”. See Glover 
(2013). 
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cases (where the law retains a neutral position in relation to litigants), with the 
requirement that whoever presents a fact or an allegation, he is the one who 
carries the responsibility of proof. 
 
Hand in hand with the burden of proof comes the concept of the standard of 
proof, namely the degree of certainty or probability which the evidence must 
generate in the mind of the tribunal of fact in order for the party bearing the 
burden of proof to gain a favourable verdict. In modern English jurisprudence, 
this level of proof varies between civil and criminal cases, in the first being proof 
‘on the balance of probabilities’23 and in the second proof ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’24 so that the jury are ‘sure of guilt’25. Although the definition of the 
terminology is far from unambiguous in Anglo-American law, there is at least 
some guidance for the fact-finders to follow26. In Athenian law, the absence of 
such a concept signified an uncertainty as to the expected proof of the 
allegations in the written plaint, however objectively these allegations and the 
breach of the law could have been documented. The absence of ratio decidendi 
and of any deliberation between the jurors before the verdict leaves a grey area 
of subjectivism surrounding the passing of court verdicts. In other words, 
evidence that could have satisfied the subjective level of proof required by a 
particular Athenian juror might have been less conclusive for another who had 
set a higher standard of proof. 
 
This uncertainty as to the required level of proof induced Athenian litigants to 
follow a race in proving their case as convincingly as possible (setting the 
standard of proof to the highest level), using any relevant or remotely relevant 
argument at their disposal and taking a wider approach to extra-legal 
argumentation in order to damage the opponent and his credibility. Each litigant 
raised the stakes, with character evidence providing a significant weapon in his 
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 See R (N) v Mental Health Review Board (Northern Region) [2006] QB 468, esp. at [62]; In re 
B (Children) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof) CAFCASS Intervening [2009] 1 AC 11. 
24
 This formulation has been approved on more than one occasion by the House of Lords, e.g. 
Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481; Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 11; Miller v Minister of 
Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372, 373. 
25
 E.g. Summers [1952] 1 All ER 1059. 
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 See McEwan (2003), p. 134: “Most British and American judges think it best to avoid giving a 
definition of beyond reasonable doubt, leaving it to juror common sense to fix the appropriate 
level of certainty”, with “the absence of a definition clearly affects verdicts as much as the terms 
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armoury. Apart from the legitimate use of such argumentation, a litigant 
(especially the prosecutor who spoke first) might (in the absence of opposition 
by the jurors) resort to irrelevant pleas about his opponent in order to direct and 
partly control the latter’s reply. In simple words, the prosecutor, by presenting 
irrelevant facts or allegations not included in the written plaint, placed the 
burden of disproving them to the defendant and, potentially, raised the standard 
of proof for him by demanding a multilevel refutation. Usually, these new 
allegations concerned the opponent’s character27and put him in the uncertain 
position, either to refute them with the risk of alienating the jury by responding to 
irrelevant matters or disregard them with the danger of being accepted by the 
court as true28.  
 
To recap then, the Athenian amateuristic approach to justice precluded the 
formulaic development of the concepts of burden and standard of proof. The 
uncertainty as to who had the onus of proving the facts of the legal case and to 
what degree, provoked an even wider use of character evidence in an attempt 
to convince the undirected jurors about the verisimilitude of a story. This 
unpredictability surrounding the persuasion of the jury, triggered the introduction 
of even more (similar or more remote to the dispute) facts and allegations which 
called for a greater resort to extra-legal argumentation in order to be proved. 
Nevertheless, this point of doubtfulness should not be pressed too far since the 
Athenian law had developed safeguarding mechanisms to counterbalance the 
risks of this highly amateuristic approach. 
 
- Evading Amateurism 
The institutional structure and rules of the Athenian democracy in relation with 
the promotion of an amateuristic ideology to participation soon revealed the 
need for a more artful approach to public argumentation and delivery of 
speeches. Although there is some doubt regarding the sociology and activity of 
different classes of Athenian citizens to the workings of the democracy, at least 
as far as the courts are concerned the figures are striking and speak for 
themselves.  At least six thousand fully eligible Athenian citizens over the age of 
                                            
27
 E.g. Lys. 9.1-3. 
28
 Hyp. 4.32; Dem. 18.9; Aeschin. 1.166-170. 
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thirty (out of a total of approximately twenty thousand over that age in the fourth 
century)29 nominated themselves for jury service to be selected by lot at the 
start of each year. The six thousands jurors of a particular year (since there was 
annual change to the composition of this panel due to a competition for 
places)30were eligible to show up on each particular court day, with these 
varying between approximately 175 and 225 times per year. The fact that a 
graphe hearing took the whole day and the time allotted to dikai varied 
according to the value of the suit (with the suits for over 5000 drachmas lasting 
more than two hours), a single active juror could decide tens or even hundreds 
of cases annually and thousands during his lifetime. Keeping in mind that this 
juror could have also served the Athenian democracy from other positions (such 
as magistrate, bouleutes, or a simple spectator of the Assembly), he was 
extremely qualified and experienced in abstract, or when compared to modern 
jurors. Nonetheless, what he shared equally with his modern descendant was 
the ability to decide factual disputes by resort to lay common sense, not 
particularly negative a factor in principle31. 
 
As far as the parties to these hundreds of lawsuits that reached the courts (and 
the much more that were decided at deme level or through arbitration) are 
concerned, Athenian ideology compelled them to retain the identity of idiotai 
throughout the proceedings. In theory, the initiation and conduct of both private 
and public cases should remain in private (amateur) hands, making it a 
punishable offence to pay someone else to appear as your advocate in court32. 
What is of particular interest to this study is the actual preparation of litigants’ 
speeches and their delivery in the courts. The formidable experience of 
addressing mass juries, the usually high stakes of the legal cases, and the need 
for a professional legal and extra-legal preparation of a speech gave rise to the 
need for a focused expertise in speech-writing. In other words, the emergence 
of rhetoric as an art, the study of the psychology and response of mass juries to 
divergent kinds of argumentation and the more scientific method of approaching 
oral delivery called for (in theory, undetectable) ways to evade the restrictions of 
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 Hansen (1991), p. 91. 
30
 Hansen (1991), p. 182, citing Kroll (1972), pp. 69-90. 
31
 For ‘common sense’ in modern jurisprudence, see McEwan (2003), pp. 16-23. 
32
 Todd (1993), pp. 94-6; Hansen (1991), p. 180; Dem. 46.26. 
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amateurism. An amateur litigant therefore could resort to the assistance of a 
synegoros (or a team of synegoroi) or a logographer in order to make the most 
of his case. 
 
A synegoros was in principle a friend or relative of the speaker, having a good 
reason for being given the time by the litigant to address the jury33. Personal 
interest to the case, affiliation with the speaker and enmity with the opponent 
were regarded as valid reasons, avoiding thus a financial or professional link 
with the litigant34. Nonetheless, the frequency of their appearance is a matter of 
controversy35. An even more significant figure is the one of the speech-writer 
(logographos)36. A litigant who had not studied the art of rhetoric and was 
inexperienced or uncertain of legal matters and “since for most people litigation 
was a unique or rare experience rather than a career, it was far more useful (if 
one could afford it) to obtain the advice and help of another kind of expert which 
flourished in the fifth century, the professional speechwriter (logographos)”37. 
This shadow figure (not mentioned in the speeches but acting behind the 
scene) could provide advice on how to present a case or even provide part or 
the whole text of a speech. The ancient Athenian logographer, unlike a modern 
advocate, “had considerable latitude to exaggerate, suppress and even invent 
aspects of his story in order to make the best of his client’s case”38. What we 
usually see in the surviving speeches is, therefore, a refined version of forensic 
                                            
33
 For a comprehensive discussion on supporting speakers see Rubinstein (2000). Up to that 
work, modern scholarship preserved one of two functions for the synegoros: either as “a ‘super-
witness’ whose role in the legal proceedings amounted to a display of solidarity with the main 
litigant” (true in private cases) or as the “Vicarious Voice of the main litigant only if it was 
universally agreed that the main litigant could not be expected to plead his case adequately 
because of exceptional circumstances” [Rubinstein (2000), p. 17]. Rubinstein (2000, p. 18) adds 
one more function, interpreting the role of synegoros as “a ‘with-speaker’ who could join in the 
proceedings because he had a personal or political interest in the case, and whose role in the 
trial would not necessarily be perceived as a token of his personal solidarity with the main 
litigant. Rather, such a speaker might represent himself as involved in the dispute in his own 
right, but without necessarily having to represent the legal dispute as ‘his’ action”. 
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 Lys. 32.2, 9-10; Dem. 18. 
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 Todd (1993), p. 95, n. 19 says that only thirteen of the surviving speeches were delivered by 
synegoroi; see also Carey (2011), pp. 13-4. On the other hand, Rubinstein (2000, Chapter 2 
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which was “hitherto considered exceptional was in fact the norm in certain types of legal action” 
She finds 25 speeches delivered by synegoroi and 6 delivered by elected prosecutors. 
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 See Lavency (1964); Dover (1968); Usher (1976). 
37
 Carey (2011), p. 19. 
38
 Griffith – Williams (2013), pp. 24-25. 
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argumentation, interesting enough to have been published, revealing many 
times the elegant, though covert, touches of professionalism.   
2.1.3 : The Adversarial Nature of the System 
An issue with serious implications for argumentation in forensic fora is the 
adversarial nature of the trials. As it has already been noted the absence of 
competent state bodies tended to promote an adversarial approach to legal 
cases. Disputes were transformed into legal charges and feuds were 
neutralised for the benefit of social order through their introduction in the non-
violent sphere of adjudication. In accordance with the principle of party 
autonomy, the role of the court as adjudicator is essentially passive, limited to 
hearing the evidence and arguments presented by litigants. Litigation in this 
form takes the character of a contest or fight between opponents, each aiming 
to present his own case in the best possible light and to cause maximum 
damage to the case of the rival39. Aristotle had already observed that:  
 
“The forensic kind [of speech] is either accusatory or defensive; for litigants must necessarily 
either accuse or defend” (Arist. Rhet. 1358b) 
 
“One must therefore make room in the hearer's mind for the speech one intends to make; and 
for this purpose you must destroy the impression made by the adversary. Wherefore it is only 
after having combated all the arguments, or the most important, or those which are plausible, or 
most easy to refute, that you should substantiate your own case” (Arist. Rhet. 1418 b) 
  
Aggravated by the agonistic environment of Athenian society, litigiousness 
became the channel for the persecution of an adversary, using any means at 
his disposal. As a result, evidence from character acquires greater significance 
during the presentation of cases before mass juries. Argumentation ad 
hominem was an effective weapon in the quest for victory, in fora where 
credibility and trustworthiness were of utmost importance40. Aristotle notes that 
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 See Frank (1949), Ch. 6. The ‘fight theory’ he develops which is another way of naming the 
adversarial mode of conducting trials in realistic terms, poses significant problems in the 
appropriate, though idealistic, utmost aim of the court as institution of finding the ‘truth’. In 
practice, lawyers abstain from being facilitators of the court system’s implementation of justice in 
this respect, and winning a case becomes much more important than ascertaining the true 
facts. Cf. Kubicek T.L. (2006). 
40
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“Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our adversary, as to the fact itself or moral 
character; so that it is evident that one never need lack useful evidence. For, if we have no 
evidence as to the fact itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor against our opponent, 
it will always be possible to obtain some evidence as to character that will establish either our 
own respectability or the worthlessness of our opponent” (Ar. Rhet. 1376a). 
  
Under such conditions, jurors usually have to choose between two different 
versions of the same story. Opposing parties struggle to prove their credibility, 
while at the same time diminishing the opponent’s. Invocation of a trustworthy 
character may induce jurors to positively receive a litigant’s pleas showing him a 
high degree of good will. These have to account as contributing reasons for the 
vividness of narratives and the rich storytelling in the speeches of the Attic 
orators as well as the presentation of background, seemingly irrelevant, 
information. 
2.1.4 : The Genuine Difficulties in Crime Investigation 
A further, substantial, issue to be taken into account is the era under 
consideration. The insufficient, barely existent, methods of crime investigation 
and evidence collection41, urge us to view oral, forensic argumentation under a 
different light. Extra-legal considerations (character evidence, background 
information and contextualisation of the dispute in question) gain weight in 
Athenian courts, which relied substantially on issues of probability. This means 
that the general tendencies and character traits presented in forensic speeches 
were (in theory) evoked in order to assist the jurors, following a deductive 
method of reasoning, to extract the truth and resolve the factual dispute that 
originated litigation. In other words “the importance of this mode of 
argumentation will have reinforced the commonsense assumption that the 
plausibility of specific statements about an individual can be assessed with 
reference to his or her established patterns of behaviour”42. Most cases 
                                                                                                                                
have been slandered, or are easy to slander; for such men neither care to go to law, for fear of 
the judges, nor, if they do, can they convince them; to this class belong those who are exposed 
to hatred or envy.”. 
41
 The fact that investigation was a problematic field of Athenian law is proved by Antiph. 5.67-
71 where he refers to past crimes that have been unsolved or, even worse, men were 
condemned due to undue hurriedness with their innocence being proved through time.  
42
 Carey (2011), p. 19. 
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concerned factual rather than legal disputes and arguments from probability 
were predominantly used to illuminate issues of fact43, so Athenian litigants 
frequently highlight their arguments’ probative value, with jurors having to 
evaluate them within a very uncertain environment. 
 
Furthermore, the limited scale of the Athenian polis makes unavoidable that (at 
least) some of the parties involved in litigation were already known. The direct 
evidence that survives in the form of forensic speeches (although to a great 
extent coming from upper class and high profile cases where litigants could 
afford the hiring of a speechwriter) reveals that, especially (but not only) in the 
case of distinguished individuals, one’s character and mode of life, could 
become notorious by being circulated through gossip in advance of a trial. 
Whether or not Athens was a face-to-face society one fact is indisputable 
regarding the ethical homogeneity of its inhabitants: this polis differed a lot from 
industrial, socially fragmented and territorially vast (compared to Attica) states. 
This social and ethical homogeneity of Athens allowed for the identification of 
popular opinion regarding acceptable morals and norms, thus aiding litigants in 
their effort of designing their strategies, by knowing in advance the kind of 
arguments that would probably receive the good will of jurors. Complete 
adherence to communal norms was the utmost character evidence and an 
unmistakable indicator of a litigant’s personality. 
 
In this uncertain judicial environment regarding the proof of the presented 
evidence, litigants’ speeches (and their witnesses’ deposits) posed as the sole 
source of information. Therefore, a litigant ought to design a careful strategy 
and efficient tactics in order to enhance his trustworthiness as a person and the 
believability of his words. Thus, apart from the factual considerations 
surrounding and to an extent inciting a wider use of character evidence, the 
issue of credibility has to be taken into account. In this battle of words between 
two competitors, the effort for the receipt of the jurors’ good will was great. 
Adding to this the limited flexibility open to jurors in the issue of sentencing, it 
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was a matter of utmost importance for a litigant to provide all the necessary 
evidence which could tip the balance in his favour44.  
2.1.5 : The Flexibility of the System 
Before proceeding to conclusions, one should take into account the outstanding 
flexibility of the system. Apart from the convenience offered by the lack of strict 
adherence to legal precedents or the avoidance of ratio decidendi for 
legitimising the majority verdicts, one should add one more peculiar feature. In 
particular, the Athenian legal system allowed for the presence of many 
divergent procedures for prosecuting the same act; presumably, this was 
chosen by the plaintiff as better suiting the circumstances of his specific case. 
The reasons offered for the presence of this special characteristic of the 
Athenian legal system include: the democratic tendency of providing equal and 
uninhibited access to the courts45, the flexibility offered to the prosecutors by 
allowing them to calculate the risk46; it offered an answer to the problem of 
enforcement in a system which relied on the volunteer. All these rationales are 
valid enough to explain the matter. In my opinion one more piece is needed to 
complete the puzzle, which can be seen as the ‘glue’ bringing together all these 
features, and this will become clear in the course of the next chapters. For the 
moment it suffices to say that there was an underlying cause illuminating the 
Athenian approach to this particular issue. This was the Greek ideas of 
‘character’ and ‘personality’ and the relationship of the person with the 
community. 
  
All these are grounded on the fact that the Greeks understood human beings 
and ‘personhood’ in a way different to ours. The ‘objective – participant’ model 
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 See Carey (2011), p. 19: “If they wished to show leniency to a defendant they believed to be 
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of the self (as described by Gill47) provides the key for a better understanding 
since it offers the most suitable model of interpretation. An ancient Athenian 
understood himself as an integral part of the community, wholeheartedly 
adhering to its ethical norms. His highest goal was to act in harmony with his 
particular ‘role’ assigned to him in the society, and the attainment of virtue lie on 
the accomplishment of this task in the best possible way48. But how this 
characteristic of the Athenian legal system provided an incentive for further use 
of character evidence? 
 
The description of this characteristic is offered by Demosthenes (22.25-7): 
  
“Moreover you should grasp this fact, that Solon, who framed these and most of our other laws, 
was a very different kind of legislator from the defendant, and provided not one, but many 
modes of procedure for those who wish to obtain redress for various wrongs. For he knew, I 
think, that for all the citizens to be equally clever, or bold, or moderate folk, was impossible. If, 
then, he was going to frame the laws to satisfy the moderate man's claim to redress, many 
rascals, he reflected, would get off scot-free, but if he framed them in the interests of the bold 
and the clever speakers, the plain citizen would not be able to obtain redress in the same way 
as they would. But he thought that no one should be debarred from obtaining redress in 
whatever way he can best do so. How then will this be ensured? By granting many modes of 
legal procedure to the injured parties. Take a case of theft. Are you a strong man, confident in 
yourself? Arrest the thief; only you are risking a thousand drachmas. Are you rather weak? 
Guide the Archons to him, and they will do the rest. Are you afraid even to do this? Bring a 
written indictment. Do you distrust yourself, and are you a poor man, unable to find the 
thousand drachmas? Sue him for theft before a public arbitrator, and you will risk nothing. In the 
same way for impiety you can arrest, or indict, or sue before the Eumolpidae, or give 
information to the King-Archon. And in the same way, or nearly so, for every other offence.” 
 
The truth of this assertion is examined by Carey (2004), and his conclusion is 
that it is accurate in a high degree (specifically that an Athenian could choose 
between different procedures of varying risk in cases of e.g. assault, rape, 
guardianship, theft etc.) provided that some adjustments are made49. Osborne 
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observes that Demosthenes in fact leaves a whole dimension out of the 
question. The procedure followed determined the consequences for the 
defendant as well as the prosecution50. 
 
Now that the picture is complete the already apparent implications may be 
highlighted. The first is noted by Demosthenes himself: human beings are 
unequal in respect of their internal and external characteristics. The level of 
cleverness, boldness and skilfulness differs among individuals and this has to 
be taken into account by the legislator. This divergence is even more apparent 
in case of status, wealth and power. Therefore it is assumed that the procedure 
chosen reflects the individual characteristics of the parties. These 
characteristics have to be (and in a great degree are) presented before the 
Athenian jurors in order to explain this procedural choice. The insolent Meidias 
in Demosthenes 21, wealthy and powerful though he is, has to be punished for 
hubris. In his case, a lesser punishment would not suffice and would simply 
make him more hostile and thus dangerous to the people. Therefore 
Demosthenes has to portray him as fulfilling these characteristics. On the other 
hand, in Demosthenes 54, the young and inexperienced prosecutor could not 
pursue a risky and demanding public prosecution, as this would have been 
above his powers. This offer of justifications based on stereotypical 
assumptions about youth and inexperience is a well-attested pattern of 
argumentation. It aims at causing the sympathy of the audience and preventing 
any thought of sycophancy; apparently it had the above implication as well, i.e. 
a litigant’s deeds conforming to his ‘role’ and personality51. In other instances, 
natural strength could be used for the arrest of a criminal in cases that this was 
permitted52. Questions could arise in case that this failed or was not pursued. 
Also, as Aristotle observes (Rhet. 1372a) questions may arise if “a man wanting 
in physical strength were accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an ugly 
man of adultery”. 
   
The status of the defendant determined the risk that a prosecutor would be 
willing and able to take. An excuse of inability to find witnesses due to the 
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intimidation of the defendant’s personality and power is attested in the 
speeches53. As a result a safer course of action should be followed. The 
dangers posed for the prosecutor by a failed public prosecution, contrasted to 
the financial benefits of a successful private one, could induce him to pursue, 
wherever possible, the latter path. The invocation of liturgies by defendants and 
the anticipation of such a plea by prosecutors illuminate the matter further. In 
contrast, a prosecutor, calculating the weakness of a defendant, could choose 
the procedure most suitable to his aims. . The prosecutor in Lysias 14 asks for 
the extermination or banishment of Alcibiades the Younger since his weakness 
and skills rendered him harmless and unable to inflict any harm to Athens54. 
Calculation of risk and benefit, determined by the individual characteristics of 
the parties, seems to be central in the Athenian approach to justice. As a result, 
invocation of character evidence seems inescapable. 
2.1.6 : Autonomy of the Courts 
Finally, in order to complete the picture of this peculiar (to modern 
understanding) system of justice, yet another substantial aspect has to be 
considered: specificity. The Athenian approach to justice seems very far apart 
from the modern which views the autonomy of the courts as a sine qua non of a 
fair trial. The dominant definition of this term is related to the concept of the 
separation of powers and means the absence of interference of the other 
branches of government to the workings of the judiciary. However, other 
interpretations of court autonomy are more closely related to this thesis and 
serve as further incentives to the wide use of character evidence. The first 
concerns the internal autonomy of the courts, i.e. the autonomy which a panel 
of judges enjoyed in relation to other panels and their decisions. The absence of 
formalism and professionalism in the Athenian system of justice produced the 
underdevelopment or total lack of the legal rule of ratio decidendi, the concept 
of binding precedent, and the principle of stare decisis. In relation to this, a 
particular panel was liberated and enjoyed significant flexibility and latitude in 
reaching a verdict. This, in conjunction with the limited flexibility of the court in 
proposing the sentence in most trials, facilitated the wide use of character 
evidence, giving to litigants one more opportunity in their effort to win the good 
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will of the jurors, enhance their credibility and, at the balance, win a favourable 
verdict.  
 
Secondly, although the Athenian court was in principle sovereign and its 
decisions were unappealable, it did not enjoy total autonomy and separation 
from its socio-political environment. As Carey notes and it is widely true “over 
and above any practical reasons for the inclusion of such material, the most 
important factor is cultural. Whereas most modern systems surround the law 
court with artificial rules and barriers designed to treat the individual case in 
isolation, the Athenians viewed the trial within the lives of the parties, the judges 
and the community as a whole”55. The above two factors contributed to the 
attested wide approach of Athenian courts to character evidence and, even 
though they might be considered by them as relevant to the legal case and its 
facts, they nonetheless served the aforementioned secondary rhetorical 
purposes as well. In other words, adding these reasons to the absence of 
authoritative decision as to the admissibility of evidence, of formal collective 
deliberation, and of principles such as stare decisis and standard of proof, 
convincing each particular juror that the evidence adduced is relevant and, on 
the top of that, winning his sympathy and his positive vote, was a parallel to the 
legal case, though significant aim of rhetoric, an aim more prone and open to 
extra-legal argumentation56. 
 
Arguably, one could identify two acceptable forms of character evidence; 1) 
arguments directly relevant to the offence in question that tend to reveal a 
specific propensity or disposition enhancing the probabilities of committing the 
specific crime, and 2) more general arguments about one’s life, illuminating the 
personality of the party, revealing character traits and disposition, as well as 
credibility. In principle, a litigant should rely solely on the first set of arguments 
at the guilt phase of the trial, while mentioning the second during the sentencing 
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phase57. The (desired) absolute equality of individuals, translated in the 
courtroom as absolute equality before the law (meaning that one has to stand 
totally stripped of any distinguishing personal factors enjoyed due to e.g. status, 
merit, or life), resulted in the prohibition of litigants’ invocation of any merit from 
one’s life outside the courtroom, retaining the realm of the courts autonomous 
from the socio-political sphere. This narrow view taken by modern law, means 
that character evidence should be invoked solely through arguments concerning 
the reputation of the litigant; persons from his immediate environment are called 
to testify on the question. In addition, the modern approach allows only for the 
invocation of past offences (or criminal past) in order to portray a litigant’s 
character. Contrastingly in classical Athens argumentation from character could 
take many forms. These included a litigant’s reputation among the wider public, 
opinion and circumstantial evidence, and particular past events highlighting 
personality traits (usually inadmissible in modern courts). 
  
However, the above factors tend to create a misleading account of Athenian 
courts, picturing them as promiscuous fora, incapable of delimiting litigants’ 
argumentation, thus reaching ad hoc and inconsistent decisions. Quite the 
contrary; the Athenians were fully capable (albeit apparently unwilling 
sometimes)58 of instituting elaborate and unambiguous procedures. For 
instance, the court of the Areopagus with its highly respected and solemn 
processes was widely received as the most scrupulous tribunal in Greece59.  In 
particular, the Areopagus had stricter rules governing forensic argumentation 
which did not apply to the popular courts. The conscious decision concerning 
the latter, namely that both forms of character evidence (1, 2 above) are 
acceptable in a courtroom, allowed for the development of  informal and 
empirical rules of relevance that governed both the invocation of directly 
relevant, as well as (seemingly) extraneous character evidence. As will be 
demonstrated in the course of this thesis, this approach becomes evident by the 
consistent patterns of argumentation that Athenian litigants followed and by the 
themes they chose to highlight.  By the same token, the rarity of arguments 
from private life [apart from those directly relevant to the offence belonging in 
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category (1)], and the frequency of invocation of particular themes from public 
life showing adherence to communal norms, prove the present interpretation of 
the issue. 
2.2 Procedures as Further Incentives 
Character evidence is central to the examination of argumentation in Athenian 
trials. Analysis of extra-legal argumentation is a prerequisite for a deeper 
understanding of the workings of Athenian courts. As it is not yet time for the 
examination of its objectives, I now aim to concentrate on the practical driving 
forces behind this broad approach. An interesting and intriguing factor, inherent 
in the legal system, is the nature of Athenian laws and procedures that 
facilitated this wide use. The open texture of legal statutes and the wide range 
of admissible (or even required) evidence, together with the semi-autonomous 
sphere of Athenian courts (which sometimes seemed to intertwine with the 
political sphere), forced litigants to design their rhetorical strategies in such a 
way as to encompass a non-provocative, carefully designed positive sketch of 
their personality. Sometimes, when the charges themselves were designed to 
require a deeper examination of one’s general behaviour and mode of living, 
litigants legitimately concentrated on evidence from character.  
 
As stated above, legal procedures were divided into public (graphai) and private 
(dikai), classified by who had the right to initiate proceedings for legally 
actionable wrongs. Apart from these ‘normal’ procedures, there were some 
‘extraordinary’60 ones, which although having a public character (in the sense 
that they were initiated by ho boulomenos) and designed to correct public 
wrongs, it would be inaccurate to be classified under the category of graphai. 
Two of them were largely political, designed either to protect the citizen body 
from potential usurpers of political rights (dokimasiai) or concerned with the 
accountability of magistrates and public officials for their actions while in office 
(euthunai). The peculiarity of these procedures lay on the fact that they de facto 
concern the whole citizen body for mainly political and not strictly legal reasons; 
anyone could initiate proceedings and any public official was accountable. 
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According to Hansen, every year the Council had to handle 509 dokimasiai and 
the courts at least 70061. The same several hundreds of magistrates (in the 
wider sense, including the bouleutai) had to undergo the process of euthunai at 
the end of their tenure. This process included a thorough examination of the 
officials’ financial record and any malpractice alleged against the official. This 
procedure was the citizens’ first and foremost weapon for holding his 
magistrates accountable62. The Athenians’ obsession for encountering 
corruption and the fierce political antagonism, coupled with their litigiousness 
and competitiveness, are just some logical reasons for assuming that several 
cases ended up in court.  
2.2.1 Graphai and Dikai 
As far as the type of the legal case is concerned it seems that, though not 
universally observed63, in public cases (graphai), character evidence and 
personal behaviour was more important in making a case. With the reservation 
that each litigant’s opinion is biased (in the sense that he tries to fit his rhetoric 
to his case) the following evidence has some seeds of truth (or at least, since 
they were argued before a large audience, plausibility). Demosthenes states 
that jurors in private cases (dikai) focus on the issue at hand; in public ones, 
they decide in accordance with the spirit and the norms of the state and for the 
honour of the ancestors64. This is recognised by Plato who, in the Laws, 
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provides for two forms of trial: the one when a private person accuses a private 
person of injuring him and desires to gain a verdict by bringing him to trial and 
the other when a person believes that the State is being injured by one of the 
citizens65.  
 
Moreover, in Lysias 30, the prosecutor objects66 because defendants in public 
cases (as opposed to private ones) proceed to win a case by counter-
accusations and irrelevant considerations. The peculiar thing is that in the same 
case, the very same person in the prologue of his speech says:  
 
“There have been cases, gentlemen of the jury, of persons who, when brought to trial, have 
appeared to be guilty, but who, on showing forth their ancestors' virtues and their own 
benefactions, have obtained your pardon. Since, therefore, you are satisfied with the plea of the 
defendants, if they are shown to have done some service to the State, it is fair that you should 
also listen to the accusers, if they show forth a long course of villainy in the accused” (Lys. 
30.1). 
 
Apart from trial considerations, and since (as it has already been noted) 
Athenian courts did not enjoy total autonomy, the interpretation of the 
acceptable degrees of relevance depended on external considerations as well, 
such as the type of the legal case and the particular circumstances of the 
period. Regarding the influence of the prevailing circumstances, the speaker of 
Lysias 30 blames the opponent for behaving contrary to the public interest. He 
states that his opponent  
 
“also knew that whenever the Council in a given year has enough money for its administration, it 
does no harm, but whenever it is reduced to desperation, it is forced to accept impeachments 
(εισαγγελίαι), to confiscate the property of the citizens, and to allow itself to be persuaded by 
those of the orators whose advice is most corrupt” (Lys. 30.22). 
 
Such a tendency to condemn rich citizens and confiscate their wealth could 
indeed be a dangerous problem for the whole system, albeit a not assessable 
one. Hansen notes that it probably pertained mainly to crisis periods67. In his 
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assertion’s support, he cites the Third Oration of Hypereides, which was spoken 
in the period of peace after the settlement of 338: in it there are three examples 
of how the Athenian courts did not fall into the temptation of condemning a 
number of rich mining-concessionaires, although the accusers’ proposals for 
confiscation were very tempting68. On the other hand, another source maintains 
that in those very same years the richest of all the mining-concessionaires, 
Diphilos, was condemned to death and executed and his fortune of 160 talents 
distributed among the citizens69. If such a tendency even in periods of crisis 
indeed existed, its implications to character evidence are obvious. In addition to 
his innocence concerning the strict legal case at hand, one had to convince the 
jury of his value as a person, which underlie the fact that his acquittal would be 
on the public interest due to his continuing lavish benefactions to the polis. 
Furthermore, the above factors (his favourable disposition to the polis and his 
innocence) made him a person worthy of the jurors’ pity70. These are issues that 
are going to be discussed analytically in the course of this study but, 
nonetheless, highlight at present the structural pressures and tensions that 
formed the Athenian approach to character evidence.  
2.2.2 :  Sui Generis Procedures 
The following procedures are referred to as sui generis in the sense that they do 
not belong to the normal, broad procedures of dikai and graphai71. The 
procedures of dokimasia and diadikasia will serve as indicative examples of 
widely used extraordinary procedures that, by their nature, induced litigants to a 
broader invocation of character evidence. Let us start with dokimasia as an 
example of a procedure inducing the parties to broad invocation of character 
evidence, thus revealing a structural incentive to such an approach. Definitely, 
as in most cases, there is no consensus among scholars about the purpose of 
this procedure. Disagreement can be narrowed down to two trends. Some 
scholars assert that it was introduced to test a candidate’s legal qualifications 
both as a citizen and for the office in question, mainly to protect the idea of 
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‘citizenship’ and the citizen body from unauthorised intrusions72. On the other 
hand, scholars suggest a deeper examination of a candidate’s suitability for 
public office, recognising in the dokimasia “a comprehensive enquiry, covering 
not only the candidate’s legal qualification but also the probity of his life, both 
public and private”73. According to the evidence, I take the latter view to be 
closer to the truth. I aim to show that apart from the direct evidence based on 
litigant’s surviving speeches, this conclusion is supported by the wider trend of 
the Athenian legal system to allow broad invocation of character evidence. I 
would describe this relationship as bidirectional. The structural design of the 
Athenian legal system was the result of a deeper belief in the relevance of 
argumentation from character; nonetheless, it also became an incentive and 
justification for its even wider use. 
 
Dokimasia technically signified the formal judicial scrutiny of one’s suitability for 
a particular civic role74. On a symbolic level it was the confirmation by the polis, 
either before the Council or the Court (or both in some cases), that a man was 
eligible for his registration on the citizen list75, for taking up public office76 or for 
addressing civic bodies77. As Todd notes dokimasia was yet another “procedure 
designed to protect the integrity of the citizen body from any intrusion by those 
who do not share the fullness of citizen privilege”78. Such an intrusion could take 
place due to technical reasons (as in the case of a person whose parents were 
not both Athenian citizens), but also due to behavioural reasons (for instance, 
leading a disreputable life by prostituting oneself, squandering his patrimony, 
abusing his parents and so on)79. Therefore the procedure itself (especially its 
second leg) instead of being narrow and specific, called for a wide use of 
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character evidence. An objecting plaintiff could point to instances of 
misbehaviour according to citizen standards, in order to prove the unworthiness 
of the candidate. On the other hand the defendant, by presenting evidence of 
good conduct (or providing for the absence of any reprehensible activities), 
could win the good will of the jury and gain a favourable verdict. Such 
argumentation is evident in all surviving cases of dokimasia, either concerning 
scrutiny for public office or for addressing the assembly. Litigants themselves, 
recognising this fact, state that in cases of dokimasia a more general account of 
the defendant’s life is under question80. Dokimasia is essentially an investigation 
of one’s behavioural record and  
 
“although in other trials it is appropriate to defend oneself simply on the charges, in dokimasiai it 
is fair to give an account of one’s whole life”
81. 
 
In order to understand the seriousness of the procedure, the importance of civic 
participation for the citizens of classical Athens has to be kept in mind. In a 
purely legal context, this procedure meant that every single year hundreds of 
Athenians82 were obliged to undergo this scrutiny. In addition to this number, 
the compulsory annual rotation of public officers and the prohibition of holding 
any allotted public office twice in a lifetime (apart from the office of bouleutes) 
certify the major importance of this procedure which concerned the majority of 
the citizenry. In practical terms, this means that the dokimasia was the first 
(compulsory) contact of an overwhelming percentage of Athenians with the 
city’s judicial process. Adding to this account the dokimasia of young (ephebes) 
Athenians for the acquisition (or, formal recognition) of citizenship, it can be 
safely concluded that all citizens were educated in legal matters in such a way 
as to consider the scrutiny of behavioural traits as reliable evidence in the quest 
for truth. Although presumably to a certain extent the procedure remained a 
formality, there is still evidence of cases that eventually ended up in court. 
According to Aeschines the law specifically provided for the scrutiny of anyone 
who was to be in charge of any state business for more than thirty days or 
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anyone who was to preside over a court. In the corpus of Lysias, at least five of 
the thirty forensic speeches concern charges initiated during a dokimasia for 
public office. Additionally, according to the procedure of dokimasia rhetoron 
(scrutiny of orators)83 anyone deciding to address the Assembly (or a popular 
court)84 could be called for a dokimasia85, in the form of a challenge initiated by 
anyone who wished (ho boulomenos), in order to test his eligibility. Aeschines’ 
Against Timarchus is a good example of how this procedure could be used (or 
abused) in order to disqualify a potential opponent and strip him of his political 
rights. 
 
Diadikasia is the ‘only private extraordinary procedure’86. It was initiated by a 
private individual in order to secure a claim, yet in the eyes of the law he was 
not received as the prosecutor, nor was the opposing party the defendant. In 
fact all parties, since there could be more than two rival claimants, were treated 
on equal terms. This is best exemplified by reference to an actual inheritance 
dispute [Dem. 43.8-10], where five claimants were competing to secure a claim 
on a particular estate. Cases were decided by a first-past-the-post system 
rather than by absolute majority and this is yet another indication of their 
extraordinary nature. Furthermore, the procedure of diadikasia conferred no 
absolute rights to the winning claimant. For instance, in inheritance cases 
(where diadikasia was widely used) it solely proved that the winning party had a 
better title to the estate than that put forward by his defeated opponents. If a 
new challenger disputed the winning claimant’s rights, the case could be re-
opened and re-examined. 
 
The procedure of diadikasia by its nature called for an immediate, though 
relative victory against (sometimes) more than one rival. There were no 
allegations concerning a breach of a particular law, nor was the content of the 
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litigants’ argumentation contained by the charges written on the plaint. Disputes, 
especially in inheritance cases, mainly concerned factual matters rather than 
disagreements about the meaning of the law. Usually, argumentation of litigants 
focused on the validity of an adoption or a will and, due to the limitations posed 
by the inadequate methods of scientific proof regarding such issues, litigants’ 
rhetoric relied heavily on arguments from probability. Aggravated by the 
potential multi-party clash, each party sought to supply the court with sufficient 
primary (relating directly to the legal case) and secondary (relating to the 
credibility of the parties) reasons in order to decide in his favour. The nature of 
the verdict in a diadikasia (first-past-the-post), transformed the normal strategy 
of litigants’ argumentation (i.e. proof as to the points mentioned in the written 
plaint), concentrating to a proof relative to the other parties’ position. Ultimately, 
there was no need for a claimant in a diadikasia to convince the court as to the 
truth of his case per se but, unlike a dike or a graphe87, to convince the court 
more than his opponents. Wider invocation of (positive and negative) character 
evidence served exactly this purpose. 
2.3 : Specific Charges as Further Incentives 
In order to reveal the wide spectrum of offences that followed an open texture 
and favoured a broad approach to character evidence, reference to specific 
examples of legal charges will be made. In this context, ‘open texture’ signifies 
the lack of formalism of the Athenian jurisprudence, and its resulting abstention 
from developing detailed definitions of its legal terminology88. The wording of 
legal statutes has to be, in principle, clear and unambiguous in order to allow 
                                            
87
 I acknowledge that in a system lacking the formalised concepts of burden and standard of 
proof it is risky to maintain that a prosecutor had to prove his case in absolute terms rather than 
in terms relative to the defendant’s position. However, in principle, the Athenian courts in a dike 
or a graphe ought to deliver their verdicts by reference to the legal charges as specified in the 
written plaint, in personam, for or against the specific person of the defendant. Therefore, this 
was a point of reference which ought to contain both the jurors’ decision-making and the 
litigants’ argumentation. In an inheritance case the argumentation referred more to the future of 
the estate and to the testator’s oikos, so it may be suggested that the proceedings focused in 
rem. Thus, the court had to assess the relative trustworthiness and background of the claimants 
in order to decide who would be the best inheritor of the estate and, in sequence, in all 
probability, whom among the claimants the testator would have chosen as his beneficiary.   
88
 For an analysis of ‘open texture’ and its meaning, see Hart (1961, pp. 125ff.). For the ‘open 
texture’ in Athenian law see Harris (2000). This definition of ‘open texture’ does not include 
Osborne’s understanding of this phrase as ‘procedural flexibility’ [Osborne (1985), pp. 43-44]. 
Procedural flexibility in Athenian courts is treated in 2.1.5. 
[106] 
 
limited scope to judges for innovative interpretations89. The same approach to 
legal statutes was taken by the Greeks as well, yet in the recognition that the 
effort of the law-maker to predict and cover all future cases may prove futile and 
infeasible90. 
 
As a result, the specific wording of legal statutes could originate disputes about 
the meaning of the law, especially aggravated by reference to key words open 
to interpretation. Thus, litigants’ effort to prove their legal case included a 
suggestion as to the definition of legal terminology. In order to support their 
conclusions and show that the opponent breached the particular legal statute in 
question, they proceeded to a wide invocation of character evidence to prove 
that, in addition, his conduct contravened the spirit of the laws. For instance, the 
meaning of the word ‘hubris’ which signified a particular offence (graphe 
hubreos) was interpreted by reference to the intent of the lawgiver and the spirit 
of the laws. A more liberal or strict interpretation could change the litigants’ 
argumentation and strategy91. This factor could be an incentive to the speaker 
to offer further character evidence in order to demonstrate that the opponent’s 
act, sometimes deducted by his more general behaviour, opposed the deeper, 
‘hidden’ behind the literal interpretation, meaning of the statute. To illuminate 
the issue, reference is made to examples from forensic speeches. 
2.3.1 : Examples of Graphai 
In this section, reference to the political offence of the graphe paranomon 
(public prosecution against illegal decrees) will be made, and to the ‘criminal’ 
offence tackled by the graphe hubreos (public prosecution for insolent, 
dishonouring assault). The aim is not to offer yet another analysis of the 
offences’ technical issues but to provide two more examples of procedures 
calling (or allowing) for invocation of evidence of character from two procedures 
which come from divergent fields of law. As mentioned above, an indicative 
charge relates to acts of hubris. The substantive elements of this offence are 
not free from controversy among scholars. Presumably, the essence of hubris is 
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to be found in the mental state of the perpetrator and / or in his intentions with 
respect to the social status of the victim92. According to Carey “it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that hubris had a subjective (intention / mind-set) as well 
as an objective dimension (the fact of assault)”93. The subjective dimension  
gave to the graphe hubreos its ‘open texture’ and made it more challenging for 
a litigant to prove. In order to assist this quest for demonstrating the 
perpetrator’s mind-set, a prosecutor could resort to wider invocation of 
character evidence. As a result, the perpetrator’s general disposition could be 
found on trial as much as the objective element of the assaultive fact. In 
addition, if the plaintiff was required to prove a degradation of his dignity and 
status, his own disposition and way of life could be called in question as well. To 
make it plain, the intention of the perpetrator to inflict insolent assault was to be 
found in his mind,  with evidence from character illuminating the case 
(specifically  his past behaviour which proves a propensity to commit such acts), 
while the degradation of the victim was to be found in his social status and / or 
his respectable, non-provocative character. In modern counterparts this brings 
to mind a particular defence or mitigatory allegation for defamation where the 
court recognises that the claimant’s reputation and position in the community is 
so poor that any comment would be incapable of further defamation94.  
 
Returning to classical Athens, maybe the most famous speech in the context of 
graphe hubreos is Demosthenes 21. Although it is questioned whether it was 
actually delivered before the Court, it nevertheless gives valuable evidence as 
to the Athenian approach to the offence95. The whole speech is centred on 
Meidias’ portrayal as a wealthy, insolent oligarch who chafed under democratic 
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and social norms96. His particular behaviour in Demosthenes’ assault 
illuminated Meidias’ general traits: he harassed Demosthenes in every way 
possible, he destroyed his festival chorus’ costumes, he tried to corrupt the 
officials and the judges, “he bawled and threatened, standing beside the 
umpires as they took the oath” (Dem. 21.17). These were simply the incidental 
signs of Meidias’ more general disposition, as revealed in his behavioural 
comparison with certain stereotypical patterns. He spoke loudly and often, 
getting his way with bribery when shouting didn’t work, and when all else failed, 
with threats and intimidation97. In Demosthenes’ words 
 
“if for nothing else, yet for those harangues that he delivers at every opportunity and for the 
occasions that he chooses for them, he would deserve the severest penalty” (Dem. 21.202).  
 
On the other hand, Demosthenes’ honour was affected, not only due to the 
insolent public assault in the crowded theatre, but also due to his own 
democratic and peaceful character: the exact opposite of Meidias. His patience 
and adherence to the norms of the polis are reflected in his conduct at the time 
of the assault. His decision to ‘repay’ through a speech rather than a punch 
encapsulates his devotion to acceptable public norms, but also his desire to 
protect weaker individuals from Meidias’ insolent treatment. It is the character 
and personality of such men that runs the greatest risk of being maltreated:  
 
“It is exactly the weakest and poorest of you that run the greatest risk of being thus wantonly 
wronged, while it is the rich blackguards that find it easiest to oppress others and escape 
punishment” (Dem. 21.123).  
 
Meidias’ characteristic contempt for acceptable behavioural norms and 
Demosthenes’ loyalty to democratic and cooperative ideals were as much at 
issue as the violent act itself. Both parties’ characters were relevant to the 
charge. Hubris offers thus  a good example of an incentive to broader – justified 
– invocation of character evidence. 
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The graphe paranomon, a very frequently used charge according to the 
surviving evidence98, was seemingly the main juristic weapon in the struggle for 
dominance between high-profile individuals in the Athenian agonistic political 
arena. It could be initiated by ho boulomenos from among Athenian citizens, by 
an allegation under oath that a particular degree was illegal. The accusation 
was either that the decree was unconstitutional, formally or materially, or that it 
was undesirable and damaging to the interests of the people99. Adverse 
judgment in a graphe paranomon had a twofold consequence: the arraigned 
decree was thereupon null and void and, if the case was brought within a year 
from the decree’s enactment, the proposer was punished100.  
 
What is of interest here in relation with this offence is its highly political nature in 
addition to the idea of ‘public interest’. Many of the surviving speeches 
concentrate on the fact that the decree in question is not just technically 
unconstitutional but also damaging to the interests of the demos. A convenient 
and usual method of proving this, apart from the obvious type of argumentation 
relating to its future disadvantageous consequences, was also the hostile 
character portrayal of the proposer. However, Demosthenes, in maybe the most 
famous and perfect forensic oration of classical Athens (Demosthenes 18: On 
the Crown) stated:  
 
“I suppose that our ancestors built these law-courts not that we should assemble you here to 
listen to us abusing one another with scandalous accounts of our private lives, but that we may 
convict someone if he has offended against the city”
101. 
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Character evidence in Athenian courts concentrated mainly at the public (and 
especially political) behaviour of litigants. Therefore, a tested method of 
convincing the jurors to cancel a degree was firstly to question its proposer’s 
intentions. A series of past harmful proposals, dishonest disposition, and 
propensity to reject as a person the polis’ conventional ethical and political 
norms, constituted the usual arsenal at the plaintiff’s disposal102. These same 
considerations were taken into account to the similar offence of nomon me 
epitedeion theinai to the extent that Demosthenes advises the jurors to  
 
“have regard also to the disposition of the man; for the law which he has had the audacity to 
propose is significant of his character” (Dem. 24.138). 
  
However, the issue remained a strictly legal (and highly technical) one, and any 
effort to argumentation from character was supplementary to the main cause of 
proving the illegality of the decree.  
This attested fact of attacking the proposer’s character in order to question his 
intentions and thus reject the decree per se is supported and partly explained 
by reference to a frequent target of graphai paranomon: grants of citizenship 
and honorary decrees103. Reference to these is needed in order to offer an 
example where, in addition to the proposer’s character, the recipient’s one was 
at issue as well. This refers to cases of naturalisation of aliens who had already 
proved their merit through their services to the city. In fact, Athenian appraisal 
for citizenship led to the official legal provision that citizen rights must correlate 
with worthiness. In the speech against Neaera it is cited that:  
 
“there is a law imposed upon the people forbidding them to bestow Athenian citizenship upon 
any man who does not deserve it because of distinguished services to the Athenian people… 
the law permits to any Athenian who wishes to prefer it an indictment for illegality against the 
candidate, and he may come into court and prove that the person in question is not worthy of 
the gift, but has been made a citizen contrary to the laws. And there have been cases ere now 
when, after the people had bestowed the gift, deceived by the arguments of those who 
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requested it, and an indictment for illegality had been preferred and brought into court, the result 
was that the person who had received the gift was proved to be unworthy of it, and the court 
took it back. To review the many cases in ancient times would be a long task; I will mention only 
those which you all remember: Peitholas the Thessalian, and Apollonides the Olynthian, after 
having been made citizens by the people, were deprived of the gift by the court.” (Dem. 
59.89). 
 
As a result, it is an obvious inference that character and merit were the central 
issues of these charges, in accordance with the provisions of the law .  
2.3.2 : Examples of Dikai 
As we have already seen, dikai were charges brought by private individuals in 
cases concerning private disputes. In principle, this could serve to limit the 
invocation of character evidence to issues of guilt, namely to arguments from 
probability concerning the proof of the disputable facts of the case, or to issues 
of credibility, facilitating the effort of the litigants to enhance their trustworthiness 
and win the good will of the jury. However, the public nature of Athenian 
litigation induced litigants to try to widen the perspective of private disputes and 
argue for a broader impact of their particular case, so as to make it a matter of 
concern for the city as a whole. Grounding his assertions to character evidence, 
a prosecutor could present his opponent’s conduct as dangerous for the entire 
community (although arguing a private case), and a defendant could respond by 
presenting his opponent as a malicious prosecutor having ulterior motives104. 
Moreover, in some cases, the flexibility of procedural choice for a prosecutor 
induced him to argue for the aggravated charge (usually a graphe) and a fortiori 
prove the lesser charge he chose to bring (the present dike). In order to 
exemplify the aforementioned points, I will refer to two cases of dike aikeias 
(private suit for battery) and a dike blabes (private suit for damages). In the first 
set of cases, priority will be given to the factors of procedural flexibility and the 
prosecutors’ effort to transform a dike into a public matter, while in the latter 
case the focus will shift to the ‘open texture’ of a dike statute. 
 
The first set of cases that will be closely examined is Isocrates 20 (Against 
Lochites) collated with Demosthenes 54 (Against Conon). Both are cases of 
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aikeia where the prosecutor had to prove that the opponent was the first to 
strike and, also, anticipate the defendant’s attempt of “making light of the 
injuries received” (Isoc. 20.5)105. In both cases, nevertheless, the speakers do 
not limit their argumentation in simply proving these points. Both of them insist 
that a graphe hubreos would have been just as readily available in view of the 
defendant’s behaviour (Dem. 54.1; Isoc. 20.2, 4, 5)106. Therefore, despite the 
fact that the prosecutor (due to his moderation) chose to bring a private suit, the 
issue was nonetheless a public one. Relying on a portrayal of the defendant by 
reference to character evidence, the prosecutors demonstrate his contempt for 
the laws and for the citizen body, transform the case into a public matter and 
call for his punishment (Isoc. 20.11, 20). The defendant’s general characteristic 
conduct increases the likelihood of breaching the particular law that formed the 
substance of the dike aikeias by reference to his characteristic contempt for the 
intent of the lawgiver and the spirit of Athenian laws. The fact that the 
unprovoked attack did not lead to greater misfortunes is solely due to the 
speaker’s temperance (Isoc.20.8). If people like Lochites and Conon (who are 
proved to have a hubristic character) are allowed by the court to continue their 
reprehensible behaviour (and it is certain that they will as their character 
proves), then the mere aikeia will escalate and reach homicide (Dem. 54.17-19; 
Isoc. 20.8)107. 
 
Dike blabes (private suit for damages) is the most frequently attested private 
procedure in the Attic orators108. It applies to a variety of cases concerning 
damages, presumably due to its open texture and the absence of separate, 
more specific and better defined actions. The unifying idea under the term 
‘blabe’ was its application to instances where “action or inaction caused 
(especially material) harm”109. Such instances included breach of agreements 
and contractual obligations (e.g. Dem. 48; Hyp. 3), damages to property (Dem. 
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55), or maladministration of a trust (Dem. 38). However, Demosthenes 39 is a 
test case where the prosecutor, exploiting the open texture of the term ‘blabe’, 
seeks to apply it to non-material or potential damage to be suffered in the 
future110. In this case, the dispute arose between two half-brothers, Mantitheus 
and Boeotus. Their father, Mantias, died before Boeotus reached the age of 
majority and could register him on the list of citizens in his deme. Boeotus took 
advantage of this event and had himself registered under the name of 
Mantitheus (Dem. 39.5). His half-brother protested to this and, in the absence of 
a more specific procedure, brought a dike blabes. Nevertheless, if this private 
action was to be applied to his case, Mantitheus had to convince the judges that 
the term ‘blabe’ could extend beyond its normal interpretation of ‘physical 
damage to some material object’ (e.g. Dem. 55.12, 20, 28), so as to embrace 
acts that “simply cause some annoyance or might cause inconvenience in the 
future”111.  
 
In order for Mantitheus to convince the judges, he should prove that the 
likelihood of potential future harm was immense. Hence, apart from merely 
mentioning what hypothetical situations might cause him or the state damage or 
annoyance (Dem. 39.7-18), he should provide compelling reasons that Boeotus 
would in all probability take advantage of them. Boeotus is presented as a 
meddlesome person, associated with a gang of blackmailers (Dem. 39.2, 13, 
25, 34) and, quite often, finds himself in court. This increases the likelihood of 
being convicted in a trial and be forced to pay fines. Consequently, in case of 
confusion between the two Mantitheuses, sons of Mantias, this could cause 
material damage to the speaker who might find himself obliged to go to court to 
clarify the matter. Additionally, Boeotus had recently faced charges for evasion 
of military service (39.16-17) and had been defendant in certain suits (39.19). 
Apart from the dangers originating from this aspect of Boeotus’ character, he 
did not stop short from interfering with Mantitheus’ life to the extent that he had 
laid claim to the office to which the Athenians elected the latter (39.19). Finally, 
the confusion around the persons under the name Mantitheus, son of Mantias, 
could (taking into account Boeotus’ reprehensible conduct) damage the 
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speaker’s reputation among the polis. Consequently, reference to Boeotus’ 
character was invoked to serve the focus of Mantitheus’ case (resulted by the 
‘open texture’) to future and hypothetical situations. Nevertheless, the Athenian 
court rejected this liberal interpretation of the term ‘blabe’, no matter how 
probable (by reference to Boeotus’ character) future damage appeared. 
 
2.3.3 : Examples of Sui Generis Legal Cases (Inheritance and Dokimasia 
Rhetoron) 
In section 2.2.2 we have seen how the procedure of diadikasia served as an 
incentive for a wider invocation of character evidence. In this section reference 
will be made to legal cases under this procedure in the form of disputes about 
inheritance. The aforementioned (2.1.4) genuine difficulties in investigation and 
crime detection apply particularly to this category due to the regular 
disagreement as to the authenticity of the document presented as the 
deceased’s will. In order to approach this question, the court had to rely on the 
likelihood of each potential answer, weighed by the credibility of each particular 
claimant, and by the probability of whether the document put forward as his will 
genuinely represents the testator’s wishes112.  
 
In inheritance disputes, claimants’ argumentation primarily focused on the facts 
of the case since in most of the cases the legal context was straightforward113. 
Litigants never dispute the right of a legitimate son (natural or adopted) to 
inherit his paternal estate; but they do contest the legitimacy of a particular 
claimant or the validity of a particular adoption114. This in turn originated an 
excessive reliance on arguments from probability which was implemented by 
references to the burial of the dead and conduct of funeral rites, to feuds within 
the family dating back to previous generations, and to extensive invocation of 
character evidence. The last was predominantly used to alter the equilibrium as 
to the relative credibility of the claimants (taking into account the first-past-the-
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post system of the verdict), but also to illuminate the facts of the case. In Isaeus 
4 there is an effort to associate the opponent with a potential forgery of a 
contested will by reference to his past criminal record. Chariades, who was 
imprisoned for theft and absconded from Athens to escape justice on a 
subsequent charge, had all the characteristics of a would-be forger. On the 
other hand, the law-abiding and trustworthy citizens Hagnon and Hagnotheus 
would be more worthy recipients of the estate115. 
 
Dokimasia rhetoron constitutes an indicative example of how a particular legal 
charge could be transformed into a general (deeply political) attack against 
one’s character and behaviour116. This case (Aeschines 1) was brought as a 
counter-attack by Aeschines in order to damage his opponents’ chances of 
success in his prosecution of Aeschines. The latter argued that the defendant, 
Timarchus, had illegally addressed the assembly since his past reprehensible 
behaviour rendered him ineligible to do so. The allegation was that, in the past, 
he had prostituted himself and had squandered his patrimony. The law offered a 
list of acts that rendered a man ineligible to address the Assembly. Aeschines 
offers his account of these acts, which may not be exhaustive, but includes 
violence toward parents or failure to support them, military derelictions, 
prostitution, and squandering an inheritance117. All these actions constituted 
offences that could be tried separately and incur the penalty of atimia (loss of 
citizen rights). Since such acts concern behavioural issues, they interrelate with 
evidence of character. Illegal (and morally reprehensible) behaviour should be 
proved by reference to character evidence and could turn the odds in the 
decision before an Athenian audience.  
In order to support his argumentation, Aeschines directed his attack on the 
defendant’s bad character, and especially on specific allegations of indecency 
(in contrast to the advertisement of his decency). The uselessness of 
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Timarchus’ character (as revealed by his past acts) dictated the withdrawal of 
the honour of citizenship, since the mere acknowledgement of this privilege 
connoted disgrace for the polis as a whole. Aeschines portrays himself as a 
person of dignity who acts, unsurprisingly, in the public interest. His speech, (as 
in most trials from classical Athens), is allegedly intended to be given on behalf 
of the citizens118. The setting of this highly politicised public suit played a 
significant role in his effort to portray himself as a good citizen. In order to 
anticipate the obvious allegation of sycophancy against wilful prosecutors, 
Aeschines becomes the solemn prosecutor of indecency. Character evidence is 
indeed central. Furthermore, Aeschines’ character assassination of 
Demosthenes (the supporting speaker for the defence) is noteworthy. Instead of 
deviating from the main charges, Aeschines willingly uses relevant accusations 
even against Demosthenes. In the course of the speech, the latter is portrayed 
as a pimp, homosexual, glutton and corrupt person, squanderer of his property, 
being himself a disgrace to the city. In that way he becomes Timarchus’ alter 
ego rendering both undeserving of the jury’s good will. On the contrary, they 
deserve condemnation. Timarchus was eventually punished with atimia (loss of 
citizen rights) and Demosthenes postponed the initial prosecution against 
Aeschines for three whole years.  
2.3.4 Timesis 
A further classification in Athenian law that is of interest for this study is the 
separation of legal trials into ἀγώνες τιμητοί (charges for which the litigants put 
forward their proposals as to the evaluation – τίμησις – of the penalty) and 
ἀγώνες ἀτίμητοι (offences for which the penalty was fixed, as prescribed by 
law)119. The procedure runs as follows: the trial was divided in two main parts, 
each one ending with the jurors’ vote. The first part (guilt phase) was constituted 
by the litigants’ speeches as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. After the 
court’s decision on this matter, both litigants had to put forward their respective 
proposals (one each) as to the assessment of the penalty (sentencing phase). 
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The trial ended with the jurors’ vote, and the proposal receiving the majority 
vote was enforced. The normal process (probably) did not include any hints 
during the guilt phase regarding a litigant’s evaluation of the sentence. Harrison 
notes the possible exception of litigants coming to terms as to the penalty in 
advance of the trial120. Todd refers to cases where a litigant could warn of his 
thoughts in advance121. Such behaviour is evident in Aristophanes’ Wasps 
(where in the trial scene the indictment also includes the timema); apart from 
comedy, it is also evident in the fragmentary speech of Deinarchos Against 
Proxenos (Dion. Hal. Dein. 3). The latter may be taken as a clue that reference 
to the timema in advance could function as a rhetorical ploy, advertising the 
confidence of a litigant in his case. Scafuro’s reference to more passages from 
the Attic orators, induces her to offer another (speculative) proposal, namely 
that there may have been a regular procedure of compromise on the penalty in 
ἀγώνες τιμητοί122. One way or another, in both types of trials, jurors had little 
control over the penalty imposed123, whether this was fixed by statute or by the 
litigants’ proposals. The latter suggests that traces of the system of arbitration 
had intruded into the court system.  
 
Aristotle (Rhetoric 1374; Nic. Eth. 1137b) had already recognised that 
arbitration is the suitable system for equitable and ad hoc justice whereas the 
court system favours the rule of law. However, in some cases, statute penalties 
may be harsh and potentially unjust. The general scope of written laws (so as to 
cover general situations)  and the inflexible application of the wording of a 
written statute neither allow for deeper insight into the details of each particular 
case nor the evaluation of specific extenuating circumstances that could abate 
the harshness of a prescribed penalty. Furthermore, the adversarial nature of 
the Athenian courts tended to create winners and losers, with the potential 
danger of escalation of feuding to the detriment of the polis. The procedure of 
timesis was designed to perform this mollifying duty: it brings a mixture of the 
two systems (arbitration and courts) into life in search for proportionality. Todd 
suggests that the function of timesis [was] to encourage both litigants to keep 
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their proposals moderate, for fear of stampeding the jury into the opponent’s 
arms124. Here, the paradigm of Plato’s Apology, the “only example of a speech 
that purports to have been delivered at the timesis phase”125 is enlightening. 
Although he was condemned by a narrow margin, both parties insisted on 
taking the matter to the extreme. The death penalty proposed by the plaintiffs 
was countered by a haughty, but ineffective suggestion on the part of the 
philosopher. The narrow margin widened and Socrates was condemned to drink 
the hemlock. Nevertheless, although enlightening, this case is atypical. In the 
majority of cases (especially in those decided by narrow margin), the procedure 
of timesis would probably result to milder penalties or a compromise between 
the parties.  
 
This brings us to the most direct relationship of timesis with character evidence 
and extra-legal argumentation in general. Harris126 has offered a detailed 
analysis of this issue. His main thesis is that Athenian courts did not decide 
cases on political grounds and that extra-legal arguments, especially those 
concerning public services or status, did not influence the court’s decisions 
about guilt or innocence. Contrastingly, such arguments were legitimately used 
during the timesis phase and could have a mitigating effect on the sentence127. 
Although I am convinced that the Athenian courts’ verdicts were overwhelmingly 
based on legal issues, promoting thus the rule of law, my impression is that 
extra-legal argumentation could have a supportive (and highly probative) effect 
to a litigant’s case, even during the ‘guilt phase’. To what extent such 
argumentation influenced the decision of every single Athenian juror cannot be 
adduced with precision. The weaknesses of the evidence allow for nothing more 
than educated speculation. Nevertheless, the absence of surviving (but one, the 
atypical Plato’s Apology) speeches delivered during timesis phase, the 
frequency of extra-legal argumentation both during the guilt phase of ἀγώνες 
τιμητοί and in speeches delivered in ἀγώνες ἀτίμητοι, and their (rarer but 
evidenced) invocation by plaintiffs, induce me to acknowledge a different and 
more central role for this practice. If the importance of such argumentation was 
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reserved solely for the estimation of the wrongdoer’s sentence, not one of the 
above would be so evident in the surviving literature. Nonetheless, the presence 
of the procedure of τίμησις was yet another incentive for broader invocation of 
extra-legal argumentation. It allowed for a more accurate estimation of the 
deserved penalty, due to both parties’ appeal to mitigating or aggravating 
factors. Finally, it induced Athenian citizens to conform to legal and social 
norms, as the balance of probabilities ordained that in their lifetime they would 
inevitably have to adduce such behaviour in court.  
2.4 : Limitations to the Incentives 
Notwithstanding the above examples that some cases favoured a broader 
approach to character evidence, Athenian litigants were aware that this was not 
equally acceptable in all trials. Justice required them to speak to the point and 
stay clear from irrelevant statements128. One way or another, litigants were 
asked to argue on a specific legal charge, their argumentation (in theory) being 
restricted by the documented written plaint129. This meant that if they wanted to 
win, they had to adjust their arguments (even those lying at the margins of 
relevance to the issue) in such a way as to destroy their opponent’s legal case. 
However broad the notion of relevance might have been for the Athenians, 
circumstances themselves obliged them to pay close attention to the matter. 
Aristotle signifies that 
 
“the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a starting-point, it is easier to find 
a demonstrative proof” (Arist. Rhet. 1418a).  
 
For this reason, he observes, litigants who even are at a loss for valid 
arguments can resort to attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or 
attempts to arouse emotion. As long as they could present them as relevant to 
their case, any argument could be of some worth.  
 
On the other hand, Aeschines, in anticipating Demosthenes’ supporting speech 
in defence of Timarchus, warns the jurors that he,  
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“the clever speechwriter, will discover many irrelevant diversionary arguments, to the detriment 
of the city’s system of justice”
130. 
 
Relevance, apart from its strictly legal significance, had also acquired a practical 
one as a rhetorical weapon. Athenian litigants, whether or not respecting in 
practice the rule against irrelevant statements, in theory at least recognised it as 
overwhelmingly valid. In Lysias 9, a defendant in an apographe (writ of 
confiscation) complains about the use of irrelevant character evidence against 
him. He says:  
 
“What on earth did my opponents have in mind when they ignored the point at issue and sought 
to defame my character? Are they unaware that they are supposed to keep to the point? Or do 
they recognise this, but devote more attention to other matters than they should, thinking that 
you will not notice? … I would be surprised if they think that out of ignorance you can be 
persuaded by their slanders to vote for a conviction. I had expected that I would face trial on the 
basis of the indictment and not of my character” (Lys. 9.1-3). 
 
In homicide cases, the rule against irrelevant argumentation was purportedly 
stricter. The fact that the panel of jurors in the court of Areopagus (composed by 
former holders of the nine archonships) was more experienced than in other 
courts (composed by any allotted male citizen over the age of thirty), allows us 
to assume that this rule was better observed. As early as Antiphon’s speeches, 
it was recognised that it was unacceptable to adduce irrelevant (according to 
their standards) material. In a defence speech for a charge of unintentional 
homicide the speaker argues that the prosecutor  
 
“surely does not deserve your [i.e. jurors] trust, but rather your disbelief, when in a case like this 
he directs his accusation to charges other than those that are the subject of his prosecution. I 
am fairly certain you would not convict or acquit someone for any reason other than the crime 
itself” (Antiph. 6.10). 
 
A similar respect for relevance is shown by Lysias in a speech before the 
Areopagus, where the defendant says: 
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“I wish I were allowed to demonstrate his wickedness by referring to other events…I shall omit 
everything else, but mention one episode I think you should hear about, as evidence of his 
outrageous audacity….[although] it is unlawful to mention irrelevant material in your court” (ἀλλ᾽ 
ἐπειδὴ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν οὐ νόμιμόν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν) (Lys. 3.44ff). 
 
Arguably then, in all cases and courts, litigants were aware that to a greater or 
lesser degree they ought to keep to the point and avoid irrelevant 
argumentation. Especially in homicide cases (Arist. Rhet. 1354a22-3) and in 
private suits (Ath. Pol. 67.1) a formalisation of this ‘rule of relevance’ (which 
evidently required a statement under oath)131 forced litigants to pay an even 
closer attention. However, the question of what is relevant is really a subjective 
one (even in contemporary times), but as it will be demonstrated in due course, 
there were some patterns of argumentation that the Athenians followed, as to 
what was regarded positive or reprehensible conduct, how and when it should 
be argued. These patterns demonstrate that the Athenians had, in the main, a 
fixed idea of the kind of argumentation which should be admissible in a 
courtroom. Furthermore, the same ever recurring patterns show that the steps 
taken by the Athenians in their effort to objectify the subjective approaches to 
relevance, although had not produced formalised rules and controlling 
mechanisms, were largely adequate to limit litigants’ complaints to a minimum. 
Thus, a consistency of argumentation may be found in Athenian courts, 
especially as to how and what should count as relevant character evidence. The 
fact that an Athenian litigant or a limited number of jurors (in the absence of 
formal rules of admissibility and enforcement procedures) may have followed 
their own, subjective ideas, is not enough to demolish a more coherent picture 
of Athenian approach to relevance. The majority had steady ideas of relevant 
argumentation and the reason for this is to be found in the ethical coherence of 
the Athenian polis and the underlying unifying assumptions about character and 
personality they shared. 
 
Johnstone132 and Rubinstein133 have shown that defendants were more prone 
to digressions towards irrelevant statements, usually being the receivers 
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(positively or negatively) of ad hominem argumentation. Defendants cited their 
public services and liturgies quite more often than the prosecutors in order, both 
to erode the authority of the prosecutor’s story and to construct a relationship 
with the jurors that could afford them the latter’s good will. Furthermore, 
defendants asked for charis and pity, so they had to provide good reasons for 
such appeals to have any effect. Johstone explains these tendencies of the 
defendants by reference to the asymmetric roles they had in relation to the 
prosecutors. The different, harsher for the defendant, consequences of an 
adverse verdict triggered appeals to more general considerations, countering 
the prosecutors’ attempt to contain the disputed story to a legal case based 
solely on the written statute. According to the same author, the defendant’s 
character was on trial as the prosecutor’s was not134.  In general terms it is 
accurate that a defendant had more incentives to provide character evidence in 
order to support his case. Although his character was not on trial, nonetheless 
the proceedings were in personam, so (in the special context of an Athenian 
trial discussed above) he had to persuade the jurors by reference to arguments 
from probability that he is not the person to have committed the illegal act. The 
defendant’s character had probative value as to his guilt, in the sense that most 
factual disputes called for wider invocation of character evidence in order to 
prove the likelihood of an alleged act. Besides, in adversarial trials which 
consist predominantly of oral evidence and litigants act as the main source of 
information, parties attempt to prove their credibility and trustworthiness, to 
convince of their story and, in turn, receive the good will of the audience.  
 
Apart from the defendants, these considerations affected the strategy and 
tactics of the prosecutors as well, mainly as preemptive references in order to 
anticipate and neutralise such argumentation by their opponents. Lysias 
recognises that it 
  
“has become the custom in this city whereby defendants make no defence against the charges, 
but sometimes deceive you with irrelevant statements about themselves, showing you that they 
are fine soldiers, or have captured many enemy ships while serving as trierarchs, or have made 
hostile cities into friendly ones” (Lys. 12.38). 
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Aeschines in Against Timarchus argues that  
 
“in courts the defendants use counteraccusations against their accusers to escape their 
prosecution by turning the jurors’ focus on irrelevant matters” (Aeschin. 1.179-80). 
 
However, the prosecutor in a speech during a dokimasia (Lysias 26), where the 
defendants argued that it was valid to offer a more general account of their life, 
takes a neutral approach, de facto accepting the validity of such a defence. 
Before proceeding to counter the defendant’s evidence concerning his 
character, he observes that  
 
“today he will make but a brief reply to the charges brought against him, skimming over the facts 
and shuffling off the accusation with his defence; and he will tell how he and his family have 
spent a great amount on the State, have performed public services with ardent zeal, and have 
won many brilliant victories under the democracy; that he himself is an orderly person, and is 
not seen acting as others of our people venture to act, but prefers to mind his own business. I 
do not think it difficult to refute such statements” (Lys. 26.3-4). 
 
One way or another, Athenian litigants endeavoured to justify the introduction of 
ad hominem argumentation and put the blame on the opponent for initiating 
such a challenge. Retaining the adversarial character of the trial, parties 
presented their controversial, potentially prejudicial statements as aides to the 
quest for truth or, at least, as comments authorised by resort to fairness. To be 
certain, this is not unfamiliar in modern court-rooms. The approach of modern 
English common and statute law is similar, in its effort to control and put some 
checks and balances in the adversarial parts of the trial. According to it, a 
litigant should not gain an advantage by introducing prejudicial evidence; 
fairness requires that the opponent must have the opportunity to refute such 
claims135. Section 101 of the CJA 2003 states among others:  
 
“In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant’s bad character is admissible if… (f) it is 
evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant and (g) the defendant has made 
an attack on another person’s character”. 
                                            
135
 See Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s. 1(3); Criminal Justice Act 2003 s. 101 (1) (e), (f) and (g). 
[124] 
 
 
Thus, apart from its probative value or relevance, evidence ought to be admitted 
due to considerations of fairness; this was recognised by the Athenians as well.  
 
The issue of fairness was deemed central for another reason; both parties 
ought to have equal treatment before the laws and the court. Demosthenes 
warns the jurors not to accept any irrelevant pleas by Aeschines since not only 
he (Demosthenes) is not the man on trial (implying that this would be a valid 
excuse?), but also he wouldn’t be given any more time after the defence speech 
to give his own account on the matter136. Furthermore, defendants ought not to 
gain an unfair advantage by offering a false impression that couldn’t be 
corrected afterwards. On a prosecution speech against Nicomachus the 
anagrapheus, the prosecutor states:  
 
“I should have made no reference to these events had I not learnt that he was going to attempt, 
by posing as a democrat, to save himself in despite of justice, and that he would produce his 
exile as a proof of his attachment to the people…so that he cannot expect to get any credit on 
that account” (Lys. 30.15). 
 
Since prosecutors anticipated such statements, they pre-emptively tried to gain 
themselves an advantage (or avoid a disadvantage), creating bias and curtailing 
the defendants’ freedom for tactical manoeuvring. A usual method for achieving 
this was the insistence on relevance rules and the Heliastic oath, which 
provided that speeches and verdicts should be given in accordance with law. In 
addition, the defendants’ wide use of irrelevant extra-legal argumentation was 
attacked as a weakness to find more precise and directly related to the charge 
argumentation. Lysias says that the defendant ‘failing to find a plea for his own 
defence, he will try to slander me’137. Demosthenes wonders whether irrelevant 
argumentation doesn’t mean simply that he’s at a loss for good arguments:  
 
“Who would choose to make accusations when he’s on trial, if he had a defence he could 
make?”138. 
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Defendants, on the other hand, sought to place the responsibility for irrelevant 
argumentation (especially concerning character) on the prosecutor. Following a 
rationale similar to that of CJA 2003, it was widely accepted that in the course of 
a litigant’s attack on another’s character, fairness demanded a chance for 
response. Nevertheless, the blame should be placed on the initiator. As early as 
Antiphon there are examples (from homicide cases) of such argumentation. In 
Antiphon 5 (On the Murder of Herodes), the defendant finds it terrible that the 
prosecutor compelled him to defend himself on such, irrelevant, issues139. 
Lysias offers a similar argument on a non – homicide case. The defendant (Lys. 
9) argues that since “my opponents are defaming me I am forced to make my 
defence on the basis of all these topics”140. Demosthenes argues repeatedly 
that the digression from normality in offering character evidence, both in 
defence of himself and against Aeschines’ character, is due to the prosecutor’s 
provocation. It is important to note that Demosthenes reminds the jurors about 
this on almost every single occasion. From the very start of his speech he offers 
his view of the matter:  
 
“Now if Aeschines had confined his attack to the charges in his indictment, I in turn should now 
be giving my defence of the decree. But since he has wasted just as many words in detailing 
other matters and lied about me in most of them, I think it necessary, and at the same time fair 
(δίκαιον), to speak briefly on these matters first, so that none of you may be led by irrelevant 
arguments into listening less sympathetically to my pleas against the indictment” (Dem. 18.9). 
 
This point is repeated several times. In 34-5 he says:  
 
“I demand and beg of you, men of Athens, to remember this throughout the whole trial, that if 
Aeschines had not made charges that were extraneous to the indictment, I should not be 
speaking on any irrelevant matters”. In 50 he says that “it is Aeschines’ fault for having 
bespattered me, so to speak, with the dregs of his own wickedness and his misdeeds, of which I 
had to clear myself for the benefit of those who were born after the events’. More significantly, in 
124 he states that ‘Aeschines chose to rail against me rather than accuse me. Well, in that 
exercise he should not get away with less than he gave”
141.  
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It becomes obvious then that in the case of broad extra-legal argumentation 
which, in the absence of formalised rules, could be considered at the margins of 
relevance, both defendants and prosecutors felt (not only legally, but also 
ethically and rhetorically) obliged to excuse themselves and put the blame on 
the opponent. This course of argumentation determined the behaviour of 
supporting speakers, but even the presentation of evidence about deceased. In 
a trial concerning an estate, the son of the deceased says:  
 
“About my father – since the prosecution speeches have treated him as a criminal – please 
forgive me if I report what he has spent on the city and his friends” (Lys. 19.56). 
 
The issue of relevance also arose when litigants referred to third persons. In the 
most famous speech of Lysias, against Eratosthenes, the former member of the 
Thirty, he says: 
 
“Let nobody claim that I am making irrelevant charges against Theramenes, when it is 
Eratosthenes who is on trial, because I hear that he will defend himself by claiming he was an 
ally of Theramenes and shared the same activities” (Lys. 12.62). 
 
Athenian litigants, notwithstanding the extended (compared to modern courts) 
liberality they enjoyed, consciously or subconsciously felt the need to offer the 
above excuses. The evidence on our disposal allows us to extract that this was 
a successful method of tranquilising a hostile audience, avoiding dikastic 
thorubos (uproar), and finally send the arrows against the opponents. 
Considering the above, the main point remains, namely that the issue of 
relevance was substantial and existent in Athenian courts. Litigants remained 
alert that deviation towards irrelevant argumentation was enough to hurt their 
credibility and trustworthiness, therefore their chances of success. Within an 
overwhelmingly agonistic and demanding environment, litigants ought to 
present their case, handling simultaneously public opinion.   
 
Nevertheless, Athenian litigants, despite their condemnation of irrelevant 
statements, felt obliged to offer a more general account of their case, 
presumably believing that this is appropriate, legitimate and illuminative of the 
particular case.  There was trivial opposition to the relevance of such evidence 
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(which was clearly significant in arguing a case and had an impact to the 
decision-making process) and there is nothing inconsistent in their approach. 
The defendant in Lysias 21 states:  
 
“In regard to the counts of the accusation, gentlemen of the jury, you have been sufficiently 
informed; but I must ask your attention also for what has yet to be added, so that you may 
understand what kind of person I am before you give your verdict upon me” (Lys. 21.1). 
 
In the ninth fragment of Lysias’ speeches the litigant says that  
 
“it is not because of the crimes of my opponents (prosecutors) that I expect to win this case, but 
instead because of my own good character” (Lys. Fr. 9 [60]). 
 
Thus, although the issue of relevance was central, and most of the times at the 
cutting edge of the antagonism between litigants in their effort to gain the good 
will of the jurors, it was also acknowledged that character evidence could shift 
the balance (especially in public cases) and turn the verdict in favour of one 
party or another.  
2.5 : Conclusion 
The discussion above which is indicative and not exhaustive demonstrated that 
the Athenian legal system was designed in a way as to create incentives for 
evaluating, controlling and directing the more general behaviour of Attica’s 
inhabitants and Athenian citizens in particular. The structural encouragement for 
broader invocation of extra-legal argumentation was a useful tool in assisting 
this aim. Nevertheless, in order to acknowledge law as “the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules”142, the court system and 
its decisions must have a certain degree of consistency and predictability. Lanni 
argues that the formal Athenian court system played a vital role in maintaining 
order by enforcing informal norms. To her opinion, “the enforcement of extra-
legal norms also permitted the Athenians to enforce a variety of social norms 
while maintaining the fictions of voluntary devotion to military and public service 
and of limited state interference in private conduct”143. Nevertheless, in order to 
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be able to adjust one’s behaviour to such extra-legal norms, one must be 
certain as to which are these norms (which according to Lanni are informal and 
unwritten), what they provide (in order to conform to them), and when they are 
enforced. A simple threat of spontaneous, sporadic and discontinuous 
punishment for a breach of unidentified norms could only lead to the 
obsolescence of the court system as a whole. Lanni characterises the Athenian 
court as “highly unpredictable and prey to distracting stories”. My question is 
how such a system of unpredictability, inconsistence and incoherence, could 
provide a serious incentive for the adjustment of everyday social behaviour to 
generally acceptable and coherent norms. In my opinion, only a consistent 
approach as to the reasons for punishment can provide a considerable 
deterrent and Lanni’s suggestion does not offer it. Furthermore, punishment has 
to be counter-balanced by an offer of rewards, especially in a shame/honour-
culture, in order to provide an incentive for the average citizen to willingly 
conform to communal standards of behaviour. Such a balance could strengthen 
the role of courts as determinants of acceptable social norms. 
  
In particular, as far as Athens is concerned, deeper factors underlie both the 
adherence of individuals to ethical norms and the belief in the relevance of their 
presentation (or advertisement) in courts. These have to be traced in the 
psychology of the ancient Greeks which can be revealed by re-examining and 
questioning modern presuppositions and applying a more suitable model of 
interpretation. In what follows in the next chapters, I will try to show that the 
Athenian ideas of ‘character’ and ‘personality’ influenced and dictated their 
approach to justice. The courts were designed to work in harmony with these 
ideas and this is proved by their internal processes. The belief in the stability 
and indivisibility of a man’s character could aggrandise a single act’s weight in 
proving credibility or propensity. By the same token, the courts’ methods had 
significant effects on the life of the polis. Their centrality in the Athenian life, and 
the frequency of the ordinary man’s occupation with them, caused their 
significant influence on the average citizen’s life. Private and public behaviour 
were continuously checked and re-examined, providing yet another incentive to 
conform to the polis’ social and legal norms. Again, according to Gill’s 
‘objective-participant’ model of the self, a person’s ethical beliefs are influenced 
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and informed by the environment. Adherence to these beliefs and successful 
performance of one’s role in the community constituted the individual’s path to 
virtue. Thus, showing an understanding of the social norms and demonstrating  
a real or pretended conformity with them were the guaranteed ways of 
achieving good reputation and social standing. Finally, the patterns and 
conventions followed by Athenian litigants facilitated this process. Allowing for 
consistency of verdicts and avoiding ad hoc judgments, Athenian courts were 
able to direct and educate the citizens as to the meaning and the content of the 
acceptable ethical and social norms. 
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3 CHAPTER THREE: GREEK IDEAS OF ‘CHARACTER’ 
This chapter analyses the Greek ideas of ‘character’ (ethos). In these I will try to 
discover the original causes of the wide use of character evidence in forensic 
argumentation in general which survived to the practices of the logographers of 
Athenian courts. I consider surprising the fact that current bibliography (to my 
knowledge) contains periodic treatments and lacks a complete and in-depth 
account of this issue. Examination of Greek conceptions and assumptions 
regarding ‘character’ are sporadic and usually of limited focus. Ethos thus is 
typically discussed in relation to other issues, such as the concept of ‘will’ or 
‘character’ depiction in literature. This impedes my current study which, 
although it concerns character evidence in the courts of classical Athens, 
nevertheless has to rely on a more general analysis of Greek approaches to 
‘character’.  
 
What were the Greek assumptions about character? What did they think about 
its ‘indivisibility’? In other words, does the whole character illuminate a particular 
trait and vice-versa? Is a person’s general reputation for having a character 
capable of performing good or bad activities relevant to e.g. a charge of 
prostitution as in the prosecution of Timarchus? Do humans consistently follow 
identical behavioural patterns regardless of the stimuli? Such are the questions 
that have to be asked in order to discover the original perceptions that caused 
the excessive to modern standards reliance of the Athenian courts to 
argumentation from ethos. The analysis begins with a literature review of 
modern research on the Greek ideas. Then, modern approaches to ‘character’ 
will be discussed in order to highlight the complexity of the theme and the 
presuppositions that contemporary researchers unavoidably carry when 
analysing Athenian speeches. Having sketched the context, I will proceed to a 
close analysis of the Greek ideas of ‘character’, as evidenced in the works of 
the poets, the philosophers and, finally, the orators. Indeed, the conclusions 
expose the rationale behind the wide use of character evidence in Greek 
rhetoric. Application of these conclusions to the speeches delivered in the 
Athenian courts will take place in the next chapter. 
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3.1 Modern Research on Greek Ideas of ‘Character’ 
Close inspection of whether the Greeks regarded a human being’s character as 
innate and given from nature (phusis) is essential. Its outcome in turn will 
expose a belief as to its stability and invariability. As will be demonstrated in the 
relevant section, the ground-breaking Sophistic movement
1 produced an intellectual antithesis between nature and nurture, in the form of 
the question of whether phusis or nomos played the dominant role in the 
configuration of a man’s ethos. This question lay at the heart of the intellectual 
scene of the late fifth century and left its mark on the great philosophical works 
of Plato and Aristotle.  
 
Nevertheless, as Dover warns in his book on Greek popular morality 
 
“the extent to which an individual’s behaviour is determined by his innate capacity and 
disposition and the extent to which it is determined by the environmental forces which have 
operated in him, including example, precept and habituation, constitute a problem to which it is 
customary to give extremely confident answers founded on little evidence and even less 
intellectual effort”
2.  
 
This observation is applicable to both laymen when judging their 
contemporaries and some modern historians when examining the sources. 
Indeed, this (hazardous for a scholar) inclination has to be taken seriously. 
Interpreting ‘character’ may be highly controversial, so my aim here is to avoid 
easy solutions and ungrounded judgments. For instance Dihle assumes that 
phusis is fixed character, while for Fortenbaugh phusis can refer to an innate 
condition which is hard but not impossible to alter. More importantly, phusis may 
also be used of what might be called ‘second nature’, that is an acquired trait 
that has acquired deep roots over time3. 
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Dover’s influential remarks are frequently employed by scholars, but the 
aforementioned tendency for easy solutions (whether due to phusis or due to 
nurture) still exists. However, judgments as to the question of natural and 
unchangeable character traits are of utmost importance to studies similar to the 
present one, having significant implications for their outcomes. Most legal 
historians remain silent on the issue. In contrast, Lanni was daring enough to 
follow a clear line and base her discussion of the use of character evidence in 
Athenian courts on the assumption that “the Athenians tended to view character 
as stable and unchanging”4. She strongly asserts that “character is normally 
regarded in classical Greek culture as stable and unchanging, with the implicit 
assumption that it is a natural attribute over which the defendant has no 
control”5. Although she acknowledges that normally this would create intense 
questioning as to the moral blameworthiness of such an individual, she leaves 
unjustified her observation that “litigants generally do not challenge the idea that 
one’s character should be factored into the jury’s calculation of moral desert”6.  
 
On the other hand Dover, who seems to be Lanni’s basic secondary source7, 
carefully observes that “in our sources the dramatic situation or the 
requirements of an argument in court often decide whether a speaker 
pronounces in favour of nature or of nurture”8. Saunders notes that 
“occasionally Demosthenes makes an implicit distinction between offenders 
who are evil by nature and those whose depravity has been acquired”9. This 
fact, namely that the orators were free to use ‘character’ as best suited their 
case is a rejection of a firm universal belief in the unchangeable nature of 
character and a first indication of the complex nature of the Greek opinions on 
the issue. As it has been noted before, the biased nature of Athenian forensic 
speeches does not only pose problems but also provides answers. In such an 
agonistic environment where every single mistake could be manipulated and 
emphasised by the opponent, no orator would have the suicidal tendency to use 
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such an unpopular argument that would meet the immediate rejection of the 
audience.  
 
Therefore even a single argument from the speeches that supports the 
changeability of a man’s character should not be attributed to mere 
opportunism. On the contrary, it  may serve to question any firm contention that 
the Greeks believed in the unchangeable nature of ‘character’; examples will be 
given in due course. I consider the above discussion sufficient as to the general 
context that surrounds modern research on Greek ideas of ‘character’.  
3.2 ‘Character’ in Modernity 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the ideas of character in classical 
Athens, it is useful to clarify some of the terms and notions that are connected 
with this theme. In order to offer a comparative glimpse of the issue, reliance on 
modern definitions of, especially, Anglo – American sources, is unavoidable. 
This approach need not be anachronistic; it is just an agreement on and 
comparison of terminology and definitions, for better communication and 
understanding. Later in this chapter I aim to examine how the Athenians used 
these notions, highlighting the proximity or distance of the two approaches. 
 
The first notion concerning an examination of character evidence is that of 
character proper and character in law. Seemingly, there is no explicit legal 
definition of what constitutes the character of a person, and the law relies in the 
common sense use of the term. According to ‘The Oxford English Dictionary’ 
character means: “the mental and moral qualities distinctive to an individual; 
strength and originality in a person's nature; a person's good reputation”10. 
Other, relevant to my study, definitions could include ‘ The combination of 
qualities or features that distinguishes one person, group, or thing from 
another’, ‘A description of a person's attributes, traits, or abilities’, ‘Public 
estimation of someone; reputation’, ‘Status or role; capacity’ etc. 
  
These definitions reveal how broad a meaning the word can take in its common 
usage. On the other hand, partly addressing this problem, ‘character’ in law is 
                                            
10
 OED, s.v. character. 
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attributed a narrower interpretation. Usually, it means “a person’s tendency to 
behave in a particular way”11. It is used interchangeably with  
 
“disposition and propensity, which are alternative terms with the same meaning… Thus a 
person might be described as having a violent disposition if he has several convictions for 
assault or as having an honest character if she has a reputation for integrity”
12. 
 
Nevertheless, as usual in social sciences, terminology is subject to 
interpretation. Broad and narrow definitions can be offered, not only depending 
on the social and legal context of a particular period or place, but even on the 
personal background of a judge13. Generally, ancient Athenians preferred a 
broad definition of ‘character’, as  it will be proved by their argumentation in the 
law-courts in due course. 
 
Apart from the difficulties of defining character in a legal context, one also has 
to examine the notion of character evidence. This phrase in law may be 
described as proof or attestations about an individual's moral standing, his 
general nature, behavioural traits, and reputation in the general community. 
Keane in The Modern Law of Evidence asserts that character evidence in any 
event, may constitute evidence of a person’s actual disposition, his propensity 
to act, think, or feel in a given way14. It is hardly unobservable that different 
persons give different definitions of the terms. If character for Dennis 
(mentioned above) simply means a person’s tendency to behave in a particular 
way, then this tendency is evidenced by taking into account considerations such 
as his morals and feelings; evidence of past behaviour can be adduced to 
support an argument about a good or a bad character. Nevertheless, in order to 
rely on such a ‘tendency – approach’, a certain belief becomes, to a great 
extent, unavoidable, that a person’s character is unchangeable and indivisible. 
The same person will behave in a steady way throughout the years, and his 
general traits will triumph and be revealed regardless of contexts and situations. 
                                            
11
 Dennis (2010), p. 784. 
12
 Dennis (2010), p. 784. 
13
 To make things worse, as Dworkin (1986), p. 36 famously, though exaggerating, remarked 
about legal realists’ approach: “Some realists…said there is no such thing as law, or that law is 
only a matter of what the judge had for breakfast”. cf. Kozinski (1993). 
14
 Keane, (2010), p. 439. 
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The English common law took the straightforward view that a person’s 
character is indivisible15. Thus, if a defendant claimed to have a good character 
and referred to one particular type of good behaviour, the prosecution could 
refute the claim by cross-examining him on misconduct in another respect16.  
 
Modern psychology has rejected both the simplicity and the universality of this 
approach17. Behaviour is conceived to be a function of both disposition and 
situation, and their mutual interaction18. This does not go quite so far as to 
destroy the claim that character is ‘indivisible’; nevertheless, it shows that 
character evidence should be treated with caution and maybe be limited in its 
admissibility in the courtrooms. On the other hand, other scholars suggest that 
human behaviour is not entirely arbitrary and “Character has both predictive 
force and probabilistic significance concerning a person’s past acts or 
omissions”19. Modern psychological research tends to see behaviour as 
determined by a combination of personality characteristics and situational 
factors. The acknowledgment by social science that individuals may act in 
accordance with established character traits provides useful theoretical backing 
for the claim that past criminal behaviour has probabilistic value for legal fact-
finding20. Therefore the still unanswered question of indivisibility and steadiness 
of character is also a question demanding illumination by the Athenians’ 
practices in their courts.  
 
But where is the justification for the probative value of ‘character’ to be found? 
In the past, this was primarily grounded on the intuitive conclusions of laymen 
as provided by popular assumptions. Such an approach is evident in the 
aforementioned obsolete picture of the English legal system. The abandonment 
of character-responsibility and the increasing professionalization of the legal 
                                            
15
 Dennis (2010), p. 794. 
16
 Winfield (1939) 27 Cr. App. R. 139 at 141 (Humphreys J.); Stirland v DPP [1944] A.C. 315 at 
326 (Viscount Simon L.C.). 
17
 McEwan (2007), p. 188 correctly warns against the cherry-picking and uncritical use of 
empirical evidence and experimental data. According to her “although the debate on the 
admissibility of the accused’s bad character has been increasingly informed by empirical 
evidence, lawyers have, in typical fashion, managed to use the same research to support both 
sides of the argument”. 
18
 Davis (1991), p. 518. 
19
 Zuckerman (1987), p. 190. 
20
 Redmayne (2002), p. 684 
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discourse called for a scientific justification, if ‘character’ was to be used to 
predict behaviour. Until the 1960s, research on character was dominated by the 
‘trait theory’21. This assumed that people had relatively stable personality traits 
which could be utilised to predict future conduct.  
 
This theory, which reserved a highly probative role for ‘character’, was gravely 
questioned. As a result it gave ground to ‘situationism’. This sought to explain 
behaviour in terms of situational, rather than personal, causal factors. By the 
same token, for ‘situationism’, character evidence has no probative value. 
During the 1980s, however, it was recognised that this approach too was naïve, 
and there has now been something of a rapprochement between it and trait 
theory, referred to as ‘interactionism’: both personal disposition and situations 
determine behaviour. “Today, no one contends that people fail to exhibit stable 
personality characteristics, and no one questions whether social contexts shape 
affect, cognition and action…there simply are no longer any situationists”22. 
Questions nevertheless still remain as to how broadly these stable traits should 
be interpreted, thus how predictive these dispositional tendencies can prove in 
divergent situations. Uncertain conclusions characterise even modern times. 
 
Modernity has brought about a broad movement from ideas of responsibility as 
founded in character to conceptions of responsibility as founded in capacity. 
The conception of responsibility founded in capacity is based on notions of 
human agency which emerged in Europe in the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment. The idea of the self-determining moral agent, equipped with 
distinctive cognitive and volitional capacities of understanding and self-control 
provoked significant consequences for law. This change is evident in the 
metamorphosis of the English legal system, which shifted from its eighteenth 
century character-based responsibility (according to which individuals were held 
accountable for their general conduct) to a capacity-based responsibility (where 
individuals are to be held accountable for the specific acts that they choose to 
do at a given time)23. Although character-responsibility has left its traces and is 
deeply embedded in notions such as the ‘reasonable person’ or objective 
                                            
21
 This historical review is taken from the objective parts of Redmayne (2002). 
22
 Caprara and Cervone (2008), pp. 64 and 110. 
23
 See Lacey (2001). 
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standards of proof leading to normative judgments concerning an individual’s 
behaviour, ‘character’ is (theoretically) harshly reserved for specific questions of 
fact. Otherwise, broader character evidence would violate a “social commitment 
to the thesis that each person remains mentally free and autonomous at every 
point in his life”24; a conclusion that is inapplicable in ancient times. 
3.3 ‘Character’ for the Greeks 
3.3.1 The Beliefs of the Poets 
The above discussion demonstrates the difficulty of ending up in unmistakeable 
judgments as regards the nature and functions of ‘character’. In what follows, 
Greek beliefs will be revealed, beginning with the thoughts of the intellectuals. 
By this term I mean the poets, philosophers, and thinkers, as separate from the 
orators, who although offering sophisticated ideas of ‘character’, they tend to 
manipulate it and provide biased, self-interested views. Therefore, discussion of 
forensic speeches will be considered separately next.  
 
‘Character’ for the Greeks is usually referred to as ‘ethos’ (ἦθος)25. It is also 
denoted by ‘tropos’ (τρόπος) and ‘kharakter’ (χαρακτήρ). Ethos (especially in 
the singular) best suits our case since it is the word that best captures the 
disposition of a human being, particularly focusing on inherent personal traits, 
observed as they are externalised through behaviour. LSJ following Aristotle 
(Nic. Eth. 2.1.1) sees ἦθος as the lengthened form (slight variation) of the word 
ἔθος which means habit26. For Aristotle, ἦθος is the product of ἔθος (as 
revealed by their linguistic proximity), thus moral or ethical virtue may be 
acquired through virtuous habits. Tropos is usually found in the plural (tropoi)27 
meaning ways and manners, whereas kharakter focuses on the distinctive 
marks of a person, his ‘characteristics’. Both words nevertheless are not 
excluded from denoting ‘character’ in its current sense, depending on the 
context. What is of interest here however, is not a philological approach to the 
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 Wigmore (1983), par.55 at 1151. 
25
 This is also the term used by the rhetoricians. 
26
 LSJ, s.v. ἦθος. 
27
 See Pind. Nem. 1.42; Hdt. 1.107, 3.36; Plat. Phaedr. 252D, 278D, Laws 655D; Aesch. Prom. 
11, 309, Agam. 856; Ar. Peac. 350, 935. In the singular, it usually denotes ‘character’ in a more 
external and practical way: cf. Ar. Plut. 245, Wasps 1002, Thesm. 93. 
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issue but rather an enquiry of whether the Greeks believed in an unchanging 
character which is provided by nature.  
 
Hesiod in the Works and Days (l. 67, cf. 78) describes the myth of Pandora. 
Hermes is charged by Zeus to put in her “a shameless mind and a deceitful 
character” (ἐν δὲ θέμεν κύνεόν τε νόον καὶ ἐπίκλοπον ἦθος). Character is 
therefore considered as something given by the gods at the moment of creation. 
On the other hand, when he uses the word in the plural (WD 699: ἤθεα 
κεδνὰ διδάξῃς, cf. Theog. 66) it can be translated as ‘manners’ which, although 
close to ethos and indicative of character (as behavioural traits), are acquirable. 
For Hesiod then, it seems that ethos is inborn and presumably (given his 
silence on the issue and the fact that is provided by the gods) unchangeable. 
The use of the word’s plural tense refers to manners, ways, and customs, a use 
that remained unaltered through the centuries. Its commonest use refers to 
general customs of groups or nations, therefore a distinct notion of the one that 
interests us here28. 
 
In the singular the word retains its Hesiodic meaning denoting inborn 
characteristics, at least until Aeschylus’ Agamemnon (458 BC). Aeschylus 
writes: 
 
“Even so a man reared in his house a lion's whelp, robbed of its mother's milk yet still desiring 
the breast. Gentle it was in the prelude of its life, kindly to children, and a delight to the old. 
Much did it get, held in arms like a nursling child, with its bright eye turned toward his hand, and 
fawning under compulsion of its belly's need. But brought to full growth by time, it showed the 
nature it had from its parents” (χρονισθεὶς δ᾽ ἀπέδειξεν ἦθος τὸ πρὸς τοκέων) (l. 718-725). 
 
Ethos is inborn in both human beings and animals; sooner or later it overcomes 
acquired superficial traits and is revealed. This idea of ‘character’ attributed to 
phusis (nature) remained popular and central to the intellectual discussions of 
the time. The question of character’s heredity puzzled Greek thinkers29. 
                                            
28
 See for eg. Hdt. 2.36; Thuc. Hist. 2.61, 6.18; cf. [Aesch.] Prom. 186. The commonest 
expression was ἤθεά τε καὶ νόμους referring to both morals and laws. 
29
 See for e.g. Plat. Meno 95e (especially Theognis’ fragment), 93a-94e; Protag. 327b-c; Eur. 
El. 369f.; more generally see Dover (1974), pp. 91-2. 
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Athenian law (either following a psychological or a practical rationale) never got 
rid of it entirely30. 
 
Pindar, writing in the first half of the fifth century, provides an alternative to the 
above. In the Eighth Nemean Ode he writes:  
 
“May I never have such an ethos, father Zeus; may I stick to the simple paths of life, so that 
when I die I will not fasten a bad name to my children”31 (l. 35).  
 
Pindar uses ἦθος as something that can be changed through life. The appeal to 
Zeus may denote a worry that the Gods can favour or disfavour a man by 
changing his ethos but the essence remains: it can be altered through the 
course of life. This conclusion becomes more evident when two other passages 
from the same poet are compared. In the Eleventh Olympian Ode (l. 20) he 
writes: “For neither the fiery fox nor loud-roaring lions change their ethos”32. 
Here, in order to differentiate the use of the word he refers to ἦθος as ἐμφυὲς 
(innate, inborn). Inborn ‘ethos’ cannot change in contrast to ‘ethos’ per se. It is 
unclear however which attributes he considers as innate and which can be 
acquired or reformed. To complete the picture and prove that the adjective 
before the word ἦθος was not accidentally used, citation of the Thirteenth 
Olympian Ode (l. 13) is needed. Pindar there, in order to highlight the second 
use of the word ἦθος as unchanging, accompanies it by the adjective συγγενὲς 
(inborn) (ἄμαχον δὲ κρύψαι τὸ συγγενὲς ἦθος). Thus either Pindar recognises 
two kinds of ἦθος: one that may change through the course of one’s life and 
one that contains a person’s innate attributes or he vacillates on the subject and 
the use of the adjective before the word ethos is merely an emphatic tautology. 
In any case, the absence of a firm supposition is noteworthy, yet the step 
towards a belief in the changeability of character has been taken.  
                                            
30
 Hereditary punishment was a not uncommon feature of Athenian law (e.g. in some forms of 
perpetual atimia as the one referred in Dem 9.42-5; cf. Hansen (1976), p. 119). By 
‘psychological rationale’ I mean an honest belief in the hereditary nature of a disposition for 
wrongdoing, as one could implicitly infer by the wide invocation of family evidence in the orators. 
By ‘practical rationale’ I mean the twofold attempt of Athenian law to neutralise through 
punishment a hostile oikos as a whole, and to punish the descendants of a traitor in order to 
avoid their potential future vengeance. Both matters will be discussed in due course.   
31
εἴη μή ποτέ μοι τοιοῦτον ἦθος, Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἀλλὰ κελεύθοις 
ἁπλόαις ζωᾶς ἐφαπτοίμαν, θανὼν ὡς παισὶ κλέος μὴ τὸ δύσφαμον προσάψω. 
32
 τὸ γὰρ ἐμφυὲς οὔτ᾽ αἴθων ἀλώπηξ οὔτ᾽ ἐρίβρομοι λέοντες διαλλάξαντο ἦθος. 
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Sophocles’ Ajax and Antigone, both relatively early works of the poet33, further 
highlight the change of attitude towards ‘character’. In the Ajax (l. 595) 
Sophocles writes: “You have foolish hope, I think, if you plan so late to begin 
schooling my ethos” (μῶρά μοι δοκεῖς φρονεῖν, εἰ τοὐμὸν ἦθος ἄρτι παιδεύειν 
νοεῖς). The word ἦθος is here translated as temper and it denotes the wide 
spectrum of meanings that it can take. Nevertheless it certainly refers to the 
disposition of the hero (more specifically his tenacity), and most importantly to 
the possibility of its alteration. Ajax does not seem in principle to deny that this 
can be accomplished. His dissent lies on the fact that it is ‘too late’34. Sophocles 
certainly looks aware of the problematic issues linking ‘character’ and 
education, issues that were at the centre of attention of the rising Sophistic 
movement. What is of significance here is primarily the acknowledgment of (or, 
more conservatively, the reference to) change of character by means of 
education.  
 
The wide variance of uses of the word ἦθος, but also a rising awareness of the 
possibility of its change and its adjustment to different situations is provided in 
the Antigone (l. 705-709): 
 
“Do not, then, bear one ethos only in yourself: do not think that your word and no other must be 
right. For if any man thinks that he alone is wise—that in speech or in mind he has no peer—
such a soul, when laid open, is always found empty”35.  
 
This passage comes close to modern ‘interactionism’. Ethos here denotes the 
adaptable (and as such acquirable) attributes of a person. It may be 
differentiated by the inborn characteristics (an idea which is not abandoned) 
since it can change and be adjusted according to the circumstances. Assessing 
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 The Ajax is believed to be written c. 450-430 BC, while the Antigone should be dated c. 441 
BC. 
34
 Presumably, Plato would disagree with this approach. See for e.g. Plat. Lach. 201a-b: “And if 
anyone makes fun of us for seeing fit to go to school at our time of life, I think we should appeal 
to Homer, who said that “shame is no good mate for a needy man.” So let us not mind what 
anyone may say, but join together in arranging for our own and the boys' tuition”. The quote 
(attributed to Socrates) “κάλλιον οψιμαθής ή αμαθής” has become proverbial among Greece. 
35
μή νυν ἓν ἦθος μοῦνον ἐν σαυτῷ φόρει, ὡς φὴς σύ, κοὐδὲν ἄλλο, τοῦτ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.  
ὅστις γὰρ αὐτὸς ἢ φρονεῖν μόνος δοκεῖ, ἢ γλῶσσαν, ἣν οὐκ ἄλλος, ἢ ψυχὴν ἔχειν,  
οὗτοι διαπτυχθέντες ὤφθησαν κενοί. 
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external situations and acting in a seemingly incoherent (thus sometimes 
impersonal) manner is an acknowledged, possible way of action.  
This view of potentially changeable character is evidently supported by 
Euripides. In the Hippolytus (428 BC) he writes:  
 
“O that in answer to my prayer fate might give me this gift from the gods, a lot of blessedness 
and a heart untouched by sorrow! No mind unswerving and obdurate would I have nor yet again 
one false-struck, but changing my pliant ἤθεα ever for the morrow I would share the morrow's 
happiness my whole life through”
36 (l. 1111-15).  
 
Although the word is here used in the plural, the strict rules of poetic metres and 
the context of the speech have to be taken into account. Euripides clearly refers 
to personal behavioural manners and not to objective customs or ways of 
thinking. In other words, what is at stake here is the adaptability of character 
traits to divergent situations, together (though separately mentioned) with the 
adaptability of thought perspectives (δόξα). Furthermore, voluntary choice or 
education may alter one’s character traits. For confirmation of this, I cite a quote 
from the Suppliants:  
 
“for noble nurture carries reverence with it, and every man, when once he has practised virtue, 
scorns the name of villain. Courage may be learned, for even a baby learns to speak and hear 
things it cannot comprehend; and whatever someone has learned, this it is his wont to treasure 
up till he is old. So train up your children in a virtuous way.”
37 (l. 911-7). 
 
So, up to now two possibilities emerge: either character is stable and 
unchanging though it cannot be fully revealed since one may choose to (or 
involuntarily) act ‘out of character’38, or one’s character is flexible, adaptable, 
and responsive to situations. For the moment it is preferable to interpret the 
                                            
36
 εἴθε μοι εὐξαμένᾳ θεόθεν τάδε μοῖρα παράσχοι, τύχαν μετ᾽ ὄλβου καὶ ἀκήρατον ἄλγεσι θυμόν. 
δόξα δὲ μήτ᾽ ἀτρεκὴς μήτ᾽ αὖ παράσημος ἐνείη, 
ῥᾴδια δ᾽ ἤθεα τὸν αὔριον μεταβαλλομένα χρόνον αἰεὶ 
βίον συνευτυχοίην. 
37
 τὸ γὰρ τραφῆναι μὴ κακῶς αἰδῶ φέρει: αἰσχύνεται δὲ τἀγάθ᾽ ἀσκήσας ἀνὴρ  
κακὸς γενέσθαι πᾶς τις. ἡ δ᾽ εὐανδρία διδακτός, εἴπερ καὶ βρέφος διδάσκεται  
λέγειν ἀκούειν θ᾽ ὧν μάθησιν οὐκ ἔχει. ἃ δ᾽ ἂν μάθῃ τις, ταῦτα σῴζεσθαι φιλεῖ  
πρὸς γῆρας. οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύετε. 
38
 Cf. Ar. Wasps (1002): 
ἀλλ᾽ ὦ πολυτίμητοι θεοὶ ξύγγνωτέ μοι: ἄκων γὰρ αὔτ᾽ ἔδρασα κοὐ τοὐμοῦ τρόπου. 
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Greek views as considering both: ethos may refer to deep inborn traits that, 
though concealable, are unchanging and with the aid of time revealed39, and it 
may refer to more superficial attributes and behavioural manners that can be 
altered either through education or through voluntary choice and subsequent 
habituation40. At that time approximately, at the second half of the fifth century, 
the rise of the Sophistic movement gave a boost to the aforementioned issues, 
leaving its imprint on people of all intellectual levels from Protagoras and Plato 
to common folk41. 
3.3.2 The Rise of the Sophists42 
The present enquiry would be incomplete and deceptive, if account of the 
significant, ground-breaking, intellectual developments of the Sophists was not 
taken. Unfortunately, the original works of this movement’s exponents survive in 
inadequate quantity and fragmentary form. In addition, evidence of their 
thoughts survives in works of their critics (primarily Plato) and is highly biased. 
Thus it has not facilitated researchers in reaching fair conclusions as to the 
Sophists’ true intellectual contribution. What is objective and certain though is 
that the Sophists provoked new perspectives in most issues that occupied the 
Greek intellectual world. Some of their ideas, based on cutting-edge theories of 
the Presocratics, constituted the intellectual bridge between earlier natural 
philosophers and later philosophical trends. The practical aims of the Sophists, 
supplemented with their self-determination as paid experts of knowledge, paved 
the way towards a more pragmatic, scientific, and professional approach to 
abstract and informal notions. For instance, the handbooks of Corax and 
Teisias in Sicily transformed the, previously scattered, rules of rhetoric into an 
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 This poses yet another problem which will be especially revealed in our discussion of the 
forensic speeches. If character is stable but one chooses to act ‘out of character’, how and 
when one could recognise the true natural traits?  
40
 See for e.g. Ar. Peace 350, 935.  
41
 As Guthrie (1969, at p. 73) notes, quoting W.C. Greene (Moira, p. 251f.): “most scholars 
would probably agree that the chief value of this composition (i.e. Anonymous Iamblichi) lies in 
showing ‘how far the stock ideas and arguments of the age penetrated into rather ordinary 
minds’.”. 
42
 In what follows, for the sake of convenience, I will treat the Sophists as exponents of a single 
intellectual movement, though I acknowledge that each one proposed his independent views, 
which many times were radically different or even antithetical to the others’. For the ‘Sophists’ 
one should look at Guthrie (1969); Kerferd (1981); Rankin (1983). For a selective bibliography in 
English see McComiskey (1994).  
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art, consequently urging subsequent thinkers (such as Antiphon) to research 
and experiment on more precise fields43.  
 
The conclusions of the Presocratics concerning the origin and nature of the 
cosmos, and the doubts they raised about the order and the divine source of the 
physical world, found fertile ground in the restless minds of the Sophists, who 
pushed this enquiry forward. As Guthrie writes:  
 
“We are entering a world in which not only sweet and bitter, hot and cold, exist merely in belief, 
or by convention, but also justice and injustice, right and wrong”
44. 
  
The antithesis between nomos and phusis is transferred from the cosmological 
sphere to the essential questions about human nature. To what extent does 
phusis endow humans with certain and unchanging attributes and what 
implications do acquired beliefs and conventions have on a person? Is man by 
nature a political animal or does his savage nature have to be tamed and 
suppressed? Finally, is human virtue innate or subsequently acquired? What 
implications does this have for the conception of a person’s character? These 
sample questions are necessary in order to show the Sophistic movement’s 
significance for the original question, i.e. whether a person’s ethos is innate, 
stable and unchanging. 
 
The enquiry shall begin with some common ground upon which divergent 
opinions may be offered. This is the assumption that human nature in its original 
state is so savage and self-seeking as to be unable to form ordered political 
communities in the sense that civilisation demands them. Human nature needs 
rectifications (or adjustment) in order to learn to act in obedience to society’s 
cooperative values. This is skilfully portrayed in Plato’s ‘Protagoras’, where the 
sophist is Socrates’ interlocutor. The theme of the dialogue concerns the unity 
of virtue and whether it is teachable. Protagoras’ famous claim was that he 
could teach arête45 (virtue), a thesis that Socrates doubted, questioning the very 
                                            
43
 See Gagarin (1991). 
44
 Guthrie (1969), p. 59. 
45
 The notion of arête, as well as the particular word (as in most other cases that formed the 
topics of Plato’s dialogues) lacked a specific and adequate definition. (For different definitions 
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‘teachability’ of virtue46. The great sophist’s whole intellectual testament was 
thus at stake. Conversing with elegance and skill, Protagoras finally tempts 
Socrates towards accepting that virtue is teachable. 
 
What is of major importance here is the fact that for Protagoras, humans are 
equipped by nature with ἐντεχνος σοφία (practical wisdom) but lack the so-
called quiet, cooperative virtues, which are essential to the formation of ordered 
communities. The natural (of varying degree among humans) intelligence 
should be supplemented by moral virtue47. Therefore Zeus ordered Hermes to 
provide all humans with aidos and dike  
 
“for cities cannot be formed if only a few have a share of these as of other arts. And make 
thereto a law of my ordaining that he who cannot partake of aidos and dike shall die the death 
as a public pest.” (322d). 
 
Therefore humans are receptive to virtue which, although not innate, can be 
subsequently acquired, thus can be taught. Nomos (in the form of both positive 
law and ethics) must be employed to improve human phusis for the sake of 
polis-formation48.  
 
Protagoras, however, discloses an implicit compassion for the natural state of 
humans. Others are still harsher. Nature is disorderly and varies with the 
individual. Human nature may be corrupt, savage and self-seeking. Actually 
  
“there was a time when the life of men was disorderly and beastlike, the slave of brute force, 
when the good had no reward and the bad no punishment. Then, as I believe, men laid down 
                                                                                                                                
see e.g. Pl. Meno 71e; Gorg. 492c) Socrates’ interlocutors insist on giving widely accepted 
examples of arête or putting forward popular beliefs, whose legitimacy is then questioned. 
However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, this very dialectical reflection based on the 
questioning of common norms, forms the core of Platonic (and Greek) philosophy, as opposed 
to the individual, monastic philosophic reflection idealised in the Enlightenment. This has 
significant implications on the Greek ideas of personhood, as opposed to the modern ones. See 
Gill (1996).  
46
 This formed a central topic of discussion at the end of the fifth century and beginning of the 
fourth. See for e.g. the anonymous treatise Dissoi Logoi (Double Arguments). 
47
 Cf. Protag. fr. 3, DK: ‘Teaching needs both nature and practice’. This comes close to 
Isocrates’ thesis on the combination of natural ability and practice [see Isocr. Antidosis 186-192 
and Arist. Nic Eth. 1103a]. 
48
 The Greek word πολιτισμός comes much closer to my use of the word ‘civilisation’ here. 
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laws to chastise, that justice might be ruler and make insolence its slave, and whoever sinned 
was punished”
49.  
 
According to this developmental view of human civilisation, nomos was the 
catalyst that liberated humans from their savage nature and allowed them to 
prosper. On the other hand, there were people who questioned this civilising 
ability of nomos, though still accepting that humans are naturally inclined 
towards wrongdoing; for they alleged that self-seeking interest is the strongest 
instinct. These ‘realists’ (as Guthrie names them) retain the gloomy picture of 
humans’ original state, though doubting of whether this can be truly altered. For 
them, habituation in moral virtue does not transform human nature. A 
superficially wholehearted adherence to quiet ethical norms simply forms a 
pretext, until the necessary conditions for the true human nature’s exposure are 
met.  
 
Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic50 (regardless of the extent of his picture’s 
distortion) poses a good example of a ‘realist’. For thinkers like him justice is 
identified with the interest of the stronger. The absence of proper definitions, the 
complexity and subjectivity of common beliefs, and the self-interested 
denotation of moral canons do not actually allow scope for such questions. As 
long as a person has the power to fulfil his wishes, the true justice or injustice of 
his cause is irrelevant. In other words, as Glaucon and Adeimantus propose, a 
man in possession of the ring of Gyges (that conferred invisibility to his wearer), 
would certainly reveal true human nature by showing that no one could resist 
the temptation of committing an injustice for his (supposed) self-interest, with 
the foreknowledge that it would not be punished51. There is no value judgment 
in this conclusion. It is simply a (pessimistic) observation of the natural 
necessity that induces this course of events. Human beings’ inner self is guided 
by the laws of nature which dictate the pursuit of self-interest as the only true 
(and unchangeable) disposition. Human laws and morals merely act as a 
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deterrence which, whenever possible and profitable, will be disregarded. Nomos 
can only suppress natural disposition; it never alters it. 
  
The above discussion opens the path to the next question, concerning the 
legitimacy of human laws that are designed to suppress nature. Hippias refers 
to human law as the “despot of mankind, (which) often constrains us against 
nature” (Plat. Prot. 337d). Callicles, though declaring himself not a sophist, 
claims that  
 
“the fact is this: luxury and licentiousness and liberty, if they have the support of force, are virtue 
and happiness, and the rest of these embellishments—the unnatural covenants of mankind—
are all mere stuff and nonsense” (Plat. Gorg. 492c).  
 
Human justice is inferior to natural justice; man-made laws are unnatural (thus 
illegitimate) attempts of the weak and incompetent to inhibit the natural (thus 
legitimate) laws that bless anyone who has the strength and ability to satisfy his 
needs and rule. Human nature is not simply unchangeable but should also be 
inviolable.  
 
To conclude then, the Sophistic movement and its era left an invaluable 
intellectual testament. What is relevant to my study is primarily their common 
belief that man in his original state is not naturally endowed with those virtues 
that are necessary for the formation of communities; indeed, the opposite would 
be closer to truth. Men may naturally differ in their intellectual and physical 
abilities (and capabilities) but still share certain ‘beastlike’ traits and 
dispositions, which stand apart from the (ideal for cooperation and coexistence) 
quiet ethical virtues. These are subsequently acquired and, depending on 
natural adaptability, education, and practice, they may be perfected.  
 
The extent to which these virtues are expressions of a single virtue (arête) and 
how this latter may be defined are open to examination. The importance lies on 
the fact that these characteristics (e.g. justice, moderation, self-control) 
constitute expressions of human character (ethos) and are acquired through the 
course of one’s life. Disregard of shared laws and norms of a community may 
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reveal (apart from a superficial propensity to committing a particular crime) 
one’s incapability or unwillingness to “partake of respect and right, and shall die 
the death as a public pest”52. Punishment and reprobation act as deterrents for 
future pests; as a result, “virtue can be instilled by education” (Plato, Prot. 
324b). Doubt may be expressed as to how deeply virtue can be instilled and 
change human nature, but it seems plausible to suggest that for all the 
Sophists, at least as far as quiet virtues are concerned, a man’s ethos differs 
from a man’s nature (thus is not inherent by nature). Either superficially (through 
the suppression of natural vices) or deeply (through a wholehearted and honest 
adherence to conventional norms), one’s character as exposed by one’s life 
cannot be defined as ‘natural’.  
 
This has important implications for the original question (whether character is 
stable and unchanging). If the first conclusion is taken as true (‘superficial 
adjustment’), the true nature of one’s character is very rarely revealed and 
expresses only the worse. What we observe in everyday dealings would only be 
expressions of one’s imposed character. In other words, if every man’s nature is 
self-seeking and decides everything in terms of raw interest (but is suppressed), 
then the deployment of any conventional virtue would be dishonest and 
calculative. On the contrary, any expressive act of the true -natural- character 
would be very carefully concealed from the public to avoid reprobation. 
Therefore the question is transformed to “in what circumstances can we identify 
a person’s true character?”, though if everyone’s nature is in essence beastlike, 
this query becomes meaningless.  
 
If the second conclusion is taken as valid (‘deep adjustment’), character is not 
natural and, undoubtedly, not unchanging. Humans have natural abilities 
(mainly intellectual), though what they call ethical dispositions are acquirable. 
Human nature may be altered and improved from its savage original state, 
which means that character may be adjusted to fit the particular circumstances. 
Virtue (however defined) can be taught and character traits may be altered 
either through education or through partaking in conventional norms. For the 
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exponents of this thesis, “neither nomos nor the political virtues are ‘by nature’, 
but a ‘return to nature’ is the last thing that is wanted”53. Therefore for the 
Sophists, ‘character’ is neither natural nor unchangeable or, it is natural, 
suppressed, and hardly revealed.  
3.3.3 The Theories of the Philosophers 
A complete analysis of the Platonic and Aristotelian positions on the subject is 
definitely unattainable. Nevertheless, staying focused on the primary question of 
the stable or changeable nature of human character will render their ideas 
comprehensible. Together with this main aim, supplementary conclusions as to 
the philosophers’ approaches to human character will be illustrated. 
3.3.3.1 The Ideas of Plato 
Clarification of some methodological issues concerning Plato forms a 
prerequisite for the following discussion. Awareness of Plato’s intellectual 
progress through the course of his life, as exposed by his gradual 
disengagement from the Socratic influence (to the extent that research can 
specify it) and the tireless development of new concepts and ideas, compels me 
in the limited space that I can devote to treat his writings in an improperly 
unified manner. Minor detours and inconsistencies will not be emphasised since 
the aim of my enquiry is to reveal the complex nature of Greek ideas of 
‘character’ in the sense that it cannot be reduced to simple aphorisms. Indeed, 
Plato’s own continuous dialectic on the matter, which led to rejections and 
affirmations of previously developed ideas, proves this very assertion. 
Moreover, I regard Plato’s intellectual detours as slight, insignificant deviations 
in what is overall, to my eyes, a coherent Platonic theory. 
  
The main questions to be asked are similar to the ones addressed by the 
Sophists (whose influence on Plato’s themes of enquiry is great). They include 
whether human nature is fixed and inescapable, whether ‘character’ is 
unchanging, and what is the influence of education on a person’s moral 
configuration. To use Meno’s words:  
 
                                            
53
 Guthrie (1969), p. 68. 
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“I wonder whether you can tell me, Socrates, whether arete is teachable, or, if not teachable, at 
least a product of habituation. Or perhaps it isn’t the kind of thing one can practise or learn, but 
is a natural human endowment.”(Meno 70a; 86d). 
  
This enquiry alone, and since Platonic arête has undoubtedly an ethical 
connotation54, would suffice to suggest that the Greeks had not reached 
undeniable conclusions as to the fixity of human ethos (cf. Meno 95b). To 
support this, Socrates’ hypothetical answer of any Athenian layman to Meno’s 
question may be cited:  
 
“Stranger, you must take me to be high in the gods’ favour, if you really think I know whether or 
not arete is teachable or how people come to get it” (Plat. Meno 71a).  
 
This question will be considered in due course. First, as a prerequisite, Plato’s 
view of human nature has to be understood.  
 
A question on Plato’s view of human nature unavoidably staggers between 
myth and reality. This explains why reference will be made to two famous 
Platonic myths, the Chariot myth in the Phaedrus and the Foundation Myth in 
the Republic. Starting with the second myth, which is not free from controversy, 
I quote in full:  
 
“While all of you in the city are brothers, we will say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of 
you who are fitted to be Rulers mingled gold in their generation, for which reason they are the 
most precious—but in the Auxiliaries silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other 
craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds,
 
it 
may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden 
offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one 
another. So that the first and chief injunction that the god lays upon the Rulers is that of nothing 
else are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of 
these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass 
or iron they shall by no means give way to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to 
each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artisans or the farmers. And 
again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they 
shall honour such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the 
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assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle that the state shall then be overthrown when the 
man of iron or brass is its guardian”. (Plat. Rep. 415a-c) 
 
Plato dreams of a peaceful and well-ordered state, specifying meritocracy as its 
ultimate purpose. In other words he aims at an “aristocracy of talent”55. What is 
of importance to my study is Plato’s true (though poetically expressed) belief in 
a form of natural selection through an innate gradation of skills. Humans are not 
born equal, at least as far as their aptitudes are concerned. Intelligence, talent56 
and ability may vary and this is likened to unequal quantities of gold, silver and 
iron. For Plato, human breeding may be compared to horse breeding in 
reaching a desirable result, although the outcome is not mathematically 
guaranteed. Nonetheless, amid their natural differences, they have one most 
important characteristic in common: they are brothers, they come from the 
same race, they are humans. This observation leads me to the second Platonic 
myth, as presented in the Phaedrus (246a ff.). My concern here is not with the 
souls’ composition or its tripartite nature, but with their experiences before 
incarnation. I will try to classify my understanding of the myth under three 
headings: a) common experience of the Forms, b) recollection of the Forms and 
c) individual choice. 
 
The first Platonic belief is the one that puts each individual human being under 
the auspices of common nature. This concerns the souls’ state and experiences 
before incarnation, when these dwell outside the sky’s sphere as followers of 
the gods. There, they experience the sight of the true Forms, namely the 
unborn, eternal and unique expressions of notions such as Beauty, Justice, and 
Sophrosyne (Phaedr. 247e-248b). What is common to all souls that (after some 
failure) occupy human bodies is that they have necessarily experienced these 
true Forms (249b, 249e). This has a significant implication  
 
“For a human being must understand a general conception formed by collecting into a unity by 
means of reason the many perceptions of the senses” (Plat. Phaedr. 249b-c).  
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Every person has the ability to do this by the mere experience of the Forms. 
Nevertheless, since the degree of this experience varies, the soul that has seen 
the most will lead the human life of a philosopher while the one that has seen 
the least will lead the life of a tyrant; the rest are classified accordingly. To recap 
up to now, for Plato, all human beings have by nature the ability to identify and 
conceptualise the sensate expressions of the Forms, though the degree of their 
heavenly experience may influence their ways of life. This latter issue may have 
significant influence on these souls’ ability for recollection. 
 
Before considering the other implications of the ‘chariot myth’, it is firstly 
necessary to link it with Plato’s broader theory of knowledge as recollection. 
This should probably be ascribed to Socrates, since both his famous paradoxes 
(such as no one does wrong voluntarily and, therefore, knowledgeably) and the 
maieutic methodology perfectly suit it. The basic features of this theory are 
presented in the Meno. There Socrates tries to experimentally prove to Meno 
that what humans call ‘knowledge’ is nothing but recollection. Deep 
introspection and dialectic reflection permit to the individual access to material 
that he already has as innate. What humans understand as ‘learning’ is a 
process of serious dialectical testing of their beliefs. Socrates’ methodology (the 
elenchus) provides the necessary procedure for the successful outcome. Our 
beliefs may be true or false but we can never find out unless they pass the 
touchstone of rational questioning. During this process, in a way reminiscing 
Socrates’ interlocutors, we may end up in aporia. This is nonetheless the first 
step towards true knowledge, since it allows for the rejection of false beliefs and 
further reflection on ones undecided. Therefore, a person who has honestly 
dedicated his life to such a quest for the truth cannot end up with false 
outcomes, since the truth exists already inside him. In addition, this truth is 
common to all humans (due to their experience of the Forms), therefore they all 
share (apart from a common nature) a common inherent experience of truth. By 
the same token, no one who undertakes such an effort can be consistently bad 
or immoral (since his false beliefs would be rejected), and only good people can 
have consistent characters57.  
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For Plato the knowledge humans acquire in the course of their earthly lives is 
not external, but simply a recollection of material they already have access to, 
engrained in them before incarnation due to the mere experience of the Forms. 
As has already been said, its degree varies and this may have implications as 
to the easiness of this recollection58. There enters the picture what I regard as a 
concept of ‘individual choice’. Regardless of the type of life reserved for 
everyone due to the degree of the experience of the Forms (philosopher, tyrant 
and so on), a person remains free to live it justly or unjustly59. Such souls (since 
their falsity is due to lack of knowledge / recollection)  
 
“falling to earth, were so unfortunate as to be turned toward unrighteousness through some evil 
communications and to have forgotten the holy sights they once saw” (Plat. Phaedr. 250a). 
 
Nevertheless, this is not the end of the story; because Plato wholeheartedly 
believed in the value of education. Now the answer must be given as to whether 
virtue is teachable. 
  
Plato’s whole life proves one very point: he strongly believed in improvement 
and devoted his life to this cause. Being the offspring of a powerful oikos 
belonging to the higher class of Athens, he did not hesitate to dedicate himself 
to philosophy. He envisioned a perfect, just state, where the matching of upright 
community ethics with the individual’s virtuous internal ethos, would allow a 
person to live in accordance with true justice. For Plato education was of utmost 
importance for human souls. His contemporaries were profited by the 
establishment of the Academy, while the rest of us by his written works. Each 
human soul by its nature carries a memory (which may become nostalgia) of 
the Forms and it has the ability to dig deep and uncover it. The moral 
environment must be undoubtedly appropriate, and proper education may prove 
expedient for the cause.  
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In the Republic, a large part is devoted to a detailed analysis of every part of 
education that, in addition to a receptive nature, would produce the ideal state’s 
Guardians and Philosophers-Kings. Character is shaped through education. 
Indeed, proper upbringing produces good men since harmony penetrates 
deeply into the mind and so grows in true goodness of character60. Individuals 
should learn from their youth to recognise beauty and goodness in all its 
manifestations; thus they will participate in the true nature of the good. Music, 
literature, intellectual and physical education contribute to a common aim: 
virtue. Humans can change their character, provided that they are corrupt. 
Disoriented due to ignorance, forgotten the beauty of the Forms, they are in 
desperate need of proper alignment. Although one’s disposition and talents are 
partially predetermined prior to incarnation61, ethos is open to amendment.  
 
In the dialogue Laches, Socrates challenges his interlocutors to prove their 
suitability for the role of educators. How can someone test it? Socrates gives 
the answer in telling them:  
 
“please, could you give examples of people whom you have taken in hand and whose 
characters you have changed from bad to good” (Plat. Laches 187a)62 
 
The tripartite human soul contains an irrational, intractable part, which needs to 
be tamed and controlled. The rational part, as another charioteer, has to take all 
the necessary measures to enforce its will. This is a continuous, intense 
process, expressions of which may be experienced through the course of one’s 
life. However, a philosophic life provides the charioteer with an iron bridle, with 
which he can discipline the bad horse and restore the chariot (soul) to order63. 
Repetition of this punishing (and didactic) process creates habitual responses64, 
allowing the rational part to rule and forcing the irrational to obey with fear and 
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respect65. Provided that a soul has not been corrupted to an irreversible degree, 
therapy through suitable schooling is possible66.  
 
It may be tempting to suggest that the aforementioned evidence reveals a 
Platonic belief in the indivisibility of a person’s character. What I mean by this is 
that a person has a similar dispositional response to every situation, regardless 
of the stimuli. Yes, there is some truth in this, but only half. As noted above, for 
Plato virtue is knowledge, in the form of the proper recollection of the Forms. 
Provided that a person has reached a state of ‘knowledge’ that allows him to 
remember the true Forms and act accordingly, his ethos becomes stable and 
directed towards the ‘true good’. However, the possibility of going astray 
remains, in case that the rational part leaves the soul unguarded67. On the other 
hand, a morally corrupt person, who due to this fact lacks the ability to 
dialectically and aesthetically experience the reminiscence of the Forms, is 
unstable and impulsive, responding spasmodically to dissimilar stimuli, though 
constantly (unless by chance) in an unethical direction. In such a person’s soul, 
the wicked untamed horse has grown so powerful as to take control of the 
chariot, leading it to disaster. 
 
All the above reveal a deep and sophisticated belief in the changeable nature of 
human soul (from bad to good and not the opposite, since once someone 
becomes truly good, he has already established access to the Forms). By the 
same token a belief in the changeable nature of human character may be 
adduced. All virtuous characteristics, such as moderation and self-control are 
acquirable, through the recollection of the Forms. As a result, Plato may not be 
supposed to share the pessimistic view of the Sophists as regards human 
nature. Human souls were once followers of the gods. They took part in this 
mystic initiation which takes place before incarnation; they experienced the 
Forms. They are neither good nor bad68, though they carry the notion of the 
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‘truly good’ hidden inside them. Human nature is not even close to the savagery 
picture, desperately needing rehabilitation through instruction. For the Sophists, 
education comes to suppress and conceal innate vices; for Plato education 
comes to illuminate and regenerate innate virtues. 
3.3.3.2 The Works of Aristotle 
In what follows an abbreviated account of Aristotle’s ideas of ‘character’ will be 
offered. Since Aristotle’s theses will be further highlighted during the next 
chapters, namely the ones that focus on ethos in relation to forensic rhetoric, 
the present discussion will be as abridged as possible. The first significant point 
of development, compared to previous thinkers, in the Aristotelian 
comprehensive theory of ethos is the dissociation of moral progress from 
growing intellectual knowledge. For Aristotle, the correct process of moral 
progress deviates from the traditional account of virtue as an ideal that a person 
has first to comprehend and acquire in order to use it. On the contrary, virtue(s) 
are attained by exercising and practising them on a constant basis, in an 
intentional, voluntarily chosen manner. For him 
 
“the virtues therefore are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; 
nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought to maturity by habit” 
(Nic. Eth. 1103a).  
 
Human ethics need to be detached from nature, for human action is not 
knowable and predictable as cosmic or natural events are. Human action in 
practical life cannot become the content of knowledge in the same way as a 
cosmic phenomenon or a technical procedure69. 
 
For Aristotle, practical human action is determined and judged by rules and 
norms relative to the environment. In his accounts of ethos in the Poetics or in 
the Rhetoric, he presupposes a kind of ethical consensus in the audience as a 
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precondition for a proper response to tragedy and epic as well as oratory70. 
Evaluation of individual actions is materialised by reference to the acceptable 
socio-ethical norms. For instance  
 
“we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave 
acts. This truth is attested by the experience of states: lawgivers make the citizens good by 
training them in habits of right action—this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do this it is 
a failure; this is what distinguishes a good form of constitution from a bad one.” (Nic. Eth. 
1103b).  
 
However, habit and chance are not sufficient for the attainment of virtue. 
Precisely at this point a sort of ‘knowledge’ comes into play. The agent must 
knowingly choose to perform these habitual virtuous acts, simultaneously being 
in a certain state of mind:  
 
“first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the act, and choose it 
for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of 
character.” (Nic. Eth. 1105a)71.  
 
Since the virtues are neither endowed by nature, nor are they emotions or 
capacities (cf. 1106a), Aristotle asserts that they must be dispositions. But what 
does he mean by ‘disposition of character’? As usual, he provides the answer:  
 
“The dispositions (ἕξεις) are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill-
disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to anger if 
we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good disposition if we 
habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of the other emotions.” 
(Nic. Eth. 1105b).  
 
These dispositions are not predetermined by nature but moulded through 
individual choice and practice72.  
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“Not to know that it is from the exercise of activities on particular objects that states of character 
are produced is the mark of a thoroughly senseless person” (Nic. Eth. 1114a). 
 
Individuals are therefore responsible for their character traits, to an extent that 
they may be characterised as ‘voluntary’, and consequently be justly blamed73.  
However, mere consciousness of behaving in a certain manner does not 
provide an opportunity for change. Habit may have already become second 
nature, shaping the individual’s deliberate choice of the means and ends 
(προαίρεσις), in accordance with one’s accepted ethical standards. Habitual 
virtues and vices are dispositions affecting the choice which the intellect has to 
make afresh in any given situation (ἕξεις προαιρετικαί). Practice of these is 
deliberate, and this produces their consolidation as to form a more general 
character disposition. The resulting consolidation of such traits leads to 
voluntary (thus blameworthy) though possibly inadvertent responses. In 
Aristotle’s words  
 
“when you have let a stone go it is too late to recover it; but yet it was in your power to throw it, 
since the moving principle was in you. So, too, to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man it was 
open at the beginning not to become men of this kind, and so they are unjust and self-indulgent 
voluntarily; but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so” (Nic. 
Eth. 1114a). 
 
The above discussion reveals Aristotle’s belief in human emancipation, at least 
in an early stage of life, as far as the forging of individual ‘character’ is 
concerned. Nevertheless, by introducing the notions of voluntary choice and 
intentionality in practical life (cf. 1109b ff.), Aristotle favoured an ‘interactionist’ 
approach as opposed to sheer determinism. Apart from fixed character traits, 
other conditions also influence human action. In real life, the practical intellect 
(as opposed to the theoretical one) is the main contributor to decision-making, 
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in conjunction with one’s dispositions, taking into account the surrounding 
circumstances of each situation. Chances for the exhibition of ideal (in vitro) 
freedom of choice are hardly presented in everyday life, where other factors 
have to be weighed. For this very reason, and since only deliberate action 
accurately reveals an individual’s ethos, human actions have to be evaluated by 
reference to the situation at hand.  
 
This is illustrated by reference to two examples (1110a): if a tyrant were to order 
a subject to do something base, having his parents and children in his power or 
if a ship’s crew throws the goods overboard in a storm (for in the abstract no 
one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of 
himself and his crew, any sensible man does so). Both the terms, then, 
‘voluntary and ‘involuntary’, must be used with reference to the moment of 
action. And, since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on 
voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that 
are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary 
and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the 
nature of virtue, and useful also for the legislators with a view to the assigning 
both of honours and of punishments (1109b). 
 
The aforementioned reference to passions is significant in yet another respect: 
one aspect of the Aristotelian concept of hamartia74. In that sense, a person 
may erroneously act in the grip of pathos (passionate emotion), instead of 
acting in accordance with his generally stable ethos. Emotional passion may 
lead to a wrong judgment which, though not always morally unacceptable, leads 
to negative results. Pathos may thus temporarily suspend and overcome the 
relatively predictable expression of fixed character traits; fault may consequently 
result from acting contrary to one’s ethos. This does not entail a more general 
wickedness of character or badness of the particular emotion. It simply 
highlights an incidental badness caused by an inappropriate (as regards the 
context) acting on that emotion. In other words, a person’s emotional state may 
be justified, albeit knowledge of when, where, and how he should act upon it 
determines its quality. 
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 On hamartia see Bremer (1969); Stinton (1975); Sherman (1996). 
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A parallel state to hamartia, though more permanent in nature and 
concentrating on reason rather than emotion75, is akrasia76. The term means 
‘lack of control’ or ‘weakness of will’, and it describes a persistent state of the 
soul; one on the basis of which the doer habitually acts. This state can be 
described as the intellectual knowledge of the right action (based on reasoning, 
assisted by one’s correct general beliefs) but failure to commit it due to one’s 
desires. In other words, with akrasia,  
 
“it must be the case that someone who is being led by desire to enjoy a pleasure he thinks he 
should not enjoy must no longer be holding together the line of reasoning which forbids him 
from enjoying it. But it is not the correct general belief that he has abandoned: he held to it 
before the akratic episode; he holds to it afterward; and in the interim he does not undergo an 
intellectual conversion or corruption. Thus, during the akratic episode, some particular belief 
must be in some way lacking, of the sort which would have made his general belief effective”
77.  
 
This disharmonious state of the soul (where the intellect does not coincide with 
the impulses), stands between the perfect harmony of intellect, impulses and 
action (arête) and perfect disharmony (kakia). In the case where the intellect 
does not coincide with the impulses but nonetheless the person acts in a correct 
way, this state is called enkrateia; this may be compared to akrasia as a state of 
an individual’s ethical progress.  
  
What can therefore be extracted from this brief discussion of Aristotle’s ideas in 
relation to the present investigation can be summarised as follows. For Aristotle, 
character is not provided to humans by nature. On the contrary, it is moulded by 
the habitual and intentional exercise of certain patterns of behaviour, in 
accordance with accepted ethical standards. Nature provides for the capacity of 
humans to intellectually control and determine actions, choices, and even 
emotional responses, the quality of which is shaped through the course of one’s 
life. Nonetheless, once reaching the decisive point, one’s ethos becomes 
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 Pakaluk (2005), p. 253: “any sort of departure from correct conduct on account of some 
emotion even less similar to sensual desire is called ‘‘akrasia’’ in an even more remote and 
metaphorical sense”. 
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 Pakaluk (2005), p. 251. 
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unchangeable. Humans are thus blameworthy or praiseworthy for their 
characters and ethical dispositions, as far as this is evaluated by reference to 
deliberate choices. However, one’s quality of character is determined (and 
assessed) in accordance with the established norms of his environment, not 
against any abstract laws of nature. Thus, human ethos is the result of multiple 
components. As far as how one’s ‘character’ may be documented, this has to 
happen by reference to a multitude of previous acts, deliberate in nature, 
insignificantly determined by external influences, capable of revealing a fixed 
disposition. 
  
All these have important implications to the present enquiry, to the extent that 
they illuminate an insight into the Greek way of practical reasoning. 
Remembering that the centre of attention is the discovery of the causes 
triggering the wide use of character evidence in the courts of classical Athens is 
adequate for acknowledging the importance of Aristotle’s observations. His 
approach as to how one’s ethos is to be judged, as to when an act highlights a 
character trait, and as to why invocation of a multitude of past acts may be 
necessary in order to prove one’s fixed character, offer the underlying rationale 
behind the practice of the orators. 
3.4 The Practice of the Orators 
Having sketched thus far the intellectuals’ approaches, it is now time to analyse 
the orators’ assumptions about ‘character’ as presented in the forensic 
speeches. It has to be noted in advance that the adversarial nature of the 
speeches, coupled with the fact that in the courts’ setting honesty weighed far 
less than success, make ideas of ‘character’ yet another rhetorical device at the 
orators’ disposal. Litigants are not concerned about truth or objectivity and 
advertise their assumptions as facts, in a manner that would best fit their case. 
Therefore the elasticity (and even inconsistency) with which some ideas are 
presented should cause no surprise. On the contrary, such manipulation reveals 
the absence of any fixed presuppositions about ‘character’. The hypothetical 
presence of such presuppositions would necessarily prevent any innovative 
interpretations or rhetorical handling of ‘character’ in the fear of alienating the 
jurors. The present research will address the same core questions regarding the 
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stable and unchangeable nature of character, as well as its indivisibility which, 
in the forensic environment, had a central role to play.  
 
The enquiry may begin with a foundational observation that the orators in 
general (presumably pointing to a widespread assumption) seem to support a 
relatively consistent and barely changeable character. Definitely within the 
course of an Athenian trial, this had its practical reasons. Within the context of a 
trial where litigants were the sole primary source of information and their 
argumentation relied heavily on arguments from probability, a moralising 
plaintiff, in his effort to prove the defendant’s wrongdoing, was more than willing 
to point to the latter’s past reprehensible behaviour. The necessary assumption 
of a stable and unchanging disposition paved his rhetorical path in effortlessly 
proving one’s present misconduct by reference to earlier instances. On the 
other hand a defendant, in the absence of a certified record of criminality, could 
point to his earlier beneficial acts, highlighting a consistent, positive character. 
Furthermore, in cases where the parties could point to their opponent’s previous 
transgressions, the accusatorial mode of trial permitted for the curtailing of an 
adversary’s credibility by reference to past misconduct. In contrast, the factor 
that demonstrates the rhetorical opportunism of ‘character’ assumptions lies in 
cases where one’s past wrongdoing had been decidedly proven. There, counter 
to what has been evidenced so far, a litigant was perfectly able to argue for his 
rehabilitation or picture his past conduct as ‘out of character’. 
 
For the illustration of these general considerations, specific examples may be 
offered. The belief in a deeper unchanging natural disposition is best 
exemplified by Lysias in his speech Against Alkibiades the Younger, where he 
suggests that a criminal nature cannot change; as a result such a man does not 
deserve forgiveness due to the hope for improvement78. Demosthenes also, 
advertises a belief in natural honesty, a quality which prevails through the 
course of one’s lifetime79. One’s reputation and reception by the general public 
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 Lys. 14.2. 
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 Dem. 32.26; cf. 36.44. See also Dem. 25.15: “The whole life of men, Athenians, whether they 
dwell in a large state or a small one, is governed by nature and by the laws. Of these, nature is 
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wrong, and that is why you will find men of an evil nature committing errors”. 
[162] 
 
should be determined by his own past behavioural traits rather than by any 
scheming defamation80. Aeschines (in that issue) sides with Demosthenes, 
maintaining that natural disposition always prevails, regardless of the fact that 
someone may pretend to be a man of another character for a short interval81. 
However, this last point raises questions as to the recognition of this ‘natural 
character’. If a person can pretend and act purposefully ‘out of character’, or is 
free to argue for the changeable nature of ethos, the matter becomes 
complicated. For instance, Andokides felt free to argue that  
 
“My judgment is changed now from what it was before… my present conduct is much more 
characteristic of me than my earlier conduct” (Andoc. 2.24-6).  
 
Although such kind of argumentation is rare in Athenian trials, since defendants 
do not admit guilt and try to conceal any past reprehensible acts, it nevertheless 
demonstrates a flexible approach as to the steadiness of a man’s character. 
Within such a fluid and subjective matrix of beliefs, how can someone judge 
when true character is revealed? One answer is given by Lysias who suggests 
that  
 
“although a person could create a false character for a short period, nobody could conceal 
being a criminal for a period of seventy years” (Lys. 19.60). 
 
Duration therefore forms significant evidence of one’s true disposition. 
Consistency of good behaviour is another factor that has to be assessed. A 
mere single transgression may decidedly reveal an inherent character defect.  
Demosthenes argues that a single offence should not be attributed to a 
circumstantial mistake; it rather exposes the inbred true nature of a man. In his 
prosecution speech On the False Embassy he says that  
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 Cf. Dem. 21.134: “But if you did not do it and it was all a fabrication, and if the rest of the 
soldiers, instead of reproving the slanderers, chuckled over you, it only shows that from your 
general manner of life they thought that such a story exactly fitted you. It was yourself, then, that 
you ought to have kept more under control, instead of accusing the others”. 
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“The legislator simply forbade any acceptance of bribes… considering that a man who has once 
accepted them and been corrupted by money no longer remains a reliable judge of what is good 
for the city” (Dem. 19.7). 
 
More analysis of this idea is provided in the speech Against Meidias where 
Demosthenes argues that  
 
“it was not acceptable to the city that people should be honest for a time and then thieves, but 
only that, where the property of the community is concerned, they should invariably be honest; 
for it was felt that a man of that kind had been honest during the earlier period not by nature but 
by evil design in order to be trusted” (Dem. 24.133). 
 
The aforementioned passages reveal the depth of rhetorical manipulation of 
‘character’, in the absence of any fixed popular beliefs. An orator could argue 
according to his best interests, either that one’s character is stable or that 
rehabilitation is possible, although in principle it was more rewarding to rely on 
the first argument. Moreover, a clever and deceitful litigant could neutralise his 
adversary’s record of positive actions by pointing to a (real or imaginary) 
opportunism that would best suit his case. Therefore, for a modest, law-abiding 
defendant, an offence could be described as a minor transgression that is ‘out 
of character’, whereas for the moralising plaintiff such an action exposes the 
earlier opportunism of the defendant in trying to create a false impression of 
honesty and lawfulness.  
 
This lack of uniformity of approach suggests that in the context of an Athenian 
trial, almost any (even remotely relevant to the offence) past act, could be 
invoked to assist the argumentation of a litigant. This is also advocated by 
Lysias 26 [contrary to the modern trend which renders evidence (even offences) 
from the distant past as inadmissible82], where the prosecutor directs the jury to 
examine the defendant’s conduct during a period long past, nearly thirty years 
before the trial83. The case could go further, in reprobating someone for his 
ancestors’ follies, and suggesting that he is a hereditary enemy of the polis84.  
 
                                            
82
 See Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. 
83
 Lys. 26.5. 
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The potential opportunistic behaviour of an adversary is skilfully presented by 
Demosthenes in Against Meidias. There, the arrogant and hubristic behaviour of 
the wealthy Meidias is contrasted (in anticipation) to his humble performance in 
the court. In order to leave no space for his opponent’s presentational tricks, 
Demosthenes warns the jury:  
 
“Now I know that he will set up a wail, with his children grouped about him, and will make a long 
and humble appeal, weeping and making himself as pitiable a figure as he can. But the more he 
humiliates himself, Athenians, the more he deserves your hatred. Why so? If in his past life he 
was so brutal and violent because it was impossible for him to be humble, it would be right to 
abate some of your anger as a concession to his natural temper and to the destiny that made 
him the man he is; but if he knows how to behave discreetly when he likes, but has deliberately 
chosen the opposite line of conduct, it is surely obvious that, if he slips through your fingers 
now, he will once more prove himself the man you know so well”
85.  
 
Within this ideological context, sudden changes in a man’s behaviour could be 
exposed as highly suspicious. In the absence of an acknowledgment of a 
person’s freedom of choice in every single instance of his life, deviations from 
normal behaviour could be easily attributed to external causes. In the highly 
agonistic Athenian environment, inconsistent attitude, in public cases as a rule, 
gave rise to suspicions of bribery and corruption. This is best exemplified in the 
fierce forensic contests between Demosthenes and Aeschines, where both 
orators point to the other’s aberrational acts86. On the other hand, such 
aberrations from the normal attitude could be explained by reference to the 
circumstances of the particular situation. Many defendants ask the jurors to try 
them by human standards and apply rules similar to the modern ‘reasonable 
man test’, pointing to the situational factors rather than their character. The 
implication is that as long as the agent did not (under the examined 
circumstances) fall below the attitude required by his fellow citizens, judgment 
should be given in his favour. Euphiletus, the defendant in a case of lawful 
homicide, asks the jurors to judge him as they would judge themselves in the 
same situation87. Andokides tells the jurors:  
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“since you ought to reckon cases by human standards, as you would if you were in trouble 
yourselves: what would each of you have done?” (Andoc. 1.57). 
 
Consequently a ‘situationist’ tactic was not missing from the orators’ arsenal, 
provided that it would work in their client’s best interests.  
 
Thus far the pre-eminence of a popular belief in an inbred, stable disposition, 
albeit not firmly grounded, and vulnerable to reservations has been 
demonstrated. These would be best discussed if the focus is slightly adapted to 
illuminate whether character is changeable or not. The starting point will be the 
relation between character and time; in other words, how far back should we 
look in order to find evidence concerning a person’s character? Is the 
stereotypical assumption that youth characters are moulded by education cited 
in the orators? Is this also valid for men in their maturity?  
 
Examples underlining widely held beliefs about youth dispositional traits are 
cited in multitude in the forensic speeches. Young men are collectively sketched 
as being prone to aggressiveness and drunkenness, with their eruptive 
temperament being responsible for their misconduct. In the balance of 
probabilities, it is the young that start a quarrel, whereas maturity conveys 
patience and calmness88. By the same token, youth can be blamed (or 
excused) for past misdemeanours. This age-disposition reveals a belief in the 
changeable nature of character, albeit on a group basis. What about individual 
character? Andokides, who is a supporter (due to personal considerations) of 
the theory that a person can change through the course of his life, asks not only 
to be excused for his past offences but also to be pitied. He says that to err is a 
great misfortune, and since error and misfortune are common to everyone, the 
person that was so ill starred as to err, contrary to his nature due to his 
youthfulness or folly, deserves sympathy rather than hostility89.  
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Aeschines is inconsistent in his approach. In his speech Against Timarchus he 
leaves outside the defendant’s behaviour during his youth. He says:  
 
“Observe, men of Athens, how reasonable I shall be in dealing with this man Timarchus. Any 
abuses he committed against his own body while still a boy I leave out of account. Let it be void, 
like events under the Thirty or before Euclides, or any other official time limit of this sort that has 
been laid down. But the acts he has committed since reaching the age of reason and as a 
young man and in full knowledge of the laws, these I shall make the subject of my accusations, 
and I urge you to take them seriously” (Aeschin. 1.37).  
 
On the other hand, during the fierce contest with Demosthenes, in his effort to 
ridicule him and show his bad character he recalled the nicknames of his 
opponent since his minor age: 
 
“As a child he was known as Batalus for a certain readiness for humiliation and perversion. 
When he left childhood behind he brought suits for ten talents against each of his guardians and 
got the name Argas. As a man he acquired the further name common to all unscrupulous men, 
sycophant” (Aeschin. 2.99). 
 
Again therefore, popular beliefs are manipulated as to suit the orator’s best 
interest, highlighting merely the absence of any rooted idea on the matter. 
 
Demosthenes seems to incline towards an unchangeable nature of a man’s 
disposition. Examples have already been cited where he characterises as 
opportunistic any deviations from normal, consistent behaviour. To the extent 
that any firm conclusions may be discerned from his biased speeches, this 
belief is sealed in his speech Against Aristogeiton 2. Although such an 
assumption on the unchangeable nature of a man’s character suits his case, the 
rhetoric is striking:  
 
“But after you had let him off, admittedly in hope of amendment, and then shortly after had to 
punish the same man again for speaking and acting against the best interests of the city, what 
reasonable excuse is left you if you are a second time hoodwinked? When you have tried him 
by deeds, why need you trust his words? In cases where you have not yet an accurate test 
ready to hand, it may perhaps be necessary to judge by words. [22] But, for myself, I am 
amazed that there are men so constituted that, though they deposit private property with those 
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only whose past record shows them to be honest, they entrust public affairs to men who have 
been admittedly proved unscrupulous”
90.  
 
Nevertheless, Lysias provides an example of a belief in the reformation of 
character: 
 
“What inducement, then, could you have for approving this man? Because he has committed no 
offence? But he is guilty of the gravest crimes against his country. Or do you think he will 
reform? Then, I say, let him reform first in his bearing towards the city, and claim a seat on the 
Council later, when he has done her a service as signal as the wrong that he did her before” 
(Lys. 31.24). 
 
Finally, examination of the orators’ ideas about the character’s indivisibility has 
to take place. By this term I mean the narrowness or the extensiveness of a 
single act’s probative value, the potential degree of remoteness or proximity of 
two separate acts as regards relevance, and the holistic or fractional approach 
to ethical traits as expressed by individual acts. To make the matter clearer, I 
offer as an example Aristotle’s treatment of the issue. He argues: 
 
 “The motives which lead men to do injury and commit wrong actions are depravity and 
incontinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in that which makes him vicious that he 
shows himself unjust; for example, the illiberal in regard to money, the licentious in regard to 
bodily pleasures, the effeminate in regard to what makes for ease, the coward in regard to 
dangers, for fright makes him desert his comrades in peril; the ambitious in his desire for 
honour, the irascible owing to anger, one who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the 
rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the foolish man from having mistaken ideas of right and 
wrong, the shameless from his contempt for the opinion of others. Similarly, each of the rest of 
mankind is unjust in regard to his special weakness”. (Arist. Rhet. 1368b) 
 
Aristotle describes vices as categorised under general types (in conjunction with 
the divisibility of a single virtue into many) which, due to their inducement 
towards respective negative character traits, lead to acts of injustice. What is of 
importance here is that a single act is treated as revealing a more general trait, 
in a manner that sheds light onto this defect and may illuminate similar acts in 
the future. An inherent character defect for, say, greed, can thus be exposed by 
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a single act of that kind; the general manner of this defect however, will 
characterise all subsequent acts that fall under this category. A past act of 
bribery for instance may lead to the conclusion that the individual in question 
suffers from the vice of greed, and hence be used as evidence in a case 
concerning the voluntariness or not of financial mismanagement.  
 
If this conclusion is pushed to the extreme and, since all character defects end 
up in injustice, a proponent of character’s indivisibility (or a desperate litigant) 
could point to past acts as revealing a propensity for wrongdoing or 
unlawfulness. By the same token, non-adherence to commonly accepted social 
norms (or even to a single one) may characterise an individual as a social 
misfit. At first glance such an approach is incompatible with contemporary 
presuppositions and rejected by the modern approach to justice. Freedom of 
choice and volitional capability is reserved for every single act in a person’s life 
with every incident examined on its merits. This is where modern ‘relevance’ 
stands as regards character evidence, with the rules of exclusion 
overshadowing these of admissibility.  
 
The Athenian courts evidently took a different route, as is highlighted by the 
broad invocation of character evidence. This route concentrated more on the 
general character traits as exposed by individual acts, rather than focusing on 
the surrounding circumstances that triggered the single disputable particular act 
that gave rise to litigation. Thus instead of setting the wider context which would 
lead to an equitable decision or a verdict in accordance with the parties’ social 
power, such argumentation was received as ‘to the point’, assisting the jurors in 
reaching a legal verdict. In other words, the litigants’ insistence on a number of 
past acts, that may be received by moderns as only remotely (or not nearly) 
relevant, can be likened to a number of (more or less elegant) touches in the 
portrayal of the opponent’s character traits. Nevertheless this is a matter that 
will be closely examined in the course of another chapter, when the methods 
and strategies of the Athenian argumentation from character will be discussed. 
For the moment the ideological context shall be set, within which these methods 
operated. 
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Direct evidence of the above considerations is provided by Aeschines. In his 
speech Against Ktesiphon he maintains that  
 
“a man who does not love his nearest and dearest will never feel concern for outsiders like 
yourselves; nor could a man who is evil in his private life be of use in public life; and a man who 
is worthless at home can never have been a man of honour as envoy in Macedonia – he 
changed his position, not his disposition” (Aeschin. 3.78). 
 
He cites this passage as proof to his aforementioned discussion about the 
adversary’s character traits. Demosthenes’ lack of devotion to his daughter was 
proven by his contemptible attitude shortly after her death when, instead of 
mourning, he  
 
“put a garland on his head and white raiment on his body, and there he stood making thank-
offerings, violating all decency” (Aeschin. 3.77).  
 
This – irrelevant to modern eyes – scene is vividly depicted in order to show 
Demosthenes’ impassive and calculative disposition which characterises him 
and his attitude towards his fellow citizens.  
 
A person retained his basic characteristics, which were revealed regardless of 
whether he acted in private or in public91, in Athens or elsewhere92, against his 
own body, the Gods, his family or the city as a whole93. In these terms 
Aeschines explains the law on the scrutiny of orators (also valid for any kind of 
scrutiny). In disfranchising the abusers of their parents the rationale was that  
 
“if anyone mistreats the ones whom he should honour on a level with the Gods, what sort of 
treatment, says the legislator, will people unconnected with him, and indeed the city as a whole, 
receive from him?” (Aeschin. 1.28). 
 
Regarding those who had prostituted themselves or mistreated their own body, 
the legislator, according to Aeschines, provided for their exclusion from public 
business, ‘for the man who has wilfully sold his own body would casually sell 
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out the interests of the city’. Finally, the man who has squandered his private 
property would treat the city’s interests in much the same way94. The above 
considerations elucidate the Athenian legal system’s tendency to pass laws and 
judgments on the subject’s merits, reserving for the idea of ‘worthiness’ a 
central role, since it presupposes a high degree of stability and indivisibility of 
character95. 
 
More examples of the same approach may be given in order to clarify further 
the issue. In the example above, the virtues and vices as regards a person’s 
relationship with money are mentioned. Loyal to the belief of character 
indivisibility, Lysias provides the following quote:  
 
“About my father – since the prosecution speeches have treated him as a criminal – please 
forgive me if I report what he has spent on the city and his friends. I am doing this not from a 
desire for glory, but as evidence that the same man does not both spend a great deal voluntarily 
and want to steal part of the public property despite very great danger” (Lys. 19.56). 
 
This passage, interpreted as I suggest, provides yet another underlying 
rationale for the frequent invocation of past benefactions towards the city by 
threatened defendants. Such argumentation, instead of showing off one’s 
economic status or asking for undeserved gratitude by referring to irrelevant 
considerations, was in fact relevant to the Athenian mind. A benefactor loves his 
city and his fellow citizens. He even uses his property, in a lavish manner, for 
their advantage. This reveals the disposition of a φιλόπολις, cancelling out his 
opponent’s ‘slanders’ aiming at revealing a propensity for law-breaking. His 
previous beneficial acts speak for themselves. 
 
Before concluding the present enquiry on the orators’ ideas of ‘character’ it is 
important to examine whether all past acts are afforded with the same degree of 
probative value. Character is revealed only when a person acts intentionally and 
with free will96. Thus, if external circumstances compel a particular course of 
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action, Athenian prosecutors avoided using it as a basis of attack97. The 
underlying cause for this rationale is to be found in the actual law of Athens. 
Demosthenes observes that  
 
“the laws treat the wilful and insolent transgressors as deserving more resentment and a 
heavier punishment than other classes of offenders. First then, all the laws of damage—to take 
these first—order the offender to pay the amount twice over if the damage is wilful, but only 
once if it is involuntary. This is reasonable, because, while the injured party is in any case 
entitled to relief, the law does not ordain that the resentment against the aggressor should be 
the same, whether his act is voluntary or involuntary. Again, the laws of homicide punish wilful 
murder with death, perpetual exile, and confiscation of goods, but accidental homicide they treat 
with much consideration and charity”
98.  
 
Usually, prosecutors referred to issues where external factors influenced a 
person’s actions as part of a pre-emptive strategy in order to reduce the force of 
such arguments made by the defendants. Poverty and need were considered 
as the most significant external factors compelling a person to act in a 
reproachable manner. Thus, opponent’s actions which could be attributed to 
such factors were not often invoked during character assassination since they 
would have less force. As early as Antiphon’s Tetralogies the hypothetical 
prosecutor recognised that “Need can compel anyone to speak and act against 
his nature”99. Lysias regarded such action as involuntary and in generalising this 
assumption he observes: 
 
 “It is a custom accepted as just among all mankind that in face of the same crimes we should 
be most incensed with those men who are most able to avoid criminal action, but should be 
indulgent to the poor or disabled because we regard their offences as involuntary” (Lys. 
31.11). 
 
Demosthenes acknowledges this fact and before initiating character 
assassination he exclaims  
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under compulsion. What is done voluntarily is not always done with premeditation; but what is 
done with premeditation is always known to the agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does 
with a purpose”. 
98
 Dem. 21.42-3; cf. 24.67; 57.45; cf. Arist. Rhet. 1416a. 
99
 Antiph. 3.3.1; cf. 3.3.9; cf. Dem. 29.22; 23.148; 59.58. 
[172] 
 
 
“I shall pass over what may be blamed on poverty, and will proceed to specific charges against 
your character” (Dem. 18.263).  
 
On the other hand, a person reveals his true character as soon as he acquires 
the power or wealth to behave insolently. The prosecutor of Lysias 28 accuses 
characters like the defendant’s that  
 
“As soon as they become rich, they come to hate you, and they are no longer prepared to be 
ruled by you but to rule over you” (Lys. 28.7). 
 
thus revealing their true character. In the passage mentioned earlier, where the 
prosecutor of Euandrus, in Lysias 26, refers to blameworthy behaviour 
occurring nearly thirty years before the trial, he justifies this choice as follows: 
  
“As to his love of quiet, I say that we ought not to investigate his sobriety today, when there is 
no chance for him to be licentious: we should rather examine that period in which, being free to 
choose either way of life, he preferred to mark his citizenship by illegal acts. For the fact of his 
committing no offences now is due to those who have prevented him; but what he did then was 
owing to the man's character and to those who vouchsafed him a free hand”
100.  
 
Thus it may be concluded that, together with youth, some external factors could 
lead to the voluntary exclusion of particular acts from those revealing character 
and could be invoked as evidence. 
 
Apart from poverty and need, other factors could be invoked as mitigating one’s 
blameworthiness due to a lack of complete sobriety. Drunkenness101, anger, 
and love102 could be adduced in order to assist one’s rhetoric. Demosthenes, in 
                                            
100
 Lys. 26.5; cf. the argumentation in Lys. 7.27; 25.16. 
101
 ‘Drunkenness’ could be sometimes cited as an aggravating factor, depending on the needs 
of a litigant’s case. Cf. Dem. 19.196-9; 54.3-7; 54.16. Aristotle in the Nic. Eth. distinguishes 
between acting through ignorance from acting in ignorance (1110b), drunkenness causing the 
second, definitely being more blameworthy since it has to be attributed to one’s choice; cf. 
1113b, referring to an enactment of Pittacus by virtue of which ‘drunkenness’ doubled the 
penalty. 
102
 Cf. the Athenian law on wills (Dem. 46.14: Any citizen, with the exception of those who had 
been adopted when Solon entered upon his office, and had thereby become unable either to 
renounce or to claim an inheritance, shall have the right to dispose of his own property by will as 
he shall see fit, if he have no male children lawfully born, unless his mind be impaired by one of 
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his effort to distinguish the present case from an earlier precedent which could 
be used by Meidias as a plea in mitigation, points to exactly these issues:  
 
“Then again we shall find that he has not the same claim to consideration as these others. For 
in the first case the man who struck the judge had three excuses: he was drunk, he was in love, 
and he did not know what he was doing in the darkness and the night. Polyzelus again 
explained that owing to his ungovernable temper he had lost his head when he committed the 
offence; there was no hostility behind the act and no intention to insult. But Meidias cannot 
plead any of these excuses”
103. 
 
Furthermore, the time and place of the act posed as indicative factors, 
undoubtedly revealing one’s true character. Demosthenes again, insists more 
than once that an attack taking place during daylight and in full publicity is 
extremely likely to expose the hubristic and insolent nature of the perpetrator104. 
The fact that he  
 
“was assaulted by a personal enemy early in the day, when he was sober, prompted by 
insolence, not by wine, in the presence of many foreigners as well as citizens, and above all in a 
temple which I [he] was strictly obliged to enter by virtue of my [his] office” (Dem. 21.74)  
 
further clarifies the issue. All these factors therefore should be considered when 
deciding the intention and voluntariness of an act, which unquestionably expose 
one’s true character.  
3.5 Punishment and Character 
I would consider this survey incomplete if I would not offer a brief reference to 
the Athenian rationale for punishment in relation to assumptions about 
‘character’. My aim is not to offer yet another description of the Athenian 
                                                                                                                                
these things, lunacy or old age or drugs or disease, or unless he be under the influence of a 
woman, or under constraint or deprived of his liberty.”; cf. Dem. 48.56. 
103
 Dem. 21.38-40, 180; for ‘anger’ cf. 21.41: “For what sort of pretext, what decent and 
moderate excuse, can he show for his conduct? Anger? Possibly that will be his plea. But 
whereas in cases where a sudden loss of self-control has impelled a man even to inflict a 
wanton insult, it is open to him to say that he has acted in anger; if, on the other hand, he is 
detected in a continuous course of law-breaking, spread over many days, surely this is far from 
a mere fit of anger and he stands convicted of a deliberate policy of insult”. Pace Aristotle’s Nic. 
Eth. 1111a21 stating “For it is probably a mistake to say that acts caused by anger or by desire 
are involuntary”. 
104 
Dem. 21.38, 74. 
[174] 
 
methods of punishment but to examine them in light of their consequences on 
‘character’105. What best characterises the Athenian legal system is its quite 
frequent draconian penalties, especially exemplified by the threat of the death 
sentence106. Such harsh measures at first glance may support the absence of 
any belief in rehabilitation, with retribution being the only means of exacting 
justice. Nevertheless, since the Homeric times, restitution and retribution can be 
regarded as the founding pillars of the Greek penal system107. Remnants of a 
primal approach to justice are also to be found in the Athenian legal system108. 
The Athenians, although advertising their penal system as democratic and 
humanistic, were in reality not remote from the other Greek poleis109. As has 
been demonstrated, Greek philosophers had developed a rational belief in 
mental and ethical reform, sufficient to transform the penal system so to 
primarily aim at the rehabilitation of offenders. Nonetheless, in Athens, this 
transformation did not occur.  
 
Athens was above all a Greek polis. It found itself in a constant state of war, 
and so any internal disorder would have been gravely punished. Hence, 
widening its perspective, the Athenian legal system ought to concentrate on the 
society rather than the individual. In such a way, the draconian penalties can be 
explained in terms of deterrence, rather than seen as measures exposing 
certain ideas of individual ‘character’. Death, total atimia, and exile, even though 
considered harsh and inhumane penalties, practically achieved the twofold aim 
of (one way or another) getting rid of a social misfit and having a deterrent effect 
on potential future criminals110. This is particularly verified by the Athenian legal 
system’s weakness of bringing criminals to justice, in the absence of policing 
and enforcement mechanisms.  
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 For Athenian ‘punishment’ one may consult Allen (2000); Todd (1993), pp. 139ff; Hall (1996); 
Hansen (1976); Saunders (1991); Cohen D. (2005). Relevant traces can be found in Mackenzie 
(1981). 
106
 Death sentence features prominently in our sources, though the disproportionate number of 
high profile cases included in them renders its vast percentage unlikely in practice.  
107
 Cf. Mackenzie (1981), pp. 106 ff. 
108
 Cf. Hansen (1976), pp. 118ff. 
109
 Hall (1996). 
110
 Deterrence of future misconduct was an extremely common pattern of argumentation in 
Athenian courts. See for example: Dem. 21.37, 220; 22.7; 23.94; 24.101; 25.17; 36.58; 42.15; 
45.87; 50.66; 51.12; 54.43; 56.48; 59.113; cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1113b. 
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The above conclusion that the Athenian methods of punishment are not  
decisive as to their ideas of ‘character’ may be supported by the existence of 
timesis. During this process, both litigants proposed just – in their view – 
penalties, between which the court had to decide. Nevertheless, the agones 
timetoi included very serious and reprehensible offences111. Since the guilt had 
already been proved, punishment in accordance with a belief that character is 
unchangeable would signify the automatic categorical infliction of the harshest 
penalty. On the contrary, the condemned offender could propose a milder 
penalty, even a fine, which means that a non-rehabilitated criminal would be set 
free and remain socially active. Definitely, questions of proportionality come into 
play which, nevertheless, cannot fully neutralise the effect of this procedure in 
relation to considerations concerning the Athenian ideas of character.  
 
On the other hand, other offences were treated less harshly, expressed by the 
pecuniary penalty of fine or confiscation. Imprisonment was rarely inflicted, 
usually reserved for those awaiting trial. This is the other side of the coin and, 
since it is highly unlikely that the Athenians had separated crimes open to 
rehabilitation from others that are not, it has to be maintained that their methods 
of punishment do not illuminate their assumptions about ‘character’. This can be 
additionally demonstrated by the (in some, admittedly limited cases) existence 
of multiple procedures and penalties with which an offence could be 
punished112. Therefore, if the same act could be both prosecuted in a private 
trial and punished with a fine and in a public trial punished with death, this 
cancels any further discussion that connects punishment with Athenian 
presuppositions of an unchanging ethos.  
 
Finally, example may be adduced of partial atimia, in cases of prohibition of 
exercising the same type of civic action. In cases of guilt for proposing an illegal 
proposal, the offender incurred this type of penalty after three condemnations 
by the court. On the other hand, when a plaintiff failed to get one fifth of the 
votes or withdrew the case before the hearing, this type of atimia (prohibition of 
bringing the same type of prosecution) was inflicted from the first time. Hence, 
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 For a listing of (probable) agones timetoi see Harrison (1971), pp. 81-2. 
112
 See Ch. 2; cf. Carey (2004). 
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neither an Athenian belief that repetition (three times) reveals propensity may 
be adduced, nor that a single time is sufficient so, again, this divergence can be 
explained by taking into account a desire for proportionality. Moreover, the fact 
that the offender was, in these cases, punished with partial atimia of specific 
scope inhibits a conclusion that the Athenians believed in a total indivisibility of 
character. Therefore, my proposal is that the Athenian methods of punishment 
may reveal the underlying rationales of deterrence, retribution, and restitution 
but, in the case of offenders’ rehabilitation, relevant to the question of 
‘character’ stability, it would be unsafe to offer any firm conclusions. Definitely, 
this is a fertile area for further research.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In order to complete this chapter it is essential to point to some final 
connections of the Greek ideas of character with the evidence used in Athenian 
courts. The implications of these ideas will be further highlighted in subsequent 
chapters, in which it will be discussed in detail why the Athenians used 
‘character’ in their courts, how they invoked it, and what issues this 
argumentation included. All these matters will be analysed on the basis of the 
aforementioned enquiry. The above Greek ideas of ‘character’ will offer a fresh 
viewpoint, providing for a new mode of interpretation. Consequently, a 
delineation of the axis upon which the following chapters will be designed is 
essential.  
 
First of all consideration has to be given to the highly flexible approach of the 
Athenian assumptions about ‘character’. The poets, in particular, with their 
divergent suggestions, educated the masses in yet another non-dogmatic way 
of approaching such complex issues. Following the characteristic open-
mindedness of the Greek intellect, the multiple contrasting beliefs concerning 
‘character’ allowed for an equally flexible and inconsistent approach by the 
orators. Hence, the rhetorical manipulation of the issue should be attributed to 
the absence of fixed presuppositions. Nevertheless, the fixed confidence in the 
probative value of ethos assisted the wider use of character evidence for 
rhetorical purposes. Apart from this, the conviction that a person is totally 
responsible for his actions (excluding the exceptional circumstances discussed 
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above) and that these result from a relevantly consistent character, permitted 
the unproblematic attribution of guilt and blameworthiness without raising further 
complications.  
 
Furthermore, the extensive (to a great degree compared to the fragmented 
modern societies) ethical consensus of the juries, gave rise to common 
rhetorical patterns of argumentation (topoi) which were developed through 
time113. These were based on common standards of behaviour (reminiscent of 
the modern ‘reasonable man’) and were extended so as to embrace the 
demand for the individuals’ adherence to common norms. Thus, as it will be 
subsequently shown, a person who understood himself as an integral part of the 
community with an assigned role, perceived these norms as setting the level of 
moral blameworthiness or praise.  
 
Another feature of character evidence in the courts of classical Athens that has 
to be discussed is the invocation of many examples of previous behaviour in 
order to reveal one’s character. This has to be explained by reference to both 
the (familiar to the Greek intellectuals) inductive mode of thinking and to the 
practical reason of avoiding a counter-plea of opportunism. If there was not the 
uncertainty as to the extent to which Aristotle’s theory of habitual (repetitive) 
behaviour appealed to the popular masses, it could have been included in the 
aforementioned reasons. After all, Athenian litigants by referring to numerous 
past acts aimed to expose a fixed character trait rather than an opportunistic 
‘out of character’ behaviour.  
 
Additionally, the belief in the existence of different ‘groups’ of traits (e.g. greed, 
dishonesty etc.), permitted seemingly divergent and irrelevant past actions (that 
fell under a certain behavioural category) to be adduced in order to prove a 
particular virtue or vice. The potential acceptance of the unity of virtue or vice 
made an individual virtuous or bad per se. As a result, under this extreme but 
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 Todd (1990c), p. 148 sees the direction of this approach as more useful than the opposite 
usually applied by modern scholars: “In the study of the Athenian jury, the question has 
received considerably more attention, but from the opposite perspective. Instead of using the 
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values or attitudes” (p.149) and “the values and aspirations of Athenian citizens were a matter 
of consensus rather than of division” (p.169). 
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not impossible scenario, any past act (even irrelevant to the particular charge by 
modern standards) that revealed the general virtue or wickedness of a person 
could be invoked in support of a litigant’s case. In other words, since 
unlawfulness reveals antisocial behaviour, any apparent non-adherence to 
social norms would point to the same direction. Since a person with an 
evidenced particular vice can be characterised as wicked overall, and breaking 
the law is also wicked, this particular vice (even if it is irrelevant to the offence) 
can be adduced to expose the wickedness. 
 
Finally, the Athenian supposition that an individual may change through 
education or at least his vices can be suppressed by fear, gave rise to the 
reception of the Athenian laws as having a deterrent effect on potential 
wrongdoers. In this light, the laws have a didactic nature, transforming the 
individuals for the benefit of the community. Athens, being a typical Greek polis, 
usually esteemed the public interest higher than the individual. The oikoi were 
gradually superseded by the polis, and the community developed yet another 
test for assessing the faithfulness of the citizens to common values. Punishment 
and acclaim educated the Athenian citizens as to their ways of interacting; the 
underlying cause is a belief in the adaptable nature of humans.  
 
The Greek views of ‘character’ shall be adduced to explain the presence of 
character evidence since the Homeric period (chapter 1). This fact proves that 
such a broad invocation of ad hominem argumentation is not a classical 
Athenian phenomenon and has to be explained by reference to more general 
considerations. On the contrary, it has to be examined as part of a broader 
approach to character in relation to law (namely character evidence in the 
speeches together with the structural and procedural incentives that have been 
demonstrated in chapter 2); this approach also has to be elucidated in light of 
the Greek perceptions of ‘character’. These perceptions, in addition to the 
Greek perceptions of ‘personhood’ which will be discussed in the next chapters, 
will offer a comprehensive underlying cause for the above features, as well as 
for the wide use of character evidence in Athenian courts. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: METHODS OF PROVIDING 
EVIDENCE FROM CHARACTER IN ATHENIAN 
COURTS 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the methods and tactics by which 
character evidence was adduced in the courts of classical Athens. This question 
is linked to deeper issues of Athenian life. As has already been argued in the 
previous chapter, the Athenian ideas of ‘character’ directly influenced the tactics 
they used in their courts. Furthermore, the newly developed disciplines of 
rhetoric, dialectic and logic, also played a major part in shaping the methods of 
argumentation. For instance, the combination of the inductive way of reasoning, 
supported by the undecided questions regarding the stability of one’s character 
(which in more sophisticated circles gradually gave way to a belief in the 
changeable nature of character), forced litigants to use a series of past 
examples and actions in order to deduce a character’s certain trait. Apart from 
these issues, the more practical side of rhetoric will be examined, discussing 
devices and tricks employed by orators in order to obscure an opponent’s ethos 
or to hide weaknesses in their own case. In the course of the chapter, more 
familiar issues from the life of modern courts will be discussed and comparison 
will be made as to how they approached what we would consider to be modern 
methods of portraying character, such as arguing from previous offences and 
reputation.  
 
Chapter 3 has investigated the Greek assumptions about ‘character’, with the 
assurance that many of them would illuminate an analysis of the methods 
through which a person’s ethos was revealed in the Athenian forensic 
environment. However, the fact that these assumptions were not fixed and 
constantly evolved, produced a flexible approach to the acceptable ways of 
argumentation from character. The absence of durable presuppositions 
regarding the stability or changeability of character and the ways that this may 
be proved, meant that in the agonistic setting of Athenian courts weak 
presumptions would inevitably be questioned and manipulated. As a result, 
adding to the extensive use of character evidence, numerous tactics were 
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adduced in order to expose a person’s ethos. General reputation, previous 
offences, reprehensible past acts, as well as more innovative rhetorical 
techniques such as negative comparisons and allegories, make up the list of 
how Athenian litigants could present character.  
 
This flexibility of choices has led many scholars, consciously or subconsciously 
insisting on an idealistic view of current practices, to focus on the dissimilarities 
of the Athenian legal system to modern ones, and highlight its remoteness
1. Yet, even if this comparison is taken as valid, the correct inference may not 
be so exact. Current law of evidence admits that a person’s character may be 
inferred by evidence of general disposition, by evidence of specific examples of 
his conduct on other occasions (including, in the case of bad conduct, evidence 
of his previous convictions), or by evidence of his reputation among those to 
whom he is known2. Some scholars include even the simple exercise of a 
particularly ill-regarded calling3 or negative character testimony in the form of 
statements such as “I have never heard anything ill of the defendant’s 
character”4, while others suggest the further relaxation of admissibility rules5. As 
will be shown, such evidence is not absent from Athenian courtrooms.  
 
Additionally, current legal trends progress towards a wider and more flexible 
approach to character evidence. Under common law, only reputation6 (and not 
specific events) was admitted and evidence should relate to a time proximate to 
that of the offences charged7. The traditional prohibition of referring to specific 
past acts is relaxed and the defendant himself may adduce such evidence8. The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 relaxes the rules of admissibility by promoting a more 
                                            
1
 Cf. Gagarin (2003), esp. at p. 197: “New approaches have taken over [in the study of Athenian 
law], approaches that, although healthy and stimulating in many ways, tend to exaggerate the 
otherness of Athenian law. This is not so much because historians present a false picture of 
Athenian law, as because they misrepresent aspects of our own legal system, relying on a 
traditional, idealistic view of it that is increasingly being challenged by certain branches of 
contemporary legal studies. When we take a more realistic look at our own system, however, 
Athenian law may not appear so different”. 
2
 Keane (2010), p. 439. 
3
 Munday R. (2005), p. 38. 
4
 Rowton (1865) L. & C. 520; Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr.App.R. 10; Munday R. (1997), p. 248. 
5
 E.g. Auld LJ, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Report (London, TSO, 
2001); cf. McEwan (2002). 
6
 Rowton (1865) L. & C. 520; Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr.App.R. 10. 
7
 Munday (1997), p. 248. 
8
 Howard, Crane and Hochberg, (1990) §18-14. 
[181] 
 
flexible approach to the probative force of evidence from previous behaviour 
and misconduct. Besides, the relaxation of the admissible ways by which one’s 
character may be revealed, suggests that the 2003 Act intends to facilitate the 
admission of evidence concerning an accused’s bad character. Accordingly, 
prosecutors ought to be entitled to invoke the defendant’s entire discreditable 
past, and not simply their previous convictions9. The CJA 2003 goes as far as to 
include the appearance or dress of a defendant to classify as ‘conduct’10, 
although this is merely reserved for the correction of any false impression 
already given by the party in question. A gradual shift is apparent, leading to a 
relaxation of the rules for the invocation of character evidence in modern courts. 
 
Leaving aside the absence of a solid set of Athenian beliefs about ‘character’ 
which facilitated a more liberal approach to argumentation, and its similarity to 
modern approaches, some of the conclusions shall be recalled that pave the 
way for the forthcoming discussion. These form the ideological context and 
explain the presence and relevance of the (more or less familiar) methods of 
character invocation in Athenian courts. As has been demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the emergence of the polis structure reflected the need for a 
simultaneous emergence of cooperative values to replace (or sometimes 
supplement) the archaic agonistic ones. These values, necessary for communal 
and peaceful living, marked the essence of coexistence in the civilised polis as 
opposed to the unrestrained past. However, this (natural or not) human 
tendency for barbarity needed to be altered, tamed, and adapted to the new 
reality. Transformation of human nature presupposed the transformation of 
ethos, in the sense of promoting the cooperative virtues and suppressing the 
self-seeking vices. This new kind of ‘polis-behaviour’ demanded unqualified 
adherence to communal laws and ethical norms which had to be proved in 
practice, by reference to one’s particular acts and general behaviour. A 
multitude of such acts should be presented in order to prove consistent and 
wholehearted devotion to the communal life of the polis. 
 
                                            
9
 Munday R. (2005), p. 41. 
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 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 105 (5). 
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In the absence of a firm belief in the stability of character, the difficulty of 
proving a fixed positive character was surpassed by the invocation of 
(numerous or impressive) previous virtuous deeds. Prolonged positive conduct, 
free from blemishes, was required to prove dispositional kindness. The absence 
of an acknowledgment of a person’s freedom of choice in every single instance 
of his life meant that any past reprehensible acts could be taken as the 
exposition of true ethos, as opposed to the opportunistic, hypocritical, 
superficially virtuous conduct. The classification of character traits (either virtues 
or vices) in broad, general categories, supported by an inductive mode of 
reasoning, meant that reprehensible acts could be used in order to categorise 
the person in question as possessing the relevant character defect. 
Consequently, such a person could be blamed as capable of performing any 
reprehensible act attributable to that particular flaw.  
 
Court argumentation was adjusted in order to suit these prevalent ideas. 
Evidence from past life, through the invocation of many past acts, especially 
relevant to the particular character trait highlighted by the legal charge, is the 
rule to be followed by all the orators. Crude characterisation, either as direct 
insults or in the form of innuendoes, simply emphasised the conclusions of the 
aforementioned evidence. Furthermore, reference to the general or specific 
reputation (among the whole polis or the immediate circle, referring to general 
character or specific traits) facilitated a deductive mode of thinking, aiding a 
speaker’s cause in proving credibility, worthiness or baseness. On the other 
hand, following Aristotle’s remarks, character could be portrayed at the time of 
the trial, either through the logoi of the speaker or through the mode of delivery. 
In what follows, specific examples from Athenian court speeches will be 
examined in order to prove the aforesaid points.  
4.1 Evidence from the Past 
Reference to past acts was the prevalent method of argumentation in the 
Athenian courts. Although the norm demanded such references to be supported 
by witnesses,  in the absence of direct evidence and testimonies, jurors had to 
rely on circumstantial evidence in order to decide such issues. Aeschines, in 
such an atypical case, in his effort to excuse the absence of witness testimonies 
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from his speech against Timarchus, highlights this struggle for the attainment of 
truth, especially in instances where the future of the testifiers was at stake: 
 
Come now, in the name of Zeus and the gods, if they had resorted to the same defence that 
Timarchus and his advocates now offer, and demanded that someone should testify explicitly to 
the crime, or else that the jurors should refuse to believe the charge, surely according to that 
demand it would have been absolutely necessary for the one man to testify that he gave a 
bribe, the other, that he took a bribe, though the law threatens each of them with death precisely 
as in this case if anyone hires an Athenian for a disgraceful purpose, and again if any Athenian 
voluntarily hires himself out to the shame of his body. Is there any man who would have 
testified, or any prosecutor who would have undertaken to present such proof of the act? Surely 
not… [F]or what foot-pad or adulterer or assassin, or what man who has committed the greatest 
crimes, but has done it secretly, will be brought to justice? For whereas such of these criminals 
as are caught in the act are instantly punished with death, if they acknowledge the crime, those 
who have done the act secretly and deny their guilt, are tried in the courts, and the truth can be 
determined by circumstantial evidence only [based on probabilities] (εὑρίσκεται δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐκ 
τῶν εἰκότων). (Aes. 1.87-91) 
 
In what follows, proof will be offered for the fact of the presentation of character 
traits through the use of inductive reasoning, by reference to past acts. 
Irrelevant at first glance, such references illuminated the opponent’s tendency to 
behave in particular reprehensible ways which, given the circumstances of the 
case, would assist the jurors in reaching a decision about the facts. Therefore, if 
the charge was relevant to a specific character defect (e.g. indecency, 
corruption, antisocial behaviour etc.) instances of past conduct revealing the 
existence of such a flaw would be received by the court as relevant. Evidence of 
such reasoning will be provided in the next paragraph, concentrating on 
character portrayal. This means that specific episodes of the past which deal 
directly with the offence will be largely ignored, since they form too obvious a 
method of arguing a case.  
 
To make it plain, an example taken from Aeschines’ argumentation against 
Timarchus during a dokimasia rhetoron can be offered. The main charge 
focused on the prostitution of Timarchus and (less) on the squandering of his 
patrimony. Aeschines refers to specific incidents from Timarchus’ past life in 
order to prove his breach of the law. . Firstly, specific acts are cited which refer 
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to the main charge in question. He enumerates the houses of older, indecent 
men in which he has been kept (1.40, 43, 52-3, 57 etc.) and the episodes of 
squandering his family estate (1.97-102). Nevertheless, the question still 
remains if this unwitnessed case is going to seem probable, namely what led 
Timarchus to resort to this kind of behaviour? And secondly, in anticipation of 
the defence’s arguments, isn’t the acquisition and squandering of such a 
property inconsistent with the sale of his body for money? Aeschines replies by 
a single, powerful argument: Timarchus’ character, gluttonous and excessive, 
made him an unrestrained victim of pleasures. How was this proved? By 
reference to his previous (seemingly irrelevant) conduct. Timarchus was “slave 
to the most disgraceful pleasures, gluttony and expensive eating and flute-girls 
and courtesans and dice and the other activities that should never have control 
of a decent and freeborn man” (1.42). His only care was to find a rich choregos 
(1.54) in order to continue his way of life, spending his time at the gaming house 
(1.53) and financing his extravagant tastes (1.65, 94-5). His unrestrained nature 
(proved by the above examples) is also revealed by the violent and 
unprecedented way he and his company treated his former ‘owner’ (1.59). A 
series of past acts, either central to the main charge or marginal, may by 
induction reveal specific character traits which, in turn, will serve as the catalyst 
in increasing the likelihood of the opponent’s criminal behavior. 
 
All these prove my main two points. Firstly, a legal case and the proof of the 
facts could be based on the portrayal of the opponent’s character. Without this 
mastery in the characterisation of Timarchus, Aeschines would probably have 
less success than that he achieved in this unwitnessed case. Secondly, the 
inductive way of reasoning, and the belief in general categories of character 
traits, indicate the method (and content) of argumentation in Athenian courts. 
Taking into account the Athenian ideas of character, reference to past events, 
which on the surface seem unconnected with each other and irrelevant to the 
legal case, could indeed prove decisive to the legal case. Gluttony, drunken 
violence, extravagant spending and gambling, may at first glance seem 
unconnected, especially if adduced in a case of male prostitution. Nevertheless, 
they all spring from a general character trait: excess. Timarchus’ unrestrained 
nature was the cause and the end of all his deeds. His character got him into a 
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circle of evil from which he could not escape. What was left was the financing of 
his indecent pleasures; to achieve this, again, he did not stop at anything. He 
sold his body in an analogous way to his squandering of his patrimony. He 
devoured his inheritance in the same manner as he embezzled public property 
(1.106-116). This is Timarchus’ character and these are his past deeds that 
prove it11. He is unworthy of sharing rights with the rest of the Athenian citizens, 
hence should be convicted.  
 
The same conclusion may be deduced from the speech of Lycurgus against 
Leocrates. The breach of a decree forbidding people to flee from Athens after 
the disaster of Chaeronea, was the point of conflict in that speech. Lycurgus, 
the decent patriot, claims that Leocrates left Athens out of cowardice and 
infidelity. Leocrates claims that he left Athens for trade. How can Lycurgus 
prove his assertion? By reference to Leocrates’ disloyal character which 
embraces the single act of fleeing Athens. His past acts prove his unpatriotic 
stance but also explain its underlying causes in the form of the lack of emotional 
ties and intimacy to his country, his ancestors and his dearest. His conduct had 
been firmly opposed to that of the venerable ancestors (1.14) in the way he 
defamed Athens to the people of Rhodes (1.18). After that, he stayed at 
Megara, unashamed of being ‘an alien on the borders of the land that nurtured 
him’ (1.21). He even did not stop short of uprooting the ‘ancestral images’ and 
conveying his property to safety (1.25). He also broke the law (not under 
consideration in the current plaint, but indicative of his disloyal and traitorous 
character) in transporting corn to other places than Athens. The above 
consideratios illuminate the underlying reasons that triggered Leocrates’ 
treacherous acts the night he fled Athens and support Lycurgus’ allegations as 
to why, due to his character, ‘no city let him reside within it as an alien’ (1.133-
4). Leocrates’ betrayal was total: against his country (1.18, 26, 45), his 
ancestors (Lyc. 1.25), and the gods (1.26, 76). All his past deeds have been 
                                            
11
 Researchers tend to criticise Aeschines’ attack on Demosthenes’ character in 1.170-6 as 
irrelevant. In my opinion, following the same method of reasoning, it is not. Demosthenes, the 
supporting speaker for the defence, was one of Timarchus’ closest associates. He is presented 
as Timarchus’ alter ego in an effort to reveal his lack of credibility. He is accused for exactly the 
same kind of behaviour (squandering patrimony, corrupt, indecent pervert, patron etc.), making 
the audience to wonder as to who is more to blame and be condemned. In this way, not only he 
cancels out Demosthenes’ trustworthiness, but also highlights the fact that ‘like is keen to like’, 
both being reprehensible and damnable. 
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performed out of deliberate choice and prove the ungrateful inclination of his 
character. Even non-citizens who have not been nurtured by the Athenian soil 
did not show such hatred against the city to have endured to remain outside the 
army in these times of peril (1.39); Leocrates did. Such disloyal men are bad, 
whether as citizens, guests or personal friends; for they will enjoy the 
advantages offered by the state but will not consent to assist it too, in times of 
difficulty (1.133). His more general character trait has been proved, leaving no 
question as to the motives behind his flight.  
 
More examples may be offered to prove that a litigant’s past acts, followed by 
an inductive method of reasoning, reveal a key character trait which illuminates 
the facts of the case and prove the speaker’s crucial points. In Lysias 1, 
reference to the background of the case portrays Euphiletus as the naïve 
husband, who was slow to understand and incapable of plotting the alleged trap 
against Eratosthenes12. The case was probably presented before the ephetai at 
the Delphinion, the jurors being experts and probably retaining the same stance 
against irrelevant argumentation as in their original post, the court of the 
Areopagus13. In Lysias 3, the whole context of the dispute, as revealed by 
reference to numerous past acts, assists in the characterisation of both parties. 
The jury is not invited to give a verdict based on equity by taking into account 
the whole story. Nor was the background of the dispute presented to help the 
jurors reach an ad hoc verdict by reference to the particularities of the case. 
Conversely, they are invited to give a verdict on the specific allegation of 
wounding with premeditation, as illuminated by the attitude of both litigants. The 
speaker’s (defendant) temperance and the prosecutor’s violent and hubristic 
character make it highly improbable that the first was responsible for the 
brawl14. It is of utmost importance to note here that this case was heard by the 
court of Areopagus, the stricter institution as far as its attitude to extra-legal 
argumentation is concerned. 
 
                                            
12
 Lys. 1.10-5; cf. Todd (2008), p. 93; Carey (2011), pp. 35-6. 
13
 See Rhodes (1981), p. 647. 
14
 For the defendant’s temperance see Lys. 3.4, 9-10, 13, 17, 30, 40; for the prosecutor’s hubris 
see Lys. 3.5, 6, 8, 12, 15-8, 23, 29, 45; cf. Todd (2008), pp. 278ff.; Carey (2011), p. 82. The 
same pattern is followed by Demosthenes in Dem. 54. 
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 In Lysias 32, a dike epitropes (a suit for impropriety in the conduct of the 
position of guardian), reference to a multitude of Diogeiton’s past acts highlights 
his dispositional deceitfulness15. Hypereides in Against Athenogenes portrays 
yet another deceitful character, who (jurors are emphatically informed) is an 
Egyptian (Hyp. 3.3). His past conduct proves that he is fraudulent, ungrateful 
and disrespectful, characteristics which make him a probable candidate for 
committing the alleged fraud against the speaker. He escaped from Athens after 
Chaeronea (3.29) (betraying the agreement with the laws of the state which 
welcomed him), he betrayed his second host country Troezen (3.29ff.) 
(changing his position, not his disposition), and he maltreated his kin (3.35). 
Likewise, being meddlesome and speechwriter, Athenogenes and his equally 
deceitful mistress (3.2: the most gifted courtesan of her time) were too cunny for 
a quiet farmer such as the speaker (3.26). 
 
All the above lead us to discuss the scholarly attempt to use litigants’ remotely 
relevant references to the background of the dispute in justification of the thesis 
that these were adduced in order to aid the jurors in reaching an ad-hoc, just 
verdict based on the particular circumstances of the case16. According to them, 
Athenian courts were less concerned with the legal case at hand and extended 
their perspective in order to embrace the whole context of the relations between 
the parties. By this token, verdicts were founded on equitable justifications (e.g. 
fairness) and cases were decided on an ad hoc basis. However, as has already 
been shown, the context and background of disputes (or even references 
entirely unrelated to the particular dispute) were in concord with the Athenian 
ideas of character and the ways in which these could be adduced, serving in 
turn as proofs for the establishment of the factual truth.  
 
Lanni, in order to support her aforementioned thesis, refers to two cases which 
undoubtedly suit her aim. The first case is Dem. 53 (Against Nicostratus), 
arising from an apographe (writ of confiscation for a state debtor). Lanni focuses 
                                            
15
 Carey (2011), p. 109: “Lysias presents us with a plausible villain (even where he offers no 
corroborative evidence) by striving for consistency in the actions narrated. Diogeiton conceals 
the scale of the estate as he conceals his brother’s death. He cheats on his daughter’s dowry, 
as he cheats his wards by cunningly transferring to them the whole cost of sacrifice (§21), 
funeral monument (§21) or liturgy (§24, §26) disguised as half the cost. And he persistently 
avoids attempts to resolve the dispute (§2, §12). 
16
 Lanni (2006), pp. 46ff. 
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exceedingly on the fifteen paragraphs in which Apollodorus explains to the 
jurors the background of the dispute: his respect for philia and his generous 
behaviour towards Nicostratus are contrasted with the latter’s ingratitude and 
vicious plotting against him. What Lanni nevertheless fails to mention is that 
from the proem, the prosecutor is noticeably worried about an allegation of 
bringing a malicious prosecution. Such a counter-accusation was relevant in all 
public suits where ho boulomenos could initiate proceedings, let alone in cases 
of apographe (which involved financial profit for the prosecutor). Secondly, 
although the speech is indeed divided into two equal parts (one concerned with 
the hostile relations between the parties which triggered Apollodorus decision to 
indict, the other referring to the merits of the case), when the speech was 
actually delivered in court, the first part consisted solely of narrative (with a 
minor detour at its end when Apollodorus calls witnesses), whereas in the 
second part (the proof of the plaint’s point) Apollodorus called witnesses five 
times, for every single point he mentioned. Therefore the emphasis and the 
practical balance of the speech concentrated overwhelmingly on the proof of the 
main charge. 
 
The second case Lanni cites is Dem. 47, a case of false witnessing. The 
original case that triggered the dike pseudomarturion was a dike aikeias 
(assault), won by Theophemus against the speaker. The latter then accused 
Theophemus’ brother and brother-in-law of falsely witnessing on a key issue. 
The witnesses had testified that Theophemus offered an eyewitness slave 
woman for torture, an offer that the speaker refused. In the surviving speech, he 
moves on three axes: i) direct proof that the witnesses lied and that he in fact 
asked for the slave’s testimony, which Theophemus cunningly avoided (47.4-
18), ii) reference to the incidents leading to the fight generating the original trial 
(47.19-48), and iii) reference to the incidents after the original trial and before 
the current dike pseudomarturion (47.49ff.). The first axis needs no justification 
for it is directly related to the case. The second proves by circumstantial 
evidence that the slave would in fact testify that it was Theophemus (and not 
the speaker) who delivered the first blow (i.e. against Theophemus and for the 
speaker). Thus Theophemus, by the failure to have the eyewitness testifying, 
gained a crucial advantage. Accordingly, it is illogical to believe that 
[189] 
 
Theophemus had asked for the slave to testify, whereas the speaker denied it. 
As a result, the witnesses lied. The final axis refers to violent incidents on the 
part of Theophemus who, being at an advantage after the verdict of the original 
trial, plotted against the speaker in order to compel him to drop the current dike 
pseudomarturion. Therefore, the whole speech, with the detailed references to 
the background of the dispute, is logically coherent, relevant to the case at 
hand, carefully aiming (using divergent tactics) at proving the main point: false 
witnessing. Also, the coherence of argumentation was promoted by the 
opponents’ character presentation which formed a link between the three 
aforementioned axes. Examined in this light, the speaker’s reference to a 
multitude of past acts performed by the parties (and to depositions of men who 
suffered from his opponents in the past) is designed to portray both litigants’ 
characters, rendering probable the fact that the malicious, violent and hubristic 
Theophemus delivered the first blow against the reasonable, moderate and 
lawful speaker17.  
 
Lastly, Lanni refers to inheritance cases and argues that speakers resort to 
argumentation from equity, advertising their affinity to the deceased against the 
formal document of the will. However, such cases are of special nature since 
the trial ceases to be adversarial and all claimants have equal claims. 
Furthermore, references to closeness aim to question the validity of the 
presented document, at a time when the means for testing it largely relied on 
circumstantial evidence. In any case, regardless of the special nature of 
inheritance disputes which makes them more suitable as examples of Lanni’s 
suggestions, her conclusions may not be so accurate after all since a wider 
perspective and more general considerations need to be taken into account18. 
Apart from the reference to inheritance cases, apographai and dikai 
pseudomarturion provoke similar arguments, highlighting the atypical nature of 
these procedures. During the former, the state was deemed to be the main 
interested party, with the prosecutor acting as its agent. The fact that in such a 
public case the initiator of the charge would gain material benefit rendered him 
suspect of sycophancy. As far as the dikai pseudomarturion are concerned, 
                                            
17
 Regarding Theophemus’ and the witnesses’ conduct see for e.g. Dem. 47.28, 31-33, 52ff. For 
the speaker’s see Dem. 47.34-6, 38, 68ff. 
18
 See Griffith-Williams (2012); cf. Ch. 2.2.2 and 2.3.3. 
[190] 
 
these formed an attempt on the part of the losing party to reopen and reargue 
the original case (cf. Dem. 47.46). Nevertheless, as has been proved, even in 
such cases litigants were largely committed to illuminating the main issues of 
the case, their argumentation being relevant and ‘to the point’. 
 
To conclude then, as Aristotle emphasised, reference to a multitude of 
deliberately chosen past acts could inductively prove a more general character 
trait. Correspondingly, the character trait in question could deductively illuminate 
the hidden facts of the case that formed the essence of the dispute. In cases 
where the existence of stereotypical beliefs was strong as to a particular 
characteristic of a litigant, reference to past acts was welcomed, but not 
necessary. For instance, following a deductive method of reasoning, the mere 
fact of being an Egyptian (Hyp. 3) or a Phaselite (Dem. 35) could automatically 
allow for a presumption of certain particular characteristics such as dishonesty 
and fraudulence, with the same ease that hubris and intemperance could be 
deducted from being young19. In addition to other methods of proof such as 
direct evidence and witness testimonies, arguments from probability, supported 
by circumstantial evidence contributed to the efforts ofAthenian jurors to reach a 
decision in accordance with his oath, as to the particular legal case. The 
Athenian beliefs about character, supported by their mode of reasoning 
extended the ways by which character could be adduced and rendered relevant 
any reference to seemingly remote or unrelated past acts.   
4.2 Reputation and Associates 
In everyday dealings, character and personality are closely connected with 
reputation. Both notions are determined by the perceptions of a person’s social 
circle, with reputation resulting from the opinions of people witnessing his 
everyday dealings. Furthermore, reputation is yet another distinctive feature of 
an individual, and it may be adduced in courts as evidence for a party’s ethical 
standing. Public estimation of someone may prove decisive in a legal case, 
especially in a forensic setting such as the Athenian (chapter 2) and in a culture 
placing more emphasis in questions of honour and shame20. In what follows, the 
                                            
19
 The same is true for solecism as an indication of barbarism (cf. Dem. 45.30; 36.1; but see 
Plat. Apol. 17d-18a) or for growing long hair as a sign of elitism (Lys. 16). 
20
 See the discussion of ‘shame-culture’ versus ‘guilt-culture’ in chapter 5. Cf. Cairns (1993). 
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importance of a person’s reputation will be investigated (either among the 
general public or his immediate social circle), its effect to the argumentation in 
Athenian courts, and the ways by which it was adduced.  
 
Having a comparative perspective would be useful in order to grasp the 
importance of the Athenian practice. Modern law of evidence in the United 
Kingdom provides that  
 
“the character of a person may be proved by evidence of general disposition, by evidence of 
specific examples of his conduct on other occasions (including, in the case of bad conduct, 
evidence of his previous convictions), or by evidence of his reputation among those to whom he 
is known”
21.  
 
Under common law solely reputation22, and not specific events, was admitted 
(although this is at present relaxed and the defendant himself may adduce 
evidence of particular acts23). In the United States, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (405, 608) provide for the use of reputation as an acknowledged 
method of proving character. When character is used circumstantially and 
hence occupies a lesser status in a case, proof may be only by reputation and 
opinion, prohibiting the most convincing (but more prejudicial) method of 
providing specific instances of past conduct. In both these jurisdictions, the 
importance of evidence from the reputation of the parties is proven.  
 
In classical Athens, both a (probably well-known) person’s general reputation 
and the opinions of his immediate social environment could be put forward. 
Nevertheless, the presence of partisan witnesses24 who belonged to the circle 
of litigants and their (alleged) role of supporting a litigant’s case rather than 
illuminating the truth meant that their quality and credibility determined the 
seriousness of their testimony25. Moreover, a litigant’s associates could also 
                                            
21
 Keane (2010), p. 439. 
22
 Rowton (1865) L. & C. 520; Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr.App.R. 10. 
23
 Howard, Crane and Hochberg (1990), §18-14. 
24
 Another remnant of the pre-4
th
 century age referred to in chapter 1; cf. Humphreys (1985); 
Thür G. (2005).  
25
 On the role of witnesses see Thür G. (2005); Humphreys (1985); London; Todd, (1990); 
Rubinstein (2005b). For a different view, namely that the legal risk of being prosecuted for false 
witnessing forced even a litigant’s supporters to testify the truth, see Mirhady (2002) and 
Scafuro (1994). 
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affect his reputation, as well as character evidence given about a third party 
close to the litigant. This flexible and all-inclusive approach elevated the issue of 
reputation to a prominent place, having both probative and rhetorical 
significance. Strategically, reputation could be used to reveal the relevant 
character traits of litigants. Tactically, it could serve as a rhetorical topos leaving 
to the audience the impression that they already know and adhere to the 
arguments of the speaker.  
 
All these are best exemplified in the case of Aeschines against Timarchus26. 
Aeschines’ difficulty in finding witnesses to testify against the defendant could 
seriously undermine the proof of his case. In his effort to explain and justify this 
difficulty (Aes. 1.44-8, 71-3, 160-4) he seeks to downplay the importance of 
direct testimonies and replace them with common report27. The fact that 
Timarchus was already a well-known figure among Athenians assisted the 
orator in presenting his character, though complete certainty is impossible as to 
the accuracy of his comments28. Timarchus’ reputation is blackened to a great 
extent, with Aeschines provoking the agreement of the audience29 – in this way 
he sought to transform the jurors to partisan witnesses, confirming Aeschines’ 
assertions30. Common report and reputation have acted as the connective 
elements which put Aeschines and the jurors on the same side: standing in 
agreement as to Timarchus’ guilt, his reputation formed the catalyst for his 
conviction31. Such a verdict would indeed not be unjust if indeed the defendant 
                                            
26
 Also discussed by Hunter (1991). 
27
 E.g. Aeschin. 1.90: “while the man on trial, who has been denounced by the testimony of his 
own life and of the truth, is to demand that he be judged, not by the facts that are notorious, but 
by the testimony of witnesses, then the law is done away with, and so is the truth”. 
28
 cf. Aeschin. 1.20, 44, 55, 80, 157, 186, 189. 
29
 E.g. Aeschin. 1.159: “To which class do you assign Timarchus—to those who are loved, or to 
those who are prostitutes? You see, Timarchus, you are not to be permitted to desert the 
company which you have chosen and go over to the ways of free men”. This very impressive 
tactics was used by Demosthenes against Aeschines himself in Dem. 18.52: “I call you Philip's 
hireling of yesterday, and Alexander's hireling of today, and so does every man in this 
Assembly. If you doubt my word, ask them; or rather I will ask them myself. Come, men of 
Athens, what do you think? Is Aeschines Alexander's hireling, or Alexander's friend? You hear 
what they say”. 
30
 E.g. Aeschin. 1.89: “Now if this trial were taking place in another city, and that city were the 
referee, I should have demanded that you should be my witnesses, you who best know that I 
am speaking the truth. But since the trial is at Athens, and you are at the same time judges and 
witnesses of the truth of what I say, it is my place to refresh your memory, and yours not to 
disbelieve me”. 
31
 E.g Aeschin. 1.85: “This, then, I understand to be the testimony that has been offered you by 
the people of Athens, and it would not be proper that they should be convicted of giving false 
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was notorious for precisely the kind of conduct both directly relevant to the legal 
case and sufficient to condemn him32. After all reputation was the fair resultant 
of a man’s past behaviour, being as credible as witnesses and testimonies 
given at the time of the trial33.  
 
On the other hand, Timarchus (and offended litigants in general) could dispute 
the accuracy of such reports and dismiss them as common slander. Aeschines 
replies by referring to the deification of Common Report, presenting as evidence 
for its unerring approach quotations from poetry. Demosthenes, Timarchus’ 
supporting speaker and main disputant of Aeschines’ assertions as slanderous 
and inaccurate (Aeschin. 1.125), would use the same kind of argumentation 
when it best suited his interests34. Aeschines himself, when confronted with 
negative arguments about his own reputation would dismiss them as 
inaccurate, emphasising the truth (Aeschin. 2.153). Other orators too used 
general reputation as a means of presenting the character of the parties, 
presumably those that were already recognisable among the Athenians35. In 
cases therefore where the (relevant to the legal case) past conduct of the 
parties acquired the status of common report throughout the polis, it could 
                                                                                                                                
testimony. When I, fellow citizens, say not a word, you of yourselves shout the name of the acts 
of which you know he is guilty; strange, then, it would be if when I name them, you cannot 
remember them; even had there been no trial of this case, he would have been convicted; 
strange indeed then if when the charge has been proved, he is to be acquitted!”. 
32
 Aeschin. 1.44:  “Indeed, I am very glad that the suit that I am prosecuting is against a man not 
unknown to you, and known for no other thing than precisely that practice as to which you are 
going to render your verdict. For in the case of facts which are not generally known, the accuser 
is bound, I suppose, to make his proofs explicit; but where the facts are notorious, I think it is no 
very difficult matter to conduct the prosecution, for one has only to appeal to the recollection of 
his hearers.” Cf. 1.116. 
33
 Aeschin. 1.93: “In the first place, let nothing be more credible in your eyes than your own 
knowledge and conviction regarding this man Timarchus. In the second place, look at the case 
in the light, not of the present moment, but of the time that is past. For the words spoken before 
today about Timarchus and his practices were spoken because they were true; but what will be 
said today will be spoken because of the trial, and with intent to deceive you. Give, therefore, 
the verdict that is demanded by the longer time, and the truth, and your own knowledge.” cf. 
Aeschin. 1.125ff. referring to the deification of Common Report and its unerring approach to 
people’s conduct, presenting quotations from poetry as evidence.  
34
 Dem. 21.1, 195, 134: “If you did what your fellow-troopers say you did, Meidias, and what you 
complain of them for saying, then you deserved their reproaches, because you were bringing 
harm and disgrace both on them and on these jurymen here and on all the city. But if you did 
not do it and it was all a fabrication, and if the rest of the soldiers, instead of reproving the 
slanderers, chuckled over you, it only shows that from your general manner of life they thought 
that such a story exactly fitted you. It was yourself, then, that you ought to have kept more 
under control, instead of accusing the others”. Demosthenes uses arguments from reputation 
frequently, cf. 24.128, 34.40, 45.63. 
35
 Indicatively see Lys. 6.3, 6; 7.12; Reputation among the Greeks Lyc. 1.14. 
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indeed prove a powerful weapon in a litigant’s arsenal, sufficient to disturb the 
equilibrium of a case (cf. Dem 52.1-2).  
 
Closer to modern perceptions of character evidence in the form of reputation 
are the occasions when witnesses with direct knowledge of the events provided 
evidence for the character of the parties. Again, however, the similarities do not 
exceed the differences. Litigants continue to play the prominent role since they 
themselves testify about their own (or the other party’s) conduct, merely 
providing witnesses for confirmation of their story. Furthermore, witnesses 
testified exclusively on questions of fact, leaving the issue of character to be 
illustrated only as a side-effect. For instance, Timarchus’ characterisation as 
immoral and indecent was confirmed by his immediate circle’s knowledge or 
testimonies concerning his licentious acts36. Lysias’ use of witnesses also 
focuses on their direct knowledge of facts, although they not infrequently shed 
light on the character and moral uprightness of the parties too37. Direct or 
indirect testimonies could also have rhetorical use38 since by placing witnesses 
in the position of praising a litigant envy or jealousy could be avoided.  
 
As becomes evident from a close inspection of witness testimonies, these had 
direct bearing on the case, shedding light on the most relevant issues. The 
reading of depositions meant the stoppage of the time allotted to the speaker; 
this could nonetheless damage the flow of his speech or incite an audience’s 
unease. Thus orators were very careful as to the moments that they allotted to 
witnesses and the importance of the facts the latter were called to confirm. 
Finally, noteworthy is the limited characterisation of witnesses in Athenian 
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 Timarchus’ notoriety among his immediate environment and his fellow demesmen (apart from 
his general reputation discussed above) played an important role in Aeschines’ portrayal of his 
character. Cf. Aeschin. 1.44-7, 59, 67-9, 78, 103-4 and against Demosthenes 2.155.  
37
 Direct knowledge of the facts assisted in the determination of status (e.g. Lys. 13.64, 23.4, 8, 
11), citizen virtue and liturgies (e.g. Lys. 16.8, 13-4, 17; 19.58-9; 20.25; 21.10; 31.14, 16, 19), 
family relations and kin’s uprightness of conduct (e.g. Lys. 20.26-9; 32.18), and lawlessness 
and disrespect for social norms (31.23; 13.66, 68, 81-2). 
38
 Rhet. 1418b: “In regard to moral character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves, we 
render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of 
another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness, we must make another speak in our 
place, as Isocrates does in the Philippus and in the Antidosis”. On avoiding envy in Athenian 
courts, see Spatharas (2011); Dyck (1985). 
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courts39. The inviolability of witnesses’ credibility in practice is evident as 
demonstrated by the rare attempts at character assassination against them. 
This may be explained by reference to the Athenian procedures against false 
witnessing, which in this respect promoted a substantive rather than rhetorical 
attack against perjurers. On the other hand, supporting speakers did not enjoy 
such ‘immunity’, their characters and credibility being as much a target as those 
of the main opponent40.  
 
Apart from the direct characterisation of the parties achieved by the testimonies 
of those having immediate knowledge of the facts, an indirect means of 
character portrayal could also emerge from the immediate circle. The character 
of a man resembled the character of his associates, and so linking a litigant with 
reputable or wicked men illuminated his own traits. Aeschines continually links 
Timarchus with the most disreputable men of Athens, notorious for exactly the 
kind of indecent behaviour with which he charged him41. He uses the authority 
of Euripides in order to prove that “the man is such as is the company he loves 
to keep”42. As a matter of fact, this was a widely held opinion43provoking the 
extensive use of a litigant’s associates in order to illuminate his character. The 
same strategy is also followed in the clashes against Demosthenes, where both 
Aeschines and Demosthenes try to associate their opponent with the convicted 
fugitive Philocrates44. Fifty years earlier Lysias used the same tactics in order to 
show the affinity of Eratosthenes with Theramenes45, whose character is 
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 These mostly take place in the speeches of Aeschines, for e.g. 1.41, 62, 67, 103; 2.64, 155; 
cf. Dem. 45.71.  
40
 For characterisation of supporting speakers, either in a positive or negative way, see for e.g. 
Andoc. 1.150; Lys. 30.31, 34; 31.32; 32.1; Lyc. 1.138; Aeschines v Demosthenes in 1.131-2, 
141, 163, 166-7, 170-5, 181, 194-5; the whole of Aeschines 3 turns arrows against 
Demosthenes, the main target, while in 2.184 presents his own supporting speakers in a 
positive manner.  Cf. Rubinstein (2000). 
41
 See for e.g. Aeschin. 1.70. 
42
 Aeschin. 1.152, quotation taken from Euripides’ Phoenix. 
43
 See for e.g. Hom. Od. 17.218; Plat. Symp. 195b; Arist. Eudemian Ethics 1235a; Theoprh. 
Char.XXIX. 
44
 Indicatively see Aeschin. 3.57-8, 60-2, 72; Dem. 19.8, 15, 23, 94-7, 115, 119, 144, 150, 174, 
189, 236, 245, 333. Aeschines tries to associate Demosthenes with Callias of Chalcis in 3.89, 
94, 104.  
45
 See Lys. 12.62ff. 
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portrayed in the most negative manner. More examples could be offered but I 
consider them unnecessary since the point has been proven46. 
 
Finally, character portrayal of a third party, apart from witnesses, associates, 
and supporting speakers, could regard deceased persons. Whenever relevant, 
litigants proceeded to such characterisation in order to prove important points of 
their argumentation. To demonstrate this reference to the character portrayal of 
Eratosthenes (Lysias 1) may be made, as presented by the defendant in a 
charge of intentional homicide, Euphiletus. The facts of the case are well-
known, basically concerning the lawfulness of Euphiletus’ killing of his wife’s 
lover. Athenian law, for the protection of the sanctity of oikos and the integrity of 
the citizen body, provided that a citizen could kill on the spot the seducer of any 
female family member which fell under his protection. However, Eratosthenes’ 
kin alleged that the victim was tricked and fell into a well organised trap which 
Euphiletus prepared in order to kill him with impunity. Euphiletus, in order to 
prove that the deceased had in fact seduced his wife, presents him as a serial 
corruptor of women, highlighting his propensity for such conduct by reference to 
analogous episodes from his past47. In Lysias 19, the case concerned the 
confiscation of the deceased Aristophanes’ property. The property was 
confiscated but its value did not meet popular expectations. As a result, 
suspicion arose against some of his relatives for concealing a substantial part. 
In harmony with the defence strategy of minimising the scale of Aristophanes’ 
wealth, the speaker presents the latter as spendthrift, whose extravagance and 
expenditure to achieve social recognition substantially reduced the collected 
wealth48. In Lysias 13, a trial against Agoratus (alleged informer of the Thirty), 
the speaker insists that the jury should punish the defendant and take 
vengeance for the murders for which he should be held responsible. The 
deceased men were virtuous and respectable patriots, loyal to the democracy49. 
Especially their latter characteristic induced Agoratus to inform against them, 
rendering him a collaborator of the Thirty. To conclude then, when litigants 
                                            
46
 Indicatively for more examples one could look at Lys. 16.11; 24.5; fr. 1 (2); Dem. 18.21, 82, 
131, 137; 21.110, 139, 190, 209; 22.38; 24.130, 174; 25.37, 39, 45, 61; 34.36; 37.48; 38.27; 
39.2; 40.9, 32, 57; 43.48; 52.20-2; 54.31-7; 56.7; 57.60; 58.27. 
47
 Lys. 1.4, 8, 15-6, 26. 
48
 See for e.g. Lys. 19.18, 23, 42-3. 
49
 See for e.g. Lys. 13.1-2, 60-62, 92. 
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resorted to argumentation from character concerning deceased persons, this 
was directly relevant to the case, illuminating decisive issues.  
4.3 Delivery (hypokrisis) and Presentation 
A very important method of presenting character in Athenian courts concerns 
delivery. According to Aristotle (Rhet. 1403bff.), this topic had not been treated 
systematically before his own time; only lately it came into notice and, after all, it 
was – rightly - considered vulgar. Aristotle’s negative attitude towards delivery50 
(once again attributing it to the inadequacy of the audience) has been explained 
by reference to Platonic influence on him51. Nevertheless, he briefly touched 
upon the matter, admittedly without devoting too much attention to it, 
considering it necessary as a useful tool in the influencing of an audience’s 
opinion. The gap of systematic treatment would be filled by Theophrastus in the 
next generation, with his now lost work On Style52. On the other hand, Roman 
writers considered delivery of utmost importance. For Cicero  
 
“[D]elivery alone is supreme. In speaking: without it the greatest orator cannot be of any 
account, and a moderate speaker who is trained in this field can often defeat his superiors”
53.  
 
In this, ancient theorists are at one with modern research, demonstrating the 
importance of divergent techniques, delivery and presentation supporting verbal 
communication54. 
                                            
50
 Rhet. 1403b: “as at the present day actors have greater influence on the stage than the 
poets, it is the same In political contests, owing to the corruptness of our forms of government. 
But since the whole business of Rhetoric is to influence opinion, we must pay attention to it, not 
as being right, but necessary; for, as a matter of right, one should aim at nothing more in a 
speech than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For justice should consist in fighting the 
case with the facts alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous; 
nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the 
hearer”. 
51
 Fortenbaugh (1986). 
52
 Porter (2009), pp. 97-8 narrates his interpretation of the process as such: “A parallel 
development appears to have taken place in the realm of hupokrisis, or delivery, which 
gradually detached itself from its origins in drama and came to be transferred over to the art of 
rhetoric. Dramatists at first acted in their own plays (1403b23–24), but owing to the increased 
complexity of the stage and, no less importantly, to the powerful appeal of delivery (to which 
Aristotle’s Poetics bears witness), they then turned these roles, and their voices, over to 
professional actors. The need for practical manuals arose, and eventually parallels to rhetorical 
delivery were noticed, for instance by Thrasymachus in his Appeals to Pity (1404a14). But 
apparently no substantive technical treatise on rhetorical hupokrisis existed down to Aristotle’s 
day, even if handbooks on acting and uses of the voice and vocalization in poetic contexts (for 
instance, tragic and rhapsodic recitations) had been developed, such as that by Glaucon of 
Teos (1403b21–26). 
53
 Cicero, On the Orator 3.213; Cf. Rhetoric to Herennius 3.19; Quintilian 11.3.2. 
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The issue of dramatic presentation and delivery in the ancient courts may 
indeed change the way of analysis and interpretation of Athenian orations. The 
alleged theatricality of litigants is a matter of controversy among researchers. 
According to one view, the (original) orations were, in a very real sense, 
performance texts, punctuated with entrances and exits, marked for the display 
of laws and contracts, witnesses and suppliants, and not infrequently, the 
speaker’s own theatrical gesture. Accordingly, the creation of ethos is the 
staging of a recognizable persona, portrayed by the live performances of the 
litigants55. By the same token, concentrating on the similarities between public 
performances in forensic environments and in the theatre56, law court speeches 
can be seen as essentially ‘dramatic’, where orators share the same challenges 
with actors and use similar performance techniques. The process of self-
dramatization through delivery meant that the speaker had to proceed through 
different, upward stages. Memorising the speech, rehearsing a convincing 
rhetorical ‘performance’ in advance, and creating a (seemingly spontaneous) 
likeable persona were necessary to convince an experienced and exacting 
audience. This process of dramatic characterization through the enactment of a 
vivid and consistent character, attained through the careful balance between 
speech and action, was strategically significant indeed for a court basing its 
decisions on circumstantial evidence and probabilities. Delivery itself formed an 
implied argument from probability: the character before the jury is incapable of 
behaving in the manner alleged57.  
 
The other trend in scholarship acknowledges the potentiality of such dramatic 
action by Athenian litigants, though questioning its extent and eventual 
successfulness. The discussion of emotional pleas has already demonstrated 
that excessive theatricality and tones could damage a litigant’s case, provoking 
negative responses by the audience. Skilled speakers and professional 
logographers were definitely aware of this, preferring a balanced, untheatrical 
mode of delivery. Moreover, careful examination of the tone of the rhetoric of 
                                                                                                                                
54
 Steel (2009). 
55
 Scafuro (1997), esp. Pp. 50-66. Cf. Kavoulaki (1999); Buis E. (2004). 
56
 See Ober & Strauss (1990). 
57
 Carey (1994a), pp. 40-42. 
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the orations (especially of highly emotional passages such as appeals to pity) 
suggests that the “fundamental intent of these appeals as they are composed 
by professionals is compatible with a dignified delivery”58. Regardless whether 
idiotai consciously or unconsciously resorted to theatrical delivery or imitation of 
tragic style, the slim evidence provided by the Attic orators hinders the 
extraction of any strong conclusions. 
 
Indeed, to my knowledge, there is only one passage explicitly referring to such 
a theatrical mode of delivery in court, Dem. 19.25259. This is alleged to have 
been performed by the ex-actor Aeschines, in a period when character 
presentation through the speaker’s skilful delivery had begun to be appreciated. 
Other researchers extract more examples of rhetorical ‘action’ from the wording 
of the speeches, though uncertainty persists as to the exactness of these 
remarks60. On the contrary, by concentrating on Aristotle’s observation that 
delivery is a matter of voice (Rhet. 1403b26)61 direct references can be found in 
the later orations, especially by Demosthenes. This may be yet another clue 
indicating the rising importance of vocal delivery over time, but also a hint that 
vocal and not acting skills were still valued the most. Also, in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, the Stagirite claims that voice is an important medium for conveying 
character62.  
 
Furthermore, the importance of voice is demonstrated in stories reaching us 
from antiquity. The appreciation of vocal skills is exemplified in the person of 
Isocrates who actually refrained from public speaking due to a natural 
deficiency in his voice (Isoc. 5.81; 12.10) and in the many anecdotes that reach 
                                            
58
 Bers (2009), p. 92; cf. Konstan (2000); pace Johnstone (1999), p. 116 with n. 44. 
59
 Dem. 19.252: “He illustrated his remarks by representing to the jury the attitude of the statue; 
but his mimicry did not include what, politically, would have been much more profitable than an 
attitude,—a view of Solon's spirit and purpose, so widely different from his own”. 
60
 See for e.g. Fredal (2001); judging from the words of the speech, other ‘theatrical’ passages 
can also be traced such as Dem. 19.255. 
61
 Rhet. 1403b26ff.: “Now delivery is a matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should be 
used for each particular emotion; when it should be loud, when low, when intermediate; and 
how the tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should be used; and what rhythms are 
adapted to each subject. For there are three qualities that are considered — volume, harmony, 
rhythm”. 
62
 Nic. Eth. 1125a13-14. 
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us about Demosthenes’ vocal training63. The Homeric origins of this appraisal of 
voice seem to be restricted to volume and malleability, which could support or 
advance the eloquence of a speaker64. Over time, the stories circulated about 
Pythagoras65 uncover the total advancement of speech to a new dimension: 
 
“Dispensing with appearances altogether and occulting himself from his pupil audiences, he 
appeared to them in a disembodied form, as a pure voice. His pupils, reduced to silence, were 
given over to an utter absorption of their master’s voice…it was Pythagoras, not his Homeric 
predecessors, who revealed the logic of the voice by which rhetoric works (and had always 
worked) its magic”66. 
 
Voice as an aesthetic phenomenon in its own right was finally capable of 
moving a mass audience, which in turn learnt to appreciate it as the rhetorical 
manifestation of a performance culture.  
 
This is best illustrated by reference to Demosthenes’ anxiety to diminish and 
ridicule the impact of the well-trained actor’s voice (Aeschines) during their 
contests. Demosthenes’ own natural vocal insufficiency must certainly have 
played a role, since the direct comparison between the two would be 
inescapable67. Nevertheless, Demosthenes through the interplay of preaching 
and mockery68, tried to cancel out his deficiency and induce the jurors to 
                                            
63
 Demosthenes, after his failure in his first public appearance, is said to have studied elocution 
under the actor Neoptolemus. Also, famous are the accounts of Demosthenes shouting against 
the sea and rehearsing with pebbles on his mouth. [Plut.], Lives of the Ten Orators, 844; Plut. 
Dem. 6-7, 11.  
64
 Cf. Hom. Il. 3.221 (Odysseus’ great voice which totally changed his appearance); 5.764 (the 
proverbial voice of Stentor); the Bards were also aware of the voice’s imitative powers, see for 
e.g. 13.195; cf. Homeric Hymn to Apollo 171-5. 
65
 Diog. Laert. 8.10, 15; Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 7: Pythagoras used to lecture for long 
periods to his pupils, whether hidden behind a curtain or lecturing only at night in utter darkness. 
“For five years [his disciples] would keep silent, merely listening to his speeches without seeing 
him, until they passed a test. From that point on they were allowed into his house and were able 
to see him”. 
66
 Porter (2009), p. 93; cf.: “The emergence of the voice in the guise of disembodied logos 
represents the triumph of the voice as an aesthetic phenomenon in its own right, its liberation 
from the constraints of sight, though not from the body per se. The voice when it is heard has a 
body of its own: it has pitches, melodiousness, timbre, rhythms, and other euphonic qualities”. 
67
 E.g. Dem. 19.216: “You must not notice what a fine loud voice he has, and what a poor voice 
I have”; Cf. 19.206. Even if this natural defect of Demosthenes has been improved by his 
maturity, the recurrent reference and comparison with Aeschines’ voice proves his relevant 
inadequacy or at least his concern. 
68
 19.337: “On that famous voice of his, however, I really must offer some observations. For I 
am informed that he sets great store thereby, and that he hopes to overawe you by an 
exhibition of histrionic talent. When he tried to represent the woes of the House of Thyestes, or 
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disregard (or even despise) Aeschines’ rhetorical ability. It is not vocal talent 
that really matters when it comes to serious considerations. Demosthenes’ 
appointment for the delivery of the Funeral Speech (despite Aechines’ great 
voice) proves the point (Dem. 18.285). Patriotism requires wholehearted 
devotion to the homeland, sharing its joys and misfortunes, therefore “the 
chosen speaker should not lament their fate with the feigning voice of an actor, 
but express the mourning of his very soul” (Dem. 18.287). Natural gifts should 
be used in the service of the fatherland, leaving aside inessential petty 
demonstrations69, while remaining silent in crucial moments (Dem. 18.308, 
313). Voice is merely the extension of a man’s character; it cannot alter his 
ethos and transform him from vicious into virtuous. Voice is just the instrument 
of communication; in principle, one’s ethos and spirit count (Dem. 19.336, 338).  
 
All the aforementioned points illustrate Demosthenes’ concern for diminishing 
any effects that would arise from Aeschines’ charismatic rhetorical delivery. 
Indeed, evidence reveals the existence of stereotypes relating voice with 
character. In the previously mentioned passage from the Nic. Ethics, Aristotle 
links a deep voice, and a deliberate utterance to the great-souled man; to speak 
in shrill tones and walk fast denotes an excitable and nervous temperament, 
which does not belong to a person who cares for few things and thinks nothing 
great. Thus vocal training promoted the stability and correct volume and 
malleability of voice, in an effort to improve natural defects70. On the other hand 
loud and raucous voice could be interpreted as intimidating signs of an arrogant 
oligarchic member of the elite71. The physical presentation of high valued 
notions such as arete (virtue) and enkrateia (self-control) presupposed certain 
                                                                                                                                
of the men who fought at Troy, you drove him from the stage with hisses and cat-calls, and 
came near to pelting him with stones, insomuch that in the end he gave up his profession of 
actor of small parts; and I think you would be behaving very strangely if now, when he has 
wrought measurable mischief, not on the stage, but in his dealings with the most momentous 
affairs of state, you should be favourably impressed by his beautiful voice”. 
69
  Dem. 18.280: “It really makes me think, Aeschines, that you deliberately went to law, not to 
get satisfaction for any transgression, but to make a display of your oratory and your vocal 
powers. But it is not the diction of an orator, Aeschines, or the vigour of his voice that has any 
value: it is supporting the policy of the people, and having the same friends and the same 
enemies as your country”. 
70
 The speaker’s grievance in Dem. 45.77 proves the point: “For myself, men of Athens, in the 
matter of my outward appearance, my fast walking, and my loud voice, I judge that I am not one 
of those favoured by nature; for in so far as I annoy others without benefiting myself, I am in 
many respects at a disadvantage”. 
71
 Cf. Dem. 21.72; 25.9; 57.11; Is. 6.59. 
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patterns of public conduct (the mode of speaking included) which would be 
positively interpreted by the trained audience. 
 
It now becomes clear that such stereotypical presuppositions embrace every 
part of an orator’s ‘presentational system’: delivery, voice, and appearance. The 
latter too came to reveal a person’s character and beliefs, interpreted again by 
reference to stereotypical convictions of the audience. As has already been 
shown (Dem. 45.77), outward appearance and fast walking could be annoying 
for the others, hinting at an undisciplined personality. On the other hand, 
meretricious public conduct was adequate for advertising a specific ethos72. The 
interpretation of appearance by reference to stereotypical conceptions could 
damage or enhance a litigant’s case.  
 
According to Demosthenes, Timarchus was “jeered at through slanderous 
interpretation of his handsomeness” (Aes. 1.126). Indeed, Aeschines focuses 
too much on Timarchus’ appearance, trying to provoke mockery, condemnation 
and disgust73. Fifty years earlier, shortly after the fall of the Thirty, when the 
growing of long hair was still a sign of elitist (even oligarchic or Spartan) 
sympathies, Lysias puts his (long-haired young aristocrat) client Mantitheus as 
protesting against censure of such kind74. As a matter of fact, Lysias 
concentrates more than any other orator on appearance and physical 
characteristics. This may indicate the strength of the audience’s expectations 
and stereotypical preconceptions during that particular era or it may be yet 
another factor revealing this orator’s interest for (and mastery in) dramatic 
characterisation. Litigants’ looks (supported by theatricality) provided direct 
                                            
72
 Cf. Dem. 19 314: “Behold him pacing the market-place with the stately stride of Pythocles, his 
long robe reaching to his ankles, his cheeks puffed out, as who should say, “One of Philip's 
most intimate friends, at your service!” He has joined the clique that wants to get rid of 
democracy,—that regards the established political order as an inconstant wave,—mere 
midsummer madness”. 
73
 Cf. Aeschin. 1.61, 95: “and this man [Timarchus] himself, not yet, by Zeus, repulsive to the 
sight as he is now, but still usable”, “this defendant [Timarchus] had lost his youthful charm, 
and, as you would expect, no one would any longer give him anything”. 
74
 Lys. 16.19: “it is not fair, gentlemen, to like or dislike any man because of his appearance, but 
rather to judge him by his actions; for many who are modest in speech and sober in dress have 
been the cause of grievous mischief, while others who are careless of such things have done 
you many a valuable service”. 
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evidence75 and physical attributes could be displayed and manipulated in order 
to emphasise a vital point76.  
 
To conclude then, although evidence as to the extent and the quality of 
theatrical delivery in Athenian courts is slim, it is undeniable that at least a 
speaker’s voice and appearance could provide evidence as to his character and 
beliefs. Based on the community’s stereotypical presuppositions, orators 
presented and manipulated easily interpretable stock types in accordance with 
their interest. This approach created patterns of presentation (and rhetoric) 
which allowed for the anticipation and consistency of argumentation strategies. 
In this way, the court remained adjacent to society and its preconceptions, with 
the argumentation presented by litigants retaining its relevance according to 
their collective beliefs77. After all, a close examination of the aforementioned 
evidence proves that a speaker’s voice, physique and attributes were presented 
(and were interpreted by the audience) in a manner logically relevant to the 
case at hand. The accusation of Timarchus concerning prostitution was closely 
connected with his beauty; the physical disability of the speaker in Lysias 24 
                                            
75
 Depending on the nature of the case, such evidence could be critical; See for e.g. Lys. 24 
(For the Disabled Man), where the (obvious to the audience) physical disability of the speaker 
could prove decisive for the jurors’ decision; see esp. 24.7, 12 [on this speech see Wohl V. 
(2009)]; for Lysias’ use of outward appearance as evidence cf. Lys. 31.12: “This man, therefore, 
deserves no indulgence; for neither was he disabled and thus unfit for hardship, as you see for 
yourselves…”. 
76
 See for e.g. Lys. 10.29 where Lysias stresses the antithesis between the adversaries’ strong 
bodies and coward souls: “And indeed, gentlemen, the taller and more gallant they are in looks, 
the more they are deserving of anger. For it is clear that, though strong in their bodies, they are 
ill in their souls”; cf. Lys. 31.12; 20.3.  
77
 In reality, how remote from the Athenian practice is the section 105 (5) of the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, providing that the ‘appearance’ and even the ‘dress’ of a defendant may classify as 
‘conduct’? This section, entitled ‘Evidence to Correct a False Impression’ allows the prosecution 
to adduce evidence in order to correct a false impression made (expressly or impliedly) by the 
defendant’s conduct at the time of the trial. It provides: “101 (4): Where it appears to the court 
that a defendant, by means of his conduct (other than the giving of evidence) in the 
proceedings, is seeking to give the court or jury an impression about himself that is false or 
misleading, the court may if it appears just to do so treat the defendant as being responsible for 
the making of an assertion which is apt to give that impression.101 (5) provides: In subsection 
(4) “conduct” includes appearance or dress”. For example, if the defendant appears in court 
wearing a clerical collar or a military or police uniform. Even if he holds a copy of the Bible in his 
hands while giving evidence about his respectable family life, he may be said to be responsible 
for the creation of a misleading impression. See Robinson [2001] Crim LR 478 with Glover 
(2013), p. 191 who expresses the hope that this case would be decided differently under the 
CJA 2003. 
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was directly relevant to his pension; the stereotypical assumption about the 
oligarchic sympathies of the long-haired youths was anticipated in a dokimasia 
where the fear of rejection due to cooperation with the Thirty was imminent; 
loud, raucous voice was linked with the intimidating behaviour of insolent 
members of the elite, and so on. Finally, to be clear, this enquiry is limited to the 
methods of character presentation in Athenian courts and their proximity (in 
accordance with Athenian beliefs) to the legal case at hand; therefore any 
question or value judgment about the correctness of these stereotypical beliefs 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
4.4 Logoi and Lexis 
Apart from hypokrisis, character portrayal could be effected by logoi (what 
should be said) and lexis (how it should be said). Invocation of poetry, remotely 
relevant laws, similes and comparisons were included among methods of 
outlining character in Athenian courts. Starting with the last, the comparative 
way of thinking allowed for the extensive use of metaphors and contrasts in 
Athenian courts. Aristotle in his Rhetoric continuously advises the proportionate 
and stylistically correct use of examples from the past or the imaginative 
invention of vivid and relevant comparisons78. In particular, he proposes the 
(positive or negative) contrast with well-known historical figures (1368a). This 
method of character portrayal is frequently adduced by the Attic orators. 
Although reluctant to contrast themselves with the famous and idealised heroes 
of the past, speakers often resort to association of their opponents with persons 
notorious for their negative deeds79. Whenever a comparison with notable 
figures of the past was adduced, it was simply invoked to reveal the littleness of 
the adversary80. Serious ethical weaknesses of past figures were also 
mentioned, as being shared by the opponent81 and even comparison with 
                                            
78
 See for e.g. Arist. Rhet. 1356b, 1357b, 1377a, 1393a etc. 
79
 See for e.g. Lys. 6.17, 45; 21.20; Dem. 58.38. Also, for the frequent comparisons with the 
Thirty see Andoc. 1.101; Lys. 25.31; Dem. 24.90, 164. 
80
 Usually such comparison was invoked in public disputes (e.g. about the worthiness of a 
person for crowning or the legitimacy of a legal statute). Aeschines contrasted Demosthenes 
against Pericles and Miltiades in order to highlight his smallness for being crowned (Aeschin. 
3.181), with Demosthenes using the same argument against Charidemus (23.196ff.) and 
Aristogeiton (26.6). However, when this argument was used against him by Aeschines, he 
discarded it as irrelevant since one ought to be judged by reference to his contemporaries 
(Dem. 18.209, 316ff.).  
81
 Dem. 21.143ff; 165.  
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mythical personas was put into play82. All of them were drawn from a pool of 
relevant past incidents, supporting the speaker’s argumentation in relation to a 
character trait of the opponent relevant to the offence83.  
 
Furthermore, in conformity with Aristotle’s suggestions (Rhet. 1384a) 
comparison was effective with men who resemble us. Demosthenes compares 
his character and deeds with Aeschines’ (Dem. 18.265; for similar direct 
comparison between litigants cf. Dem. 50.58), Aeschines’ treacherous 
behaviour with his co-ambassadors’ upright behaviour (Dem. 19.229-30), his 
own prudent reaction with that of other victims found in similar situations (21.39, 
71ff.), and Meidias’ insolent attack with the lesser insolence of previous notable 
offenders (21.38, 63ff.). Finally, as Aristotle observes (Rhet. 1368a) “if a man 
has done anything alone, or first, or with a few, or has been chiefly responsible 
for it; all these circumstances render an action noble”. Demosthenes took 
advantage of it, advertising his outstanding behaviour during the crisis of Elateia 
(18.173).  
 
Past acts and previous deeds are thus offered for comparison for the sake of 
portrayal of character and its assessment by reference to common standards. 
Nevertheless, such acts, not infrequently in a forensic setting, take the form of 
argumentation from precedent, a controversial issue that has attracted the 
attention of recent scholarship84. Though I am convinced by the arguments 
offered by Harris, my purpose here is to shed light on another use of precedent 
in Athenian courts: that of character portrayal. This is also discussed by 
Aristotle (cf. Arist. Rhet. 1356b, 1357b, 1377a, 1393a etc.) who exemplifies the 
use of rhetorical examples in proving a litigant’s argument. Apart from a 
comparison with the acts triggering the legal charge, the opponent’s character 
may be compared with that of a previous offender. This is especially useful 
when the speaker seeks to emphasise a particularly relevant character trait that 
was allegedly decisive to the conviction of a past perpetrator, or when he 
                                            
82
 Dem. 19.247; 18.127, 180; Antiph. 1.17. 
83
 Metonymies and metaphors could also be used in a positive manner, emphasising the 
speaker’s positive traits [see Wohl (2009)]. 
84
 Harris (2007b); pace Lanni. (2004). 
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highlights the fact that the present defendant is morally reprehensible in an 
even greater degree.  
 
In the (admittedly relevant to the legal case) examples from precedent offered 
by Demosthenes against Meidias, the latter’s arrogance and intemperance is 
emphasised by contrasting it with former convicted offenders (21.38). 
Furthermore, earlier precedent was invoked to reveal the reasonableness of 
notable men who succumbed to the authority of the laws and the power of the 
demos, as opposed to the disrespect shown by lawless and insolent individuals 
finding themselves on trial (Dem. 26.6-7; 24.134-8; cf. 19.271-81). The list of 
examples that prove this use of precedent for character portrayal may be 
lengthened by reference to comparisons between former trierarchs convicted 
for cowardice and desertion of their posts (Dem. 51.8-9), betrayal of the 
country85, instigation to manslaughter by mere words as opposed to the 
defendant’s aggressive and violent nature (Dem. 54.25), or the contrast of a 
former convicted hierophant’s worthiness and merit against the sacrilegious and 
lawless prostitute Neaera (54.25)86. The main point is that presentation of 
character could be achieved by divergent means, left to the initiative and the 
imagination of the orators. 
 
A similar means to character portrayal by reference to precedent is by the 
citation of laws. Reference to legal documents that could allegedly be applicable 
to the particular case assisted a litigant to enliven his argumentation and sketch 
the characters of the parties. For instance, Ariston, the speaker of 
Demosthenes 54 cites the law against hubris in order to reveal its applicability 
to the defendant’s conduct, further emphasising the gravity of his offence. In 
addition, the speaker’s choice of indicting him for a less serious offence (dike 
aikeias) reveals his modesty and lack of vindictiveness. Therefore, citation of 
laws could be used to reveal the character and ethics of both litigants. In such a 
way, an applicable statute reflected the ethos of the party that resorted to the 
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 E.g. Lyc. 1.52-3; 93, 112, 117, 122. 
86
 The more general issue of character worthiness is addressed in Dem. 23.199-200, when 
Demosthenes is comparing the honours given to previous benefactors of Athens with the 
proposal of Aristocrates for the bestowment of great (and illegal) honours to Charidemus. 
Demosthenes via this comparison questions not only the legality of the proposed law but the 
worthiness of the acceptor per se.  
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prohibited conduct, as well as the adherence of the speaker to the laws of the 
state87.  
 
However, a balance should be kept in the use of legal statutes, since detailed 
knowledge of the laws could be (stereotypically) interpreted as suspicious (i.e. a 
prerequisite for sycophancy). On the other hand there is the paradigm of the 
inattentive young speaker of Hypereides 3 (Against Athenogenes). In that 
speech a perfumer was accused of fraud in the sale of his business, due to the 
inappropriate ‘fine print’ of the contract transferring huge debts to the plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, the fault stood at the buyer’s side who, carelessly, signed the 
contract. In his speech, the extensive use of (at first glance) irrelevant legal 
statutes aimed to reveal the defendant’s breach of the ‘spirit of the laws’, seen 
as a single, diachronic entity. Furthermore, the - now scholastic – reading and 
use of statutes (which the speaker hasted to justify), although attributed to force 
majeure, is contrasted with his previous folly in signing the contract, 
emphasizing thus the fact that his character has changed by becoming more 
careful since his lesson has been learnt. His adherence to the laws of Athens 
(in opposition to his Egyptian adversary’s disrespect for their spirit) and the 
improvement of his conduct made him morally stand on the right side and 
therefore undeserving of this unjust punishment produced by the unfair 
contract88. 
 
Another authority, standing beside the laws and similarly shaping people’s 
norms and behaviour, is poetry89. Epic and lyric poetry provided the ‘norm’ of 
righteous conduct that should be adhered to and followed. Aristotle 
recommends its use as a kind of ancient testimony or evidence, sanctioning a 
litigant’s argumentation90. The mere invocation of didactic passages highlights 
the speaker’s education as well as his adherence to the notions he advertises. 
This partly explains the citation of poetry solely by senior political figures in 
high-profile public cases. In the unwelcome event of lack of witnesses, poetry 
may be invoked for support in the interpretation of the law or the assessment of 
                                            
87
 For further analysis and examples see De Brauw (2001). 
88
 Cf. Scafuro (1997). 
89
 See for e.g. Dorjahn (1927); Perlman (1964); Ford A. (1999). 
90
 Arist. Rhet. 1375a-b. 
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a character’s uprightness. This point may be proven by reference to Aeschines’ 
use of a verse from Euripides:  
 
“before now he has been made judge of many cases, as you today are jurors; and he says that 
he makes his decisions, not from what the witnesses say, but from the habits and associations 
of the accused; he looks at this, how the man who is on trial conducts his daily life, and in what 
manner he administers his own house, believing that in like manner he will administer the affairs 
of the state also; and he looks to see with whom he likes to associate. And, finally, he does not 
hesitate to express the opinion that a man is like those whose “company he loves to keep.” 
(Aeschin. 1.153) 
 
The relevance of this analysis to the argumentation of Aeschines is noteworthy, 
even if it is scrutinised scholastically point by point. In the extant speech 
Aeschines focuses on the reprehensible habits of Timarchus, emphasising his 
association with disreputable men. The truth of this passage is also reflected in 
the fact that as Timarchus squandered his patrimony in order to finance his 
immoral desires, in the same way he mismanaged and embezzled public 
property. The provision of the law which forbids the exercise of civic rights for 
those who had debauched or prostituted themselves reflects the same basic 
idea:  
 
“For the man who has made traffic of the shame of his own body, he thought would be ready to 
sell the common interests of the city also” (Aeschin. 1.29).  
 
In all the above Euripides stands as witness. But comparison should also be 
offered, in anticipation of his opponents’ arguments, of the differences between 
legitimate and ‘Timarchean’ love. Again the intellectual and moral heritage of 
poetry, in the verses of Homer now, is invoked (Aeschin. 1.141ff.)91.  
 
Apart from Aeschines, another orator, Lycurgus, used poetry extensively in his 
orations92. Again, the aim was the successful and vivid character portrayal, 
                                            
91
 Aeschines was fond of using poetry in his speeches. Relevant verses are used for the 
justification of his arguments concerning reputation and common report (φήμη) (Aeschin. 1.129; 
2.144ff) or offering a comparison between his contemporaries and the distinguished men of the 
past (3.184-5, 190). Demosthenes replied to these in 18.209, 316. 
92
 Although only one of his orations is surviving it is safe to conclude that Lycurgus used poetry 
freely in all his speeches. Cf. Dorjahn (1927), p. 88 with n. 7. 
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comparing his opponent’s alleged acts against the standards of behaviour 
offered by the poets. Through the quotation of verses from Homer, Euripides 
and Tyrtaeus, Lycurgus emphasises the magnitude of Leocrates’ offence, which 
amounted to treachery. Simultaneously, he advertised his own adherence to 
these norms, presenting a solemn patriotic ethos. The quotation of epigrams 
commemorating the heroism of the war dead in Marathon and Thermopylae 
further highlights Leocrates’ betrayal. He promised to make a just accusation, 
neither falsifying nor speaking outside the point (Lyc. 1.11, 23). In his opinion 
(and presumably in the jury’s) he “conducted the trial rightly and justly without 
slandering the private life of the defendant or digressing from the subject of my 
[his] indictment” (Lyc. 1.149).  
 
Quotations from poetry operated as the epitome of the Athenian common 
standards of behaviour against which a person’s character and deeds ought to 
be assessed. In Athenian society, which was – when compared to modern 
societies – (ethically and ideologically) coherent, communal expectations as to 
one’s mode of behaviour were understandable. Their ideas of character and 
personality directed a wholehearted adherence to the norms of the polis, proved 
by deeds, over and above any egoistic considerations. This conformity between 
law and ethics (expressed by the legal enforcement of morals) promoted the 
uniformity of behavioural standards among citizens and, given the conservative 
nature of the Athenian society, a consistency of approach regarding the 
execution of justice. By the same token, the importance of character evidence 
was upgraded, with litigants proving their simultaneous adherence to laws and 
morals by the use of a single argument. Conformity with laws signified the same 
for morals, leaving limited scope (e.g. in the absence of written laws as the 
Heliastic oath indicates) for external considerations such as equity. The 
application of the rule of law, decision-making consistency, and execution of 
justice were in concord. 
 
A society which meditated in the form of binaries and contrasts and put 
exceptional emphasis on written and spoken logos would unsurprisingly 
develop a deep understanding of the importance of silence. Pythagoras trained 
his followers in a five-year silence test that silence too is logos (“καὶ τὸ σιωπᾶν 
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λόγος”) (Philostr. Life of Apollonius, 1.1). In the Athenian courts, the 
presentation of character could be achieved either by the things said or by 
those unsaid. Decency ordained the avoidance of licentious language even 
when describing the adversary’s acts93. Respectable men not only shrink from 
performing such acts but restrain themselves from merely mentioning them, 
even by using euphemistic language94. Others, apart from their adherence to 
decency, highlight their respect for family bonds in order to justify their silence 
and simultaneously portray their character95. Further proof is provided by the 
speaker of Lysias 3, another example of the orator’s mastery in dramatic 
characterisation. Facing the charge of ‘wounding with premeditation’ and 
arguing his case before the Areopagus, he concentrates on his age, social 
standing and respectability in encountering his opponent’s pleas. Well-known 
for his public services and military achievements, as opposed to his provocative 
opponent’s characteristically violent and antisocial past conduct, he 
acknowledges the danger he faces by the mere disclosure of the events. Highly 
vexed by this fact, he asks for the jurors’ pity, not for the possibility of 
conviction, but “for having been compelled, as a result of such transactions, to 
stand my trial on such a charge” (Lys. 3.48). Shame and decency ordained 
silence, secrecy, or better quietness, for a man of his character (3.9, 10, 30, 
40). Such a man would never risk all his life’s achievements by resorting to such 
senseless acts (3.4, 34, 41).  His character’s portrayal has been completed.  
 
 Finally, (as in modern courts)96 negative character testimonies such as “I‘ve 
never heard anything ill of the defendant’s character” could also be adduced or 
                                            
93
 See Carey (1994a), pp. 174-5: “In theory of course this type of constraint looks like a terrible 
handicap. In practice it is an enormous boon. Litigants are well aware that if the jurors are left to 
imagine the details for themselves they will come up with something far more shocking than the 
actuality. Speakers are also able to exploit such modest silence in order to present themselves 
as men too decent to utter filth, while the opponent emerges as someone who is prepared to do 
things which decent people shudder even to utter”. 
94
 Dem. 21.79; 54.9, 17; for a very indicative example see Aeschin. 1.55: “Now the sins of this 
Pittalacus against the person of Timarchus, and his abuse of him, as they have come to my 
ears, are such that, by the Olympian Zeus, I should not dare to repeat them to you. For the 
things that he was not ashamed to do in deed, I had rather die than describe to you in words”; 
cf. Aeschin. 1.76. 
95
 Dem. 45.3: “As for myself, men of the jury, a large property was left me by my father, and this 
was in the possession of Phormio, who furthermore had married my mother while I was out of 
the country on public business, serving as your trierarch. (How he managed it, perhaps it is not 
proper for a son fully to explain about his mother)”. 
96
 Rowton (1865) L. & C. 520; Redgrave (1982) 74 Cr.App.R. 10; Munday (1997), 248. 
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transmitted by the speakers97. However, in modern courts this role is reserved 
for the witnesses, whereas in the courts of classical Athens, litigants themselves 
provoked or incited the audience or even their opponent to testify on the truth of 
such a matter. The supposition was that if there is a negative testimony to an 
alleged fact, it would have been received as true by the court. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The Athenian ideas of character (discussed in chapter 3) illuminate their courts’ 
approach to character evidence. The inductive mode of deliberation 
necessitated the reference to numerous incidents from a litigant’s past life in 
order to prove the desirable point. As Lycurgus said in Against Leocrates: “For if 
my point is backed by frequent illustrations, I am rendering your verdict easy” 
(Lyc. 1.124). Furthermore, the absence of firm conclusions on the subject 
allowed for the existence of a variety of methods in providing evidence. The 
newly developed art of rhetoric and the emphasis on performance as a key 
factor of Athenian culture provided even more available techniques in 
presenting a case. The persuasive strength of delivery, supported by a carefully 
drafted speech with references to examples, analogies and widely 
acknowledged authoritative sources, promoted the vividness of character 
portrayal and its effectiveness in producing results. 
  
The social concord as to the accepted communal norms and the wide 
agreement on the value of cooperative virtues rendered argumentation in courts 
predictable and grounded on traditional patterns. As a result, and taking 
account of the procedural norms that litigants and jurors should respect, it is not 
unlikely that the Athenian courts could actually achieve a significant degree of 
consistency. After all, no litigant ever criticised the jurors for an inconsistent 
approach. On the contrary, citation of precedents was not uncommon, having 
persuasive power. The overall aim of litigants, when the point of dispute rested 
on the interpretation of the facts of the case which was the rule in Athenian 
courts, was to highlight a character trait particularly relevant to the case at hand, 
in order to reveal adherence or disrespect for communal norms.  
 
                                            
97
 See for e.g. Dem. 21.176; 29.24; 37.56; Ant. 6.9; Lys. 5.3; 7.25-9. 
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This brings me to the link between this chapter and the next, which examines 
the Greek perceptions of ‘personhood’. The Greeks, interpreting the person as 
overwhelmingly a social being which primarily was a constituent of the polis and 
only secondarily an ‘individual’, evaluated one’s personality by reference to his 
adherence to shared values. Thus, any person shown to act in uniformity with 
them was simultaneously credited with loyalty to the polis and its laws. 
Contrastingly, disrespect for collective norms (as revealed by reference to past 
acts) reflected the existence of character flaws which, in the extreme, proved a 
detachment of the person from the community. In the next chapter therefore 
these Greek perceptions of the ‘person’ will be discussed and more light will be 
shed on litigants’ patterns of argumentation in Athenian courts. 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: GREEK PERCEPTIONS OF 
‘PERSONALITY’ APPLIED IN THE ATHENIAN 
COURTS 
In the previous chapters I have highlighted the problems and controversies 
surrounding the interpretation of the wide use of character evidence in the 
courts of classical Athens. Chapter 1 aimed at the presentation of the issue in 
its entirety. The wide invocation of argumentation from character is not a 
peculiar feature of the Athenian courts nor is it to be found only in fourth century 
sources. On the contrary, the presence of this type of argumentation from 
Homer onwards, in both judicial and other contexts, calls for a magnification of 
perspective in order to give a universal explanation for this attitude. Chapter 2 
confined the perspective to the Athenian legal system, focusing on the factors 
that provided formal incentives for Athenian litigants to resort to a wide use of 
character evidence. The mere presence of such formal enticements in the 
judicial context calls for a plausible exegesis. Chapter 3 proposes that the 
rationale behind the wide argumentation from character is to be found in the 
Greek ideas of ‘character’. The conclusions offered in this chapter are applied in 
Chapter 4 in order to analyse the ways and methods that the Athenians used to 
portray their characters. The main suggestion of this chapter is that the Greek 
assumptions about character called for (and caused) a wide invocation of 
character evidence, especially in the form of several characteristic past acts. 
The current chapter aims to complete the explanation of this practice. This is to 
be found in Greek ideas of ‘personality’. 
 
The issues of ‘personality’ and ‘personhood’ are problematic since controversy 
persists as to the particular definitions and uses of these words
1. Ancient models of the ‘person’ differ significantly from the prevalent modern 
theories. However, latest trends in the philosophy of mind and ethics reveal a 
shift to the ancient ones, as providing a more plausible model. These theories 
are not just abstract philosophical enquiries. They deeply penetrate the 
‘collective mind’ and form what could be described as “common perceptions of 
                                            
1
 The range of (everyday or more technical) meanings of ‘personality’ and ‘self’ simply reveal an 
aspect of the problem. Cf. Gill (1996), pp. 1-2. 
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‘personality’”. As a result, ‘human beings’ or ‘individuals’ whose ideas of their 
‘selves’ are influenced by the mere fact that they find themselves surrounded by 
predefined structures (e.g. the modern state), gradually internalise the prevalent 
opinions of their groups. Thereafter, these assumptions influence every aspect 
of public and private life, such as art, politics and ethics. As a matter of fact, 
rules of relevance and argumentation in courts have also been substantially 
influenced by modern ideas of ‘personality’ and ‘human motivation’, restricting 
the use of character evidence as far as possible. This important factor ought not 
to be neglected in any discussion of the issue, and in particular in what 
concerns us, specifically evaluations of ‘relevance’ and discussions about the 
legitimate extent of character evidence in courts.  
 
In what follows I will contrast modern with ancient philosophical models of 
‘personality’, applying the latter to the context of Athenian courts. Building on 
the work of modern scholars who study the ancient ideas of the human mind 
and its functions, we will discover their mode of thinking, decision-making, and 
acting. The application of these ideas in the context of the Athenian courts will 
reveal an underlying (maybe only partly conscious) rationale for the wide use of 
character evidence. Furthermore, such an effort will allow us to evaluate 
objectively the relevance of such argumentation in relation to their standards 
and perceptions. The enquiry will proceed with a contrast of modern to ancient 
philosophy of ethics, which further illuminates litigants’ ethical motivation as 
presented in their speeches. This undertaking will allow an assessment of their 
arguments’ substance and provide us with a model for the interpretation of 
problematic cases (e.g. the invocation of liturgies). The study of ancient 
‘personality’ will be permeated with the division between ‘shame-culture’ and 
‘guilt-culture’ and its implications.  
5.1 Models of the Human Mind: Action-Theory and Practical 
Reasoning 
In what follows examination will be offered of the approach to human motivation 
and action of modern philosophers of the mind, and comparison will be made 
with those of the Greeks. Christopher Gill, in his seminal work on Greek 
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‘personality’2, building on the work of modern thinkers, offers a plausible model 
of interpretation of Greek psychology and motivation. According to him, the 
preponderate Cartesian model of the human mind, for which mental processes 
and actions derive from a single source of consciousness (a unitary ‘I’), can 
prove misleading when applied to ancient Greek psychology. Contemporary 
thinkers3 question the Cartesian model as being overly ‘subjective’, replacing it 
with a more appropriate, which understands human action in ‘objective’ (non-
subject-centred) terms4. For instance, human action can be interpreted as 
motivated by reasons and reasoning rather than by conscious acts of will5. 
Following such an approach, Greek psychology and perception of human 
motivation can be best understood and evaluated on their own terms, rejecting 
the misleading and, until recently, very influential developmental accounts that 
evaluated Greek examples of human action by reference to Cartesian and post-
Cartesian ones6.  
 
Contemporary action-theory accepts that an agent’s reasons for a given action 
provide a plausible causal explanation for that action7. An agent’s reasons for 
acting illuminate the causes which produce that action and can be best 
understood in objective (third-personal) modes of enquiry. As a result, 
prominent modern notions such as a person’s (as a unified locus of self-
consciousness) ‘autonomy of the will’ in every single instance of his life are 
challenged. Furthermore, such ‘objectivist’ trends find their precursors in Greek 
literature and philosophy, either in Homeric psychology or in Aristotle’s account 
of the ‘practical syllogism’. In this light, human action is presented as following 
by a process of logical reasoning, whose stages express the human being’s 
beliefs and desires which finally cause that action. This kind of practical 
syllogism has its roots in the ‘crucial mark of human rationality’, namely “the 
ability to conceptualise (to structure one’s responses in terms of universal 
                                            
2
 Gill (1996). 
3
 See for e.g. Williams (1993); Wilkes (1988); for a detailed discussion and bibliography see Gill 
(1996), Ch. 1.1-2. 
4
 For the definition of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in this context see Gill (1996), pp. 6-7. 
5
 Cf. Gill (1996), p. 12. 
6
 Prominent developmental accounts are those of Snell (1953); and Adkins (1970). For criticism 
of these accounts see Gill (1996), Ch. 1.1. 
7
 Davidson (1980). 
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concepts), and – a capacity implied by conceptualisation – the ability to reason, 
to make inferences and draw conclusions”8.  
 
Inferential reasoning, as a source of human action, can be divided into ‘means-
end’ type and ‘rule-case’ type. In both cases the agent decides the ‘end’ to be 
attained by reference to his beliefs and desires. In the first type of reasoning, 
the action is directed ‘through the possible’, by evaluating the efficacy and 
difficulty of available means for achieving that ‘end’. In the second type of 
reasoning, the present case is placed into a general class. The agent deduces 
the appropriate mode of action from a preconceived set of actions that form the 
‘rule’ which according to his experiences or perceptions can achieve that ‘end’. 
To use a Homeric example, Odysseus (without considering the available 
means) applies to his own case the general principle that “whoever is to be best 
in battle must stand his ground strongly” (Il. 11.409-10)9. Both types of 
reasoning, nevertheless, have significant implications for how others perceive 
and evaluate a person’s actions. Additionally, the fact that human action is 
determined by reference to one’s experiences and presuppositions (in the form 
of the beliefs used for reasoning and the ways of forming desires) and exhibits 
the sense of time (the ability to weigh the advantages of future courses of 
action, and the sense of one’s own past)10, has equally important effects, 
especially (as will be demonstrated) in a courtroom. For instance, past acts 
acquire an exceptionally predictive (and probative) force since (after a process 
of conceptualisation) they may expose a human’s characteristic beliefs and 
desires.  
 
Patterns of behaviour may be abstracted in order to form character traits and 
reveal the person’s internalised beliefs and typical desires that direct his action. 
As a result, it becomes easier to infer the usual ‘ends’ that such a person 
pursuits and the ‘means’ by which this person uses to attain them, i.e. his 
characteristic ‘practical syllogism’. In other words, ‘rule-case’ and ‘means-end’ 
reasoning can serve the purposes of uncovering (or attributing) motivation and 
                                            
8
 Gill (1996), p. 52.  
9
 Gill (1996), p. 53; for further discussion of this passage and other cases of Homeric 
deliberation see Ch. 1.3-4. 
10
 Gill (1996), p. 55. 
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assessing the facts in light of litigants’ characteristic conduct, thus making the 
reconstruction of the ‘true facts’ more probable.  
 
The above considerations are negated by the modern (Cartesian and post-
Cartesian) conception of the human mind. Interpretation of human action as the 
independent decision, detached from the ethical environment, of a self-
conscious subject, whose ‘autonomy of the will’ in every single instance of his 
life is recognised, automatically diminishes character’s probative value. Past 
acts can no more serve as possible indicators of future behaviour (in the form 
that has been described above) and each act is independent and cut off from 
the rest (dissociated from the agent’s  ‘characteristic’ reasoning). In the context 
of the courts in particular, this preconception of human action and motivation 
has banished as irrelevant any reference to litigants’ previous conduct, leaving 
small room for invocation of previous offences of the same type. The above 
reasoning leads us to infer that even conclusions as to the ‘liberality’ or 
‘strictness’ of notions of relevance may be totally misleading and unwarranted, 
especially when not specifying the normative model of interpretation and the 
reasons for its application. The following examples aim to illustrate and prove 
the appropriateness of the ‘objective’ model of human motivation to Athenian 
court speeches in order to attain a more plausible interpretation of their content. 
5.1.1 The Model Applied to Forensic Speeches 
In order to prove the suitability of this model in interpreting forensic speeches it 
will be applied to divergent examples, spread through time and referring to 
different types of cases. The analysis will begin with Antiphon’s First Tetralogy, 
a model speech which exemplifies modes of argumentation based on 
probability. Then real cases will be examined to see whether any patterns may 
be extracted. In Antiphon’s First Tetralogy the facts are in dispute, the only 
undeniable being the discovery of two murdered men (a master and a slave) in 
a dark street of Athens. The only evidence is the late slave’s oral testimony 
shortly before he died, whereby he allegedly recognised the defendant as their 
murderer. Arguments from probability and potential motives are adduced in 
order to prove the guilt or the innocence of the defendant.  
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The prosecutor aims to demonstrate a motive for the defendant. In order to 
ascribe it he uses the model of human motivation described above. Based on 
reasons for reasoning and on the stereotypical beliefs of the audience, he tries 
to ‘impose a plausible end’ that the defendant sought. According to his logical 
arguments and by reference to ‘rule-cases’, no other man had any motive in 
killing these people (Antiph. 2.1.4). Common criminals are not likely to have 
killed the men since, their ‘end’ being stealing their cloaks, they failed to do so. 
Neither was the killer drunk, since he would have been identified by his fellow 
drinkers. Referring to similar rule-cases he concludes that no one but the 
defendant had a motive to kill them. The ‘end’ imposed on him was to avoid 
further prosecution by the victim (after he had been recently indicted by him and 
convicted), and after rendering unattainable all the other available ‘means’ of 
achieving this ‘end’, the only way left was murder. Therefore the prosecutor by 
reference to rule-case type reasoning excluded all the other candidates and –by 
inference- imposed an ‘end’ to be achieved from the defendant. By reference to 
the background of the case (previous convictions and certainty of further 
prosecution) he consolidates the presence of this ‘end’ and excludes all other 
available ‘means’ of achieving it11, apart from the one that solves the case: 
murder.  
 
The defendant, on the other hand, rejects the prosecutor’s arguments by 
reference to the same types of practical reasoning, rather than to the Cartesian 
subjective model. Firstly, through a ‘means-end’ type of reasoning, he questions 
the very ‘means’ of achieving the ‘end’ imposed on him by the prosecutor, 
taking as valid the hypothesis that this ‘end’ is true. In accordance with 
Aristotle’s ‘practical syllogism’ he states that even if he wanted the victims dead, 
there were easier and safer means of achieving it, such as not being present at 
the murder (Antiph. 2.2.8). As a result, even if the ‘end’ was valid, the 
prosecutor’s allegation that no other ‘means’ were available collapses. Then, he 
questions the imposed ‘end’ (Antiph. 2.2.9) stating that he would prefer to live 
without property (after a possible further conviction) than be executed (as a 
penalty for murder). In order to prove the above (namely the rejection of motive 
                                            
11
 The background of the case and the enmity of the defendant with the victim made 
reconciliation unattainable. Furthermore, the defendant was quite certain that he would be 
convicted and suffering heavy penalty; see Ant. 2.1.8.  
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by denying the ‘end’) he sketches his character by reference to ‘rule-cases’. His 
past acts (liturgies, loans to friends, performance of sacrifices and obedience to 
laws etc.) prove –by conceptualisation- the virtue of his character, making him – 
by inference – an unlikely candidate to such kind of conduct. In his words: 
“That’s the way I am, so don’t convict me of anything unholy or disgraceful” 
(Antiph. 2.2.12)12. 
 
In the concluding speeches, the prosecutor silences the character aspect of his 
opponent’s speech, insisting on the presence of motive by reemphasising a 
‘rule-case’ type of human action: his prosperity is not an indication of his 
innocence; on the contrary “fear of losing this prosperity makes it likely that he 
committed this unholy murder” (Antiph. 2.3.8). Furthermore, he insists that on 
the balance of probabilities, homicide was the easiest available ‘means’ for the 
defendant to achieve his ‘end’. The defendant replies by reference –again- to 
‘rule-cases’ (Antiph. 2.4.5, 8ff.) insisting on his character and on his social role, 
stating that rich men do not look for trouble (2.4.9).  
 
The aforementioned method of argumentation about human motivation has 
significant implications. Firstly, reference to the background of the case creates 
a likely motive, making more probable the attribution of an ‘end’ to the 
opponent13. If human motivation is based on reasons and reasoning, then 
plausible reasons must be adduced in order to impose a believable ‘end’ to be 
achieved by the deed that triggered the legal dispute. Secondly, inferential 
reasoning by the jurors may take two forms, which I call ‘external rule-case’ type 
and ‘internal rule-case’ type, based on their experiences and stereotypical 
presuppositions. The ‘external rule-case’ type, bearing on issues of status, class 
or social role takes the form of “Rich men do not fight in dark streets – He is a 
                                            
12
 On serving the polis with ‘person and property’ as the essence of good citizenship, see Christ 
(2006). On liturgies as testimonies of good character see Rubinstein (2000), pp. 213 ff. On the 
extension of liturgies as to embrace any kind of virtuous public conduct Lewis (1960), Saunders 
(1991), p. 114; cf. Millett (1998), pp. 241-2. 
13
 This model of interpretation puts the (usual) discussions of the background to the dispute and 
its context within the logical argumentation referring to the specific act that gave rise to the legal 
dispute. In order to prove the commission of this act by the opponent, a plausible motive should 
be offered, and this was usually discovered in the history of the adversaries’ relations. This 
model of interpretation rejects Lanni’s assertions as to the irrelevance of such argumentation 
and its interpretation as providing more general reasons to the jurors to reach a verdict based 
on general notions of justice and equity rather than strict reasoning about the particular case. 
See Lanni (2006). 
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rich man – He did not fight”, whereas the ‘internal rule-case’ type, refers to a 
person’s character and takes the form “His past acts show that he is a decent 
man – Decent men do not commit this type of acts – He did not commit that 
act”. Finally, this model has important implications as to a ‘means-end’ type of 
human motivation in the courts, since once an ‘end’ seems probable, the 
inspector has to question and evaluate divergent courses of actions to achieve 
it (i.e. the ‘means’). Thus a litigant in such an adversarial context will try to 
impose an ‘end’ on the opponent (this ‘end’ being legal/ethical or 
illegal/unethical per se) and then reject all the available ‘means’ of achieving it, 
apart from the one which solves the particular legal case.  
 
The above considerations highlight the importance and the relevance of 
character in inferring or attributing motivation and action, especially in relation to 
the particular act which generated litigation14. Therefore in such uncertain 
factual circumstances, the objective consideration of human motivation by 
reference to one’s characteristic beliefs and desires (as exposed by past acts) 
and –by conceptualisation- to one’s character, aim at answering (sometimes in 
terms of probability) the question: “Did the defendant commit the illegal act”? 
 
After exemplifying the framework and the model by reference to Antiphon’s First 
Tetralogy, real court speeches and divergent types of legal cases may be 
examined. Lysias 4 is a defence speech presented before the Areopagus on a 
(possibly private) charge of premeditated wounding15. The prosecutor has 
placed an ‘imposed end’ of homicide on the defendant (Lys. 4.5), based on their 
enmity and former disputes arising particularly from a process of antidosis. The 
latter, following the pattern of questioning the available ‘means’ of reaching the 
imposed (by the adversary) ‘end’, concludes that if ‘premeditated wounding’ 
was actually what he looked for, he would have already carefully planned the 
alleged plot by taking a weapon with him. What is different in relation to 
Antiphon’s First Tetralogy (and forms a pattern as will be proved) is the 
questioning of the prosecutor’s motive in bringing the charge and the imposition 
                                            
14
 My interpretation therefore is diametrically opposed from Cohen (1995) and Ober (1989), by 
highlighting the role of the courts (and of litigants’ speeches) as ‘objective discoverers of truth’, 
with character evidence significantly facilitating this quest.  
15
 On the problems surrounding this particular offence and the speech in general see Todd 
(2008). 
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of an ‘end’ on him in an entirely symmetrical form of argumentation. Without the 
need for proof as to the ‘means’ that the prosecutor used (since the ‘means’ 
used was the litigation per se), defendants try to replace the alleged ‘end’ of 
achieving ‘justice’16 by imposing a less noble (or unethical) one as the cause of 
initiating the (false) prosecution.  
 
This is consistent with our model of human motivation since, with the ‘means’ 
(i.e. prosecution) being already present, the inspector should discover the 
‘ends’. If the ‘ends’ were indeed ‘justice’ and ‘legality’ and remained undisputed 
by the defendant, then the prosecution automatically becomes valid, diminishing 
the possibilities of the defendant’s innocence. On the other hand, if the ‘ends’ 
are questioned and replaced by condemnable ones the prosecution in all 
probability becomes frivolous. In this particular case therefore, the defendant 
argues that the prosecutor initiated this false prosecution in order to avoid 
paying the amount owed and retain a woman who was possibly to be 
exchanged as well in the antidosis (Lys. 4.8). The background to the dispute 
illuminated his motivation as well. In an all-or-nothing adversarial legal dispute 
both parties’ motivation and actions are at stake, interpreted by the ‘objective’ 
model discussed above. Nonetheless, at the centre of every argument stand the 
facts that triggered the particular legal case. The jurors had to decide as to 
whose party’s interpretation of the events was closer to the truth.  
 
Lysias 5 (For Callias), regardless of its brevity further illuminates the issue. 
Referring to an ‘external rule-case’ by implication of the testifiers’ social role and 
status as slaves, the speaker imposes on them an ‘end’ to be achieved 
(namely, to be released) by the wrongful ‘means’ of false witnessing. Their 
status and the circumstances make the use of inappropriate ‘means’ (which in 
the particular case condemn the defendant) more probable. In Lysias 7 the 
defendant in a case (graphe) of impiety (uprooting a sacred olive-stump) 
disputes both the imposed (by the prosecutor) ‘end’ as implausible and the 
‘means’ of achieving that ‘end’. Stating that he was not compelled by poverty to 
venture on such an act, or that the plot was declining in value while the stump 
existed (Lys. 7.14) he finds no plausible ‘end’ that could have motivated him. 
                                            
16
 Although sometimes this ‘end’ is coupled with secondary reasons such as ‘revenge’. 
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Furthermore, by reference to his positive characteristics (his great regard for his 
native land and for sacred olives, his lavish spending on liturgies and 
trierarchies etc.), he insists that such a deed does not coincide with a man of his 
sort (Lys. 7.25, 31, 41). On the other hand, even if the ‘end’ was plausible, 
easier ‘means’ of achieving it were possible (7.15, 24) especially for a man of 
his intelligence (7.12). Contrastingly, the opponent’s ‘end’ was not the 
attainment of ‘justice’. This is proved by the fact that although the defendant 
provided him with all ‘means’ possible for attaining this ‘end’, the prosecutor 
rejected them and insisted on his false prosecution (Lys. 7.34)17. Therefore, 
since the prosecutor’s ‘end’ was not justice, another ‘end’ has to be found. As 
usual, the imposed ‘end’ for a false prosecution is money (Lys. 7.39), and the 
exegesis offered for its initiation is that this was the only ‘means’ available for 
reaching this ‘end’ (7.40). 
 
In Demosthenes 47 the prosecutor in a dike pseudomarturion argues that the 
opponents used illegal and violent ‘means’ in accordance with their character 
and past acts, their ‘end’ being the avoidance of the current trial which would 
expose their lies and serve as aggravating evidence for the original trial18. In 
Demosthenes 53, Apollodorus, the plaintiff of an apographe, denies any 
improper motive for initiating this suit and replaces it (by reference to the 
background of the dispute) with the more plausible and noble ‘ends’ of revenge 
in accordance with justice. The ‘means’ available for taking this revenge was 
the initiation of the current apographe, in accordance with law. In Lycurgus 1, 
the prosecutor of an eisangelia for treason rejects the opponent’s alleged ‘end’ 
for leaving Athens (i.e. trade; cf. Lyc. 1.55) by reference to the ‘means’ he used 
(Lyc. 18ff.). By reference to ‘external rule-cases’ he compares the ‘means’ that 
tradesmen use when departing, with the uncommon ones used by the 
defendant19. These ‘means’ and his character (by reference to ‘internal rule-
                                            
17
 This passage, if interpreted in light of this model, illuminates the inner reasoning behind the 
challenges (dares) in Athenian courts. Slaves’ tortures and oath-challenges provide the ‘means’ 
to attain the ‘ends’ of learning the truth and achieving justice. Facilitation of this ‘means’ signifies 
adherence to the ‘end’ of truth, while their rejection reveals ulterior motives. For the use of 
‘dares’, see Johnstone (1999). Their extensive presence in Athenian courts highlights the 
dominance of disputes about ‘facts’ rather than ‘law’. 
18
 For discussion of this case see Ch. 4. 
19
 Lyc. 1.55: “The first point is that men travelling as merchants do not leave by the postern on 
the beach; they embark inside the harbour with all their friends watching to see them off. 
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case’ type of reasoning through Leocrates’ past acts) prove the ‘end’ of treason. 
In Lysias 16, the defendant of a dokimasia, who is accused for collaboration 
with the Thirty, rejects any motive on his part for such conduct. His past acts 
conceptualised reveal an egalitarian and philopolis character, wholeheartedly 
adhering to the polis’ democratic norms (‘internal rule-case’; Lys. 16.10ff.). He 
also rejects the ‘external rule-case’ of judging by one’s appearance and 
imposing oligarchic affiliations from the mere fact that a man grows his hair long 
(Lys. 16.18-20). As a result, no collaboration with the Thirty may be attributed to 
him.  
 
The above patterns of argumentation remain intact in dikai as well, both on the 
part of the prosecution and on the defence. Demosthenes 54 (Against Conon) is 
a prosecution speech in a dike aikeias (private prosecution for assault). The 
background to the particular deed that generated the proceedings illuminates 
the case as to the opponents’ characters and (as a result) their motives. Their 
character is portrayed by reference to violent and hubristic behaviour (54.3-6), 
revealing a characteristic pattern of practical syllogism (‘internal rule-case’ 
type). The tension alleged by the opponent between the parties led to the 
creation of a motive for an unprovoked attack (the opponents’ usual ‘means’ of 
achieving their ‘ends’ as presented by the speaker). The ‘end’ as portrayed in 
the assaulter’s conduct was the violent humiliation of the victim (54.9). On the 
other hand, the defendants would reject such a motive and would downgrade 
the case to a usual violent brawl between youngsters (54.14ff.). This is rejected 
by the prosecutor by reference to their own good character (being incapable for 
such deeds, and achieving the ‘end’ of justice by legal and mild ‘means’ 54.15-
6, 24)20 and to the opponent’s (distinguishing them, especially the ‘father’ 
Conon, from the ‘brawl between youngsters’ ‘external rule-case’ 54.22-4).  
 
After establishing the true facts of the case, the prosecutor proceeds to reject 
the opponent’s alleged challenge to torture the slaves, Conon’s oath-taking, and 
to prove the falsity of the defendant’s witness testimonies. Starting with the first, 
                                                                                                                                
Secondly, they go alone with their attendant slave, not with their mistress and her maids. 
Besides, what need had this Athenian to stay five years in Megara as a merchant?”. 
20
 The invocation of harsher, though irrelevant, laws serves to highlight the mild ‘means’ via 
which the prosecutor chases his ‘ends’. As a character trait, it may be interpreted as modesty 
and reasonableness, standing in opposition to the defendants’ illegality and hubris.  
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the prosecutor rejects the allegation that the defendant asked for the slaves’ 
torture in order to establish the true facts and thus attain justice, by exposing 
the fallaciousness of their ‘means’ (54.30). The fact that the challenge was 
issued too late, missing many opportunities hitherto, exposes the true ‘end’ of 
their challenge which was to delay the main trial (by reference to their usual 
practical reasoning, since they had employed such delaying tactics in the past 
too; 54. 26, 29). A similar argument from precedent (revealing Conon’s 
character by reference to his past acts) reveals the spuriousness of his oaths 
(54.39-40). Finally, the falsity of the testimonies is proved firstly by reference to 
an ‘external rule-case’ whereby partisan witnesses should not be afforded the 
same credibility as neutral ones (54.32ff.). Thereafter, the prosecutor proceeds 
to an ‘internal rule-case’ type of reasoning, exposing the particular witnesses’ 
unreliable character, thus making them probable candidates for perjury 
(54.34ff.).  
 
 In Demosthenes 55, the speech comes from a defendant in a dike blabes 
(private suit for damages). The prosecutor alleges that the defendant’s building 
of a wall inhibiting drainage caused his property to flood after a heavy storm. 
Again, the background to the dispute illuminates the particular case by exposing 
the motive of the prosecutor in bringing a false charge, making the imposed (by 
the defendant) ‘end’ more probable. The opponent’s past acts reveal a desire to 
take by any means the defendant’s property (55.1-2). The previous inaction of 
the prosecutor through the course of many years (55.4-7) reveals that the 
defendant had not committed any illegal or inappropriate deed. This omission, 
coupled with the fact that he did not suffer any significant damage (52.21-2), 
excludes the ‘end’ of justice, replacing it with the ‘end’ of misappropriating his 
property. The ‘means’ for achieving it is the current false prosecution.  
 
To recap, in accordance with the Greek model of practical reasoning (and 
modern action-theory), character in Athenian courts is invoked to illuminate the 
motives for committing the actionable deed (defendant) or initiating the 
prosecution (prosecutor). This motive may be exposed [by reference to a 
person’s character (by conceptualisation as revealed by his past acts)] by 
questioning (and usually imposing) the ‘end’ to be achieved and by evaluating 
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the ‘means’ by which this ‘end’ was sought. Character also reinforces 
stereotypical presuppositions by reference to ‘rule-cases’. According to this type 
of reasoning, the person (his character traits, his status, or his action) is placed 
in a more general category, making the existence of a motive more or less 
probable by reference to the ‘rule’. This interpretation of character evidence in 
Athenian courts (a person’s past acts, his characteristic practical syllogism, and 
the background to the dispute) are directly relevant to the legal case and are 
invoked to illuminate the particular facts which triggered the charge21. Jurors 
were not asked to give their verdicts on litigants’ characters but litigants’ 
characters illuminated the facts of the legal case as these were specified in the 
written plaint22.  
5.1.2 The Impact of the Verdict as a Supplementary Reason for 
Reasoning 
The Greek mode of practical reasoning sheds light on yet another problematic 
feature of Athenian courts, namely the numerous references to the impact of a 
verdict. These could take three forms and provide a supplementary reason for 
reaching a verdict: impact on the jurors, impact on the parties, and impact on 
the polis. However, it is of utmost importance to remember that such references 
were always coupled with justice (in the strict legal sense), thus providing yet 
another (supplementary) reason for reasoning. In other words, having proved 
the justice of their case, litigants proceeded to strengthen their argumentation 
by reference to further reasons which (correctly interpreted) would emphasise 
the justice of their case. 
 
To begin then, we may examine litigants’ (especially defendants’) references to 
the harsh impact of an adverse verdict23. Appeals to pity were not uncommon in 
Athenian courtrooms, sometimes being supplemented by (actual or verbal) 
                                            
21
 Pace Christ (1998a), pp. 41 and 196. 
22
 On the role of the ‘plaint’ see Harris (2013). Harris convincingly asserts that the written plaint 
served as the ‘point’ on which litigants’ argumentation should refer to and jurors’ decision should 
focus. Therefore the requirement of ‘speaking to the point’ is best illustrated by reference to the 
written plaint. 
23
 My interpretation of references to ‘harsh impacts’ opposes that of Lanni (2006), especially in 
the sense that Lanni interprets them as widening the legal case by introducing statements which 
could influence the jurors’ decision by references to wider norms (such as equity). My 
interpretation supports the view that such references further illuminate the legal case, support 
argumentation about the innocence or guilt of a litigant and induce the jurors to decide in 
accordance with the law and their oath, by providing yet another reason for their reasoning.  
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simulation of supplication24. Johnstone (1999) has extracted a pattern from this 
practice, namely that such appeals were adduced in cases of a real threat to the 
oikos of the defendant as a result of the jurors’ verdict. This unjust threat is 
aggravated by the defendant’s innocence, standing in contrast to the services 
that this particular oikos has offered to the polis25. Following a similar rationale, 
questions of proportionality may come into play26. Of particular importance is 
the fact that such appeals to pity are not received as inhibiting the rational 
judgment of the jurors; rather they serve to reinforce and assist it. Appeals to 
pity presuppose the defendant’s innocence and are always adduced in order to 
highlight the undeserved suffering of the defendant (and as a result of his 
oikos), giving the jurors yet another valid reason for his acquittal27.  
 
In addition to the personal impact of an adverse verdict, references to its 
consequences on the polis at large were not uncommon. Even in present times, 
judges and juries think about the political cost of a decision and many times try 
to convey their verdicts in accordance with public policy28. However, the 
Athenians seem to have placed more emphasis on such considerations, taking 
into account the relative instability and (alleged) insecurity of the polis and its 
constitution29. Again, nonetheless, arguments about public impact are always 
adduced to reinforce the legality of one’s case, offering one more reason to the 
jurors to decide in accordance with his story30. Good management of property 
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 For the statistics of these approaches and further analysis see Johnstone (1999), pp. 109-
120; on supplication in Athenian courts see Naiden (2004); ‘pity’ as an emotion will be further 
discussed in chapter 6. 
25
 See for e.g. Lys. 3.47; Lys. 4.20; Lys. 7.41; Lys 9.21; Lys. 19.33; Lys. 20.35; Lys. 21.25; cf. 
Andoc. 1.146-9. Cf. Macdowell (1962), p. 163 where he observes that: “for the family to become 
extinct would be a misfortune not only to Athens, but also in the usual Greek view, to the dead 
members of the family itself”. 
26
 See esp. Lys. 24.6-9; Dem. 55.35. Likewise, arguments from reciprocity and requests for 
charis complete the aforementioned pattern. 
27
 For ‘pity’ as a response to unmerited suffering’ highlighting the innocence of a defendant, see 
Konstan (2000). This is not a case of ‘jury nullification’ since the defendant does not ask for 
‘pardon’ (which implies an admission of ‘guilt’). 
28
 Griffith (1997). 
29
 The insecurity that the Athenians felt as regards the democratic constitution began with the 
reforms of Kleisthenes and the establishment of democracy in 508/7 and reached its climax 
after the two short periods of oligarchic coups in 411/10 and 404/3. However, the anti-tyrannical 
sentiment and the insecurity about the democratic constitution were especially recurrent in 
times of crises. This is best reflected by the passing of relevant anti-tyranny legislation, e.g. the 
alleged original purpose of ostracism, the decree of Demophantus (410 BC), and the law of 
Eukrates (337/6 BC).  
30
 The fact that ‘public impact argumentation’ supplemented, rather than replaced, the legal 
argument is proven by Harris (2007b) in his discussion of liturgies. Although I do not agree with 
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and future material contribution to the polis is a well-attested pattern of forensic 
speeches31. Likewise, non-pecuniary considerations could be brought forward32 
and especially the impact that a verdict would have on the life of the polis, as a 
sign of approval or disapproval of behaviour. In this kind of reasoning, verdicts 
would become known and be circulated throughout the polis or in some 
occasions of high profile cases, throughout the Greek world. Therefore, litigants 
tried to persuade the jurors that voting for their case would have an educational 
impact on the whole city and especially on the youth33. Conversely, a verdict 
could have an adverse impact on the legal system and the courts in particular if, 
for example, a sycophant’s prosecution would be upheld. This would open the 
floodgates to similar false prosecutions. 
 
Finally, references to the impact of the verdict on jurors (personally, not as 
representatives of the polis) complete the picture. Jurors are frequently 
reminded to vote in accordance with the law, especially by reference to the 
Heliastic oath34. Although many restrictions35 were offered in order to limit the 
jurors’ discretion as to whether they should apply the letter of the law in their 
decisions, their informality jeopardised their effectiveness. Still, the fact that no 
Athenian litigant asks them (even implicitly) to disregard the law by giving 
precedence to other considerations, and the fact that no defendant admits his 
guilt and expresses remorse (by offering, again, extraneous reasons and 
benefits as a recompense and incentive for lenient treatment), are significant 
indicators that cases were decided in accordance with the law36. Furthermore, 
jurors were reminded of the social sanctions that an allegedly illegal verdict 
                                                                                                                                
his assertion that liturgies were invoked in order to influence jurors on the timesis phase 
(otherwise they could be seen as irrelevant aberrations), his analysis of verdicts as uninfluenced 
by ‘public impact argumentation’ when this stood in opposition to legality is convincing; see for 
e.g. Hyp. (Euxenippus) at 34.  
31
 See for e.g.  Lys. 19.61; cf. 20.36; 21.13-5; 19, 25. 
32
 Andoc. 1.145; Lys. 6.48. This kind of considerations is reinforced by reference to a flip-side 
argument found in Lys. 14.44: “what is more, even if he left the city he could do you no harm, 
craven and pauper that he is, with no ability for business, at feud with his own folk and hated by 
everyone else; so neither is there any reason here to be heedful of him”. 
33
 Aeschin. 2.180; Aeschin. 1.186; 1.194; Lys. Lys. 1.47; Lys. 5.5; 14.45; Lys. Fr.7 [134]. 
34
 On the statistics of the Heliastic oath in forensic speeches, see Johnstone (1999), pp. 33-45; 
my view regarding the role and effect of the dikastic oath in Athenian courts coincides with that 
of Harris (2006a), contra Christ (1998a), pp. 194-6. 
35
 E.g. the Heliastic oath, the written plaint, the echinoi, social sanctions, etc. 
36
 Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. 1358b32-33: “For example, a man on trial does not always deny that an 
act has been committed or damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit that the act is 
unjust; for otherwise a trial would be unnecessary”. 
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would produce, referring especially to the shame this would incur when facing 
their families37.  
 
To conclude then, problematic (and at first glance irrelevant) appeals may be 
interpreted in light of the Greek model of human motivation as incentives for 
further reasoning emphasising the proper outcome to the particular legal case. 
Litigants present themselves as ‘adherents’ of the community’s values, obeying 
its norms, seeking common ‘ends’ and having mutual interests with the jurors. 
The ‘end’ of achieving legal justice in a particular case is the most important 
reason influencing the jurors’ reasoning for reaching their verdict. In conformity 
with this reason, other supplementary ones were offered in order to strengthen 
a litigant’s case and convince the jurors that their decision promotes the 
common interest. Although a defendant’s innocence in a particular case would 
be enough to convince the jurors to vote for acquittal (in accordance with their 
oath), this is highlighted by reference to the undeserved and disproportionate 
suffering and / or the (past and future) services to the community. The common 
‘end’ is the implementation of justice in both its legal and its wider meaning 
(since these were identical in the forensic speeches) and the ‘means’ to achieve 
this is the appropriate verdict. Such an outcome serves the interests of the 
jurors (in keeping their oath and implementing justice ‘in accordance with the 
laws’), of the polis (in a utilitarian and an ethical sense), and of the speaker 
(avoiding the ‘unmerited suffering’). As a result, in accordance with the Greek 
model of practical reasoning, references to the impact of a verdict (which 
always coincided with legal justice) cohere with legal argumentation and offer 
fitting (secondary) reasons for reasoning, without – in principle - obstructing 
rational and impartial judgment38. 
5.2  ‘Participant’ Personality and Ethical Motivation 
In the preceding section it has been demonstrated how human action may be 
interpreted in ‘objective’ terms. That is, a person’s beliefs and desires provide 
                                            
37
 See for e.g. Aes. 1.187: “What then, pray, are you going to answer, you in whose hands the 
decision now rests, when your sons ask you whether you voted for conviction or acquittal? 
When you acknowledge that you set Timarchus free, will you not at the same time be 
overturning our whole system of training the youth?” 
38
 Emotional appeals (e.g. pity, anger, envy etc.) as consistent with legal argumentation and 
‘emotions’ as consistent with ‘reason’ will be discussed in chapter 6. 
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the reasons for reasoning which generate human motivation and action. This 
model is diametrically opposed to the modern ‘subjective’ view of human action 
which is based on the Cartesian philosophy of mind. In a similar vein, ancient 
ethical motivation differs from the modern Kantian and post-Kantian model. Gill, 
based on the work of Williams and MacIntyre, develops his model of the 
‘ancient self’ which he describes as ‘objective-participant’ (as opposed to the 
modern ‘subjective-individualist’). The Kantian model presupposes that moral 
life is grounded in a distinctive individualistic stance adopted by the moral 
agent. A key example of this idea “is Kant’s thesis that the moral response 
involves, or implies, an act of ‘autonomy’, or self-legislation, by which the 
individual agent binds himself to universal principles”39. This fundamentally 
‘individual-centred’ approach prescribes that “only the individual herself (the 
possessor of a uniquely subjective viewpoint) can determine the validity of the 
rules that he legislates for herself”40. Such a ‘person’ exercises his capacity for 
autonomy by establishing moral principles for himself, in a process that involves 
“abstraction from localised interpersonal and communal attachments and from 
the emotions and desires associated with these”41.  
 
This kind of moral ‘autonomy’ coupled with the ‘autonomy of the will’ 
presupposed for every single instance of a person’s life, may have implications 
for a legal system and its courts. Legal enactments may be interpreted as 
utilitarian expressions of ‘positive law’ distinct from the ethics of a community. 
Law, lacking the moral foundation provided by concurrence with the (‘critical’ or 
‘conventional’) morality of the community, may be received as a useful –though 
independent- tool for subjecting individuals to the governance of ‘positive’ rules. 
Any question concerning ethics might be questioned and ejected from the legal 
discourse, making obsolete any discussion about the identification of legal with 
moral norms. The significance of the individual’s level of adherence to 
conventional ethics is devalued and the court’s function is as an (ideally) 
autonomous realm. Furthermore, the notion of ‘moral autonomy’ presupposes 
the idea that one’s ethical stance should not be evaluated by reference to 
communal norms, rendering issues of ‘merit’ based on ‘overall personality’ 
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 Gill (1996), p. 7. 
40
 See Gill (1996), p. 9, with n. 27. 
41
 See Gill (1996), p. 11 regarding the ‘subjective-individualist conception’ of the self.  
[230] 
 
meaningless. As a result, evidence from character in modern courts, where it is 
already considered irrelevant according to the modern ‘subjective’ model of 
human action, is further restricted by reference to the agent’s ‘ethical motivation’ 
as well.  
 
On the other hand, current interpretations of the ancient model of ethical 
motivation promote a less ‘individual-centred’ approach. According to such 
theories, ethical life should be understood “primarily in terms of the 
development of dispositions by whole-hearted engagement in the value-bearing 
practices, roles, and modes of relationship of a specific society”42. Based on the 
idea that human beings are functionally adapted to participate in interpersonal 
and communal relationships, this ethical life is at the most fundamental level 
shared rather than individuated. For Williams, ethical knowledge is achieved in 
a life guided by ‘thick’ (culturally localised) ethical values rather than by ‘thin’ 
(universalised) ones. For MacIntyre in particular, ethical thinking is influenced 
by a conception of what is required by the social role which each individual 
inhabits43. Thus, in contrast to the Kantian model, the fullest possible (practical 
and psychological) engagement of the individual with the localised nexus of 
roles and relationships in which he finds himself, dictates, forms, and transforms 
the beliefs which produce the desires and ultimately the reasoning for human 
action. The kind of reasons and reasoning taken to motivate one’s actions 
cannot be analysed adequately without reference to his engagement with this 
localised nexus. In other words the individual agent’s actions are based “on 
reasons and reasoning informed by the action-guiding beliefs of his community 
and by his engagement with his social role”44 and these, in turn, are effectuated 
and publicised by these actions.  
 
This analysis brings out the essence of the different approaches to ethical 
motivation as exemplified by the aforementioned opposing theories. The 
implications that such divergent approaches have in courts are obvious, though 
it might be useful to specify them. The ancient ‘participant’ model of the self 
presupposes an -as far as possible total- adherence to the communal ethical 
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 Gill (1996), p. 7. 
43
 MacIntyre (1985), p. 128. 
44
 Gill (1996), p. 86, cf. pp. 175-6. 
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norms. Any claim to moral ‘individualism’ or any attachment of the individual to 
‘universal’ norms become absurd, with the result that such a moral agent 
becomes ‘moral outsider’ suffering the dreadful (especially for an ancient) 
penalty of living in isolation. A human being’s ethical stance is compared with 
accepted standards, with actions and ethical motives being evaluated according 
to these. Total adherence to these norms presupposes their practical 
effectuation, signifying a ‘worthy’, properly motivated social ‘participant’. 
Additionally, if ethical beliefs are taken as directing human action, then a person 
proving their internalisation by previous conduct by being motivated by the 
‘correct ethical beliefs’, renders himself (almost) incapable of ‘unethical action’. 
Taking into consideration the ancient legal system’s identification of ‘positive’ 
law with ‘ethical’ norms (the first following and officialising the second), then the 
aforementioned ‘ethical person’ renders himself normally incapable of ‘illegal 
action’ as well. The ancient ‘participant’ ethical model which holds that 
adherence to the community’s proper ethical beliefs directs virtuous (according 
to this community’s standards) action, renders ‘character’ a central means of 
evaluating, understanding, and testing human deeds.  
 
To the above analysis, the characteristics of a small-scale agricultural 
community (applicable to Athens whether it was indeed a ‘face to face’ society 
or not) or a ‘shame-culture’ shall be calculated. There is no need here to enter 
into a detailed examination of the different approaches and (alleged) distinctions 
offered by scholars between ‘shame-cultures’ and ‘guilt-cultures’45. It has been 
convincingly proved that sharp dissimilarities between these are not justified46. 
In ancient Greece (and classical Athens in particular) ‘shame’ was heaped on 
the individual agent not merely as an emotive reaction to external sanctions but 
as the result of self-criticism. Evidence shows that the communal standards of 
behaviour and the society’s ethical norms were internalised by the individual 
agents47, carrying with them the related ethical judgments48. This process of 
                                            
45
 Although there is no need to distinguish between ‘shame-cultures’ and ‘guilt-cultures’, 
classical Athens will be referred to as a ‘shame-culture’ for the sake of convenience. 
46
 See Williams (1993); Cairns (1993); Konstan (2003). 
47
 Cf. Plat. Prot. 325c-326e. 
48
 Gill (1995), p. 25 describes this process as follows: “Shame, both in Greek and modern 
culture, does not depend simply on the force of the social judgments made by other people on 
one’s actions. It also depends on the individual’s internalisation of the ethical judgments made 
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internalisation may be evidenced by reference to the ‘internalised other’49 (the 
imaginable figure who expresses society’s ethical judgment). Thus a (real or 
imagined) fear of external sanctions functioning in the conscience of the agent 
provides the catalyst for incurring the emotion of shame50, simultaneously 
covering much of the ground which differentiates it from ‘guilt’.  
 
A characteristic of such societies is emphasis on questions of honour and 
reputation. Although this difference between ‘shame-cultures’ and ‘guilt-cultures’ 
is not one of kind but of degree (placing more or less emphasis on issues of 
‘reputation’, ‘honour’, ‘face’ etc.)51, the focus shifts from one’s actions and 
concentrates on the agent. To put it simply, questions such as ‘what kind of 
person one is’ tend to overshadow questions such as ‘what kind of actions this 
person does’52. As a result, emphasis is placed on the agent’s personality and 
character, as means of proof and relevant factors to be assessed for the 
interpretation of his acts. Nevertheless, as has already been shown, a person’s 
character is exposed through conceptualisation by reference to a multitude of 
past acts53, and this in turn is (through inference) used to interpret past or 
predict future behaviour.  
 
The relative identification between a citizen and his community in the ancient 
polis stands in contrast to the modern detachment (and resulting tension) 
between the individual and the state. In the ancient context, the habitual 
participation of the person in all the interpersonal nexuses of small-scale 
subcultures (oikos, neighbourhood, demos, phratry, and ultimately polis) 
signified the affiliation of the individual with these institutions54. This attachment 
to each particular socio-political circle, which creates ethical adherents and 
                                                                                                                                
in one’s society, so that these become ‘one’s own’, as well as part of the discourse of the 
society”. 
49
 Williams (1993), Ch. 4. 
50
 ‘Shame’ as an emotion will be discussed in the Chapter 6.  
51
 Cairns (1993), p. 44. 
52
 Cairns (1993), p. 45: “[although] there is a certain amount of evidence which suggests that 
Greek culture actually did place greater emphasis on the excellences of persons and on ideal 
self-image than we do, the difference is again one of degree, for focus on agents rather than 
acts can only be a matter of emphasis; any focus on oneself as a certain type of person must 
take into account the character of one’s acts, and any rejection or repudiation of a specific act 
must encompass a conception of one’s selfhood.”. 
53
 See Ch. 3 and 4. 
54
 Evidenced for example by the emphasis the ancient Athenians placed on the demotic name 
for the identification of a certain individual. 
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outsiders, ultimately signifies a degree of interdependence between individual 
with, for instance, his polis, to the extent that their improvement or deterioration 
go hand in hand. Any individual act may have a bearing on the well-being or 
disintegration of the community; if this act is based on ethical beliefs and can be 
predicted by inference from ‘character’ or ‘personality’ (i.e. wholehearted 
adherence to the conventional behavioural norms of the community), then the 
emphasis put on ‘what the person is’ is justified.  
 
The above outcomes, as drawn from psychology (in the form of the human 
being’s ‘participant’ personality with its implications for the person’s ethical 
motivation), social anthropology (as the characteristics of a ‘shame-culture’), 
sociology and politics (in the relationship of the individual with surrounding 
structures, such as the state), need to be considered carefully when examining 
the use and relevance of character evidence in the courts of law. In what 
follows, the above models and their results will be applied in the courts of 
classical Athens.  
5.2.1 The ‘Participant’ Person in the Athenian Courts 
Our analysis of the above conclusions promotes the following reflections, 
provided by the analysis of the Athenian courtroom speeches’ patterns of 
argumentation (sometimes heavily criticised by modern scholars): 
 
i) Litigants advertised their whole-hearted adherence to communal 
(conventional) ethical norms, 
ii) Legal adversaries compete as to the relative degree of internalisation 
of these norms, 
iii) Litigants compete within a coherentset of ethical norms officialised by 
the undisputed authority of the laws, and 
iv) Litigants observe the behavioural standards required by their social 
‘role’. 
 
The results coupled with the general remarks offered in the previous section 
(5.1) will allow us to propose a new (all-embracing) interpretation of the role of 
character evidence in Athenian courts (and the Greek culture in general).  
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5.2.1.1 Whole-hearted Adherence to the Norms of the Polis 
The main aim of Athenian litigants was to show that their characteristic ethical 
motivation was guided by the principles of their community. Their actions, being 
directed by cooperative values, are adduced to earn them complimentary 
characterisations such as sophron (self-controlled), prothumos (eager to serve 
the polis), and ennomos (law-abiding), while proving their respect for the 
informal rules of proper forms of social interaction such as philia. As a result, 
such an Athenian litigant whose (in accordance with the Greek ideas of 
‘character’ and way of reasoning) numerous past acts prove a high degree of 
internalisation of the coherent, unquestioned set of communal ethical norms, 
proves himself an ethical adherent of the community and, by inference, a 
person incapable of performing illegal, anti-social acts. 
 
There is no need to dwell extensively on the content of these norms since this 
theme is treated many times by respectable scholars55. What is needed is to 
focus on the cooperative character of the majority of the norms adduced in 
Athenian courts. This proves that the Athenian courts were not arenas for 
competition through an arbitrary measurement of honour and status. Rather, in 
these institutions the publicised adherence to conventional ethics and the 
accomplishment of public services were taken as means of proof for the 
particular legal case. Virtuous past acts verified authentic internalisation of 
social norms leading in turn to honest, proper, cooperative citizen conduct. 
Appropriate ethical beliefs influenced analogous desires. I will offer just a few 
examples. 
5.2.1.1.1 Sophrosyne or Antisocial Behaviour? – Hubris and Indecency 
In Demosthenes 21, the famous statesman tries to prove his rival choregus 
Meidias’ hubristic behaviour, which culminated in his assault during the religious 
festival of the Great Dionysia. Meidias’ past acts56 reveal his inherent antisocial 
and antidemocratic stance which achieved the status of a character trait. 
                                            
55
 See for e.g. for aidos Cairns (1993); for sophrosyne Rademaker (2005); for manhood 
Roisman (2005); for litigiousness and bad citizenship Christ (1998a) and (2006) respectively; for 
hubris Fisher (1992), Cairns (1996); MacDowell (1976). 
56
 Meidias’ record of past acts is full of attempts of bribery, insolence, violence and hubris, 
proving him a social and ethical outsider. His wealth and power make him arrogant, voluntarily 
transgressing and showing contempt for the laws. See for e.g. Dem. 21.17, 21.66-70, 21.79, 
21.85ff. , 21.109-112, 21.123-4 et.al.  
[235] 
 
Rejecting any argument that the insolent aristocrat acted ‘out of character’ 
swept away by anger, he asserts that Meidias “is detected in a continuous 
course of law-breaking, spread over many days; surely this is far from a mere fit 
of anger and he stands convicted of a deliberate policy of insult” (Dem. 21.41-
2). This is further proved by the evaluation of Meidias’ public-spiritedness by 
reference to his liturgies. Without objecting to the validity of such an evaluation, 
Demosthenes asserts that the polis has not been given a proper share of 
Meidias’ riches which he used totally for his haughty showing off (Dem. 
21.158)57. His behaviour makes him a social and ethical outsider of the polis, a 
“common enemy of the state” (21.142)58. 
 
In Demosthenes 53, the usual ethical motivation of the opponents (i.e. contempt 
for the ethical norms of the community) as presented by their past acts, 
illuminates the present case of false witness (disrespect for the laws, inhibition 
of justice) as well as the original case dike aikeias59. In Demosthenes 54, the 
assaulters’ antisocial behaviour as expressed by their brutality and violence has 
put the prosecutor in a position to shrink from even narrating their abusive 
language and deeds. Apart from a rhetorical trick (as discussed in Ch. 4), his 
silence may reveal a sophron character. Being in ethical concord with the jurors, 
his high degree of internalisation of the communal norms makes him believe 
that even the citation of his adversaries’ unethical deeds could bring shame60. 
Sophrosyne (moderation, self-restraint), the ultimate cooperative virtue of the 
polis61, could be presented in numerous forms, having a bearing on the 
person’s behaviour in the private sphere, in social interaction and the courts62. 
                                            
57
 Nonetheless, public service and invocation of liturgies are not rejected as irrelevant. They 
have probative value as means of proving a person’s character and ethical motivation. 
58
 For the jurors’ inducement to anger and punishment of the defendants in order to make them 
examples for future possible transgressors in different contexts (e.g. in a graphe or in a dike) 
see Rubinstein (2004), (2005). 
59
 The respective characters of the opponents provide the ground which links the speaker’s 
argumentation. On the one hand, the philopolis, law-abiding, reasonable and sofron citizen 
(53.33-5, 38, 44, 68-70) stands against the violent, disrespectful, greedy and illegal adversary 
(53.28, 31, 52-60). The first is motivated by the correct ethical norms while the second reveals 
his characteristic contempt for them at every single opportunity. 
60
 Cf. Aeschin. 1.55. 
61
 See for e.g. Fisher (1976), p. 41; Seaford (1994), p. 611 with n. 150 and 151; Rademaker 
(2005). 
62
 Self-restraint could be expressed as control of sexual desires, as moderation in the face of 
conflict or excessive litigation, as the denial of unjust enrichment or bribery etc. Acts of this kind 
reveal a more general character trait which makes the person incapable of paranomia (both in 
the form of breaking the law and of breaking the ethical norms). 
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In the context of the law courts, as Rademaker observes, a claim of sophrosyne 
could be made both ad rem, to prove that a speaker is innocent of certain types 
of aggression, and extra causam, to suggest that he is generally incapable of 
injustice63.  
 
Aeschines, the rigorous patriot, presents himself as the protector of the 
communal ethical norms of decency64. He repeatedly characterises his main 
target, Demosthenes, as effeminate pervert, squanderer of his patrimony, and 
unprincipled in every possible way65. However, his non-adherence to the 
virtuous ethical norms of the polis is best exemplified by his outrageous 
behaviour after the death of his daughter. Demosthenes was presented as the 
man who perjured himself on every occasion and perverted the burial rites of 
his own daughter66. A man of his character is definitely unworthy of being 
crowned by the Athenians for his services.  
 
Andokides, answers one of the main charges (placing a suppliant’s bough on 
the altar during the Mysteries) by reference to his opponent’s moral character. 
He asserts that Callias, a member of the Kerukes, did not hesitate from 
committing impiety in order to trap Andokides. His other deeds prove his moral 
baseness: he did not refrain from establishing sexual relationship with mother 
and daughter (despite being himself a priest of the Mother and the Daughter, 
namely Demeter and Persephone), perjuring himself at the Apaturia, and 
destroying his own family67.  
 
In Lysias’ speeches allegations of disregard for communal ethical norms are 
also present, proving the pattern of argumentation by reference to the litigants’ 
reactions as to the set of communal norms68. On the other hand, adherence to 
the ethical norms of the community is invoked to receive credit, making the 
                                            
63
 Rademaker (2005), p. 233. 
64
 E.g. Aeschin. 1.117; 2.180. Demosthenes replies by reference to Aeschines’ hubristic attitude 
against an Olynthian woman (19.196-99).  
65
 See for e.g. Aeschin. 1.131, 163-4, 167, 170ff., 181; 2.23, 88, 127, 148, 151, 179; 3.155, 162, 
167, 172-4. 
66
 Aeschin. 3.77-8. 
67
 Andoc. 1.124-31. 
68
 See for e.g. Lys. 4.4-9; 13.66; 14.25-7; 24.15. 
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person an ethical companion, truthful and law-abiding, who deserves to be 
treated by the court accordingly.  
5.2.1.1.2 Citizen and Democrat 
In Demosthenes 22, Androtion’s behaviour is characterised as undemocratic, 
lawless and tyrannical, surpassing in violence even the deeds of the Thirty 
(Dem. 22.49-54). His characteristic disrespect for the laws of the polis are 
presented as the ‘beliefs-reasons’ on which the opponent’s reasoning was 
based in order to make the unconstitutional proposal for which he is prosecuted. 
His non-adherence to the ethics of the polis transformed him into this 
unrestrained and vicious figure69. The illegal proposal was merely the 
culmination of such a person’s acts. As stated in Demosthenes 24, such ethical 
outsiders do not deserve to bear the fruits of the polis’ noble morals70.  
 
The opponents’ conduct is also contrasted to the Athenian national character 
(τῆς πόλεως ἦθος):  
 
“[..] truthful, honest, and, where money is concerned, not asking what pays best, but what is the 
honourable thing to do. But as to the character of the proposer of this law, I have no further 
knowledge of him, nor do I say or know anything to his prejudice; but if I may judge from his law, 
I detect a character very far removed from what I have described” (Dem. 20.13). 
 
Bribery and corruption (in opposition to the ἦθος of the polis) are regularly 
invoked as improper motives caused by the adversary’s moral failure71. In 
accordance with our model, an act must be explained by reference to the 
agent’s beliefs. Reprehensible acts prove the agent’s non-adherence to the 
                                            
69
 This characteristic disrespect for the laws of the polis and contempt for fellow citizens 
becomes a pattern to be followed in other trials for unconstitutional or illegal measures. Cf. 
Dem. 24.76-7, 124. 
70
 Cf. Dem. 24.197, where the defendants do not deserve the jurors’ characteristic compassion 
shown to people in misfortune, since they failed to do the same when in power.  
71
 See for e.g. Dem. 24.3: “while Timocrates has their fee in his pocket, and never introduced 
his law until he got it, I, so far from getting any reward from you, am risking a thousand 
drachmas in your defence”. Cf. Dem. 24.14. Corruption (especially of officials) – the psychosis 
of the Athenians - had become the stereotypical argument of most Athenian litigants; see for 
e.g. Lys. 26.23-4; 27.2-3; 27.9-10; 30.25; Antiph. 6.34 et.al. This was a central argument in the 
fierce judicial contest between Demosthenes and Aeschines; see for e.g. Aeschin. 2.154, 165-6; 
3.69, 85-6 91, 94, 104-105, 113, 125, 129, 149, 156, 167, 209, 214, 218, 220, 222, 237, 239, 
240, 259; cf. Din. 1.44; Hyp. 5.20; For Demosthenes’ accusations against Aeschines for 
corruption see for e.g. Dem. 18.44 49, 52, 131, 284, 286, 297; 19.145-6, 230, 265, 275, 314. 
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norms of the polis and this factor becomes decisive in attributing motive to a 
questionable deed. Yet, the character trait remains present and the 
characteristic defective ethical motivation as well72. This is exemplified by 
reference to Timocrates’ character on a prosecution speech in a graphe 
paranomon: 
 
“Yet from what gain do you think that such a man would restrain his hand or what would he 
hesitate to do for lucre's sake, when he did not disdain to legislate in contradiction of himself, 
though the laws forbid contradiction even of others? It seems to me that, so far as effrontery 
(ἀναιδείας) goes, such a man is ready to do anything” (Dem. 24.65)73 
 
Similar accusations referring to the (abstracted) character of the defendant, 
whose traits oppose Athenian ethical values, further illustrate the case: 
 
“For what fatal or dangerous act will he shrink from, men of Athens,—this polluted wretch, 
infected with hereditary hatred of democracy? What other man would sooner overthrow the 
State, if only—which Heaven forbid!—he should gain the power? Do you not see that his 
character and his policy are not guided by reason or by self-respect (αἰδὼς), but by 
recklessness? Or rather, his policy is sheer recklessness. Now that is the very worst quality for 
its possessor, terribly dangerous for everyone else, and for the State intolerable.” (Dem. 
25.32) 
 
A litigant’s unpretentious respect or lofty contempt for the laws revealed his 
typical attitude towards the polis and the democratic constitution74. Past conduct 
proving a characteristic disregard of the laws and the court judgments is a 
common accusation to be found in Athenian courts75. Contrastingly, absence of 
criminal convictions or infrequent inhabitation of the courtrooms was adduced 
                                            
72
 On the other hand, ethical concord may be adduced in order to prove the justice of one’s 
case; see for e.g. Dem. 36.58: “Phormio, then, men of Athens, who has in so many ways 
proved himself of service to the state and to many of you, and has never done harm to anyone 
either in public or in private, and who is guilty of no wrong toward this man Apollodorus, begs 
and implores and claims your protection...”. 
73
 Cf. Dem. 57.59. 
74
 The speeches of Lysias are more indicative of patterns of argumentation regarding loyalty to 
the democracy since they were written and delivered in troubled times. Many cases were 
triggered by alleged cooperation with the Thirty and this was a common background for one’s 
argumentation as to political affiliations. See for e.g. Lys. 12 and Lys. 13. Cf. Lys. 9.17; 10.31; 
20.17; 30.7-8; Fr. 3.a.2; Fr. 7. 
75
 See for e.g. Dem. 42.2, 8-10, 15, 30; 43.6; 50.45; 58.14; Lys. 30.4-5.  
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as positive evidence for a person’s adherence to the laws76. This latter plea was 
a rhetorical topos of prosecutors (usually to be found in the prologue) to refute 
accusations of sycophancy77. Being a philopolis demanded positive acts of 
proof78, egalitarian attitudes79, and wholehearted adherence to the communal 
customs80. Sometimes this could be said to cause the envy of grudging 
countrymen81. Although it should not be taken at face value, the strength of 
Euphiletus’ assertion in identifying himself with the law (his hand becoming the 
weapon that enforced justice)82 is exceptional and indicative of his complete 
devotion.  
 
The most explicit way of proving unequivocal loyalty to the polis was military 
service. This was the most informative opportunity to sacrifice self-interest for 
the common good and demonstrate adherence to the ideology of the 
community. Serving the polis by one’s own person revealed total commitment 
and complete adherence to its ethical and heroic values83. Heroism and 
excellence were honoured and rewarded, whereas cowardice and draft-evasion 
were reprimanded as signs of bad citizenship84. Voluntariness was 
exceptionally valued. Deliberate devotion to state service was not as fictitious 
                                            
76
 See for e.g. Lys. 5.3; 25.16; 26.21-2; Antiph. 6.9; 4.19. 
77
 See for e.g. Aeschin. 1.1, 116, 159; 2.181-2; Lys. 16.10; Lys. 19.55; 22.1-4; 26.15; Dem. 
18.222-6. Cf. Christ (1998a), pp. 148ff. 
78
 E.g. Andoc. 1.56, 68, 101, 102, 134; Dem. 18.86, 88, 94, 108-111, 125, 173, 179-180, 197, 
206, 277, 288, 298, 306; 19.166, 170-173, 230; Antiph. 6.38, 50. On the other hand, enemies of 
the polis were also easily identified by reference to their treacherous past acts. These revealed 
a character trait that directed such conduct and were attributed to a character defect; see for 
e.g. Lys. 12. 2, 36, 42, 82, 94; 13.2, 30, 59, 65; 22.14. 
79
 Aeschin. 1.141; cf. Lys. 14.9. 
80
 Aeschin. 2.23; contrast this with the conduct of the Thirty in perverting the burial rituals in Lys. 
12.18 or Demosthenes’ alleged conduct in Aeschin. 3.77-8. 
81
 See for e.g. Lys. 24.3: “So now, gentlemen, it is clear that he envies me because, although I 
have to bear this sore misfortune, I am a better citizen than he is”. 
82
 Lys. 1.5, 26, 1.29, 1.47, 1.50; in 1.26 Euphiletus (the defendant arguing for a lawful homicide) 
states: “It is not I who am going to kill you, but our city's law, which you have transgressed and 
regarded as of less account than your pleasures, choosing rather to commit this foul offence 
against my wife and my children than to obey the laws like a decent person”. 
83
 See for e.g. Dem. 54.44 (members of an oikos serving both in person and their property); cf. 
Lys. 20.14, 23 as indicative of loyalty and affection to the polis; cf. Lys. 7.30-1; 16.13-8; 21.6-11, 
24. Such considerations are adduced as possible grounds for acquittal in Lys.6.46-9; cf. 
Aeschin. 2.167ff. (continuous military record since his youth) in reply to Dem. 19.113;  
84
 See Christ (2006), Ch. 2 and 3. For references to cowardice or military evasion in the orators 
see for e.g. Aeschin. 2.79, 148; 3.151, 155, 159-60, 163, 167, 175-6, 181, 214, 253 (references 
to Demosthenes’ conduct in deserting his post in the battle of Chaeronea); cf. Dem. 21.110, 
133, 166-7 (Meidias deserting his post and discovering questionable methods to avoid risking 
his life with his fellow citizens) cf. Lys. 14.9, 17, 44; 21.20; 10.25ff. These arguments are usually 
adduced on grounds of ‘fairness’, i.e. in anticipation of or reply to similar accusations of the 
opponent.  
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as Lanni suggests85 nor as impossible as a modern state’s citizen would 
suppose. Contrastingly, the close identification of the citizen with the state, the 
imminence of real threats against the oikoi of a ‘polis at war’, and the obvious, 
appreciable impact that the voluntary participant could make (this impact being 
extended to himself, i.e. the community’s opinion) were adequate incentives for 
voluntary self-sacrifice86. This extreme sacrifice of self-interest87 revealed a 
philopolis personality that had internalised and adhered to the common norms 
to the extent of self-denial. By inference, such a person was an unlikely 
candidate for breaking the laws of the polis. Military service as a means of proof 
is thus adduced several times in the court speeches.  
5.2.1.1.3 Respecting the Norms of Philia 
Philia designates a variety of positive bonds based on a sliding scale of 
affection and utility among social circles such as kin, friends, comrades, and 
fellow citizens88. In the majority of such positive relationships, affection and 
concern dominate merely calculative considerations based on a strictly formal 
and objective structure of obligations89. Nevertheless the presence of a 
                                            
85
 Lanni, (2009), p. 30 states that “the Athenian approach of enforcing extra-legal norms through 
the courts created state sanctions for violations of public service norms, while at the same time 
permitting the Athenians to maintain the fiction that Athenians fought for and served the state 
out of patriotism”. Even though I am opposed to Lanni’s more general argument (enforcement of 
extra-legal norms) in the sense that Athenian courts predominantly enforced the written laws 
and (as a side-effect) the moral norms hidden behind the particular statutes, my thesis proves 
the more specific argument about the fictitiousness of voluntary service equally wrong. Lanni 
bases her supposition on entirely anachronistic grounds. In particular she asserts that the 
Athenian state purposefully enforced such extra-legal norms since it provided for the advantage 
of bolstering “the democratic ideal of a limited state” (p. 24). Furthermore, the Athenians were 
able to “maintain the fictions of an unregulated private sphere” (p. 28). I consider these 
suppositions entirely alien to the context of an ancient polis and the Athenian state in particular. 
I prefer to side with Finley’s perception of the polis as a potentially “all-encompassing” 
community [cf. Fisher (1976), p. 1] which could regulate any kind of private or public behavior 
[for the regulation of the private sphere, and the tensions created by the conflicting interests of 
the polis and the oikos, see Seaford (1994)]. Finally, I also disagree with Lanni’s assertion that 
the polis was militarily supported by coercion rather than patriotism and voluntarism, interpreting 
it as yet another anachronistic assumption of a modern state’s citizen. I prefer to see the polis 
as a ‘nation at (constant) war’ [cf. Adkins (1960), pp. 28-32); Dover (1974), pp. 159-60 with n. 
32] whose citizens had internalized the Homeric agonistic values of arete, and where draft-
evasion was the exception of the norm (and sign of ‘bad citizenship’). After all, if Athenians were 
coerced to go to war, who were the ones that voted for it? 
86
 Cf. Fisher (1976). 
87
 For ‘self-interest’ as the utmost sign of ‘bad citizenship’ see Christ (2006), p. 9. By 
conceptualization (and with reference to our discussion of the brutality of human ‘nature’), 
human beings showing excessive self-interest reveal their uncultivated character, which renders 
them unsuitable for living in a polis. By inference, such characters could break any communal 
law or norm to achieve their selfish goals. 
88
 Mitchell (2002) Ch. 1; cf. Konstan (1996). 
89
 Konstan (1996), p. 86. 
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persuasive informal set of reciprocal norms emphasises and exemplifies the 
degree of affection between philoi. A citizen of an ancient Greek polis realised 
himself by reference to a nexus of such relationships carrying varying degrees 
of affection and divergent obligations. Oikos, friends, phratry, deme, and polis 
all make (sometimes contradictory) ethical requests on their members. 
However, virtuous citizenship presupposed the sacrifice of one’s self-interest (or 
his oikos’ and friends’) for the sake of his polis90. As the polis supersedes 
individual households and regulates private sphere, private reciprocal 
obligations based on philia are limited (and transformed) to suit the interests of 
the wider community91.  
 
The written laws of the polis coexist with informal norms, both collections 
making ethical requests to the individual. The agent’s degree of discipline to 
and observance of these is up to his character and personality. Betrayal or 
breach of the rules of philia exposes a character trait which is typical of more 
general conduct. The stronger the bonds between two people, the more serious 
the injustice the perpetrator commits; and if he dares to injure his own philoi, 
nothing would stop him from acting analogously against his fellow citizens or his 
polis92. Breach of the norms of philia makes the perpetrator a probable 
lawbreaker93. This rationale was formalised by the Athenian legal system which 
provided for the penalty of atimia in cases of maltreatment of parents94. This 
offence included physical abuse as well as negligence of performing certain 
obligations required by virtue of this relationship: trophe, oikesis, and taphe95. 
Breach of the requirements of philia in the orators could take many forms and 
                                            
90
 However, obligations based on philia were deemed so powerful that could be offered as 
excuses (or as more valid reasons than e.g. bribery) for law-breaking in courts; see Dem. 
20.195-6. 
91
 See Seaford (1994), chs.4, 6. 
92
 Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1160a: “Injustice therefore also is differently constituted in each of these 
relationships: wrong is increasingly serious in proportion as it is done to a nearer friend. For 
example, it is more shocking to defraud a comrade of money than a fellow-citizen; or to refuse 
aid to a brother than to do so to a stranger; or to strike one's father than to strike anybody else. 
Similarly it is natural that the claims of justice also should increase with the nearness of the 
friendship, since friendship and justice exist between the same persons and are co-extensive in 
range”. 
93
 Lys. 30.23: “for if a man commits such crimes against his own relatives, what would he do to 
strangers?”. 
94
 Andoc. 1.74; Xen. Mem. 2.2.13; Dem. 24.60; Aeschin. 1.28. 
95
 Aeschin. 1.13; cf. Hansen (2006), p. 56. 
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designate the character defects of disloyalty and ingratitude96: abandoning a 
father in need97, refusal to bury him98, defrauding brothers and kinsmen99, 
bringing false charges against kin or friends100, betraying friends or 
neighbours101are just some of the categories102 that shocked the audience and 
exposed a litigant’s wickedness and propensity to breach proper norms. 
5.2.1.2 Creating Boundaries: Ethical Adherents and Outsiders 
Moral agents acting in accordance with the objective / participant model of the 
self, are engaged in ‘primary’ (first-order) reasoning to apply their deeply rooted 
ethical beliefs (i.e. the beliefs of their community) for determining the proper 
course of action in a particular situation. However, sometimes secondary 
(second-order) reasoning is employed denoting the reflection about the goals or 
rules which are operative in first-order reasoning. This may trigger questions as 
to the conventional ethical beliefs and, if applied to a specific situation, give rise 
to problematic cases103. Such problematic cases may be interpreted and 
illuminated by reference to second-order reasoning since the application of first-
order reasoning and conventional norms would dictate a different course of 
action. This situation is frequent in Greek tragedy but absent from Athenian 
courts. There, conventional ethical norms are indisputable, forming a coherent 
universal set of action-guiding rules. Litigants competed to prove their whole-
hearted adherence to these norms by reference to their past acts which indicate 
a high degree of internalisation of indisputable communal beliefs104.  
 
The existence of an unquestioned universal set of conventional social norms 
(which precluded notions like the ‘moral autonomy’ and ‘self-legislation’ of the 
                                            
96
 On the other hand, observance of these obligations revealed affection, loyalty and 
observance of the ethical norms of the community. See for e.g. Lys. 7.41; 24.6; Andoc. 1.118-9. 
Supporting speakers usually invoked their personal intimacy with the litigant they assisted; see 
for e.g. Dem. 20.1; 58.3. 
97
 Dem. 24.200; or a close relative Aeschin. 1.103. 
98
 Dem. 25.54; Aeschin. 1.99; Lys. 31.30. 
99
 Dem. 24.127; 36.36; (sister) 24.202; 25.55; (guardians embezzling property of orphans) Dem. 
27.65; 28.15-6. 
100
 Dem. 45.53, 56,70; Aeschin. 2.93; 3.51, 172. 
101
 Dem. 25.57; 53.4; Andoc. 1.54, 56, 68 in reply to Lys. 6.3, 7, 23-4; 14.26-7, 44; 15.10; 32.10; 
Fr. 8. 
102
 For a more detailed treatment of the issue see Christ (1998a), pp. 167ff. 
103
 See Gill (1996), pp. 117, 133, 181, 237, 239. 
104
 Burkert (2013), p. 76: “To belong to a group is to conform to its standard of purity; the 
reprobate, the outsider, and the rebel are unclean”. 
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individual) permitted an objective (by reference to the invoked evidence) 
evaluation of a person’s degree of loyalty to the ethics of the polis. In the 
Athenian courts’ setting, this fact gains greater importance. In a society that 
professed the conformity of written laws with unwritten ethical norms, 
adherence to the latter signified obedience to the former. The of Athenian laws 
in particular, assisted the deeper internalisation of ethical norms by reference to 
the law’s moralising effect105. This is also exemplified by the frequently 
inaccurate attribution of Athenian laws to the (largely imagined) figure of Solon. 
The authority-figure of the ‘ideal lawgiver’ demonstrated the ethical coherence 
of Athenian laws and the legal system’s almost mystical continuity through time. 
This imagined figure impersonated the ethical prototype of the Athenian legal 
system, persuading the jurors to interpret the Athenian laws by reference to its 
demands106. When Athenian jurors decided a legal case, a specific law was 
applied and a wider ethical norm was reinforced107. The court acted as the 
moral educator of the polis which reinforced the single, universal, coherent set 
of primary ethical norms as ‘action-guiding principles’. As a side-effect, the 
‘participant’ ethical model of the self was thus sheltered and promoted. 
  
The aforementioned considerations stress the importance for a litigant of 
presenting himself as a committed ethical adherent rather than the holder of an 
individualistic stance which could render him a moral outsider. In fact, a fierce 
contest as to who will prove himself as closer to the communal values emerges 
as a pattern from the court speeches. In Antiphon 1 the speaker asserts that his 
stepmother poisoned his father, whose honour and justice he seeks. In doing 
this he has to face the wrath of his own kin who instead of avenging the dead, 
side with the murderess. The dead man fell “victim of those who should least of 
                                            
105
 On the substantive orientation of Athenian laws see Harris (2009); cf. Farenga (2006), pp. 
276-9. 
106
 On the figure of the ‘ideal lawgiver’ and its implications see Johnstone (2009), pp. 25-33; cf. 
Harris (2006b). I borrowed the notion of the authority figure as assisting to the internalization of 
norms from Cairns (1993), p. 39 since I find its application to the Athenian legal system’s 
context with its frequent invocation of the ‘ideal lawgiver’ as suitable.  
107
 This I consider to be the essence of the ‘legal enforcement of morals in classical Athens’, 
namely the reinforcement of the wider ethical norm that triggered the enactment of a particular 
law. In this way the court, apart from its primary task of implementing the rule of law by applying 
specific laws to particular legal cases, acted also as the moral educator of the polis in the 
absence of an official system of education. Cf. Rubinstein (2005a). 
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all have done this” (Antiph. 1.21) and this proves their ethical depravity. His kin 
have isolated him but he is not alone. He refers to the jurors and states:  
 
“For you are my kin; those who should have avenged the dead and supported me are his 
murderers and my opponents” (Antiph. 1.4). 
 
This exact argument concludes Demosthenes’ plea for justice in Demosthenes 
28 after the alleged embezzlement of his property by his cousin Aphobus who 
had acted as his guardian. Aphobus betrayed the conventional ethical norms 
and the obligations of philia between kin. The twenty-year old Demosthenes 
states:  
 
“Succour us, then, succour us, for the sake of justice, for your own sakes, for ours, and for my 
dead father's sake. Save us; have compassion on us since these, our relatives, have felt no 
compassion. It is to you that we have fled for protection” (Dem. 28.20). 
 
Litigants could also focus on the adversary’s moral depravity as illustrated by 
his expulsion from his own social circles108. These circles, although closer to the 
opponent, should nonetheless be treated as representative of the polis’ 
attitudes. Their reaction to the opponent’s misconduct paved the way and posed 
the example of the proper treatment he should receive from the jurors. 
Especially illuminating is the treatment that Aristogeiton received from his fellow 
prisoners. They, refusing to withstand Aristogeiton’s unacceptable (even for 
them) behaviour “passed a resolution not to share fire or light, food or drink with 
him, not to receive anything from him, not to give him anything” (Dem. 25.61). 
What should therefore be the proper response of the jurors to such a person 
who even in prison was an ethical outcast? The same rhetorical question was 
asked of jurors judging cases between Athenians and foreigners, the former 
presenting the latter as total outsiders109.  
 
                                            
108
 See for e.g. Dem. 21.197: “That is my own opinion of him [that he is an unhallowed ruffian]; 
[for how else are we to describe a creature whom his own troopers, his brother-officers and his 
friends cannot stomach?”. 
109
 See for e.g. Hyp. Athen. 3: the opponent “is a speechwriter, a man of affairs and, most 
significant of all, an Egyptian”; cf. Dem. 35.1-2. 
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Nonetheless the prototype of the ethical outsider in the Athenian courts was the 
objectified persona of the sycophant110. Application of religious purification 
language and rites (used for pharmakoi) was appropriate to cleanse the city 
from the unclean sycophants. These inverters of social norms manipulate and 
abuse the legal system, thus mutilating the cohesion of the polis111. In the case 
against Aristogeiton referred to above, in which Demosthenes presents his 
opponent as the typical sycophant-outsider112 (being an outcast even in jail), he 
also provides the proper response to such ethical outcasts:  
 
“His case is incurable, men of Athens, quite incurable. Just as physicians, when they detect a 
cancer or an ulcer or some other incurable growth, cauterize it or cut it away, so you ought all to 
unite in exterminating this monster. Cast him out of your city; destroy him.” (Dem. 25.95) 
5.2.1.3 Ethical Motivation Prescribed by the Social ‘Role’ 
Thus far it has been proved that according to the ancient model of the self, 
ethical motivation is provided by the agent’s whole-hearted adherence to the 
ethical norms of his community. One significant aspect of this fitted engagement 
with the community’s values is ethical motivation and action according to what 
is required and expected due to the agent’s social role and status113. Frequent 
use of such reasoning can be found in the Athenian courts. Following 
stereotypical beliefs as to how a ‘virtuous citizen’, a ‘righteous youngster’ or a 
‘respectable member of the elite’ should behave, litigants stress and manipulate 
these expectations in order to support the legal case. Instances of misfit with 
the social role or ethical motivation of a person revealed his more general 
contemptible character trait that illuminated the particular case. 
 
A ‘good citizen’ was expected to engage in certain forms of social conduct. In 
Demosthenes 18, the famous orator compares his civic behaviour with that of 
                                            
110
 For a similar discussion about the underlying connotations of being a sycophant see Christ 
(1998a), pp. 50ff. 
111
 Christ (1998a), p. 54 refers to the second sycophant scene of the Acharnians (esp. l. 944-5) 
as symbolic of the sycophant’s conduct: “the sycophant’s restless and disruptive energy is 
literally contained and this inverter of norms is himself appropriately turned upside down”; cf. the 
figure of Cleon – Paphlagon in the Knights. 
112
 Cf. Christ (1998a), pp. 57-9. 
113
 Gill (1996), Ch. 1.3 discusses Odysseus’ monologue in Hom. Il. 11.401-10 where his ethical 
motivation is dictated by his social role and accordingly decides to act as a ‘good Homeric 
chieftain’ would do.  
[246] 
 
Aeschines. Every single quote is best understood by reference to the ethical 
motivation provided by their respective roles as ‘citizens’; though the one was 
virtuous, the other contemptible, in accordance with the Athenian society’s 
expectations: 
 
“You were an usher, I a pupil; you were an acolyte, I a candidate; you were clerk-at-the-table, I 
addressed the House; you were a player, I a spectator; you were cat-called, I hissed; you have 
ever served our enemies, I have served my country.” (Dem. 18.265)114 
 
Exercising a menial calling could also be interpreted as unfitting and degrading 
for a citizen115. Stereotypical beliefs as to the virtue of farmers as opposed to 
merchants and hand-workers are repeatedly found in ancient literature. 
Unsurprisingly then, they are followed in the court speeches (albeit sometimes 
manipulated), allegedly placing undue emphasis on the ‘person’ rather than the 
‘deed’ of the legal charge116. However, even in such circumstances, these 
allegations illuminated an aspect of the opponent’s character which could be 
invoked in connection with the offence117. In Demosthenes 57, the exercise of a 
menial calling was adduced in order to prove that the defendant was not an 
Athenian citizen. Selling ribbons in the agora or (for his mother) serving as a 
nurse did not coincide with Athenian citizenship118.  
                                            
114
 Cf. Dem. 19.299-300. 
115
 Such stereotypical beliefs relating to one’s appearance or calling survive in different forms 
even in our days and are sometimes adduced in the courts [Munday (2005), p. 38]. In the small-
scale society of the ancient polis, their force would unavoidably be greater. Cf. Ar. Rhet. 1367a: 
“Customs that are peculiar to individual peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed among 
them are noble; for instance, in Lacedaemon it is noble to wear one's hair long, for it is the mark 
of a gentleman, the performance of any servile task being difficult for one whose hair is long. 
[27] And not carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a gentleman does not live in 
dependence on others”. 
116
 See for e.g. Dem. 37.52: “When anyone asks him, “What valid charges will you be able to 
make against Nicobulus?” he says, “The Athenians hate money-lenders”.  
117
 See for e.g. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1121b who refers to different callings as revealing character 
traits: “The other sort of people are those who exceed in respect of getting, taking from every 
source and all they can; such are those who follow degrading trades, brothel-keepers and all 
people of that sort, and petty usurers who lend money in small sums at a high rate of interest all 
these take from wrong sources, and more than their due”. For invocations of the opponent’s 
menial calling see for e.g. Dem. 18. 127, 129, 209, 261-2, 267; 19.70, 95, 120, 200, 247, 314; 
37.52; 57.31, 35; Lys. 30.27-8. 
118
 Dem. 57.31, 35: “57.31: We on our part acknowledge that we sell ribbons and do not live in 
the manner we could wish, and if in your eyes, Eubulides, this is a sign that we are not 
Athenians, 57.35: He has said this too about my mother, that she served as a nurse. We, on our 
part, do not deny that this was the case in the time of the city's misfortune, when all people were 
badly off; but in what manner and for what reasons she became a nurse I will tell you plainly. 
And let no one of you, men of Athens, be prejudiced against us because of this; for you will find 
today many Athenian women who are serving as nurses”. 
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Bravery and self-sacrifice were also expected from a ‘virtuous citizen’119. The 
same degree of adherence to Athenian ethical norms was demanded from the 
metics as well. The ‘role’ of a peaceful metic prescribed the return of gratitude 
for his residence in Athens and generosity to the polis that nurtures him120. 
Failure to act accordingly and conform to the social expectations could expose 
wrong ethical motivation and be used as a means of proof of the legal case. 
The same degree of gratitude towards the Athenians was expected in cases of 
naturalisation. Apollodorus, acting in accordance with this ‘role’, in revealing his 
gratitude and his resulting ethical motivation states: 
 
“When it came to fixing the penalty, the jurymen wished to impose a sentence of death upon 
him, but I begged them to do nothing like that on a prosecution brought by me, and I agreed to 
the fine of a talent which these men themselves proposed,—not that I wished to save 
Arethusius from the death penalty （for he deserved death on account of the wrongs which he 
had committed against me）, but that I, Pasion's son, made a citizen by a decree of the people, 
might not be said to have caused the death of any Athenian” (Dem. 53.18) 
 
Analogously, behavioural scripts were prescribed for other classes of persons 
as well, such as youngsters. Again, the presence of stereotypical presumptions 
about youngsters’ characters and conduct are decisive and set the norm121. 
Such agents needed to excuse themselves for bringing lawsuits in order to 
avoid any prejudice for litigiousness and meddlesomeness122. The typical 
youngster had not fully internalised the ethical norms of his community and 
behaved in accordance with his impulses and desires. The characteristic 
prejudice against youth’s lack of self-control123, hubris and 
aggressiveness124could decisively turn the balance against a young litigant. In 
Lysias 16, the young long-haired aristocrat Mantitheus needs to explain the 
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 See for e.g. Lys. 30.5; 31.7: “My opponent has placed a higher value on his personal safety 
than on the public danger”; cf. Lyc. 1. 
120
 See for e.g. Lys. 12.20; Fr. 7; on the other hand, a metic’s hostile behaviour revealed a more 
general enmity against the polis; see Lys.24.14. 
121
 Arist. Rhet. 1369a: “For if the young happen to be irascible, or passionately desire anything, 
it is not because of their youth that they act accordingly, but because of anger and desire. Cf. 
1389a: The young, as to character, are ready to desire and to carry out what they desire”. 
122
 For this topos see for e.g. Antiph. 1.1, 30; 5.1, 79; Dem. 27.2; 29.1; 44.1; 53.13; 54.1; 58.3. 
123
 E.g. Antiph. 3.3.6. 
124
 E.g. Antiph. 4.1.6; 4.3.2; 4.4.2; 4.4.6; Lys. 24.15-6; Dem. 54.14. 
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ethical motivation behind his conduct, which was untypical for his role125. On 
other occasions, young adversaries are accused of not putting their natural 
characteristics in the service of the state. Their role prescribed bravery and 
vehemence in war rather than cowardice126. Their role also prescribed shyness 
and decency127. On the other hand, similar expectations were existent for 
mature and respectable citizens. Failing to act in accordance with the role of the 
sophron man was contemptuous and blameworthy128. 
5.3 The Invocation of Liturgies as the Culmination of the ‘Objective 
/ Participant’ Model 
The invocation of liturgies in the Athenian courts has been the core of 
controversy in modern scholarship, perceived as providing the most 
characteristic type of extra-legal argumentation. On the one hand, scholars 
insisting on structural interpretations assert that by adducing their liturgies, 
litigants entered into a contest for honour and prestige highlighting the 
underlying role of the Athenian courts. Furthermore, structural tensions of the 
democratic system such as those between the elite and the demos were 
regulated and fashioned by the jury’s control of Athenian liturgists through the 
court system (and the final accommodation between rich and poor) or by the 
elitist implicit threats of withdrawal presented through their orations129. Based on 
similar methodology, an alternative interpretation is offered by Millett, who sees 
the liturgies as “disruptive of elite cohesion” and as “a weapon that the rich 
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 Lys. 16.20: “I have had occasion to observe, gentlemen that some people are annoyed with 
me merely for attempting at too early an age to speak before the assembly. But, in the first 
place, I was compelled to speak in public to protect my own interests; and indeed, in the 
second, I do feel that my tendency has been unduly enterprising: for in reflecting on my 
ancestors, and how they have continually taken part in the administration, I had you also in my 
view…”.  
126
 In charging them with cowardice, the speaker of Lysias 10 asserts: “Indeed gentlemen of the 
jury, the more impressive and youthful my opponents are in appearance, the more they deserve 
your anger” (Lys. 10.29). 
127
 E.g. Dem. 42.24: There is one thing only, men of the jury, in which anyone could show that 
this man Phaenippus has been ambitious of honour from you: he is an able and ambitious 
breeder of horses, being young and rich and vigorous. What is a convincing proof of this? He 
has given up riding on horseback, has sold his war horse, and in his place has bought himself a 
chariot - he, at his age!—that he may not have to travel on foot; such is the luxury that fills him. 
Cf. the arguments of the dikaios logos in Ar. Clouds l. 961ff. 
128
 See for e.g. Lys. 3.4: “If I am guilty, gentlemen, I expect to get no indulgence; but if I prove 
my innocence as regards the counts of Simon's affidavit, while for the rest you consider my 
attitude towards the boy too senseless for a man of my age, I ask you not to think the worse of 
me for that, since you know that all mankind are liable to desire, but that he may be the best 
and most temperate who is able to bear its misfortunes in the most orderly spirit”. 
129
 See Ober (1989), pp. 226-30 and Davies (1981), pp. 88-132 respectively. 
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turned against each other as well as against the egalitarianism of 
democracy”130. Although such interpretations may be valid (as secondary to the 
main role of the courts as enforcers of the law) they are not free from 
complications.  
 
The main idea that such invocations were centred on ideas of reciprocity is 
vulnerable on the following grounds. This notion is better understood in the form 
of ‘generalised reciprocity’ involving a ‘gratuitous gesture’ on the part of the 
obligated, thus revealing his noble and unforced generosity rather than a 
restricted (‘quid-pro-quo’ type) re-payment of the services131. Furthermore, an 
(even implicit) assertion that a specific breach of the law could be annulled and 
redeemed by reference to public services would automatically place the polis 
(the demos, i.e. the jurors) and its legal system (which the Athenians highly 
valued) in a position of inferiority against the assets of a wealthy litigant132. 
Explicit statements of such type are totally absent from Athenian courts; to 
impose them on the (implicit) reasoning of the litigants or the (unknown) 
deliberation of the jurors would be inappropriate. Finally, by adhering to the 
interpretation of the institution of law (and consequently the courts) as 
fundamentally designed to break such cycles of reciprocity, I consider it unlikely 
that Athenian jurors succumbed to such reasoning in defiance of legal justice 
and their oath133. On the contrary, I would assert that even implicit 
argumentation of this type would run the great risk of backfiring by alienating the 
jury, if the latter considered it as irrelevant and obstructive of legal justice. 
  
Even when scholars concentrate on legalistic issues, controversy persists. In 
this field the main controversy concerns the degree to which the invocation of 
liturgies by Athenian litigants influenced the verdict of the jurors. To offer but a 
couple of indicative examples, Christ concentrates on the incentives given by 
wealthy litigants to the jurors to show gratitude (charis) and vote for him by 
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 Millett (1998), p. 250. 
131
 See Donlan (1981-2), pp. 154-71; cf. Gill (1996), pp. 133, 139, 142, 145 et.al.  
132
 The fact that any such statement is absent from the Athenian court speeches is indicative. 
Gill (1996) explains on these terms the rejection of Achilles to the gifts of Agamemnon in Iliad 9. 
Agamemnon, severely breached the norms of reciprocity between chieftains and an acceptance 
of the gifts (by the method that Agamemnon chose) would unequivocally place Achilles in a 
position of inferiority. 
133
 Cf. Seaford (1994), Ch. 3 and 6. 
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reference to the future material benefit his acquittal will mean for the polis134. 
However, Harris convincingly demonstrates by reference to the few known court 
decisions that such argumentation did not have the force to make the jurors 
betray their oath and vote contrary to the law135. Harris then goes as far as 
asserting that the invocation of liturgies aimed at distracting the jurors, though it 
was relevant at the timesis phase (regarding the assessment of the penalty)136. 
However, such a conclusion is not supported by evidence137 and does not fit 
with the steady presence of such argumentation in agones atimetoi. As a matter 
of fact, since the decisions of Athenian trials rarely survive, any effort to uncover 
the implicit reasoning of the jurors is based on circumstantial evidence and is 
largely speculative. What is needed is a more objective method of interpreting 
the invocation of liturgies rather than a resort to subjective explanations. In my 
opinion, applying the ‘objective’ / ‘participant’ model is a suitable and valid 
starting point for the objective interpretation of forensic speeches. 
 
In the first part of this chapter it has been shown how the invocation of liturgies 
may serve to illustrate the character of litigants, by reference to their typical 
‘practical reasoning’. Frequent, lavish and voluntary liturgies that exceed the 
requirements of the law reveal by conceptualisation the character of a law-
abiding, magnanimous138 public benefactor, thus rendering him an unlikely 
candidate for performing a crime139. Such argumentation is not rejected by the 
prosecutors as irrelevant. On the contrary, acknowledging its value, they 
attempt to diminish the effect of their opponent’s public expenditure stating 
either that this took place out of selfish opportunistic calculation (thus it does not 
reveal the genuine character of a pro-democratic wealthy philopolis) or that the 
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 Christ (1998a), pp. 92-3; cf. Lanni (2005), (2006), pp. 46-64. 
135
 Harris (2006a), pp. 66-72; cf. (2013). 
136
 Harris (2006a). 
137
 See the statistics in Jonhstone (1999), p. 94. A close reading of the court orations indicates 
that the invocation of liturgies was not restricted to timētaì díkai. It is hardly convincing to 
suggest that Athenian litigants, knowing that their liturgies were only relevant during a timesis, 
would voluntarily and emphatically reveal their implicit purpose of distracting the jurors by 
asking them to betray their oath. The risk of alienating them would have been extremely high.  
138
 See for e.g. Lys. 21.5; Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1366b on magnificence and magnanimity as 
components of virtue. 
139
 See for e.g. Antiph. 2.2.12; Lys. 7.25, 31, 41; cf. Lys. 19.56:”I do this, not for mere vainglory, 
but to bring in as evidence the fact that the same man cannot both spend a great deal without 
compulsion and covet some of the public property at the gravest risk.”; Dem. 52.26: “Then we 
are to believe, in the first place, that he wronged a man who would be able to do him injury to 
twice the amount of his gains, and secondly that my father in this instance was a base lover of 
gain, whereas in regard to special taxes and public services and gifts to the state he was not.”. 
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type of liturgies performed by the opponent was useless to the polis as a 
whole140. Therefore, as a matter of fact, a ‘rule-case’ type of reasoning could 
lead the jurors to assert whether such a person was capable of performing an 
illegal deed141, assist the litigant to win their good will and increase the 
credibility of his character. Adding to this the shame-culture’s emphasis on the 
‘person’ rather than the ‘act’ it may be suggested that the invocation of liturgies 
coincides with this model and becomes relevant in solving a particular legal 
case. 
 
The second type of reasoning that has been discussed (‘means-end’ type) may 
assist in interpreting more problematic cases. The most characteristic and 
notorious passage is found in Lys. 25.13 which, though usually curtailed and 
taken out of context, reads: 
 
“But my purpose in spending more than was enjoined upon me by the city was to raise myself 
the higher in your opinion, so that if any misfortune should chance to befall me I might defend 
myself on better terms” 
 
Reading merely this statement may leave the impression that a person’s 
liturgies enter into the courtroom as external and irrelevant aid in order to 
distract the jurors from the facts of the case. However, this case involves a 
charge of ‘subverting the democracy’. The speaker continues: 
 
“Of all this credit I was deprived under the oligarchy; for instead of regarding those who had 
bestowed some benefit on the people as worthy recipients of their favours, they placed in 
positions of honour the men who had done you most harm, as though this were a pledge by 
which they held us bound. You ought all to reflect on those facts and refuse to believe the 
statements of these men: you should rather judge each person by the record of his actions.” 
 
                                            
140
 See for e.g. Dem. 21.158; Lyc. 1.139-40. Lycurgus in particular highlights the ethics of his 
troubled era by stating that the only useful liturgies at that time were the ones concerned with 
the war preparation of Athens against its enemies. cf. Lys. 31.12; Dem. 38.25; 42.3, 25. 
141
 Cf. Lys. 21.1; Is. 4.29-30 where the speaker alleges the forgery of the will presented by his 
opponent who apart from being a denounced criminal has never served the polis either with his 
property or with his person. The question at issue is one of fact, argumentation based on 
circumstantial evidence and probabilities. Furthermore, the issues decided during a diadikasia 
put the fate of the property in the centre of attention rather than concentrating on a specific legal 
offence. On the other hand, by reference again to ‘rule-case’ type of reasoning, prosecutors 
could impose a plausible motive to their wealthy opponents (using their liturgies as evidence) 
such as that found in Antiph. 2.3.8. 
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Even if taken at face value, the statement is clearly relevant to the legal charge 
by referring to his characteristic attitude towards the demos. However, we may 
stretch the analysis more142. The speaker is accused of oligarchic affiliations. 
The period is uneasy since shortly after the fall of the Thirty and the restoration 
of the democracy such cases were frequent. By reference to ‘external rule-type’ 
reasoning, wealthy members of the elite (especially those who stayed in Athens 
during the reign of the Thirty) were the usual suspects, but also vulnerable 
targets, of sycophants (25.1, 3). The speaker is clear as to his aims from the 
beginning of his speech: 
 
“And I claim, gentlemen, if I am found to have been the cause of none of our disasters, but 
rather to have performed many services to the State with both my person and my purse, that at 
any rate I should have that support from you which is the just desert” (25.4, cf. 11-12) 
 
The speaker continuously revokes the unjust ‘rule-case’ reasoning which 
renders him suspect for being disloyal to the democracy143. Switching to a 
‘means-end’ type of reasoning, he annuls any ulterior ‘end’ that could be 
imposed on him by his enemies for his extravagant spending and his great 
resources144. In this model, the ‘means’ is his lavish expenditure, while the ‘end’ 
imposed could be the showing off of his power which could –stereotypically- 
render him suspect. On the contrary, he advertises a different ‘end’ for his lavish 
expenditure. This ‘end’ is pro-democratic (in opposition to the charge with which 
he is accused), humble and respectful to the power of the demos. The 
allegation is simple: I performed lavish liturgies for the sake of my polis and the 
                                            
142
 The speaker at the beginning of his speech clarifies his intentions as to how he will try to 
persuade the jurors of his innocence: “I will now try to explain to you who of the citizens are 
inclined, in my view, to court oligarchy, and who democracy. This will serve as a basis both for 
your decision and for the defence that I shall offer for myself; for I shall make it evident that 
neither under the democracy (Lys. 25.7). 
143
 Lys.25.5-6: “But in fact they conceive that your resentment against those men [the Thirty] is 
sufficient to involve in their ruin those who have done no harm at all. [6] I, however, hold that, 
just as it would be unfair, when some men have been the source of many benefits to the city, to 
let others carry off the reward of your honors or your thanks, so it is unreasonable, when some 
have continually done you harm, that their acts should bring reproach and slander upon those 
who have done no wrong.”. 
144
 Imposition of a selfish ‘end is not unusual in relation to public services, therefore it is 
anticipated’; Cf. Lys. 26.4: “As regards the public services, I say that his father would have done 
better not to perform them than to spend so much of his substance: for it was on account of this 
that he won the confidence of the people and overthrew the democracy; and so our memory of 
these deeds must be more abiding than of the offerings he has set up1 in record of those 
services.”. 
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democracy because I am a loyal citizen. Knowing that many sycophants (i.e. 
the enemies-outsiders of the state who behave like oligarchs themselves and 
had offered pretences to the Thirty)145 lurk, I considered this ‘means’ 
(performing liturgies) as the best available for proving my character and my 
loyalty to the constitution, and for achieving the ‘end’ of gaining your good will 
(out of my respect for and submission to the democratic law court) for the sake 
of justice.  
 
Such argumentation may also be interpreted by reference to the ‘participant’ 
model of the self as influencing the agent’s ethical motivation. Voluntary lavish 
expenditure for the benefit of the community shows in practice a whole-hearted 
adherence to the norms of the community. Supporting by one’s possessions the 
democratic institutions of the community, as well as profusely financing the 
military of the polis proves the internalisation and adoption of this community’s 
practices and undertakings. In addition, according to the agent’s adherence to 
his role in the community, performance of public services’ ethical motivation 
could be interpreted as “this is how a virtuous member of the elite should 
act”146. The agent’s role in the community may be adduced to illuminate cases 
of naturalised citizens as well:  
 
“Whatever concerns the state, however, and all that concerns you, I perform, as you know, as 
lavishly as I can; for I am well aware that for you who are citizens by birth it is sufficient to 
perform public services as the laws require; we on the contrary who are created citizens ought 
to show that we perform them as a grateful payment of a debt.” (Dem. 45.78, cf. 85) 
 
A citizen’s role dictated the subordination of his oikos’ obligations to the ones of 
the polis: 
 
“[…] never once when I had to perform a public service in your aid did I consider it a hardship 
that I should leave my children so much the poorer, but much rather that I should fail in the 
zealous discharge of my obligations.” (Lys. 21.23) 
 
                                            
145
 Lys. 25.19, 31. 
146
 This stands in conformity with the Greek aristocratic values, according to which members of 
the elite undertake the expenses of the democracy and act as protectors of the demos.  
[254] 
 
The frequent invocation of liturgies is best understood as the culmination of the 
ancient model of the ‘objective / participant’ self and they should be interpreted 
accordingly; not by reference to modern presuppositions and subjective 
perceptions.  
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6 CHAPTER SIX: PURPOSES OF CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS OF ATHENS – 
PREDOMINANCE OF LAW OR RHETORIC? 
In the preceding chapter it has been demonstrated how the Greek perceptions 
of ‘personality’ influenced and fertilised argumentation in Athenian courts. 
Specifically, I have proved that these ideas explain the (by modern standards 
wide) use of character evidence and render it relevant to the legal charge in 
dispute. Setting aside the psychological and anthropological analysis of the 
previous chapter, a more legalistic explanation of this kind of rhetoric in 
Athenian courts may be offered. Yes, according to the prior analysis, the 
methods of giving character evidence (chapter 4) were dictated by the Greek 
ideas of character (as set in chapter 3). Furthermore, the Greek way of practical 
reasoning and ethical motivation (chapter 5) provides the model of interpretation 
for the forensic speeches, rendering groundless any analysis influenced by 
modern presumptions of relevance or the rule of law. However, apart from the 
obvious purpose of arguing convincingly the legal case, character evidence had 
secondary purposes as well. These aims, based on legalistic and rhetorical 
grounds, provide critics of the Athenian law with fertile ground for harsh 
interpretations, arguing that these secondary purposes aimed at the distraction 
of jurors from the legal case. Again, however, what is understood today as 
extra-legal argumentation neither obstructed legal justice nor inhibited the 
jurors’ rational legal judgment. 
  
The first part concerns the use of character evidence regarding issues of strict 
law, such as the speaker’s fundamental aim of proving his adversary’s 
propensity for reprehensible behaviour. Furthermore, the topic calls for a 
discussion of the (sometimes misinterpreted and blamed) genre of forensic 
rhetoric, which in turn gave rise to harsh criticisms about the implementation of 
justice in the Athenian courts. This discussion of forensic rhetoric, although 
comprehensively researched, is necessary for my thesis in order to reveal the 
underlying tensions brought about by the wide use of character evidence in 
Athenian courts. These tensions have already been shaped since antiquity by 
the work of Aristotle ‘On Rhetoric’. Opinions include sharp reproaches of the 
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ways that the orators tried to manipulate the popular juries with the latters’ 
alleged inclination to give verdicts based on emotional considerations rather 
than on the laws.  Character evidence is central in this respect since (apart from 
the strictly legal questions of propensity and the quasi-legal questions of 
credibility) this method of argumentation involves questionable extra-legal ways 
of winning the good will of an audience which in turn may be induced to decide 
cases on ethical or emotional grounds.  
6.1 ‘Character’ in Strict Law – Proving Propensity 
The most ‘legal’ use of character evidence is its assistance in answering 
questions of guilt. Even in modern days, the legitimate purpose of proving or 
disproving one’s guilt is achieved by proving the propensity of the accused to 
commit the particular crime in question or to aggrandise his blameworthiness 
due to his more general way of living in order to make him an unreliable 
character. In classical Athens, analogous efforts of proving one’s criminal 
disposition (if talk can be made about such) were extended to the accuser 
(especially in terms of having a propensity to bring malicious prosecutions and, 
therefore, act as a sycophant) and were prolonged in order to cover more 
issues than the particular crime under question. In chapter 3 I have highlighted 
the fact that the lack of a particular uniformity of approach regarding ideas of 
‘character’ in Athenian courts meant that almost any past act could be invoked 
to assist the argumentation of the litigants. Furthermore, the inductive way of 
reasoning supported such an approach and allowed for extracting conclusions 
about issues of propensity to criminality by reference to a series of 
reprehensible past acts that in a modern court would probably have been 
rejected as irrelevant.  
 
On the other hand, in chapter 2 (referring to incentives for wide use of character 
evidence), I have pointed to the difficulty of gathering evidence for an Athenian 
trial, lacking the support of technological means and being left to private 
initiative. Taking into consideration that in the majority of surviving cases parties 
mainly dispute about questions of fact and not questions of law (where there 
seems to be an apparent agreement between the parties as to the meaning and 
the correct interpretation of the legal statute in question)
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1 assists in the better understanding of the difficulty.  Moreover, such a situation 
increases the importance of character evidence, which could tip the balance in 
favour of one litigant or another. After all, the presence of the innovative 
(especially in the 5th century) rhetorical tactic of argumentation from probability 
reveals the weakness of the ancient courts in being absolutely certain about the 
facts of a case2. Additionally, the fear of rhetorical manipulation of juries by 
litigants led the Athenians to put greater weight (according to a famous 
rhetorical topos, in the degree it can be trusted) on one’s actions (during the 
course of his life) than on one’s words (especially in the highly agonistic 
environment of the court). Therefore, for the Athenians, a presentation of a 
series of past acts may securely reveal a person’s general disposition, and thus 
should be given more weight than words at the time of trial3.  
 
The issue of propensity occupied the work of thinkers at least since the fifth 
century BC. Aeschines insisted that past acts can predict future behaviour4. His 
whole prosecution speech against Timarchus consisted of a combination of 
specific indecent events from the defendant’s life with references to his general 
reputation. Using an inductive method of reasoning, Aeschines argues that 
Timarchus’s appetite for lust, gluttony and hubris proved his general propensity 
for criminal and indecent behaviour5. The prosecutor of Lysias 14 in anticipating 
the defendant’s plea for acquittal due to his previous honourable acts, proceeds 
to a series of allegations against them, highlighting their indecent and disorderly 
(private and public) behaviour, in order to conclude that  
 
                                            
1
 Harris (2007b) shows that out of the twenty nine legal cases of the Lysianic corpus, the twenty 
six primarily involve questions of fact.  
2
 Argumentation from probability was primarily employed in cases where the facts of a case 
were in dispute. See for e.g. Gagarin M. (1994); Harris E.M. (1994). 
3
 For the logos - ergon antithesis see for e.g. Aeschin. 1.179-81, 93; 2.5; 3.168, 174; Dem. 
18.276; 55.2; Antiph. 2.2.2; 2.3.3; 5.84; 6.47; Andoc. 1.7; 3.1; Lys. 7.30; 12.33; 19.61; 25.13; 
34.5. 
4
 Aeschin. 1.127. 
5
 Then, using a deductive way of reasoning, Aeschines could argue that for an indecent man 
like Timarchus it was highly likely to have prostituted himself. Cf. Aristotle’s Nic. Eth. 1103b: “our 
actions, as we have said, determine the quality of our dispositions”; 1114a: They acquire a 
particular quality by constantly acting in a particular way. This is shown by the way in which men 
train themselves for some contest or pursuit: they practice continually. Therefore only an utterly 
senseless person can fail to know that our characters are the result of our conduct”. 
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“Indeed, there is nothing that they have been spared, or have spared. For, their propensity is to 
be ashamed of what is honourable and to glory in what is base”6.  
 
On the other hand defendants could also use analogous argumentation in order 
to prove a prosecutor’s propensity for bringing sycophantic suits. The following 
statement is revealing:  
 
“I think, then, men of Athens, that nothing could be more to the purpose than to bring forward 
witnesses to these facts. For if one is continually making baseless charges, what can one 
expect him to do now?”
7
 
 
In fact, this quote perfectly respects even a modern court’s rules, in the sense 
that it refers specifically to a person’s past offences of the exact same nature as 
the alleged crime, passing the test of relevance. The Athenians were more than 
capable of assessing the degree of relevance of a past act, overwhelmingly 
promoting the most relevant at the expense of the most remote8. Therefore, 
both the quantity of one’s past acts and the quality in terms of gravity and 
relevance to the particular case, played a major role in an orator’s decision as to 
whether and when such arguments should be adduced. 
 
The adversarial nature of an Athenian trial meant that propensity arguments 
could be also adduced (especially by the defendants) in order to highlight the 
positive side of a person’s character. A defendant that led an orderly life, 
performing honourable deeds or liturgies for his fellow citizens, had proved his 
merits and his inclination to act in a good manner. In fact, one’s good will 
towards the polis and his fellow citizens could have been dispositional rather 
than opportunistic9. For example, the speaker of Lysias 19 exclaims that the 
account and accomplishments of his father’s whole life overwhelmingly prove 
that he never acted because of greed and he never had the propensity for such 
                                            
6
 Lys. 14.44. 
7
 Dem. 36.55; 52.26. 
8
 A similar argument is given by Harris (2007b), regarding legal precedent, pace Lanni (2004). 
In our case, although the Athenians were inclined to admit evidence that modern courts would 
tend to dismiss as irrelevant (but evidently they did not as their practice suggests), they carefully 
designed their speeches in order to promote the most relevant and proximate. See for e.g. the 
directly relevant argumentation in Dem. 18.125; 37.56; 44.38; 50.68; 54.3-7, 16; 57.59-60. 
9
 Cf. Dem. 36.55-6. 
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a flaw10. The prosecutors, on the other hand, concentrated on their lack of 
propensity for excessive litigiousness, which could lead to the serious allegation 
of sycophancy. Almost every prosecutor alleges his inexperience in legal 
matters. Whenever possible, he argues that it is actually the first time he 
attends a court, the fault being the defendant’s since he was obliged to bring a 
public suit due to the latter’s grave illegality.  
 
What may be extracted regarding the probative value of character in revealing 
propensity in Athenian courts is that it does not differ sharply from the modern 
ideas. The nature of Athenian trials and the philosophical ideas of the period 
dictated a less offence-focused argumentation, embracing other matters such 
as litigants’ positive or negative former acts. Nevertheless the essence of 
argumentation is the same, with the central aim being the revelation of one’s 
character traits in relation to the legal case at hand. No matter whether the 
Athenians used more (and slightly different sometimes) paths for achieving this, 
proving one’s propensity to commit (or not to commit) a particular crime was the 
utmost goal to be achieved. The reasons for the trivial deviations from the 
modern norm are mainly to be attributed to the Greek ideas of character 
discussed in the previous chapter, but again, these prove that both litigants and 
jurors regarded such argumentation as relevant to their case. 
6.2 ‘Character’ in Rhetoric – Persuasion, Credibility and Good Will 
Although this topic has been treated extensively by numerous scholars the 
multitude of divergent views and interpretations of the ancient sources calls for 
a fresh more straightforward view of the controversial issues. Furthermore, the 
treatment of the secondary (less legal) uses of character evidence is necessary 
to the development of my thesis, since it has provided a superficially valid 
justification for those researchers rejecting the implementation of the rule of law 
by the Athenian courts. Based on the views of some Athenian writers11, these 
scholars have placed too much weight on the rhetorical uses of ad hominem 
argumentation, deducing that the courts slipped into an extra-legal way of 
decision-making. Their conclusions that litigants based their pleas on irrelevant 
                                            
10
 Lys. 19.13. 
11
 For a polemic against the Athenian legal system due to its manipulation by witty orators, see 
for e.g. Isocrates’ 7.33-4; Xen. Apol. 4; Dem. 23.206 etc. 
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matters led them to the inference that the Athenian courts downplayed their 
legal role, primarily serving other, mainly socio-political roles12. To what extent 
is such a statement valid that character evidence chiefly played an extra-legal 
role? Were the aims of rhetoric, especially as presented in the law-courts, 
incompatible with legal argumentation? Is the modern researchers’ view 
influenced by the bias of ancient writers? These matters will be discussed in the 
next paragraphs, paving the way for the next parts of my thesis, discussing 
questions of relevance in Athenian courts. 
 
As has been demonstrated, apart from the strictly legal use of character 
evidence (the proof of propensity), argumentation from character may also be 
used for other, secondary reasons. These include the effort to enhance the 
credibility and trustworthiness of a speaker, and gaining the good will of an 
audience through ethical and / or emotional pleas. Especially in the enormously 
adversarial environment of the Athenian law courts, which was sometimes 
susceptible to such argumentation, the extent of these secondary, extra-legal 
aims acquire additional significance. Keeping in mind the high stakes of the 
majority of the surviving Athenian trials, it is not difficult to deduce that litigants 
could employ all acceptable means in order to convince the jury and reach their 
ultimate goal: victory13.  
 
Nevertheless, the experience of Athenian jurors and the fact that any mistake 
would be exposed by the adversary signified the need for very careful rhetorical 
strategy and tactics. This need was covered by the emergence of professional 
logographers and the study of rhetoric as a discipline. The absence of 
professional lawyers meant that the amateur Athenian litigant would have to 
deal with every step of a trial. Most importantly, in general terms it is often said 
that a litigant was required to speak for himself14. That created a twofold issue: 
either someone would have to face the realities of amateurism and commit 
(very) costly mistakes or he would professionalise the job either by hiring a 
                                            
12
 In the previous chapters I have referred to relevant literature, for e.g. Ober (1989), Cohen 
(1995), Christ (1998a), Lanni (2006). 
13
 This is the ultimate goal of the parties in modern trials as well; cf. Kubicek (2006), Ch. 1. 
14
 For the extent of assistance that Athenian litigants received by their friends and supporting 
speakers see Rubinstein (2000). The evidence for a law requiring that litigants ought to speak 
for themselves come from Quintilian’s, Institutio Oratoria (2.15.30), and is accepted by Bonner 
(1927); Goldhill (2002), 62; Kennedy (1998), p. 219. 
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professional logographer15 or by studying the secrets of rhetoric himself16. As a 
result, sophists, philosophers and professional speechwriters competed in trying 
to find the nature of persuasion, composing numerous theoretical and practical 
treatises on rhetoric17, depending on each one’s primary interests.  
 
Undoubtedly, our view of rhetoric has been shaped by Aristotle. The penetrating 
thought of the Stagirite and his enormous ability in classification has haunted 
the study of the discipline since antiquity18. In the Rhetoric he classifies the 
different kinds of proofs (pisteis) as artful (entechnoi) or artless (atechnoi) 
depending on whether they belong in the province of rhetoric, in other words 
whether they have been provided through the orator or they were already in 
existence. The first set of pisteis includes witnesses, tortures, contracts, laws, 
and the like (being there at the outset), while the second, which concerns us 
here, includes those proofs that must be devised by ourselves, in the form of 
moral character, emotion, and argument (Rhet. 1355b35ff.). Although the 
effects of persuasion through moral character and emotion may often be said to 
overlap19, Aristotle does not support such a conclusion regarding forensic 
rhetoric. These key terms, together with eunoia (good will) and axiopistia 
(credibility, trustworthiness), definitely need clarification.  
 
Preliminary clarification of the roles of ethos and pathos in relation to forensic 
argumentation is necessary. My aim is to concentrate on Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
                                            
15
 For the logographer see 2.1.2.The differences between amateur and professional speech in 
the Athenian courts with the shortcomings of the first that the second tried to correct is the 
theme of Bers (2009). The extent of the logographer’s assistance to an amateur client forms a 
continuum, ranging from “the high end, a logographos composing and delivering a speech 
himself…to the extreme low end, a functional illiterate making an unrehearsed, truly 
spontaneous speech” is described in Bers (2009), p. 10; cf. Dover (1968), Ch. 8.  
16
 The most famous example is to be found in the face of Strepsiades in Aristophanes’ Clouds. 
17
 Aristotle’s Rhetoric being the most famous, without underestimating the influence of Plato 
(see for e.g. Gorgias, Phaedrus) or the practical handbook of Anaxim. Rhet. ad Alex. Others 
have reached us through fragments or only by their names, though they seemingly had 
substantial impact on their contemporaries, such as Thrasymachus, Prodicus, and Theopompus 
of Chios.  
18
 Although his lack of interest in (or even dislike of) forensic oratory hindered him from giving us 
a more accurate and detailed view of this genre [see Trevett (1996)]. Furthermore, his interest 
in discussing rhetoric as a discipline forming the counterpart of dialectic, led him sometimes to a 
more theoretical than practical approach. This is also the reason that makes questionable 
whether the Rhetoric forms an accurate guide for the study of Athenian rhetoric in particular 
[see Hesk (2009); Harris (1994); Mirhady (1990); Carey (1996)]. 
19
 Carey (1994), at pp. 35, 39, 44. 
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which, due to its importance and its ‘intellectual approach’ to the subject20, has 
created disputes and misinterpretations. It is said that for Aristotle, the 
importance of ethos/pathos argumentation should be attributed to the 
inadequacy of the audience (cf. Rhet. 1354b; 1415b) and the weaknesses of 
the system which permitted such aberrations21. Although Aristotle admires 
systems which strictly prohibit speaking outside the issue and pass laws so 
inclusive that leave nothing to the discretion of the dicasts, evidently this is 
hardly realistic. Thus, room is left for the rhetoricians to resort to emotional 
pleas, by focusing on methods of putting the judges into a certain frame of 
mind. As a result, “in their case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved, 
so that they are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately,their 
judgment being obscured by their own pleasure or pain” (Rhet. 1314b). Such 
rhetorical devices “are outside the question, for they are only addressed to a 
hearer whose judgment is poor and who is ready to listen to what is beside the 
case” (Rhet. 1415b). Nevertheless, not all judges are such, and definitely 
Athenian judges did not lack the experience or the mental capacity to uncover 
rhetorical tricks22. It must also be noted that Aristotle particularly refers to 
emotional pleas which, as will be shown later, have (to an extent) to be 
distinguished from character evidence. However, an all-inclusive interpretation 
is usually given, citing Aristotle as hostile to any kind of rhetorical argumentation 
as inconsistent with law23, rendering mass juries incapable of regulating extra-
legal references.  
 
The question then admittedly is a complex one and the situation deteriorates if a 
question is asked as to why Aristotle, contrary to his suggestively negative 
opinion of rhetoricians who placed too much weight in the treatment of 
emotional appeals, devotes a substantial part of the Rhetoric’s Book II to the 
analysis of ‘non-essentials’ like emotions and types of personality. This may be 
explained as an inconsistency of approach (doubtful when referring to Aristotle) 
or as a practical division of Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric as ‘idealistic’ and 
                                            
20
 I borrow the term from Carey (1996). 
21
 Based on Arist. Rhet. 1354a,b; 1415b, this is the interpretation of e.g. Carey (1996), p. 40, 
n.24; Trevett (1996), pp. 378-9. 
22
 Cf. Harris (1994). 
23
 Harris (1994), (2006b) shows that such inconsistency is non-existent. No Athenian would 
consider rhetoric as inconsistent with legal argumentation, and no litigant would even think of 
inducing the jurors to disregard the law in favor of equity or other considerations.  
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‘realistic’24. Could there be another explanation for this? The answer will be 
given in due course, after the necessary clarification of the aforementioned key 
terms. For the moment it suffices to state my position that his hostility is against 
the degree and quality of emotional pleas suggested by his intellectual 
opponents. Aristotle is not overwhelmingly hostile to balanced emotional pleas 
which do not hinder the rational ability of the receiver, although he knows that 
these may sometimes be interpreted as irrelevant.  
 
In Aristotle, ethos has primarily an ethical or moral sense and is associated with 
the self-presentation of the speaker25. He is definitely not inimical to this and 
acknowledges its importance. The accounts of Aristotelian persuasion through 
character can be found in the chapters 1.2 and 2.1 of the Rhetoric. According to 
Fortenbaugh, the first refers to judicial settings while the second to 
deliberative26. In his view, in forensic environments the speaker must show 
epieikeia (uprightness of character) which parallels moral virtue (Rhet. 1377b 
25-6). Ethos here refers to moral disposition, as distinct from 2.1 where it is 
supplemented by the speaker’s reference to his deliberative capacities (wisdom, 
phronesis) and the advertisement of his good will towards the audience. 
Nonetheless, the rhetorical practice of the Athenian courts indicates that this 
traditional (Homeric) tripartite persuasion (wisdom, virtue, good will) was 
present in full in the law-courts27. Apart from the surviving speeches, this 
tripartite division is also verified by (probably) Anaximenes of Lampsacus advice 
in the rhetorical treatise Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (1436b 22-6).  
 
As shown in chapter 5, Greek ideas of ethical motivation dictated that in order 
for an orator to be successful (especially in the portrayal of character), account 
must be taken of the beliefs and values of the audience he wants to persuade28. 
                                            
24
 See for e.g. Rodgers (1984). 
25
 Gill (1984), p. 165; cf. P. 153. 
26
 Fortenbaugh W. (2006), Ch. 18, pp. 317 ff.  
27
 This was the idea in Fortenbaugh (1992), where he sees the Arist. Rhet. 1.2 and 2.1 as 
complementary. In Fortenbaugh (1996) he prefers to see them as distinct referring to different 
settings. The fact that Aristotle deals very briefly with persuasion through character as opposed 
to his account on emotions (2.2-2.11) is attributed to the familiarity of the audience with this kind 
of argumentation, since it held its roots in Homer. This lack of originality, as opposed to 
Aristotle’s new, cognitive analysis of emotions, led him restrict the length of the former and 
expand that of the latter.   
28
 Cf. Classen (1991). 
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In that respect, character is of utmost importance and “may almost be called the 
most effective means of persuasion he possesses” (Rhet. 1356a 10-14). One’s 
axiopistia (credibility) depends on the convincing of the audience of his 
adherence to popular norms; moral character needs to be presented 
accordingly. For Aristotle, this impression of one’s ethos is created through the 
speech and achieved through the skilful use of language, not by what people 
think of him before he begins to speak (Rhet. 1356a 8-10). Appropriate 
arguments, style and delivery, in a manner that is prepon (fitting) to the speaker, 
are necessary to create a particular impression of one’s character to the 
audience. In contrast, Isocrates refers to a speaker’s ethos as something 
achieved throughout one’s life, i.e. his prior reputation (Isocr. 15.278). This can 
be said to be more effective in face-to-face communities (not rejected in 
principle by Aristotle as has been shown in chapter 1). Furthermore it has been 
recently argued that “the aspect of character was perhaps relatively 
straightforward in Athenian oratory because in the law courts defendants spoke 
on their own behalf; advocacy…greatly complicated the use of character”29. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s remarks fit better with Attic oratory where speakers, 
regarding presentation of character, relied to a great extent on rhetoric. Careful 
argumentation was employed in order to highlight or darken the more or less 
advantageous details of an (even well-known) event, to eulogise one’s past acts 
in proving an upright way of life, to advertise his good will towards the audience, 
the polis and its norms.  
 
Persuasion through pathos has different implications. Here, the centre of 
attention departs from the speaker and focuses on the hearer. From ‘persuasion 
through the speaker’s character’ it becomes ‘persuasion through the hearers’ 
emotions’. In particular, the orator concentrates on ways and methods that 
could produce the desired emotional effect on his audience. Emotional appeals 
had been very popular with the writers of rhetorical handbooks, forming the 
central theme of their treatises. Aristotle, although he recognises the importance 
of the audience’s emotional condition (Rhet. 1377b 21-31) as a result of its 
inadequacy, nevertheless remains hostile to such practices, though not 
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 Steel (2009), p. 81. As we have seen before, this may be accepted with some reservations. 
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universally30. His negative remarks form a reply to the writers who have 
themselves overstated the importance of emotional appeals, presumably at the 
expense of legitimate strictly legal argumentation and character evidence31. But 
to what extent does Aristotle’s treatment of emotion differ from that attributed to 
other writers? And to what extent may be said that emotional appeal was 
relevant and successful in Athenian courts?  
 
Emotional pleas have always been regarded as targeting the impulsive, 
irrational parts of the human mind and soul, thus hindering its ability for rational 
thought. On the other hand, Aristotle’s treatment of emotions in the Rhetoric 
2.2-2.11 is original and contributes significantly to the development of 
philosophical psychology. It is explaining the tie between belief and emotion, 
intending to show that human emotions can be based on the outcomes of 
rational calculation. An orator’s ethical and emotional argumentation need not 
aim at arousing illogical reactions but provide grounds for trust without 
undermining the impartiality of the audience32. In other words, such 
argumentation about the moral uprightness of a litigant’s character which 
provides reasons for reasoning (and as a result it may cause mild emotional 
reactions), differs sharply from what Aristotle’s adversaries advised their 
readers. Their kind of argumentation, according to the Stagirite philosopher, 
was outside the issue, referring to extraneous matters, undermining the 
audience’s impartiality and critical thinking. In this way the audience, which was 
provoked to feel pleasure and pain, was directly affected in judgment (cf. Rhet. 
1377b 31-1378a6; 1378a 20-21). On the contrary, argumentation producing 
sensible emotional responses based on beliefs and reasoning retains its 
legitimacy since it does not hamper the audience’s straight judgment. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have indicated yet another critical point concerning 
ethical and emotional argumentation. Aristotelian persuasion through character 
is not intended to arouse emotional reactions in the audience. The uprightness 
of one’s moral character provides reasons for trusting the speaker, without 
undermining the audience’s judgmental ability. Presenting good character by 
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 Cf. Carey (1996), p. 40 n. 24. 
31
 Cf. Fortenbaugh (2006), p. 325. 
32
 Fortenbaugh (2006), p. 317. 
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showing adherence to widely accepted norms and beliefs can be a way of 
making oneself credible (axiopistos), significantly contributing to persuasiveness 
by legitimate means. Secondly, this kind of argumentation may overlap with (or 
be seen as) emotional pleas which, again, need not be illegitimate and 
irrelevant. What may be called trustworthiness, when focusing on the speaker, 
can also be called good will (eunoia), when focusing on the audience’s 
response. However, the triggering act remains the same: the speech and 
argumentation which provides reasons for a cognitive procedure providing the 
aforementioned results. Lastly, emotional argumentation may be unrefined and 
irrelevant, aiming at arousing crude responses in the unsophisticated mob, thus 
undermining rhetoric and justice per se33. To conclude, in Gill’s precise words  
 
“a prose orator either can appeal to his audience to view his figures in an ‘ethical’ way, as 
characterised agents, whose moral or personal qualities are presented for calm and rational 
assessment. Or he can aim at a more intuitive response, inducing his audience to share his 
figures’ emotions or to respond to the pathos of their situation, with very limited critical or ethical 
detachment”
34
.  
 
In the course of the above discussion reference has been made to the issue of 
good will, which also needs some clarification. The issue of securing the good 
will of the audience was crucial and common to all litigants. In all parts of a 
speech, from the prooemium to the epilogue, speakers aimed at establishing 
concord with their hearers35 simultaneously undermining their opponent’s 
chances of success. Either through the presentation of their own (dispositional 
or occasional) good will towards their hearers, or through the presentation of 
their ethos or pathos, speakers sought for a mild and impartial or an intensely 
emotional and partial kind of good will. As a result, four meanings of eunoia are 
present in the law courts. 
  
A speaker’s good will towards his polis (represented by the jurors) could be 
revealed through his ethos, arguing that his philia towards his polis and 
compatriots is an established disposition, a character trait acquired through his 
                                            
33
 This strategy was very risky as to its results, as will be shown in due course, especially when 
dealing with experienced audiences like the Athenian. 
34
 Gill (1984), pp. 165-6, and n. 99. 
35
 Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1167a-b; cf. McGlew (2004). 
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civic paideia. Past services to his polis, enumeration of liturgies and other 
benefactions, and a more general adherence to the norms of the audience as a 
proof of civic virtue36, formed patterns of argumentation in Athenian courts. 
Regardless of whether he asked for the jurors’ charis (gratitude) by referring to 
such arguments, the essence remains the use of the Homeric tripartite division 
(virtue-wisdom-good will) in order to secure the eunoia of the audience. On the 
other hand, a speaker’s good will could be proved by more emotional 
argumentation. In reference to occasional, spontaneous reactions, which 
though not proving an established character, could nonetheless prove his 
emotional attachment to his polis. He may invite the audience to share the 
pathos he felt during such moments and respond accordingly. Therefore both 
ethos and pathos could be adduced in a litigant’s speech in order to advertise 
his good will37. 
 
As far as the eunoia of the audience is concerned, again, this might be divided 
into two kinds: mild and passionate. The audience may react in an unemotional 
way, acknowledging the trustworthiness of a speaker and attributing a fair 
amount of credibility, though retaining their impartiality and critical thinking in 
order to reach a just result. It was a rhetorical topos to ask for the eunoia of the 
audience (especially in the Prooemium), and definitely this kind of good will 
equated to fair hearing rather than an invitation to the jurors to behave contrary 
to their oath, in an emotional, biased manner. In fact, there was nothing to 
prevent an audience from feeling good will toward all speakers, even though the 
speakers are opposed to each other. That is what Isocrates calls “common 
good will” (koine eunoia, Isoc. 15.22)38. On the other hand good will may reach 
its climax and imitate ‘friendship’39, inducing the audience to more passionate 
and partial responses40. Although this was prohibited by the Heliastic oath 
(Dem. 24.151), the mere presence of such a clause in the oath reveals the 
                                            
36
 Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1367b: “We ought also to consider in whose presence we praise, for, 
as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians.
 
We ought also to speak 
of what is esteemed among the particular audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or 
philosophers, as actually existing there”.  
37
 Cf. Fortenbaugh (2006), p. 338. 
38
 Fortenbaugh (2006), p. 334 n. 44. 
39
 Arist. Rhet. 1378a19; Nic. Eth. 1166b33 where good will is described as “less intense philia”; 
Fortenbaugh (1992), pp. 219-220. 
40
 For a study of such responses, see Bers (1985).  
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existence of the problem. The most famous and characteristic example comes 
from a speech delivered by Apollodorus (Dem. 45) against Stephanus for false 
testimony, in prolongation of a trial between himself and his stepfather Phormio. 
Apollodorus says that his opponent “made such an impression on the jury that 
they refused to hear a single word from me: I was fined one-sixth of the amount 
claimed, was denied the right of a hearing, and was treated with such 
contumely as I doubt if any other man ever was, and I went from the court, men 
of Athens, taking the matter bitterly and grievously to heart”41. Although such 
episodes may be described as “aberrations from the norm” where the court 
“have yielded to emotional appeals and failed to perform their duty of upholding 
the law”42, they nonetheless highlight the untypical emergence of passionate 
good will towards one of the parties, reaching the extent of prejudice. After all, 
this is what Aristotle detested the most.  
 
From the above evidence it is revealed that the popular conclusion regarding 
emotional pleas and prejudice in Athenian courts, i.e. litigants digressing to 
irrelevant argumentation thus hindering the correct execution of justice, may not 
be so accurate after all. Especially when referring to Aristotle, modern 
researchers must be very careful in citing his Rhetoric for support. Moreover, 
regarding the court speeches in particular, new studies have shown that 
emotional argumentation could in truth damage a speaker’s case. In her study 
on dicastic anger, Rubinstein has noted that emotional pleas needed to be 
carefully checked, having different, proper degrees of intensity43. Depending on 
the type of the case and the composition of the audience, speakers had to 
adjust their argumentation, avoiding emotional extremities. Similarly, Bers 
argues that professional speech in the courts of classical Athens aimed at the 
restraint of the speaker’s affect, thus correcting a common mistake of amateur 
speakers. In his words “an individual amateur litigant, lacking the logographer’s 
restraining hand, would more likely yield to his emotions and allow his rage to 
break out, thereby offending his judges and harming his case”44. The changing 
attitudes in Athenian society, namely the transition from the approval of anger, 
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 Dem. 45.6. 
42
 Harris (1994), p. 137. 
43
 Rubinstein (2004). 
44
 Bers (2009), p. 98. 
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rage and aggressive emotions of the heroic age to their restraint due to the 
emergence of cooperative values such as moderation and self-control, ordained 
similar behaviour in the courts of law45. Evidently, this is not to suggest that 
emotional pleas were abandoned or even condemned46; however, the 
emergence of a new ethics was at hand, once more rendering easy conclusions 
concerning the Athenian legal system inappropriate. 
 
Our final consideration in this effort for clarification of rhetorical terms concerns 
axiopistia (credibility, trustworthiness). Credibility concerns the believability of 
the person, either litigant or witness. The strict legal application of the notion of 
credibility relates to the testimony of a witness or party during a trial. Testimony 
must be both competent and credible if it is to be accepted by the tester of fact 
as proof of an issue being litigated. Questions may arise concerning the 
credibility (including reliability) of a witness (or a litigant) who testifies about the 
facts in issue or facts relevant to the issue47 and this also decides the weight 
that a testimony deserves. Overall, a trustworthy and respectable speaker 
enhances his chances of being successful.  
 
Aristotle in his Rhetoric (1356a) links credibility with character:  
 
“The orator persuades by moral character when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to 
render him worthy of confidence; for we feel confidence in a greater degree and more readily in 
persons of worth in regard to everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is 
room for doubt, our confidence is absolute”. 
 
By the same token, counter-attacking the adversary and assassinating his 
moral character is equally recommended: for it would be absurd to believe the 
words of a speaker who is himself unworthy of belief (Rhet. 1416a). These 
conclusions had been reached by earlier orators as well. Antiphon, in one of the 
earliest surviving speeches observes that ‘when there are no witnesses, you are 
forced to reach a verdict about the case on the basis of the prosecutor’s and 
                                            
45
 For a study of ‘rage’ and the aforementioned transition see Harris W. (2001), esp. Chs. 7,8. 
46
 This is evident by their presence in the surviving speeches; see for e.g. Dem. 21.34; 24.118 
Lys. 6.17; 31.11; Isoc. 18.4,36; 20.6, 9, 22 etc. 
47
 Dennis (2010), p. 12. 
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defendant’s words alone’48 so the jurors ‘must examine what each side swore 
and decide which of us was more truthful and swore more correctly’49. 
Andokides, in his defence speech repeatedly tries to attack the credibility of the 
prosecutors, by referring to allegations of dishonesty and sycophancy. 
Projecting his own beliefs onto the jurors he continuously uses phrases such as 
‘you know what sort of men they are…’50 in order to diminish the credibility of 
his opponents. The examples are numerous and occur in almost every extant 
speech, even in cases where the court had to decide on an inheritance, where 
the claims were equal and the structural unsymmetrical adversarial nature of 
the trial was neutralised. Similar efforts can be found in Lysias. The prosecutor 
on the scrutiny of Evandrus acknowledged that ‘It is your business, gentlemen 
of the Council, to inquire whether you will reach a better decision in the matter 
of this scrutiny by listening to me or to Thrasybulus, who will defend this man’51.  
6.3 Emotional Argumentation 
The previous section demonstrated the, in principle, unjustified universal 
condemnation of emotional appeals as inconsistent with rational judgment and 
irrelevant to the legal case. This approach is heavily influenced by the post-
Kantian assumptions of a ‘reason – passion’ contrast with the first requiring total 
abstraction and detachment, being, as a result, incompatible with the second. 
The Greeks however narrate a completely different story52. For them, human 
emotions and desires are informed by beliefs and reasoning. A person’s 
emotional world is totally dependent on and informed by contextual stimuli, such 
as cultural presumptions and upbringing. In other words, pathos is taken to be 
‘rational’ in the sense that it is based on a cognitive evaluation of a particular 
situation; the person, drawing on preconceived ethical beliefs and stereotypical 
assumptions instilled on him  by the environment, reacts with a proper 
response, i.e. feeling the proper emotion53. Therefore, the Greek ideas of 
personality and the human mind discussed in chapter 5, illuminate this 
problematic case as well. The ‘objective / participant’ human being’s emotional 
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 Antiph. 6.18; cf. Lys. 22.17. 
49
 Antiph. 6.16. 
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 Andoc. 1.133; cf. 1.139. 
51
 Lys. 26.21. 
52
 See for e.g. Gill (1996), at pp. 22, 104, 179, 203 and 227; cf. Cairns (1993), at pp. 6-10. 
53
 For Chrysippus in particular, emotions depended on (or, more strongly, were) beliefs. See Gill 
(1996), p. 227. 
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responses (as well as human action) are formed by his ethical judgments 
leading to a rational – cum – emotional consistency. As a result, patterns of 
emotional response are created which can then be evaluated and characterised 
as acceptable or unacceptable by reference to shared ethical norms for such 
responses. 
 
This story is also evident in Athenian courts. Appeals to pity are not uncommon 
in the forensic speeches, especially of the defendants. But did these appeals 
prejudice the jurors unfairly in order to reach an irrational and unjust decision? 
Regardless the underlying motives of the speakers, such emotional appeals 
were not inconsistent or incompatible with rational judgment. Pity was asked by 
the jurors as the proper emotional response to the particular situation of the 
innocent defendant. Based on the proper beliefs (as presented by the 
defendant), the correct reasoning and evaluation of the particular case would 
lead the jurors to acquit the appealing litigant, simultaneously showing the 
proper emotive reaction of pity. Unmerited suffering is the key phrase that 
denotes the proper understanding of the emotion of pity in classical Athens54. 
The cognitive dimension of the emotions is thus evident. However, together with 
the psychological element, reference can be made to structural considerations 
in order to prove this compatibility between the emotional appeals to pity and 
the rational evaluation of the particular legal case. The cognitive dimension is 
demonstrated by the establishment of a relationship between the jurors and the 
litigant, whereby the latter exemplified (either through words or enactment) his 
submission and trust to the power of the demos55, asking for its proper 
emotional response56. Finally, noteworthy is this emotional appeal’s very 
reasonable and targeted usage in cases of harsh impact, and especially when 
the preservation of an oikos was at stake57. Its proper and targeted use signifies 
the very ‘rationality’ of its application. 
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 Cf. Konstan (2000), p. 129. 
55
 See Johnstone (1999), p. 110. 
56
 Cf. Konstan (2000), p. 138: “[h]e is making vivid to the jury what losing his case would mean 
for himself and his family, precisely on the assumption that he is innocent. His object is not to 
ask for mercy, in the sense in which mercy presupposes guilt; it is to make sure that no 
irrelevant motive, such as personal hostility, political partisanship, or favour toward his accuser, 
may induce the jury to convict him, by making clear what is at stake if they do so”. 
57
 Cf. Johnstone (1999), at pp. 111-120. 
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As far as appeals to dicastic anger are concerned (although as an emotion 
diametrically antithetical to pity) the same patterns emerge58. Aristotle defines 
anger as “a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge on account of 
a perceived slight” (Arist. Rhet. 1378a31-2). Appeals to anger or rage (orge) 
(which, as an emotion is dictated by the relevant beliefs that produce it) 59 are 
always coupled with the guilt of the opposing party. The argument is context-
sensitive and is only adduced in public cases (graphai) or in dikai where the 
legal offence called for the punishment of the perpetrator (signified by the verbs 
kolazein or timoreisthai and their derivatives)60. Appeals to orge are invoked (in 
accordance with Aristotle’s analysis in the Rhetoric) only against a specific 
individual, provided that the person appealed to has to feel that he has been 
injured personally. By contrast, misos is represented as an emotion that can be 
directed against an entire category of people, without presupposing a feeling of 
personal injury61.  
 
The perfect rationality of these emotions and their usage in Athenian courts is 
therefore evident. In Rubinstein’s words “what held speakers back from 
appealing openly to dicastic orge in dikai  may have been their fear that such 
appeals might back-fire, because their claim that their case was of common 
concern simply would not have seemed plausible enough for the dicasts to 
accept that line of explicit emotional argumentation”62. Finally, it is noteworthy 
that Athenian defendants never tried to assuage the jurors’ stirred anger 
through an expression of remorse or repentance because this would simply 
mean admission of guilt. However, if they believed that the jurors voted carried 
away by their emotions rather than according to their oath, such efforts might 
have been present. For the simple fact that their admission of guilt would not 
automatically condemn them (since the jurors would assess extraneous 
considerations) and the (more influencing) appeals to emotions would provide 
them with a better chance. 
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 See for e.g. Rubinstein (2004) and (2005a); Konstan (2008); Harris W. (2008), Ch. 8. 
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 Arist. Rhet. 1380a. 
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 See Rubinstein (2004), (2005a). 
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 Rubinstein (2004), p. 193. 
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Shame63(aidos or aiskhune) is the emotion of “pain or disturbance concerning 
those ills, either present, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to disgrace, 
while shamelessness is a disregard or impassivity concerning these same 
things” (Arist. Rhet. 1383b12-14). This emotion is prompted by three elements: 
a particular disgraceful act, the fault of character that is revealed by the act, and 
the (real or imagined) loss of esteem brought as a result before the community 
at large. As becomes evident, shame before the community presupposes an 
adherence to and internalisation of conventional ethical norms and proper 
courses of action, whose breach would be perceived as reprehensible by the 
community and trigger negative judgments against and disgrace to the agent. 
The fact that this reaction by the community may even be totally imagined 
reveals the significance of this process of internalisation for the emotion of 
shame64. Shamelessness, on the other hand, entails either the agent’s 
indifference as to his reputation or the lack of knowledge as to which acts or 
character traits are disgraceful. This latter aspect is brought forward in the 
forensic speeches.  
 
Shamelessness in Greek orators is directed against an opponent whose 
conduct and previous acts prove indifference as to the conventional ethical 
norms. Shame is the indicative emotion which renders an agent adherent to or 
unreceptive of the community’s values. Hubristic, arrogant conduct is coupled 
with shamelessness65. A shameless person is one who “has not stopped short 
of the utmost limits of depravity”66. In a similar manner, concerning misuse of 
the laws and sycophancy, Demosthenes asks Aeschines “Are you not ashamed 
to prosecute for spite, not for crime?”67. Any breach of communal norms 
coupled with the agent’s lack of shame proved the latter’s lack of internalisation 
of ethical norms, with the subsequent results discussed in chapter 5 (rendering 
himself an ethical outcast of the community). On the other hand, a speaker’s 
silencing of the opponent’s (what are said to be) exceptionally reprehensible 
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 See Konstan (2003); cf. Cairns (1993). 
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 As Cairns (1993), p. 5 asserts: “to experience shame is to place an action, experience, or 
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relates to some perceived attribute of the world ‘out there’”. 
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and indecent acts may be used to reveal his unequivocal adherence to the 
community’s morals68. Phrases such as “I am ashamed to say how mean and 
shabby they are”69  are not uncommon. The most indicative example comes 
from Aeschines: 
 
“Now the sins of this Pittalacus against the person of Timarchus, and his abuse of him, as they 
have come to my ears, are such that, by the Olympian Zeus, I should not dare to repeat them to 
you. For the things that he was not ashamed to do in deed, I had rather die than describe to you 
in words (ἃ γὰρ οὑτοσὶ ἔργῳ πράττων οὐκ ᾐσχύνετο, ταῦτ᾽ ἐγὼ λόγῳ σαφῶς ἐν ὑμῖν εἰπὼν οὐκ 
ἂν δεξαίμην ζῆν)” (Aeschin. 1.55). 
 
The ‘rationality’ of this emotion and the ‘reasonable’ outcomes it causes are 
obvious. 
 
Finally, focusing on the jurors calls for an analysis of the emotion of envy70. 
Aristotle defines this (Rhet. 1386b18-20) as a painful emotion arising from the 
prosperity of a person who is ‘similar’ to us, thus produced by an unfavourable 
comparison with someone who seems to possess something that we lack. 
Although the ‘rationality’ of this emotion and its grounding on the agent’s beliefs 
and reasoning are evident, further analysis is due. Apart from concentrating on 
techniques of inoffensive self-praise before a mass audience (these techniques 
acknowledging the ‘rationality’ of the emotion, aiming at cancelling or 
substituting the beliefs or the reasoning that provoke it), the main aim here is to 
demonstrate the role of liturgies in neutralising the jurors’ potential envy. In 
chapter 5, the multidimensional role of the invocation of liturgies has been 
demonstrated. These findings may be supplemented with the interpretation of 
this practice as potential obstruction to the arousal of envy.  
 
Adducing liturgies, instead of being a method of distracting the jurors from the 
particular legal offence, may be contrastingly seen as a method of keeping them 
focused on the point. Considering certain that the adversary of a wealthy litigant 
would try to excite the envy (and suspicion) of the jurors against a wealthy 
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litigant, the latter, by enumerating his liturgies, reveals his public-spiritedness 
and asks them not to decide the case by reference to irrelevant motives. In 
order to achieve this he refers to his public expenditure as generous sop 
sharing71 or even true sharing. The speaker of Lysias 19 exclaims:  
 
“Consider, as you survey the time that is past, all that is found to have been spent on the city: at 
this moment, too, I am equipping a warship from the residue; my father was equipping one 
when he died, and I will try to do what I saw him doing, and raise, by degrees, some little sums 
for the public services. Thus in reality it continues to be the property of the State” (Lys. 
19.62).  
 
Envy, although an emotion, was again treated as ‘rational’ deriving from 
relevant beliefs and a course of reasoning. Appeals to emotion were not 
incompatible with rational consideration of the legal case; rather they reinforced 
it by reference to a different kind of reasoning.  
6.4 Conclusion 
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics evaluates the quality of a person’s 
emotional response and its relation with virtue by reference to the mean (to 
meson). He provides that  
 
“[…] to feel [fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and, in general, pleasure and 
pain] at the right time, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right 
motive, and in the right way, is what is both mean [meson] and best, and this is characteristic of 
virtue”. (1106b21-3) 
 
The Athenian legal system, as presented in the speeches of the orators, 
encouraged litigants to use character evidence and appeals to emotion in a 
similar, rational manner. Proper emotional responses should be provoked with 
regard to the right persons, at the correct timing (in dikai, graphai etc.), with the 
appropriate reaction in the form of a legal verdict, always   combining written 
law and justice. Behavioural patterns were thus formed and propagated by the 
jurors and the court (acting as a section of the demos, therefore as a coherent 
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ethical sub-community) in the Aristotelian way72, whereby a virtuous community 
propagates its ethical beliefs (as discussed in chapter 5) and the appropriate 
emotional responses (chapter 6). In this way the court through its verdicts 
structurally acted as the educator of the polis, testing, reinforcing and 
propagating the correct ethical motivation and reasoning of the citizens. Thus, 
the court, in order to achieve this legal enforcement of norms, not only had to 
decide in accordance with the written law which encapsulated an underlying 
ethical norm but (it is unavoidable to suggest that) it had to do it in a fairly 
consistent way as to allow the citizens to adjust their behavior accordingly.  
 
The aforementioned considerations also reveal the importance and the 
complexity of the uses and purposes of character evidence and extra-legal 
argumentation in Athenian courts. Opposing arguments and divergent 
conclusions (both from ancient and modern sources) have confused the picture 
and called for a fresh consideration of the issues. Contrary to the popular 
perception regarding the susceptibility of Athenian courts to irrelevant 
considerations, the above discussion has proved that ethos and pathos 
argumentation could be relevant and legitimate in a forensic setting. Aristotle 
particularly acknowledged character evidence as the most important assistance 
in arguing a case. The surviving speeches prove that this was true for the 
protagonists of the Athenian legal system as well. Moreover, emotional pleas 
could also be relevant and legitimate, provided that they were checked and kept 
to a balanced degree. Athenian jurors, with minor aberrations, were 
experienced and thus more than capable of recognising the rhetorical strategy 
of litigants, not letting themselves be tricked and manipulated. In truth, such an 
effort could backfire and damage a speaker’s chances of success. Therefore, 
modern researchers should be cautious when they underestimate the ability 
and desire of Athenian jurors to perform according to their oaths in order to 
enforce their notion of the rule of law. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In these final remarks, conclusions are drawn as to the issues that have been 
raised by this thesis and the further implications that my findings may have for 
research. Analysis of character evidence, a dominant aspect of Athenian 
forensic argumentation, is central to the better understanding of the nature of 
Athenian law and its placement within its appropriate socio-political and cultural 
boundaries. In the first instance, the issues discussed touch upon the Athenian 
approach to law and justice; the question of relevance predominates. Closer 
inspection shows that the evidence offered by this thesis radiates in most fields 
of human life. Building on its outcomes, further research is needed in order to 
grasp its wide-ranging impact. 
  
This thesis aspired to be deeply ‘political’ in the Aristotelian sense of the word. 
The flaws of historical materialism, as disguised in the form of Western 
Capitalism or Marxism, have repeatedly been exposed and the homo 
economicus has slipped into following a deeply antisocial, utilitarian stance. The 
western worldview with its deification of the consumerist market economy has 
led to an egocentric, individualistic barbarism. On the other hand, the Greek 
worldview, as subtly presented by this thesis, poses as an alternative. Ideas 
and mentality may form the foundations of social and historical progress, being 
the driving forces behind the institutional and political development. Resistance 
to voracious selfishness need not take the form of an alternative ideology which 
accepts the same patterns of thought but interprets them differently. The 
emergence of an alternative lifestyle directed by the tropoi of the participatory, 
communal homo politicus may be brought forward as the way ahead. Therefore 
this thesis aimed at familiarising its reader with an alternative worldview, by 
taking a step away from the materialistic conception of being and placing the 
political human at the forefront. 
 
As has been demonstrated, the legal structures of the ancient polis in particular, 
retained their original political character of serving the needs of the citizens. 
Abstaining from taking an elitist, cut off from the society, autonomous path, 
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justice remained a matter of the community. Direct and unimpeded partaking in 
the civic workings gave meaning to the ‘objective/participant’ person’s life. The 
field of the courts was run by laymen whose deeply rooted traditional 
conceptions guaranteed a coherent and consistent approach to justice in the 
form they moulded it. Though focusing on character evidence and the 
administration of justice, this thesis touched upon wider issues which can 
change our perspective of the world.  
 
1. Key Findings 
This thesis demonstrated the consistent presence of character evidence during 
the archaic and the classical period. Alongside other examples from the earliest 
period in which evidence exists proof was offered that this approach to forensic 
argumentation, typical of the fifth century, was inherited from the practices of 
the past (Chapter 1). This conclusion allows us to observe the Athenian legal 
system as a single living organism which changed and evolved through the 
centuries, rather than a corpse whose last moments are used for autopsy. 
Furthermore, evidence drawn from throughout the Greek world, demonstrated 
the inner uniformity of Greek law as an entity, regardless of the superficial 
differentiations of the laws of each polis.  
 
In both legal and quasi-legal fields, broad citation of argumentation drawn from 
the speaker’s ethos challenges the rule of relevance that required adversaries 
to ‘speak to the point’. However, the persistence of this practice and the 
consistent patterns of argumentation which were (intuitively or consciously) 
followed by the speakers, accepted by the audience, and permitted by the 
structures, call for explanation. If these were leading to confusion and dispute, 
the Athenians would have developed stricter controlling mechanisms. The 
incentives offered by the legal system itself (Chapter 2) prove the opposite. The 
implication of this thesis was that the rule of relevance was substantively 
respected, in accordance with the standards the ancient Athenians had set. 
These standards had to be uncontroversial and objective, rather than 
questionable. If the underlying causes of this practice were solid, the first step 
towards consistency of approach through time and space would have been 
taken.   
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The wide invocation of character evidence is proved to have its roots on 
psychological factors and may be safely partly attributed to the Greek ideas of 
‘character’ (Chapter 3). Both philosophical and popular confidence in the 
probative value of character allowed the emphasis it enjoyed in forensic 
argumentation. In an era when proof beyond doubt was not facilitated by 
technological means, other forms of evidence (such as circumstantial 
demonstrating probability) gained ground. Of these alternative forms, character 
was the most trustworthy. Belief in the unity of virtue or vice induced litigants to 
advertise their good traits and highlight their opponent’s reprehensible ones, 
even though (at first glance) they may seem only remotely relevant. Uncertainty 
as to the changeable nature of a person’s character led to the citation of a 
series of examples from the past, in order to prove consistency of behaviour 
and militate against allegations of opportunism. The uncertain conclusions 
about human character caused the flexible approach of the orators and explain 
the varying theories expressed in the speeches. Nonetheless, responsibility for 
one’s actions was not questioned (regardless whether other forces such as 
chance or accidental ignorance come into play) with attribution of guilt and 
blameworthiness remaining unproblematic.  
 
The above conclusions of Chapter 3 as to the first underlying cause of the wide 
approach to argumentation from ethos reveal the rationale behind the strategies 
and methods the Athenians used to portray character. These have been 
explored, while illustrating the patterns the orators followed. As a result, these 
patterns made forensic argumentation relatively consistent and predictable. Its 
content though, was directly linked to deeper issues of Athenian life. 
Sociological and cultural considerations have to be taken into account in order 
to understand the rhetorical tactics of ancient orators. The importance of living 
in a face-to-face community leaves its mark on the strategies of providing 
character evidence. In the context of a ‘shame culture’ reputation and gossip 
carry significant weight, disproportionately to what they are afforded in modern 
courts. Comparison with the Anglo-American approach is necessary in order to 
highlight the cultural forces influencing the semi-autonomous realm of the 
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courts. To complete the picture, technical issues have also been discussed, 
mainly concerning the presentation and delivery of the speeches. 
  
These two chapters (3 and 4) examined the Greek ideas of ‘character’ and 
illustrated how these worked in practice. Another driving force, the Greek ideas 
of ‘personality’, decisively influenced forensic argumentation (Chapter 5). 
Ancient ideas of the ‘person’, as opposed to modern ones, form yet another 
cause for the wide approach to character evidence and explain many rhetorical 
patterns. Researchers assume modern ideas of personality which are 
completely unsuitable for application in the setting of classical Athens. This is 
central to this thesis’ argumentation since it has proved that in order to 
comprehend and explain the Athenian approach to justice, the Cartesian and 
Kantian models of the ‘subjective-individual’ person have to be replaced by the 
ancient ‘objective-participant’ self. This methodological issue constitutes the key 
for a more accurate and proper interpretation of Attic rhetoric. What is more, 
recognition of this fact reveals the problematic nature of comparative studies. 
The Athenian legal system’s procedures and practices can only be evaluated in 
accordance with their standards. When contrasted to modern approaches, 
clarification has to be made of the terms and standards through which this 
comparison is made. Any references to controversial notions such as the rule of 
law or relevance and any evaluations as to whether the Athenians actually 
attained them are invalid, unless clear definitions of these terms are given. 
Judging the ancient Athenians according to whether they had actually attained 
anything similar to the modern ‘rule of law’ is anachronistic. 
  
Chapter 5 therefore proved in objective and unambiguous terms the relevance 
of character evidence which is, at first glance, unrelated to the offence. Deeper 
understanding and application of the ancient model of the human mind and 
action theory (instead of their Cartesian and post-Cartesian counterparts) 
exposed the Greek method of reasoning. Questions as to the facts of a case or 
as to whether a litigant committed an alleged deed were answered by reference 
to his previous record of actions which revealed his way of thinking. In addition, 
the application of the ancient theory of ethical motivation illustrated that the 
many instances of litigants’ invocation of their wholehearted adherence to the 
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norms of the community, was not simply a rhetorical device to win the good will 
of the jury but had deeper causes and implications. Keeping in mind the unity of 
virtue and vice and the indivisibility of character (discussed in Chapter 3), 
obedience to communal rules proved the person’s affiliation to the polis and the 
community as a whole. As a result, a person who had demonstrated proper / 
improper ethical motivation was deemed to be capable / incapable of 
committing a crime. These findings were illustrated by reference to many 
examples from court speeches. Understood in such terms, character evidence 
becomes surprisingly relevant. 
 
Thus far, the main ideas answer to the presence and the persistence of the 
wide invocation of character evidence through the centuries and identify the 
structural and psychological reasons that caused it. The final Chapter (6) limits 
its focus to the legal system (once again after Chapter 4). Based on a close 
examination of the forensic speeches, it exposed the more practical and 
legalistic purposes of character evidence in the courts. By questioning the effect 
that such argumentation allegedly had on jurors, the secondary aims that it 
served have been detected. The conclusion is that, regardless the fact that 
many researchers interpret character evidence as a means of distracting the 
jurors’ rational thinking by arousing their emotions, the susceptibility of Athenian 
courts to irrelevant argumentation remained minimal and rarely obstructed the 
smooth execution of justice. The rule of law (as the Athenians understood it) 
prevailed and, among other factors, credit has to be given to the wide use of 
character evidence.  
 
2. Further Implications of the Thesis 
As noted above, the study of character evidence in the legal sphere touches 
upon further issues of everyday life. The sphere of the courts is not autonomous 
from other fields of social and political life; this is true in the case of classical 
Athens, where the ‘objective-participant’ person lacked the modern ‘autonomy 
of the will’ and the audiences of public bodies were manned by the same 
people. Litigants carried with them their personal merit and characteristic ethical 
motivation they displayed through the course of their everyday life.  
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This reality of the Athenian legal system, which is proved by this thesis’ close 
inspection of forensic rhetoric, may be extended to other fields such as the 
theatre and political rhetoric. A comparative study may put together the 
evidence from political speeches and theatrical plays in order to discover 
similarities and differences as to their respective approaches to character and 
personality. This may disclose the extent of homogeneity between the 
argumentation displayed in a theatrical agon, in a fierce political contest and in 
the adversarial arena of a court. In this way, constants of a popular culture will 
emerge and the extent of diffusion of philosophical ideas to the popular masses 
will be revealed. Although this influence is bidirectional, a solid argument will be 
offered to those that see arenas such as the theatre and the Pnyx as educators 
of the public.  
 
What is certain from my thesis is that the argumentation offered in the courts 
differed from the theatrical agon in a very important aspect. While litigants 
displayed ‘first-order’ ethical reasoning, showing their complete adherence to 
the undisputed conventional ethics of the community, theatrical characters 
proceeded to ‘second-order’ reasoning, examining and questioning these 
norms. The reasons for this approach are many and to an extent obvious. 
Firstly, the role of theatre differs from that of the court. Regardless whether a 
poet longed for the prize, theatrical characters enjoy a certain freedom, while 
litigants risk their life and property in reality. Thus for the latter it is of utmost 
importance to win the good will of the jurors by showing their unequivocal 
submission to the rules of the community. At the end of the day, the one and 
only norm to be judged in the court is the written law that the defendant had 
allegedly breached. This alone is enough to forbid any ‘second-order’ reasoning 
that challenges the law of the polis; no one dared to question it or to provoke 
jurors to vote on other issues and this is yet another indication of the prevalence 
of the rule of law in Athenian courts.  The only court speech that seems to 
display ‘second-order’ reasoning, criticising the practices of Athenian courts and 
the systematic attitudes of litigants and jurors is Plato’s Apology of Socrates. 
This may also form the focus of further research and analysis on the above 
grounds.  
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This thesis also relied on the understanding and application of the Greek 
method of reasoning. It has been argued that the strategies and the content of 
character evidence have been formed in accordance with the inductive mode of 
thinking. Either in a conscious or an unconscious way, the influence it has 
exerted on argumentation is indisputable. Nevertheless, the type of 
argumentation influenced in turn the functions of the legal system and the 
nature of Athenian law. The obvious question that logically follows is that: “If the 
inductive mode of reasoning influenced and formed to an extent the Athenian 
legal system, did it have similar consequences for other institutions as well?”. 
Maybe the question seems far-fetched and overambitious, but what is the 
relationship of a population’s typical method of reasoning to formations such as 
the polis-state, to constitutions such as the democratic, or to religious types 
such as polytheism? Building on the methodology of Plato in the Republic, does 
the human psyche resemble the institutions humans create? Is there a link 
between the Greek ideas of ‘character’, ‘personality’ and the political and social 
structures they formed? Such questions which fall outside the sphere of the 
present study may nonetheless be equally fruitful if met.  
 
Insisting on the realm of reasoning, light should be shed on the ‘Greeks and the 
Rational’, as dictated by the findings of Chapter 5. There, it has been proved 
that the ordinary Athenian, sitting in the popular arena of the courts, judged 
human action and motivation in perfectly rational terms. Litigants and jurors 
alike insisted on proofs based on logical argumentation in which the aims, 
motives and past acts formed the parts of an almost mathematical equation. 
Human action was thus judged in nearly objective terms. The striking fact is that 
this argumentation was offered to a large audience of average, sometimes 
illiterate, citizens. Farmers, merchants, hand-workers over the age of thirty 
interpreted human action (possibly intuitively)  as the use of all available means 
in order to achieve the desired end, which in turn illuminated the particular facts 
of the case. It seems that this audience was particularly experienced in such 
matters and since it formed the core audience of every public institution of 
classical Athens it may safely be concluded that it was one of the highest-
quality popular audiences of recorded history. Therefore further research may 
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be undertaken on similar grounds regarding the factors and the rationale that 
directed decision-making in other popular bodies as well.  
 
Leaving aside the implications of the thesis for the Athenian socio-political life, I 
want to highlight its major implications for its legal system. It has been 
demonstrated that character evidence may be seen as a remnant of the archaic 
age. This provides a link of the classical legal system with its archaic 
counterpart, supporting the view that it should be regarded as a single organism 
that evolved and changed through time. This approach may help us to shed 
light on the poorly recorded archaic system, by discovering its similarities with 
the better recorded classical one. Procedures, institutions and practices of the 
classical system may have already been present in older times, though in an 
embryonic state. Transformations may have concealed the common core of two 
practices. To give but an example, the reward to the judge with the better 
judgment of archaic times (prize) may have given its place to the democratic 
jurors’ pay (a law initiated by Pericles himself). In this symbolic way, every 
Athenian citizen (rather than a single elder judge) was considered capable of 
giving straight judgment and the polis was certain that he would do so. This 
does not mean that no alterations or innovations took place; it simply means 
that research has to take a holistic approach regarding the Athenian legal 
system in order to uncover the causes and rationale behind its major changes.  
 
Focus on the classical legal system reveals even more opportunities for further 
research. Researchers so far have been convinced that argumentation and 
decision-making in the popular courts differed from the stricter approach taken 
by the Areopagus (and the Maritime cases as well). However, the exactness of 
argumentation in the popular courts and the fact that my thesis finds no major 
differentiations between argumentation in the various court settings calls for 
investigation. Relevance may thus be reconsidered, as well as the Athenian 
(and modern) certainty about the expertise of the Areopagus. This does not 
diminish this respected court’s value; it rather appreciates the efficacy and 
worth of the popular courts. Hand in hand with this approach goes the capability 
of Athenian courts to achieve consistency. Although this topic has already been 
treated in the past
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1, this thesis may assist by focusing on the litigants’ patterns of argumentation 
and the jurors’ way of decision-making. It has been demonstrated that both 
followed a consistent, rational and nearly objective approach, and this adds to 
the opinion of those who maintain that the Athenian courts were able to achieve 
consistency. 
 
Finally, attention should be given to the methods of punishment which may 
illuminate their originator’s ideas of character. Although these methods may be 
instigated by other considerations as well, they undoubtedly reveal a great 
amount about the psychological convictions and the priorities of a people. For 
instance, acceptance of the possibility of rehabilitation produces milder, less 
final sentences and indicates a trust in character’s changeable nature. On the 
other hand, severe penalties may highlight the society’s assumption that a 
criminal does not change. In more practical terms, it may express the state’s 
need for deterrence due to its weak proactive mechanisms and its commitment 
on public peace and security rather than on the individual. This is indeed a 
fertile ground for further research.  
 
My thesis has explored a series of issues, touching upon several fields of social 
sciences. It is certainly challenging to follow an interdisciplinary approach. 
Combination of evidence from law and history, sociology and social 
anthropology, politics and psychology is demanding but worthwhile. This is 
definitely not the end of the story; no one (including myself) would have been 
satisfied if it was, so the above examples indicate possible ways for 
advancement. What is more fascinating and valuable after all is for this thesis to 
become a stimulus and a stepping stone for fruitful and honest dealing with the 
Greeks and their underrated system of law. Hopefully, the various influences 
that gathered their forces to produce this result, will offer as many inspirations 
for the advancement of research and for the good of humanity. 
 
 
 
                                            
1
 Lanni (2004); Harris (2007b). 
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